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Abstract 
This thesis critically analyses claims to globality and universalism in the 
contemporary globalization ideologies; neoliberalism, cosmopolitanism, and alter-
globalism. Employing a scale from nationalist, via internationalist, to planetarist, the 
conclusion is that neither of the ideological discourses have become notably engaged 
with a truly global conception of world politics. Instead they largely remain 
committed to internationalism understood as cooperation among nations. This is an 
important finding in light of the many claims to globality made both by participants 
in the diverse discourses and their scholarly critics. But crucially signs of an 
emerging planetarist mode of thinking is registered. 
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Preface 
Please note that this text has been written in American English. Citations have been 
reproduced in either American or British English true to the original source. Single 
quotes are used exclusively for indicating a citation, double quotes for indicating for 
instance nonstandard usage, a neologism, the use of quotation marks within a 
citation, and so forth. 
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Introduction: Towards a Planetarist Conception of 
Politics 
In the past human beings conducted their lives in fairly narrow 
social and political frameworks, in nation states among a favored 
minority and in smaller units for the bulk of humanity. Now, and 
forever in the future, they are crowded together ever more 
densely in the global arena, a community of sorts but deeply 
divided.  
The new era poses an immense challenge: how can the ever 
growing but highly diverse human multitudes learn to work 
peacefully together with due regard for the limited resources of 
their earthly habitat? 
From their narrow perspectives people have to rise to a global 
overview; acting locally and thinking globally have to converge. 
In this inescapable but painfully protracted adjustment our sense 
of the future plays a crucial part. Toward what kind of world are 
we moving? What is in store for us? The future is always part of 
the present. In times of profound change, like ours, it is all the 
more important to shape a constructive and realistic image of the 
future – admittedly a risky venture, but part of every generation’s 
effort to assess its prospects (Laue 1994: 184).   
   This political theoretical inquiry into contemporary globalization ideologies begins 
here with an introduction explaining its research design. An integral part of that 
design is that the explicit normative assumptions of the work as a whole will be 
recognized. Firstly I commence with the ontological parameters of the inquiry, 
which principally serve to elucidate what the central categorical units are taken to be 
in this thesis, in short Earth and humanity – while these also indicate which 
categorical units we should probably view as an impediment to the future progress 
of our planetary civilization, and those are primarily the nation-state and the national 
people. Secondly I briefly present an account of the theoretical framework this 
ontological orientation lends itself to – which will later be fleshed out in greater 
detail in the first chapters – and which forms the backbone of the methodological 
apparatus applied throughout the whole thesis. Then thirdly I articulate the exact 
normative angle of approach taken in this thesis, which focuses its broader 
ontological orientation. Taken together with the more general ontological parameters 
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and the more specifically designed theoretical framework this forms the complete 
ontological-normative perspective utilized to place all the historical and textual 
material handled in the thesis in a greater narrative. Fourthly, after this has been 
established I will describe the methodological nature of the enquiry which is based 
on the assumption that new meaningful knowledge about historical and 
contemporary world politics in general, and political theories and ideological 
discourses in particular, can be inferred through the comprehensive study-, analysis-, 
and critique of relevant texts to the period being dealt with. The more specific 
technical considerations that come into play here are also dealt with in this section. 
All these steps together forms a method which is meant to bring to the surface 
enough critically evaluated information to facilitate an understanding of how the 
conceptual world that drives our political understanding has evolved along important 
ideological-ideational dimensions and in the process reveal dynamic patterns that we 
might reasonably expect to be reproduced in similar ways in the future. Fifthly, and 
finally, I will explain why I have chosen to exclude several contemporary or 
relatively recent globalization ideologies from the selection of ideologies studied in 
greater detail in the thesis and how this is motivated by the ontological-normative 
framework first presented here. 
Since our present political world is not only the product of mere circumstance, but 
also a distilled result of earlier worldviews which with time have been weighed 
against each other, the methodological approach used in this thesis tells us 
something important about the world we live in now and the possibilities for 
changes to it in the future. The end result is a political narrative, but it is a story that 
stops mid-air, like a bridge half-built. It is a long time still before the ending to this 
story comes about, but the aim of this thesis is to make a contribution to raising 
awareness about the fact that we are living roughly in the middle of such a story and 
that the trajectory of this actually ongoing event will be shaped by whether or not we 
find a constructive way of handling our collective role as a species in the custody of 
a global civilization over the coming decades. The specific contribution of this thesis 
is not primarily in the creation of an new piece of theory, but in the creation of a 
theoretically and historically informed analytical framework that allows us to both 
excavate and evaluate the meaning behind conceptual notions used by earlier 
theorists, and explore the potentialities and limitations inherent in the ideologies that 
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currently more or less uncritically employ these or very closely related ideational 
constructs.  
The desired result is to help bring about a more clearly defined conceptual 
vocabulary that hopefully can play a role in an urgently needed recalibration of our 
collective political perspective; because we need to agree on some basics if we want 
to maintain a progressive forward momentum in the politics of humanity; i.e. where 
we are, where we are going, and what is the purpose of acting in common, 
collectively speaking? If we get our bearings right through such a conceptual 
recalibration this should make it an easier choice to finish that bridge suspended in 
mid-air, and to resist the urge to take the easy option and rush back to the safety of 
the land from which we came no matter how depleted and lacking in nourishment 
that is likely to prove to be for the longer term. The latter is an option that appears to 
be increasingly tempting to many of our numbers, particularly pronounced in a time 
like ours where any real ideational forward momentum has stalled. Only through a 
reinvigorated effort by the rest of us will we potentially be able to reach the other 
shore. We cannot waver in our conviction because it is only there that we could 
possibly hope to find a new, lasting and better life for all of humanity. And not just 
momentarily for privileged enclaves thereof, as we presently have managed to do for 
a fair but dwindling part of the Western populace and for a substantially smaller part 
(typically amongst those closer to power) of the Earth’s population living elsewhere.  
The Ontological and Normative Elements of the Method 
  Ontologically speaking we find ourselves on a planet daily spinning a full turn 
around its own axis while it annually circles a star a mere eight light minutes away. 
Together the Sun and the Earth forms part of our solar system which is located in 
one of the vastly more extensive spiral arms of the immense Milky Way galaxy. 
“Our” galaxy is at least one hundred thousand light-years across, and composed of 
hundreds of billions of stars, but this absolutely gargantuan conglomeration of stars 
and planets is just one of an estimated ‘hundred billion galaxies’ which together 
hold about ‘a billion trillion stars’ (Sagan 1981: 318). Carl Sagan was a particularly 
bright light of his generation; the generation born in the inter-war era who was one 
of the very first to realize the profound implications of our newfound existence as 
part of a much larger universe than had earlier been anticipated. Sagan pointed out 
perhaps the central finding of modern science ‘we are not the center and purpose of 
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the Universe, but rather live[ ] on a tiny and fragile world lost in immensity and 
eternity, drifting in a great cosmic ocean’ (Sagan 1981: 318).  
Not that this humbling realization concerning our place in the universe renders 
human existence insignificant: ‘There are worlds that have been charred and ruined 
by cosmic catastrophes. We are fortunate: we are alive, we are powerful; the welfare 
of our species and our civilization is in our hands’ (Sagan 1981: 320). But our 
telescopes and missions into space have not revealed deities or their associates 
watching us from the vantage point of the clouds above as previously believed, 
further underlining how fully any belief system involving the physical existence of 
such creatures from polytheism to monotheism has now become examples of the 
most complete conjecture in scientific terms. Instead it has dawned on a substantial, 
but perhaps yet not sufficient, part of humanity that reality as we know it involves 
much greater wonders than the beastly and angelic visions of yore led our ancestors 
to contemplate: What Sagan alludes to when he states that the welfare of our 
civilization is in our hands is that today the fundamental truth of existence is not that 
there is a god or gods that “wills” things, but that we happen to exist on a specific 
planet where life can thrive which is surrounded by unfathomably vast tracts of what 
the naked eye perceives as empty space (see also: Krivine 2015). Science has vastly 
enlarged our horizon and revealed a world of splendor devoid of interference from 
supernatural creatures: ‘We were created not by a supernatural intelligence but by 
chance and necessity as one species out of millions of species in Earth’s biosphere’ 
which further means that: ‘We are, it seems, completely alone’ but there is no reason 
to despair, because this also allows us to realize that ‘we are completely free’ 
(Wilson 2014: 173). But our freedom to act without threat of divine retribution is for 
now confined to one planet, and our freedom to act on it appears to be rapidly 
becoming constrained by the impact of our actions as well: ‘We have not been 
seeing our Spaceship Earth as an integrally-designed machine which to be 
persistently successful must be comprehended and serviced in total’ as R. 
Buckminster Fuller’s famous metaphor has it (Fuller [1969] 2008/2013: 60). Luckily 
for us ‘designed into this Spaceship Earth’s total wealth was a big safety factor 
which allowed man to be very ignorant for a long time’ (Fuller [1969] 2008/2013: 
61). But we cannot afford to be ignorant and incapable of action at the global level 
much longer, for if we destroy the ability ‘our spherical Spaceship Earth’ has ‘to 
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keep life regenerating on board’ we have nowhere else to relocate to (Fuller [1969] 
2008/2013: 56 and 58).  
There are no other self-sustaining “spaceships” with room for the entire species that 
we know of. Even if a ‘recent extrapolation [ ] predicts that a fifth of stars are 
orbited by Earth-sized planets’ (Wilson 2014: 107) it is an entirely different matter 
to say how many of these planets that would possibly have forms of life thriving on 
their surface capable of sustaining humanity indefinitely. But if we for the sake of 
argument are dealing with ‘an average distance between a habitable planet and its 
closest neighbour in our region of the Galaxy’ of ‘about 24 light-years’ as another 
speculative calculation has it – which coincidentally gives us altogether about ‘600 
million planets in our Galaxy that could be habitable by human beings’ – then some 
people might think that this could offer us a way out of our present predicament 
(Michaud 2007: 60). However the distances involved makes sending even a small 
contingent of humanity to a “nearby” planet in galactic terms a seemingly 
insurmountable obstacle, and though theoretically interstellar travel might be 
possible in the distant future, facilitating any sort of large-scale migration to other 
planets is so far beyond our present technological abilities that any sort of escape 
from the confines of planet Earth is not a scenario that in any way can be seriously 
entertained now (see: Michaud 2007: 130-132). Already in 1959 Julian Huxley 
remarked that just keeping the world population level would involve ‘shipping off to 
Mars or Venus, every twenty-four hours, around 150,000 people’ (as cited in: 
Bashford 2014: 356). Today the daily increase of the world population is greater 
than it was then and we have also established that we must travel much farther, to 
other solar systems, if we are to find habitable planets other than our own.  
Around us, in our own solar system, there is a smattering of neighboring globes 
whose local environments make the endless sands of the Sahara and the icy 
desolation of the Antarctic appear as exquisitely hospitable places for human life in 
comparison. The celestial bodies in our immediate vicinity can teach us much about 
the universe we live in, but they are not possible substitutes for Earth. We live on a 
uniquely hospitable planet for life which only amounts to an infinitely small part of 
a much larger “world” or universe. And we tend to forget how newfound this very 
realization is – especially how recently it is that this knowledge became 
commonplace to hold for the vast majority of the populace even in the most 
modernized parts of our global civilization. For as Sagan argues:  
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While almost everyone is taught that the Earth is a sphere with 
all of us somehow glued to it by gravity, the reality of our 
circumstance did not really begin to sink in until the famous 
frame-filling Apollo photograph of the whole Earth – the one 
taken by the Apollo 17 astronauts on the last journey of humans 
to the Moon (Sagan [1994] 1997: 3). 
The photograph Sagan has in mind here, known as The Blue Marble, was taken in 
1972. That image served to elucidate our singular planetary existence in space for 
the general population, together with other similar photographs – such as the equally 
iconic Earthrise (which views the Earth as it rises above the surface of the Moon 
while the latter was orbited by the Apollo 8 mission in 1968) that has been called 
‘[arguably] the most important single political image ever to be “captured” on film’ 
(Douglas 1997: 170). Sagan’s was a pioneering voice who drew attention to the 
political, planetarist as I would term it, consequence following from this realization: 
‘You spend even a little time contemplating the Earth from orbit and the most 
deeply engrained nationalisms begin to erode. They seem the squabbles of mites on 
a plum’ (Sagan [1994] 1997: 175). This distant ‘overview effect’ (Dickens & 
Ormrod 2007: 134) which aids in the creation of a nascent sense of planetary 
belonging has occurred at a crucial moment in human history as it broadly 
considered happened to coincide with the merging of the last remnants of all 
previous civilizations into one unitary technological human civilization global in 
scope (see: Iriye 2014).  
Our civilization, which subsumes most of its predecessors, is a 
great ship steaming at speed into the future [ ] The vessel we are 
now aboard is not merely the biggest of all time; it is the only 
one left. The future of everything we have accomplished since 
our intelligence evolved will depend on the wisdom of our 
actions over the next few years. Like all creatures, humans have 
made their way in the world so far by trial and error; unlike other 
creatures, we have a presence so colossal that error is a luxury 
we can no longer afford. The world has grown too small to 
forgive us any big mistakes (Wright 2005: 3).  
A new responsibility has been bestowed on humanity – since this realization means 
we have started to cross a threshold of collective self-awareness that puts human 
civilization on the verge of rising to an entirely new plateau of complexity – we are 
no longer simply the most dominant species on the planet, but an organism in need 
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of gaining a heightened measure of conscious self-control at the species level (see 
for instance: Morris 2010: 610-611). This daunting challenge is previously unheard 
of in the animal world from which we originate. Once our civilization became global 
in scope we should have realized that going with the ebb and flow of the available 
energy in our now biospheric system was simply no longer a viable option. Because 
we have basically incorporated everything there is on our planet into a singular 
systemic dimension overstepping its limits would at the same time be risking the 
elimination of the very foundation that all complex lifeforms on the planet, us 
included, rely on for their continued sustenance.  
Our perception of a shrinking planet and the concomitant wider expansion of the 
universe which it is located in has been going on for some time: ‘The vision of a 
singular planet, spaceship Earth, is better understood as a new rendition of a 
planetary imagination that was already many generations old’ (Bashford 2014: 355-
356). Two human induced drivers have greatly contributed to this change in 
worldview over the last couple of centuries. First in ‘the later part of the nineteenth 
century, the compression of space by technology – above all the steamship, the 
railway, and the telegraph – made new forms of political community imaginable 
over the expanses of empire and across the world’ (Armitage 2014: 242, added 
emphasis). This meant that ideationally: ‘The contexts for thinking expanded to 
encompass the entire globe. Modern intellectual historians accordingly have to track 
ideas on even-larger scales: continental, interregional, transoceanic, and ultimately 
planetary’ (Armitage 2014: 242). In short, to maintain a global political community 
suddenly became technologically plausible, and therefore far easier to imagine on a 
planetary scale. This in contrast to earlier when: ‘For what seemed like endless 
centuries the swiftest means of locomotion had been the horse and the high-road, the 
running man, the galley and the uncertain, weather-ruled sailing ship’ (Wells 1940: 
31). H. G. Wells called the technological break with these past constraints ‘the 
abolition of distance’ (Wells 1940: 31). The former immensity of the globe shrunk 
to a potentially manageable size because of this. Since Wells made his observation 
we have added the commercial jetliner, the intercontinental ballistic missile, the 
space-rocket, the satellite, worldwide television coverage, and the internet to the 
expanding list of world interconnecting technologies, just to mention a selection of 
some of the more impactful innovations, that have all played a role in making the 
entire Earth visible to large swathes of humanity. The backside to all these 
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technological innovations is that they have all depended on industrially 
manufactured components to function, and that their creation demands a historically 
unprecedented use of the resources and energy that can be harvested from the Earth. 
The second driver which has led us to increasingly think in planetary terms is the 
identification of the beginnings of ecological breakdown. This is a relatively 
recently acknowledged phenomenon (popularly ecologism started gaining traction in 
the 1970s) which has led to the dawning realization that the technological 
breakthroughs of the last two-hundred odd years and the attendant industrial world 
civilization we have created might have more or less inadvertently led us to destroy 
the fine tuned equilibrium of our planet. The knowledge that humanity is severely 
and negatively impacting the Earth’s natural carrying capacity have made some 
leading scientists suggest that we have in fact started a new ‘geological epoch’ they 
term ‘the Anthropocene’ (Steffen, Crutzen, and McNeill 2007: 614).  
Humanity has in this way for the better or the worse become ‘stewards of the Earth 
system’ and ‘will remain a major geological force for many millennia, maybe 
millions of years to come’ as these same scientists assume, not without a certain 
optimism (Steffen, et al 2007: 618). But this fairly optimistic long-term scenario 
hinges on whether or not we can weather the perfect storm, in ecologically harmful 
terms, that we can presently see brewing up on the horizon if we connect the  rate of 
world population increase we now have with the extreme pressures this will force us 
to exert on the Earth’s ecosystem just to avoid mass starvation (see: Sachs 2015). 
The projected growth in our numbers over the next several decades is in all but the 
most optimistic of scenarios set to raise past 10 billion from the present baseline of 
‘7.2 billion’ in the period between 2040 and 2060 (Sachs 2015: 209). There is 
precious little we can do to stop that, but it is clear that the environmental and social 
consequences of this accumulating trend will become more severe in the foreseeable 
future. 
This raise in population, with an attendant heightened pressure on the yields we have 
to get from agriculture, fisheries, and so forth – will present us with a dynamic and 
potentially volatile environment, also politically speaking. The only humane and 
viable long-term solution is to get the aggregate birth rate down, and thus lower our 
collective numbers to a level more in tune with the carrying capacity of the Earth. 
But with the current trends in mind, and due to the intrinsically long-term nature of 
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the problem, that is going to be a project for later generations to undertake. Our 
challenge in the present is to halt the rising tendency and make sure that the living 
are fed and otherwise taken care of in a manner that neither leads to environmental 
nor societal breakdown. Both these kinds of breakdown should be seen as 
interlinked phenomena, where whichever happens first is likely to lead to the other, 
and this is something which serves to amplify the severity of the situation. A much 
cited example of this interlinkage did historically unfold on Easter Island, where 
environmental collapse was followed by societal collapse (see: Christian 2004: 472-
474, and Diamond 2005: 79-119).  
To recap, ontologically the main categories we have oriented ourselves by here are 
first taken from an astronomical perspective which allows us to infer the following 
outside viewpoint; focusing in from the universe, then to the Milky Way, so to the 
solar system, and finally to our planet Earth, from which there is no escape due to 
the barren nature of nearby planets and the absolutely massive leaps in technological 
innovation required before interstellar exploration could become a reality in some 
distant future. The Earth itself has a biosphere which we happen to both belong to 
and simultaneously threaten the wellbeing of. This is because technological 
advances over the last 200 years or so made it possible to develop a world 
encompassing industrial civilization, which while expending vastly more resources 
than any civilization before it also has led to an unprecedentedly rapid growth in 
world population, which further requires the use of exceedingly more resources to 
satisfy its needs and desires. This feedback loop has now led human civilization to a 
critical point in its development, where it either manages to constrain itself through 
prudence and self-control or it will at some point not too far off be existentially 
constrained by natural means such as the loss of lands suitable for agriculture 
through global warming or similar negative effects which we have provoked through 
our excesses.  
The normative implications of this ontological take on our present reality are as 
follows: Even if the Earth is still a vast and bountiful planet in many respects, our 
use of its resources must be managed, controlled, and coordinated on a global level 
with previously unprecedented precision if we are to ensure that it will remain in 
that state for generations to come. Our collective security now hinges on finding a 
way to do this politically in a way that is not only sustainable for the biosphere we 
rely on, but that is also politically sustainable in terms of a prospective system’s 
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continuous ability to generate and secure the compliance of the vast majority of 
human beings it aims to exercise a measure of control over. The latter point is a 
necessity simply to save any prospective system from getting overturned by popular 
demand. Achieving a kind of near universal consent to start acting politically on 
behalf of the wellbeing of humanity and, by extension, also that of the biosphere is a 
must for amassing the authority required for a global political system to function 
with sufficient effectiveness at the level of planetary civilization. Basically this 
means that the prevailing nationalist mentality in world politics will have to be 
replaced by a planetarist one before there can be any chance of creating an effective 
global political entity capable of reigning in the excesses of our 21
st
 Century 
civilization. Because this is ultimately what it means politically to exercise control 
over human civilization – we have to develop a planetary polity with sovereign 
characteristics that with authority can act legitimately in the interest of- and on 
behalf of humanity. But a planetary polity can only become a realistic prospect when 
the world populace has gotten accustomed to thinking in planetarist terms, rather 
than in terms of national or religious affiliation. That both nationalism and religion 
should be thought of as obstacles standing in the way for the political progress of 
human civilization is a conclusion both Sagan and other highly reflective observers 
reach on the basis of the present level of scientific knowledge. Our understanding of 
what exists beyond the confines of the Earth undermines all belief in a deity or 
deities that is preoccupied with human affairs, and the many ways human 
civilization is now discovered to be a complex interdependent network renders all 
kinds of nationalism into anachronisms which only serve to perpetuate a type of 
political organization that is both inherently inadequate for dealing with the most 
pressing problems of our times and an obstacle to start dealing with these in an 
effective manner. 
Normatively speaking the ontological categories of an imperiled biosphere on Earth 
and a human civilization in distress brings on the need for a type of intensified 
global political integration that only seems feasible as a long-lasting construct if it is 
done democratically, i.e. through seeking the consent or the approval of the 
governed on a worldwide basis, and not by appealing to the national people as 
confined in a particular nation-state. That this human civilizational consent might at 
some point be forthcoming is made more likely by the spread of a global awareness 
- 11 - 
facilitated by for instance images of the whole Earth or the threat of global warming 
which is caused by the aggregated pollution created by human civilization. 
Suggestions have been made to solve this present challenge by creating a ‘new 
democratic governance beyond the state’ that nonetheless is based on the present 
nation-state framework and the perfection of the type of international institution we 
already have experimented with for quite a while (Biermann 2014: 213, see also; 
139 and 212). But this plan – like so many before it that are further addressed in the 
chapter on cosmopolitanism – puts an almost completely unwarranted faith in the 
competence of our current international institutions to solve global problems through 
international cooperation (for some highly informed criticisms of the way the United 
Nations operates see: Ross 2011: 136-149, Weiss 2013, and; Hale, Held and Young 
2013).  
We might very well instead need a state-like capacity at the global level for the task 
of solving the growing number of global problems, meaning an institution that 
replaces current “complex sovereignty” with actual world government (see: Grande 
& Pauly 2007, and Hurrell 2007: 95-117). If this is the solution, as for example 
Torbjörn Tännsjö has quite recently argued the case for (Tännsjö 2008), then ‘a 
central conflict of our times’ needs to be resolved first, namely ‘that between 
nationalism and internationalism, between the concept of many national 
sovereignties and one world sovereignty’ as Julian Huxley once understood this 
(Huxley [1946] 1991: 41). To fit contemporary parlance we have to employ another 
term than “internationalism” to convey the “one world sovereignty” Huxley thinks 
of here, and that is where planetarism comes in.          
To create this level of one world sovereignty politically requires one or several 
political ideologies that can motivate enough people to act in concert and thereby 
turn it into reality, since ideologies in the most basic sense are collective cognitive 
schemata enabling group action (see: Billig 1991: 9-14). Without such shared 
schemata there is simply no way a group can be guided in the right direction, and 
therefore an articulated schema necessarily has to precede any form of meaningful 
group action. Individuals on their own might very well rely on a loose hunch or an 
instinctual feeling of some sort for their sense of direction, but the articulation of a 
common goal is key to group action. The realization of any such goal depends on it 
being sufficiently clearly communicated amongst a mass of individuals so that they 
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are able to consciously work towards reaching it together. World political plans or 
projects are articulated in the packages of concepts we refer to when we talk about 
political ideologies (Freeden 1996).  
Political ideologies of a post-national, truly global, nature must necessarily predate 
the creation of a world polity no longer based on notions of the nation-state and the 
nationally defined people. So do these ideologies currently exist? People tend to 
think the current crop of globalization ideologies fits the bill, amongst these for 
example; neoliberalism or globalism, cosmopolitanism, and alter-globalism (see: 
Huntington 2004, Saul [2005] 2009, and Steger 2009a). This should not be thought 
of as very surprising, since it is only natural to assume that the names with universal 
connotations here being used should correctly describe the underlying ideological 
tendencies. It is however not a notion that will be substantiated in this thesis. Quite 
to the contrary these ideologies all appear to be chiefly conceptually grounded in the 
nation-state, and to be more aligned with a global political system of an 
internationalist rather than a planetarist character. 
I make this discovery by way of addressing the research question in this thesis, 
which is: “Is there a planetarist ideology among the contemporary globalization 
ideologies?” To understand what this question entails requires some explanation.  
First “contemporary globalization ideologies” describes the range of ideologies that 
we presently can choose from to guide our global interactions. They tell us what it is 
we should focus on, such as trade, peace, or the preservation of nature, and which 
political arrangement their adherents see as the best for facilitating the pursuit of any 
such specific goal globally. They are in one sense “foreign policy ideologies” 
because they essentially deal with how we should interact across the world, not just 
domestically. But they are not the exclusive prerogative of diplomats, statesmen, and 
businessmen. Presently there is a global public that wants a say in these matters also, 
and rightly so because at many levels the world is in the process of becoming one 
interlinked community. This brings us to the salient component of this research 
question and that is the “planetarist” concept. This I have developed largely on my 
own as an ideal post-national political position that provides us with a scale to 
measure the distance an existing ideology has covered on an assumed trajectory 
moving away from an equally ideal-type autarkic nationalist position and towards 
the opposite interdependent universalist end of the scale. “Planetarist” is then meant 
to convey the diametrical opposite of a nationalist position.  
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What makes the planetarist concept useful is that it replaces the currently existing 
fuzzy concepts which can be used to signify a similar position, but which usually 
serves to obscure a position closer to the nationalist ideal type. “Globalism” (with its 
attendant “globalist” advocates) is one such example. To the uninitiated there is no 
way of telling the difference between a “globalist” and a “planetarist” political 
viewpoint, as the terms themselves are synonymous, but my argument is that these 
two terms should be understood as describing two very different concepts.  On first 
sight “globalism” shares the same immediate universal connotation as 
“planetarism”, but a key finding in this thesis is that  “globalism” in essence is little 
more than a rebranding of the earlier concept of “internationalism”, when the latter 
means ‘an interest in international cooperation’ (Goldmann, Hannerz and Westin 
2000: 4). The same can be said about “cosmopolitanism”, a concept which in reality 
seems to cloak an internationalist position with universalist language. What this 
conceptual reconfiguration reveals is a scale where “internationalism” (as 
understood above) would fit square in the middle, together with nominally more 
universalist political conceptions such as globalism and cosmopolitanism, while 
there still is considerable distance left to travel before these rhetorically universalist 
ideological discourses become actually universalist or “planetarist” in the truly 
global sense meant here. Planetarism is a term meant to describe what potentially 
could be an ideology of world integration that takes on the features of an imaginary 
(the distinction is explored in Chapter 1).  
The two drivers mentioned above – the technological developments and its 
deleterious environmental side-effects – both point beyond the present international 
framework towards the creation of a global political entity or world state that can 
manage a transition to a world economy based on principles that does not work 
against the long term prospects of humanity. Technological developments have 
made a globally inclusive polity a feasible prospect, while the environmental 
degradation these have inadvertently led to hints that a globally sovereign entity 
might be a necessity for our long-term survival. In other words, we are dealing with 
a self-reinforcing dynamic, where advances in the technological domain of human 
activity brings forth a demand for adjusting the now outmoded political techniques 
currently being employed to cope with the ruinous side-effects of these 
developments. We do however have to be extremely cautious when we enter this 
terrain – where the demand for change takes on a heightened acuteness – because 
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social and individual considerations must be taken into account to ensure that we do 
not inadvertently and severely impact the conditions for living a full life on the 
individual plane in order to save the long-term outlook for the species. This 
promises to be a delicate balancing act, and it is currently a problem that people tend 
to get the balance wrong at quite an early theoretical stage. 
John Dryzek has pointed out the tendency among some scientists concerned with 
climate change to suggest that authoritarian measures will be needed to ensure 
species survival (Dryzek 2013: 38-39). This is exactly the juncture in the debate 
about the shape of a future world order where social and political theorists have the 
greatest responsibility to interfere. It is our task as I see it to remind the type of over-
eager natural scientist which Dryzek has identified in his work about the 
counterproductive propensities that are inevitably inherent when a ruling faction 
takes “authoritarian measures”. All polities, even authoritarian ones, rely on a 
certain level of acquiescence between rulers and ruled, where the expressed 
intentions of the ruling class has to some extent to conform to the will of those being 
ruled, at the very least at the rhetorical level where ideology operates most readily as 
a binding force between the government and the governed (see: Geertz 1964: 47-
76). A complete disconnect between the intentions of the rulers and the wishes of 
the ruled is a surefire sign of societal breakdown. In an authoritarian state an  
understanding of a society’s evolving political culture on the part of the political 
elite is needed to avoid such a moment of disconnect from occurring, while in a 
democracy a new government more closely responding to societal needs will most 
likely get elected into power long before a split of this magnitude happens. Richard 
Wilson’s definition of political culture here sheds light on the phenomenon: 
Political culture is a set of values that stabilize institutional forms 
and hierarchical social relationships in terms of ethical 
constructs; over time these values reflect developmental changes 
in individual psychology and in social norms of legitimation; 
they evolve as a consequence of the interaction between them 
(Wilson 1992: 6). 
The more authoritarian measures are being taken without any form of consultation 
with the populace itself the wider the gap between the values of the governing 
stratum and the governed stratum in a polity will become, since they cease their 
political-cultural evolution in tandem because of the lack of any interaction between 
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the two strata (formal in democracies, informal in authoritarian systems). 
Authoritarian measures taken without proper consultation or legal avenues for 
feedback will result in the build-up of relational tension which further exacerbates 
the split between the public and its masters as both sides start fearing the others 
intentions. As this tendency progresses the ethical constructs guiding one stratum 
will become steadily differentiated from the ethical constructs guiding the other. A 
rupture between the two will become more and more likely as the formerly shared 
political culture diverges into what then becomes two clashing ethical constructs, or 
competing political cultures. Having two political cultures instead of one leads to the 
destabilization of institutional forms and hierarchical social relationships rather than 
to their stabilization, and this state of affairs can only be put back in order by the less 
popular political culture yielding its place to the new culture being championed by 
the masses. The normative element of my approach to the material handled in this 
thesis is as a consequence of this way of understanding government-public relations 
heavily reliant on the notion that democracy – where the consent of the governed is 
key – ought to be preferred over other competing forms of government such as 
authoritarianism, theocracy, or a pure technocracy.  
There is a limit to how much good a democratic framework can do all on its own. 
What makes it potentially a conduit for progressive politics is the fact that a 
democratic polity allows for the creation of novel political parties and/or ideologies 
that in time can rise peacefully to shift the course of the polity in a more favorable 
direction. Let us for the sake of argument say that a hypothetical twenty percent of 
the adult population in North America and Europe would fall into a category of 
people with a planetarist rather than a nationalist political inclination. We would 
then potentially be dealing with a support base of a few hundred million people for a 
future planetarist party to draw upon. Economies of scale tell us that this kind of 
venture could quickly become a politically influential organization at the global 
level, provided that it could actually harness the support of a substantial substratum 
of the electorate. Assuming that a party needs to follow an ideology to maintain a 
minimum of political cohesion for it to function properly, then a future development 
of this kind could only follow in the wake of the creation of a universal political 
ideology with a relatively wide popular appeal.  
For a development as described above to be desirable and something we should 
welcome the prospects of, I argue that ideally a planetarist ideology would have to 
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be; not only; 1) universal, i.e. planetarist, and 2) emancipatory, i.e. democratic, but 
also, 3) enlightening. What this last criterion entails will be explained in detail in the 
first chapter, but it basically means that an ideology ideally should neither be 
deceptive nor misrepresent reality. If an ideology is deceptive one risks electing 
parties to power that do not represent what they publicly claim to represent and the 
whole representative function of modern day democracy is diminished as a result. 
The consent given to the government by the electorate is then simply given on false 
premises. If this should happen repeatedly democracy as an institution risks being 
undermined as a system of rule.  
We have now reached a point where we are dealing with a set of normative 
assumptions; universalism should be preferred over particularism, democracy over 
competing forms of rule, and enlightening ideologies (which at a minimum would 
have to be both universalist and democratically inclined) are seen as better than 
deceptive ideologies. I think there is a rational argument for claiming that all these 
properties are superior to the alternatives, and this is founded in an ontology which 
sees both humanity and the Earth as being the two pillars of our present social 
scientific understanding of what constitutes “reality”. This differs markedly from the 
average ontological understanding which for example is still prevalent in 
International Relations where “states” are perceived as making up the core entity in 
world politics (see: Behr 2010). This view is mirrored in contemporary political 
theory where “the people” – where a particular people, more often than not, 
constitute a specific state – are generally still seen as the ontological base unit of the 
political world. This has the result, in Jürgen Habermas’s words, that we do not get 
‘a law-governed, politically constituted world society, but [ ] an international order 
of formally independent liberal states’ (Habermas 2006: 183). This hegemonic form 
of liberalism has had many influential spokesmen and women in political theory 
over the last several decades (e.g. Rawls 2001). In contradiction to this theoretically 
prevalent view I see the true territory of humanity as being commensurate with the 
spherical globe we since before the dawn of history have found ourselves attached 
to. All other territorial identities stem from a combination of geographical 
happenstance, the accidental outcomes of historical species infighting, and more or 
less random migrations. This view can also be taken to be “liberal” (see: Vincent 
2007: 172), which highlights how conceptually imprecise that distinction has 
become these days. If we instead conceive of nationalist and planetarist liberals, then 
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we might approach a meaningful distinction again. Though I think that only world 
integration under some form of world control can in theory ensure equitable 
resource distribution within the boundaries of sustainability, which comes close to 
sounding like the articulation of a planetarist socialist stance, I would hasten to add 
that a crucial dimension is that this has to be consented to by the governed, i.e. 
humanity, if it is going to work in practice. That latter point is what essentially 
makes my stance swing back towards liberalism, but clearly in an old fashioned 
sense of the word which emphasizes the ‘condemnation of despotic political power 
and the demand for self-government of civil society in the name of liberty and the 
rule of law’ (Losurdo 2011: 48). But who should be included in “civil society” 
would in this regard mean “the world populace” and not the community of free men, 
or the national people as it gradually came to denote for liberals in the 19
th
 Century. 
This means that the explicit normative assumption driving this inquiry is neither 
socialist nor liberal, but that a partial furthering of both these traditions in their 
important democratic, solidaristic and individualistic aspects could still be desirable. 
Mainly then the ontological-normative angle of approach utilized in this thesis is 
therefore democratic and pluralist – albeit what differentiates it from most other 
accounts is that this mode of political organization ideally should be applied in a 
truly global and potentially post-national context. It recognizes that even though all 
current forms of liberalism and socialism appear to be outdated in respect to the 
latter concern, these two broad ideological traditions could conceivably be 
reinvigorated through not only incorporating the many lessons of the identity 
politics revolution of the late 1960s and early 1970s inclusive of the ecologist 
tradition, but also through adopting a planetarist political stance and decisively 
abandoning the nationalist inclinations which have been a core conceptual element 
of these ideologies for the greater part of their existence. 
We should not succumb to the temptation to think of humanity as inherently “evil” 
by nature (or “good” for that matter) and treat it as a bland mass of equally disposed 
individuals. Regardless of where we are born we are not by any means predisposed 
to entertain exactly the same political standpoints as everyone else in the population 
we happen to be embedded in. There are people with extreme propensities for 
altruism and people with extreme propensities for egotism. But in general we should 
probably assume that any sufficiently large sample of people will be dispersed in the 
manner of a bell-curve path, so that the overwhelming majority of individuals will 
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be  found to belong somewhere in the middle-range between these two extremes. 
Here a propensity for solidarity with strangers might be found on the left side of the 
curve and a propensity for advocating a tax-free existence could be found on its right 
hand side, but the highest number of people would be found clustered around a more 
ambiguous middle position. It is an assumption here that this is a worldwide pattern 
that can be found in any developed or developing country, and though there is bound 
to be some cultural and experiential differences that alters people’s position along 
the scale somewhat, these will not be so consistent that we will find any society 
composed of only one or the other type of personality trait. We are in essence 
dealing with a transnational trait where all human beings are mentally predisposed 
(though one’s mental predisposition certainly can be altered in different directions 
by one’s experiences as a child) to fit at different points along this altruist-egotist 
scale. I do think that we can say, broadly speaking, that since the immediate postwar 
years and up to today we have experienced a shift from a world civilization 
dominated by those inclined towards solidarity to a world civilization dominated by 
those inclined towards egotistical thinking. This shift has perhaps counter-intuitively 
not necessarily been a bad thing, but the pendulum might now have reached its 
farthest point towards the egotistical side, which means that it should be in the 
process of swinging the other way again.  
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union are historic examples of political cultures rife 
with solidaristic rhetoric, even though the solidarity on display predominantly 
happened to be rhetorically directed inward to the domestic community defined by 
its ethnicity or class and not outward to the rest of the world. A propensity towards 
solidarity can be abused and misdirected so that it only counts for people belonging 
to a certain preconceived category, for instance religiously, racially, nationally or 
economically defined. In those cases a society can improve and possibly become 
more open and tolerant if people suddenly start minding their own business instead 
of trying to keep everyone else in line with the collective mindset. But in the long 
run it should logically be easier to build a well functioning political culture through 
an appeal to solidarity rather than to egotism, since the former ought to be much 
more conducive to the creation of societal coherence than the latter individualist one 
which ultimately points the other way towards complete societal fragmentation. In 
the end it is really a false dichotomy to set up collectivist solidarity against 
individualistic freedom, for any polity wanting to function properly, i.e. better than 
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the arguably too individualistic present as well as the too collectivist past, needs to 
find a working balance somewhere between these two points on a much larger 
continuum. 
This brings us to the present ideological conundrum, where an egotistically inclined 
neoliberalism, which has become dominant practically on a worldwide basis since 
the end of the Cold War, is only indecisively being countered by an appeal to former 
modes of national solidarity.1 Assuming that neoliberalism is too much dependent 
on appeals to individual egotism to be beneficial in the long run and that a 
regression to a “national socialism” of the past resembling either its left (e.g. social 
democratic or Stalinist) or right (e.g. conservative or fascist) manifestations will not 
help us properly deal with our novel range of global problems, but instead is liable 
to exaggerate these. Then we are presently left without recourse to a positive 
ideological path that humanity can follow out of this political wilderness. In theory 
there is a path available, as I see it different articulations of a planetarist worldview 
might be what we should be looking for. But any such ideology is a long while from 
being practically implemented since this way of thinking has not evolved into a 
political ideology proper at the present stage, i.e. an ideology a substantial number 
of people seek to promote politically.  
Planetarism should be understood as a political vision of a prospective world order 
that goes far beyond the notion of intergovernmental cooperation, or 
internationalism in the internationalist sense which often these days is presented as 
being “globalist” or “cosmopolitan”. The lack of a clearly defined qualitative 
difference between these three terms; “internationalist”, “globalist”, and 
“cosmopolitan”, is what necessitates the invention of the new “planetarist” concept, 
which even though it sounds similar, conceptually points beyond what is currently 
meant when the other terms are used. Only this neologism makes it possible to 
communicate the idea of a truly global polity in an unambiguous manner in the 
present conceptual climate. 
                                                 
1 From the left with e.g. Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, Jeremy Corbyn in the United Kingdom, 
and Bernie Sanders in the United States, and from the right with e.g. Golden Dawn in Greece, 
Front National in France, UKIP in the United Kingdom, and the Tea Party or presidential 
candidates such as Donald Trump in the United States. 
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The planetarist concept lends itself to the notion of an ideology of “planetarism” that 
in theory could have the potential to be for global civilization what nationalism at an 
earlier time was for the nation (-state). “Globalism” when it predominantly means 
internationalism as international cooperation only signifies a half-way point between 
nationalism and planetarism thus conceived. This matters greatly for the world order 
perspective that comes with ideologies placed at different points along this scale. 
And, as I will go on to argue here, only the planetarist extreme appears to offer a 
genuinely progressive way out of the present interregnum (which Theodore von 
Laue aptly describes in the quotation at the start of this introduction). But moving 
beyond internationalism requires a revolution in the consciousness of substantial 
parts of the world populace. The findings of this thesis is a testament to the fact that 
this requisite planetarist ethos has been under development for quite some time, 
especially in the intellectual realm. But equally also to the fact that in its present 
form this planetarist perspective has yet to be transferred wholeheartedly into any of 
the leading contemporary globalization ideologies of neoliberalism, 
cosmopolitanism, and alter-globalism. In short, the signs of the emergence of a 
planetarist ideological perspective exist, but it can by no means be said to have 
emerged fully as a clearly articulated ideological force at this moment in time.  
During the course of this thesis I will show that a planetarist perspective was quite 
early on both entertained and dismissed within the neoliberal discourse. And that 
presently there is good reason to think that a planetarist perspective is being actively 
opposed by the contemporary neoliberals. Within the cosmopolitan discourse there 
is a slightly more ambiguous relationship to a planetarist perspective on world order 
– where a minority strain of the discourse has promoted it at various periods from 
the Enlightenment down to the present day – but overwhelmingly cosmopolitanism 
remains an internationalist endeavor. Finally, alter-globalism as a discourse 
entertains many planetarist notions, but instead of prescribing planetarist solutions, 
the tendency – when the issue of world order is given any thought at all – is to 
advocate a form of internationalism that comes close to being a socialistic equivalent 
of the liberal international world order the predominant strain of cosmopolitanism 
aims to promote.  
It should here be acknowledged that Jan Otto Andersson has used both the terms 
‘planetarism’ and ‘planetarist’ in a similar, albeit not identical, fashion to the way I 
use them here (Andersson 2008). Andersson also refers to Ele Alenius, whose work 
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Planetarismi maailmankehityksen rationaalisena perustana was published in 
Finnish in 2005, the title of which translates2 to “Planetarism a Rational Basis for 
the Development of the World” (see: Andersson 2008: 87 and 89). According to 
Andersson ‘Alenius is looking for a new civilization that would encompass the 
whole humanity and that would organize society in accordance with solidaristic and 
ecological principles’ (Andersson 2008: 87).3  
Andersson himself employs the concept to describe a ‘red-green planetarism’ 
apparently much in the same vein which would prioritize ‘global justice’ (red) and 
‘ecological sustainability’ (green) over ‘mass consumption prosperity’ in a ‘global 
ethical trilemma’ of choices, where whichever two you pick will work to the 
detriment of the third (Andersson 2008: 85-89). He contrasts this ‘planetarist’ 
position with the two other ‘progressive alternatives’ that now exist, namely; ‘eco-
efficient capitalism’ (which ignores global justice) and ‘global social democracy’ 
(which ignores ecological sustainability) and asserts that only a red-green 
planetarism ‘satisfies the conditions for a new “third” Left’ (Andersson 2008: 85-
89). The reason red-green planetarism is considered the most progressive by 
Andersson is that he considers it ‘the most honest alternative since it [ ] openly asks 
for solutions that require deep changes in “Western” values and lifestyles’ 
(Andersson 2008: 89). Chief among these prospective and necessary deep changes 
would be to abandon today’s consumerism, preferably in favor of a focus on ‘quality 
of life’ that is measured in ‘fulfillment, not wealth’ (Andersson 2008: 88).  
Andersson’s ideas are noteworthy, but the world political dimension which I focus 
on here remains undertheorized in this brief expose of his. The question whether any 
of these different ideological configurations would entail the construction of another 
kind of world order altogether is not posed. I find it hard to believe that any form of 
ecological ideology would be able to make a sufficient impact on the 
environmentally destructive behavior of humanity if it was paired with an adherence 
to nationalism. To counter the present ecological challenge with global coordination 
– provided this is done in a respectful, democratically authorized, manner – should 
                                                 
2 Using Google Translate. 
3 It would be interesting to someday find out exactly how close my conception of planetarism comes 
to Alenius’s but it has been beyond the timeframe and the financial constrains of this thesis to 
either learn Finnish or get Alenius’ book translated.  
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in theory be a much more effective approach. What I am going to do to address this 
deficiency is to employ the concept of planetarism in an ideologically less specific 
manner, where it comes closer to being an imaginary in the specific way theorized 
by Manfred B. Steger (see: Steger 2008, and Patomäki & Steger 2010). What this 
entails exactly will be explained in the first chapter. But one reason to get some 
distance between Andersson’s and my own conception of planetarism is that, as far 
as I can tell from his notion of “red-green planetarism” flanked by “global social 
democracy” and “eco-efficient capitalism”, this comes very close to resembling the 
ideology of ‘ecosocialism’ being contrasted with social-democratic and green-liberal 
ideologies (see: Kelly & Malone 2006, Foster, Clark and York 2010, Wall 2010, and 
Boggs 2012: 131-142). Ecosocialism is already an ideology with a name and it 
would not be much of a theoretical contribution on my part to aid Andersson in 
rechristening it “planetarism”.  
This is not to say that I see the core insight of ecosocialism – which is that 
continuing with industrial capitalism and its attendant consumption patterns appear 
to be fundamentally incompatible with the goal of successfully making human 
civilization ecologically sustainable – as a prima facie faulty assumption. But if the 
mission seriously is to change the basic workings of capitalism on a global scale I 
would suggest getting a broader coalition behind the effort than what the 
ecosocialists currently conceivably could muster on their own. Crucially as a step to 
accomplishing any such feat one needs to create a global political architecture that 
has the capacity to regulate and tax legitimately and effectively on a worldwide 
basis, and that is where planetarism comes in as a necessary ideological prerequisite 
before for example ecosocialist policies could realistically be carried out at the 
appropriate scale. There is of course no preordained guarantee that ecosocialist 
policies would be the result of the creation of a democratically elected global 
political authority. If a completely unconstrained global one person-one vote 
election was carried out this instant the chance that an ecosocialist party would carry 
the day would have been rather miniscule. But given a proper political foundation 
and a world constitution where the advice of a strongly shared scientific consensus 
would have to be followed on such an important matter, we could quickly see the 
downgrading of the importance of capitalist imperatives on the one hand, and a 
prioritization of the long term interests of humanity and its worldly habitat on the 
other. This would be consistent with the ecosocialist insight, if not necessarily with 
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the ecosocialist ideology per se. There might be room for quite a wide span of 
ideological differences even in a political system tuned to ensure long term survival. 
I would suggest that the polity has to be reshaped to fit the globe first, before 
policies that can alter the direction human civilization is headed can be expected to 
work effectively in practice. Therefore for instance green liberal and ecosocialist 
ideologies can be seen as symptomatic of a heightened global awareness of the 
planetary bounds of our existence, an awareness which at some point could lead to 
the formation of new ideological projects for uniting the world politically. Is it 
possible to identify any such project now in existence? That is the task I have set 
myself to find out in this thesis, and the answer I arrive at after looking into the 
contenders is essentially “no”. But at the same time there are numerous signs that 
indicate an ongoing ideational movement in the direction of planetarism and away 
from, not only nationalism, but also internationalism, which shows the usefulness of 
the concept. From a globally conscious viewpoint this could be cause for some 
optimism, though it is evident that a full-fledged planetarist ideology has yet to 
materialize.  
The Methodological Assumptions and Specific Techniques Utilized 
  The methodological assumption followed here is that new meaningful knowledge 
about historical and contemporary world politics in general, and political theories 
and ideological discourses in particular, can be inferred through the comprehensive 
study-, analysis-, and critique of relevant texts to the period being dealt with. In this 
case this is handled as a completely qualitative endeavor. Later historical texts give 
us a unique overview not available to contemporaries, while a closer study of 
especially pertinent contemporary texts reveals crucial details about the way highly 
informed people of the era perceived the world politically. The technical part of the 
method employed here relies heavily on the analysis of texts written by political 
theorists or by scholars and authors from other disciplines (such as for instance 
economics) that have participated in debates of a political philosophical nature.  
Ideally an undertaking such as this present thesis represents would have been able to 
go down to the same level of detail as the consummate intellectual historian does in 
his or hers work concerning individual theorists (for example: Porter 2011, 
Bevilacqua 2012, and Spieker 2014). That however, when dealing with the works of 
so many theorists as is done here, who in addition are spread over a series of more or 
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less distinct discourses, over the span of altogether several centuries, would have 
meant extending the timeframe for this project with considerable time if the same 
ideological breadth and diversity of individual viewpoints were to be covered in this 
manner.  
Instead of devoting myself to what in earnest would have been an impossible task I 
have based several sections of the following work on trusting those academics that 
have already undertaken a meticulous study of for example the work of Anacharsis 
Cloots, or published texts presenting the essential arguments made in some of the 
more obscure works by Walter Lippmann or Friedrich Hayek (i.e. respectively; 
Bevilacqua 2012, Porter 2011, and Spieker 2014). Not that I uncritically accept 
everything the authors I rely on when using such secondary sources claim, but I do 
trust that their citations and their summaries of the material referred to are correct in 
their essentials. I do not think this is too much to ask from peer reviewed and edited 
texts either published in respectable academic journals or by well known university 
presses or the chief academic publishing houses. Even so, as a rule, I have always 
aimed to seek out the original source (or its equivalent English translation) and 
utilized this as far as that was practically possible.  
In a world where we are exceedingly swamped by an overload of information I think 
this approach – where one essentially utilizes the hard work already done by other 
academics instead of replicating their effort in the hope of adding a level of nuance 
that perhaps would have been unnecessary for getting the overview over the broader 
picture sought here – makes sense. This should especially hold true when trying to 
cover lots of texts written by theorists participating in extensive discourses over long 
periods of time such as is being attempted here. This occasional reliance on 
secondary sources is debatably a weakness of this approach, but it has in any case 
been a necessary economizing step to make the work a feasible prospect given the 
resources at hand. I would nonetheless ultimately argue that this admittedly less-
than-perfect approach is justified by the unique overview one gets over the larger 
whole that one in the end has pieced together by way of amassing an amount of 
information that would not have been individually obtainable through the ideal 
method of solely relying on original sources.  
The basic method of textual analysis or interpretation described above undergirds an 
application of the method of discourse analysis (see: Gill 2000). I am not just 
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critically analyzing or commenting on singular texts, but I identify them as parts of 
broader debates or discourses which can be clustered together into different 
ideological constellations. Though “discourse” is often used to describe more 
complex phenomena (see: Dijk 1998: 191-199, and; Laclau 2005: 13), my 
interpretation of what constitutes a discourse is simplified to mean the texts 
produced by significant sympathetic intellectual contributors to the debate 
surrounding a specific ideology. For the purposes of this work the temporary 
manifestation of an ideology at a moment in time is seen as a reflection of the 
contemporaneously dominant tendency within a longer lasting and ideologically 
wider spanning political discourse. This work of interpretation or looking for 
meaning in texts is facilitated by engaging the text at hand with the ontological-
normative theoretical framework explained earlier firmly in mind (see: Sayer 2010: 
35-36).  
I subject the discourses at hand to what I would term “conceptual excavation”, and it 
is primarily the relationship the different participants singled out as representative of 
these discourses have to the concepts of the nation, internationalism, and potentially 
planetarist conceptions of a post-national and post-international world politics, I 
have wanted to unearth by the application of this method. It is important in this 
regard to note that one ‘concept may be designated by more than one word or term’ 
and that it is possible that ‘an individual or group may possess a concept without 
having a word by which to express it’ (Richter 1995: 9). The latter is clearly the case 
when Huxley as previously mentioned uses the term “internationalism” to denote 
“one world sovereignty”. This approach has meant that I have had to sift through 
large amounts of material that often did not address what I was looking for in search 
for salient passages which reveals the conceptual thinking that can tell us more or 
less precisely where important individuals in these discourses can be located on the 
nationalist-planetarist continuum, even though that terminology is never explicitly 
applied by any of the authors in question. By extension the span these entire 
discourses covers (or covered at one point) is revealed as the number of observations 
pertinent to each discourse accumulates.  
What I present here is a highly qualitative approach because it is not enough that 
someone employs the terms “internationalism” or “globalism” for instance to find 
their position in the debate, but one has to diligently check what exactly these terms 
means for the author that employs them on a deeper conceptual level – e.g. whether 
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“internationalism” is perceived as an extension of nationalism into the 
intergovernmental realm or is a term meant to convey the complete opposite of 
nationalism. Registering the number of instances a term crops up in a text or 
discourse in a quantitative manner is not part of the method employed here at all. A 
quantitative approach to the material could of course have been complementary and 
yielded interesting results, but it is a conscious methodological choice not to add that 
type of analysis to the already quite extensive and labor intensive qualitative 
analysis employed here. 
Ideologies should be understood as ‘multi-conceptual constructs’ that evolve within 
the confines of broader ideational discourses (Freeden 1996: 88). Michael Freeden 
addresses this evolutionary attribute of ideologies in general by pointing out their 
tendency towards conceptual ‘morphology’ where the position of individual 
concepts that in combination make up an ideology tend to be given more or less 
weight as the groups utilizing the ideology alters its conceptual composition to fit 
changing circumstances (Freeden 1996: 75-91). In light of Freeden’s observation 
that ‘ideologies are configurations of decontested meanings of political concepts’ I 
search for instances of concrete ideology formation (or reformation) before 
decontestation happens, i.e. periods of intra-ideological contestation (Freeden 1996: 
76, emphasis in original). The basic assumption I work from here is that the 
participants during the period of contestation all take part in a discourse with greater 
ideological range than what a consolidated, coherent, ideology signified by 
decontested ‘core’ concepts could possibly cover (Freeden 1996: 77). For example 
in the instance of neoliberalism I discover that three different world order 
perspectives could be identified among the main contributors during the ideology’s 
first formative phase, namely; Atlanticism, federal internationalism, and 
universalism. Only the first of these three options existing in the larger neoliberal 
discourse became the decontested core part of the more narrow neoliberal ideology 
(or that is what I argue). But as we can infer from the range of the options listed here 
there were several alternative, more or less parochial – but most importantly readily 
available – versions of nationalism that were not seriously considered by prominent 
members participating in the neoliberal discourse at the time when the discourse 
underwent this instance of intra-ideological contestation. The point is that discourses 
that feed into ideologies are wider than the concrete form the ideology takes at any 
time, even if they in practice are only open to participants who share a somewhat 
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similar political outlook. This political commonality facilitates a certain level of 
mutual recognition and respect amongst the participants in the debate and it is this 
again which makes the ideational cross-fertilization necessary for the ideology’s 
further development possible. But once conceptual decontestation has been achieved 
regarding core issues formerly subject to contention, an ideology will take a more 
definite form for what is likely an extended period, and the participants whose views 
were discarded might go on to form splinter groups that (if they do not peter out into 
nothingness) could turn into competing ideological camps stemming from the same 
original discourse.  
If we trace today’s major ideologies back to the early days of the French Revolution 
we can see that they were all roughly part of the same anti-absolutist discourse that 
united everyone from factions of the nobility wanting greater autonomy to the most 
radically minded of the Enlightenment thinkers in the struggle to diminish the 
dictatorial powers of contemporary monarchs. Today’s ideological span, from the 
conservative nationalists found on the right to the contemporary variations of 
anarchism which now occupies the opposite post-Stalinist left extreme, can all be 
thought of as the result of successive splits in this “all-encompassing” political 
discourse which initiated modernity over two centuries ago. The reason I am putting 
“all-encompassing” in quotation marks here is because the most fundamental result 
of this development has been to erase the possibility of a prospective return to the 
monarchical order from the public imagination. In this sense the political mega-
discourse of post-revolutionary modernity encompasses all options except a return to 
the monarchical ancien regime order.  
The contribution of this thesis lies predominantly in the excavation and exploration 
of the potentialities and limitations inherent in the views expressed by some of the 
core contributors to the major contemporary globalization ideologies. This thesis 
therefore does not deal expressively with the creation of a new piece of political 
theory, even though it employs and further develops a conceptual apparatus to 
underline the direction of potential movement from a world political past signified 
by nationalism to a future possibly signified by planetarism. A key piece of this 
“thin” theoretical framework – that nonetheless shares similarities with “grand” 
theory (see: Skinner 1985: 3-20, and; James 2006: 7) – is that internationalism is 
seen only as a temporary way-station along this nationalist-planetarist trajectory. 
Planetarism is therefore theorized as being “the true” conceptual opposite of 
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nationalism, in place of internationalism which traditionally has been seen as the 
furthest one could move away from a nationalist standpoint. It is however not the 
intention of this thesis to present a fully fledged theory of planetarism, only to work 
out the basics of such a position to use this as a measuring rod while analyzing the 
stance of contributors to real world ideologies such as neoliberalism, 
cosmopolitanism, and alter-globalism. Using this theoretical construction as a 
conceptual yardstick allows us more fully to understand the ideational range these 
different ideologies cover as well as better see what their inherent limitations are.  
The observant reader might have noticed that I have not explicitly addressed the 
epistemological nature of the overall method set out here. The ontological basis of 
the inquiry here is taken to be of a fundamentally dualistic character. One the one 
side the natural scientific worldview that underpins the ontological framework 
belongs within the positivist camp where it is taken for granted that ‘the world exists 
independently of our knowledge of it’ (Furlong & Marsh 2010: 193). On the other 
the ontological categories we find in the social and political world particular to 
human beings are taken to be more or less fully consistent with a ‘world [that] is 
socially or discursively constructed’ which by itself would be consistent with an 
‘interpretivist’ or ‘constructivist’ position (Furlong & Marsh 2010: 199). I claim that 
we are dealing with a real world which we in fundamental respects have no choice 
but to learn to live with, but that this natural scientific dimension to reality is 
overlaid with a political layer which is the product of historical circumstance and 
human creativity that crucially can be altered. This view is neither consistent with 
positivism nor with an interpretivist/constructivist position, but with ‘realism’, a 
position which underscores the ‘need to identify and understand both the external 
“reality” and the social construction of that “reality” if we are to explain the 
relationship between social phenomena’ (Furlong & Marsh 2010: 204-205).  
Why Some Globalization Ideologies Are Not Potentially Planetarist 
  While the normative commitments undergirding the work on this thesis has been 
explained in more detail above, it should nonetheless be made explicitly clear that 
the selection criteria for the inclusion of the three ideological discourses analyzed in 
the chapters to follow are founded on the same normative assumptions: That a 
desirable planetarist ideology would have to be universalist, inclined to accept a 
polity with a plurality of democratic choices available to the electorate, and actively 
be seeking enlightenment (which in this context means to further the advancement 
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of the collective knowledge held by the human species). There are other ideological 
discourses that can be thought of as just as “global” in scope as the three ideologies 
selected for a more thorough analysis in this thesis, but I will now explain why some 
of the most obvious contenders do not possibly meet these criteria. I will also show 
how some other alternatives that could have been considered on their own are at 
least partially included in the analysis as implicit subcategories within the larger 
ideological discourses being analyzed in the thesis. 
Manfred B. Steger, whose work is central to the argument presented in this thesis, 
did at one point suggest that ‘Jihadist Globalism versus Imperial Globalism’ could 
be ‘the great ideological struggle of the twenty-first century’ (Steger 2008: 213). 
Jihadist Globalism was Steger’s name for the ideology underpinning militant 
groupings such as Al Qaeda and more recently the self-proclaimed Islamic State, but 
later Steger has changed the name to ‘Islamist Globalism’ instead (Steger 2009b). 
This ideology is rightly understood as universalist in the same manner as religions 
such as Christianity and Buddhism are seen as universalist. The ideational construct 
Steger calls Imperial Globalism on the other hand comes very close to describing the 
ideology which first was called “globalism” historically, namely the ideology of 
furthering American world hegemony that arose with victory in World War II (see: 
Brands 1997, Ambrose & Brinkley [1971] 2011, and Fousek 2000). While those in 
favor of Islamic jihad would probably welcome converts from all over the world to 
their cause with open arms, it is not so that the United States openly welcomes all 
and sundry who would like to be an American citizen. Though both creeds would 
ideally like to dominate the globe, only the Islamists are universally inclusive of 
those that happen to accept their terms of affiliation. This potential universal 
inclusiveness though is the only thing Steger’s Jihadist Globalism has going for it in 
planetarist terms.  
Whether Jihadist Globalism can be said to completely stumble on the democratic 
pluralist criteria is debatable, since the Muslim Brotherhood which is moderate 
enough to play by democratic tenets when it suits their goals (see: Achcar 2013: 
124-125) and the Islamic State who at the time of writing is attempting to establish 
‘a theocratic Sunni state under sharia law’ in what used to be the hinterlands of Syria 
and Iraq and does not tolerate any competition of a religious, cultural, or political 
kind (Cockburn 2015: 84) may both fit this ideological label. But it is quite clear that 
this ideology fails most spectacularly on the issue of enlightenment intentions. 
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Jihadist Globalism in all its variations eventually comes down to espousing pure 
religious dogma, in its ideal polity there is no separation between religion and state, 
no possibility to challenge the truthfulness of scripture, and no recourse for ordinary 
people to question the validity of the moral codes upheld by the leading community 
of high-priests. It is both anti-humanist and anti-science and it replaces everything 
but the most basic aspects of education with the rote learning of sacred texts and the 
repetition of rituals.  
The Islamic fundamentalism Steger calls “Jihadist Globalism” is so deeply 
reactionary that it is possible that observers such as Steger confuse its medieval 
mono-universalist aspects (well known from the era of Christendom) with the Space 
Age concept of planetary allegiance that have given rise to notions such as 
“globalism” and the planetarism I argue the case for in this thesis. There are 
obviously certain similarities between the two, which the following proclamation by 
the leader of Islamic State (also known by the acronym ISIS) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
sheds light on: ‘[The Islamic State is meant to be] a state where the Arab and non-
Arab, the white man and the black man, the easterner and the westerner are all 
brothers [ ] Syria is not for the Syrians. Iraq is not for the Iraqis. The Earth is 
Allah’s’ (as cited in; Cockburn 2015: xi). Here we see an appeal to all humanity 
using the image of the Earth, which one could say employs hyper-modern or perhaps 
even planetarist elements in its imagery, but at its bottom there lurks a command to 
submit to the one true God that instantly indicates that we are dealing with an 
essentially pre-modern worldview. Its adherents are clearly intent on turning the 
political clock back to an age when a religious caste of clergy in cohorts with an 
aristocratic class of warriors together made up a patriarchic governing structure 
which forced the general population to keep in line with their superstitious 
interpretation of reality. They do not really want harmony between diverse groups 
and instead they aim for the complete homogenization of world society. But they 
derive part of their allure exactly from not being principally racist, which in 
combination with their apparent readiness to welcome anyone from wherever who 
are willing to fight for their cause gives them a potential strength in numbers that 
from the outset is denied to more particularist political ventures such as singular 
nation-states with exclusive citizenships.   
Imperial Globalism, understood as an ideology of American exceptionalism geared 
toward ensuring that “indispensable” nation’s continued world domination, has 
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exactly the noninclusive weakness ISIS has made an effort to exploit. If the US had 
been imperial in the traditional sense it could theoretically have conquered the world 
through military and diplomatic means and thus created a singular global empire, 
but after the United States did so much by itself to end the age of empire through 
insisting on the self-determination of peoples it would seem positively anachronistic 
to suggest such a project. The Imperial Globalism we are dealing with here is simply 
a peculiar variety of Chauvinistic nationalism amplified to a superpower scale. 
Irving Kristol has described the nationalism of the United States as ‘the nationalism 
of a world power’ which seems to neatly describe Imperial Globalism (as cited in; 
Lieven 2012: 7). It cannot be a possible contender for being a planetarist ideology, 
in the way that for example neoliberalism (when decoupled from American 
exceptionalism) would be, because Imperial Globalism excludes non-Americans 
from holding an equal position within its preferred political system. Neither are 
there any indications that the United States government has any intentions of turning 
the foreign part of the world population into American citizens. The foreign policies 
of the American “empire” does have global reach, hence the “globalist” moniker 
does certainly fit to an extent, but an ideology which purposefully excludes the more 
than 95 percent of the world population who are not American co-nationals does 
obviously not seriously entertain truly global aspirations. American Globalism was 
nonetheless an important influence during the crucial formative stage for 
neoliberalism, and to an extent still is, as I will make the argument for in Chapter 3. 
Another possible contender for inclusion as a planetary ideology could have been 
communism, or more specifically the Marxist-Leninism that supposedly held sway 
over much of the Earth’s population during the 20
th
 Century. The ending of The 
Communist Manifesto admonishing ‘Working men of all countries unite!’ is 
certainly universalist in intent (Marx & Engels [1848] 1992: 39). But the reason this 
ideology is excluded is twofold; first Marxist-Leninism, or communism as it was put 
into practice during the 20
th
 Century, quite quickly developed into Stalinism. 
Stalinism’s commanding feature is a mixture of communist economic thinking and 
nationalism captured in the enduring phrase “socialism in one country” (see: Ree 
1998). This was in large part the model that was employed by communist rulers that 
subsequently came to power in Yugoslavia, China, Cuba, Vietnam, and so on, even 
if their idea of “the nation” included the whole territory of the state and did not 
necessarily exclude ethnicities other than the dominant one from positions of power. 
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The second reason is that Marxism-Leninism/Stalinism has largely lost sway over 
the imagination of people worldwide.  
The closest one would get to a communist planetarist ideology in the 20
th
 Century 
was probably the version of communism articulated by Leon Trotsky, outspoken 
opponent to Stalin in the years following the death of Lenin. Trotsky in opposition 
to Stalin saw ‘the idea of a nationally self-sufficient socialism [socialism in one 
country/Stalinism] as incompatible with Leninist tradition and Marxist principle’ 
(Deutscher [1954-1963] 2015: 827). Trotsky refused ‘to abandon the prospect of 
international revolution’ which had been so central to Marx and Engel’s original 
plan for a world communist takeover (Deutscher [1954-1963] 2015: 828). Trotsky’s 
position was based on the following rationale: 
…although socialist revolution might for a time be confined to 
the boundaries of a single state, socialism could not be achieved 
within the framework of any nation-state, not even one as vast as 
the Soviet Union or the United States. Marxism had always 
envisaged socialism in terms of an international community, 
because it held that historically society tended towards 
integration on an ever larger scale (Deutscher [1954-1963] 2015: 
835).  
Trotsky stayed true to Marxist teachings while Stalin was more interested in 
pragmatic ‘myth-creation’ in an effort ‘to conceal the gulf between Bolshevik 
promise and fulfillment’ as a means to consolidate his grip on power (Deutscher 
[1954-1963] 2015: 836). In this way Trotskyism became the term for the kind of 
communism that continued to advocate international (i.e. world) revolution. This 
split between Stalin on one side and Trotsky on the other happened in 1926-1927 
(see: Deutscher [1954-1963] 2015: 821-946). Though Trotskyism experienced 
something of an upsurge beginning in the late 1960, both this and Stalinism appears 
to have lost much of what limited popular appeal it had in the West during the 
aftermath of the Soviet implosion in 1989-1991. I therefore consider these two 
strains of communist ideology as being mostly outdated historical tendencies that 
only in part inform the contemporary Western Marxist tendency found with the 
wider alter-globalist discourse addressed in Chapter 5.  
The Stalinist and Trotskyist varieties of communism are nonetheless important 
tendencies to be aware of, because despite the evidence to the contrary offered by 
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the split between Trotsky (who had no further influence over policy) and Stalin (one 
of the greatest dictators of all time who personally commanded Soviet policy), the 
internationalist and potentially planetarist aspects of communism were hugely 
exaggerated in the popular Western imagination during the Cold War. This to the 
point that any serious attempt at contemplating political world organization risked 
the accusation of being an example of fifth column socialist agitation (see: Schuman 
1952: 465, and Goodman 1960: 415-418).  
In addition to Islamist Globalism, Imperial Globalism, and communism in its 
Marxist-Leninist guise, other potentially planetarist ideologies not specifically 
analyzed in this thesis include several varieties of ecologism, anarchism, and 
feminism. In a sense ideologies such as deep-ecology and social ecology are part of 
what is referred to here as the “alter-globalist” discourse, but my discussion of that 
discourse could not possibly do justice to the rich variety of ideological viewpoints 
this term ultimately covers. This, together with the lack of a fuller treatment of in 
particular Islamist Globalism and Imperial Globalism (even if it is clear they could 
not possibly become planetarist ideologies proper, enough people seem to think they 
are to make the endeavor worthwhile) are some of the limitations of my approach 
that could be addressed by either making the thesis longer or a lot more compact. In 
the end the time to do either of these things has not been available.  
If I were to start the thesis again I would look for a possible early contender for a 
planetarist ideology in Scientific Humanism (see: Reiser 1940), perhaps looked 
deeper into the most recent articulations of cosmopolitanism (e.g. Ingram 2013), and 
mined Murray Bookchin’s complete oeuvre to see whether his solutions were 
anything less than completely utopian (e.g. Bookchin 1982). It would also have been 
of great interest to see if any of the neoliberal authors primarily active in the second 
half of last century had fully developed ideas about internationalism being favorable 
over a fully global political system (as suggested in: Harmes 2014). But these 
shortcomings would not have been quite so obvious if it was not for the work laid 
down in the pages ahead. I hope there is something to learn here for all who ventures 
forth.  
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Chapter 1. Ideologies and Imaginaries 
 Introduction: A Conceptual History of Ideology  
  The aim of this chapter is to present the conceptual apparatus and analytical 
framework which will be used in this thesis. This, in addition to the historical 
contextual framework presented in the following chapter, forms the theoretical basis 
for the analysis that follows in the subsequent chapters. The focus here will first be 
on the concept of ideology and how it has been understood since the term itself was 
coined in the late 18
th
 Century. It will show that Antoine Destutt de Tracy’s original 
conceptual understanding of “ideology” was the complete opposite of Karl Marx’s 
later use of the term. Destutt de Tracy was concerned with striving for ideals and 
Marx with idol worship. Karl Mannheim’s later contribution was pioneering in the 
respect that it incorporated both these views of ideology, and that he identified 
ideologies as a phenomena that could exist side by side in the same society.  
But Mannheim somewhat confusingly terms Marx’s concept “ideology” and Destutt 
de Tracy’s “relative utopian” thinking. The Behavioralists added the notion that one 
can measure a person’s ideological predispositions on a “liberal-conservative” 
continuum, but also had a tendency to relegate ideologies that were not part of the 
post-McCarthyite American mainstream political debate off their charts, and thereby 
portrayed a politically sanitized and inaccurate picture of the complete ideological 
landscape.  
Noteworthy recent developments in the study of political ideologies include Michael 
Freeden’s “conceptual approach”, John Schwarzmantel’s identification of an 
“embryonic counter-hegemonic ideology”, and Manfred B. Steger’s work 
concerning “the dawning global imaginary”, all of which will help shape the 
analytical and conceptual framework employed in this thesis. Near the end of this 
chapter I will add my own take on the study of contemporary global ideologies by 
introducing the concept of a “planetary” ideology. Finally I explain why I find it 
useful to refine the units of analysis (i.e. the potential planetarist ideologies) in 
contrast to the different “globalisms” which Steger has primarily used in his 
influential studies.    
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From Destutt de Tracy’s Enlightening “Idealogy” to the Delusional 
“Idology” of Karl Marx 
  What is ideology? The concept has gone through several phases where its meaning 
has been altered from one to the other. The word “ideology” was coined by Comte 
(i.e. Count) Antoine Destutt de Tracy ‘in a “Mémoir sur la faculté de penser” read in 
installments before the Institute4 from 1796 to 1798’ (Kennedy 1979: 354). Ideology 
meant “science of ideas” in Greek, and the new word was introduced in the first 
lecture of the series at the Institute on the 21
st
 of April 1796 (Kennedy 1979: 355). 
Destutt de Tracy published his Eléments d’Idéologie in five volumes from ‘1801-
1815’ and here ‘for Destutt [ ] the study of “ideology” is part of zoology’ by which 
he meant according to Lichtheim ‘that human psychology should be analyzed in 
biological terms; that is, without paying attention to religion’ (1965: 167).  
The true foundation of the sciences is [ ] to be found in a 
“Science des idées” which will describe the natural history of the 
mind, that is, the manner in which thoughts are formed. There is 
no supersensible reality behind the individuals and their several 
“ideas”… (Lichtheim 1965: 167). 
In light of this paragraph one might be tempted to interpret Destutt’s notion of 
ideology as a purely ‘materialist’ conception, but this materialist ‘theme is crossed 
with a normative purpose’ where ‘[t]he reduction of individual ideas to generally 
held notions is intended to lay bare a common ground of human needs and 
aspirations, thus providing the lawgiver with the means of furthering the common 
good’ (Lichtheim 1965: 167). Despite his aristocratic heritage, Destutt de Tracy was 
a true Enlightenment revolutionary who believed that ‘[r]eason progressively 
discloses a true picture of humanity which constitutes the foundation of civic virtue’ 
and that ‘[t]he best social order is that which corresponds to the permanent needs of 
man’ (Lichtheim 1965: 168). This was a criticism of the ‘idols’ which distorted the 
truth, as earlier identified by Francis Bacon (1561-1626), and for Destutt de Tracy 
Christian metaphysics was clearly the main manifestation of such idols (Lichtheim 
1965: 168).  
                                                 
4 “The Institute” Kennedy here is referring to is ‘Institut de France’ founded ‘in 1795’ (Lichtheim 
1965: 165). 
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To paraphrase Lichtheim: The principal aim of the Enlightenment was the 
reformation of consciousness through the removal of popular superstition by the 
means of education and the relentless application of critical reasoning (Lichtheim 
1965: 168-169). Thereby ‘the place of religion’ was to be ‘taken by a secular 
morality inherently social because man is a social being’ (Lichtheim 1965: 169). Or, 
as summarized by Kennedy: ‘Ideology, not religion, was [to be] the basis of 
morality’ (1979: 356). So the project of Destutt de Tracy’s “Science des idées” was 
to supplant the religious basis for morality with a scientific one, and his particular 
version of scientific objectivity was highly influenced by the scientific rationalism 
and political liberalism of the Enlightenment period in which he lived.  
Destutt de Tracy and the other ‘idéologues’ of the Institute were liberals and ‘headed 
the liberal opposition’ during ‘the Bourbon Restauration’ which followed the end of 
Napoleon’s rule (Lichtman 1965: 165-166). Theirs was a ‘political ideology of free 
thought, free press, individual liberties, the integrity of representative assemblies, 
and secularization’ (Kennedy 1979: 358). But at the time this was not recognized as 
an “ideology” among several others by its proponents. Though ‘the defrocked abbé 
Lemare’ ‘[a]s early as 1812’ recognized that Destutt de Tracy’s ‘idéologue 
Republicanism’ was in itself one ideology confronting another ideology of 
‘royalism’ this was not Destutt de Tracy’s viewpoint, since he saw his ideology as a 
singular ‘solid and well linked system’ of thought confronting the superstition that 
signified prior modes of thought (Kennedy 1979: 363).  
The meaning of ideology went through a reversal, aptly described by Kennedy 
(1979: 358-368), thanks to Napoleon’s attack on the ideologues beginning in the 
year 1800 where he ‘adopted the tactic of ridiculing Ideology as metaphysical 
revery’ (Kennedy 1979: 358). For a time prior to Napoleon’s turn on the ideologues 
they had ‘firmly expected Bonaparte to inaugurate the enlightened commonwealth 
of their dreams’ and ‘in 1797’ Napoleon had even become an ‘honorary member of 
the Institute’ (Lichtheim 1965: 165). Subsequently ‘in 1799, at the time of the coup 
d’état de Brumaire’ the members of the Institute actually ‘helped to promote 
[Napoleon’s] accession to power’ through ‘their influence over the educated middle 
class’(Lichtheim 1965: 165). Napoleon’s attack had no explicit basis in the writings 
of Destutt the Tracy or the other liberals since: ‘The Idéologues were being vilified  
[ ] for propounding metaphysics (which they actually wished to bury)’ 
(Kennedy1979: 358).  
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The reason for Napoleon’s animosity towards Destutt de Tracy and his companions 
was twofold; first that their efforts promoted republicanism, which clearly was a 
threat to his rule as it became more despotic, and secondly that they actively 
undermined Napoleon’s use of Christianity as a means of popular control. For these 
reasons Napoleon proclaimed the following in a warning against the Idéologues to 
the Prussians in September 1808: 
…philosophers torment themselves to create systems; they will 
search in vain for a better one than Christianity, which in 
reconciling man with himself assures both public order and the 
peace of states. [ ] ideologues destroy all illusions, and the age of 
illusions is for individuals as for peoples the age of happiness 
(from Talleyrand Mémoires [1891], as cited in Kennedy 1979: 
359).       
By the time Marx wrote his The German Ideology in 1845 Destutt de Tracy’s 
enlightening meaning given to the word ideology had been turned on its head. 
Ideologues were now for Marx (with Engels) ‘the jurists [and] politicians (including 
the practical statesmen)’ who through their ‘illusions’ sought to perpetuate ‘the 
dogmatic dreamings and distortions’ serving ‘the ruling class’ (Marx [1845] 1998: 
68-70). We can here see how successful Napoleon Bonaparte had been with 
reversing the connotation of the word ideology, a meaning he himself had obviously 
been aware of, but which was completely subverted in common parlance by the time 
of Marx about forty years later. We can see that Marx’s use of the concept was in 
complete opposition to the original meaning.   
Marx’s idea of ideology was more complex than just the stereotypical denunciation 
of bourgeoisie ideology as leading to “false consciousness”, a phrase ‘Marx himself 
never used’ (Eagleton 1991: 89).5 Though Marx certainly did not think of the 
communism he propounded as ideological (Marx [1845] 1998: 57), he saw ideology 
as a recurrent historical phenomenon where ‘[t]he first form of ideologists, priests, is 
coincident’ with the original ‘division of material and mental labour’ (Marx [1845] 
1998: 50). Following Marx’s description of preceding historical epochs as ‘tribal, 
ancient, feudal’ in the order mentioned, his loose dating of the first occurrences of 
                                                 
5 This ‘distinction [ ] must be accorded instead to his collaborator Frederick Engels’ who 
demonstrably used the phrase ‘in a letter [ ] of 1893’ i.e. a decade after Marx had died (Eagleton 
1991: 89, the relevant passage is also cited in Lichtheim 1965: 173, footnote 33).   
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ideological practice would thereby at the latest have appeared in the ancient epoch 
(Marx [1845] 1998: 38-41).  
What has become known as Marxist false consciousness was for Marx the symptom 
of an age old praxis where historically contingent dominant ruling classes 
reflexively substituted a metaphysical falsehood (i.e. Marx’s concept of ideology), 
presented as eternally true, for the real ‘logic of the “material” process itself’, a 
process which went through epochal changes (Lichtheim 1965: 175). To hide this 
logic was perhaps an understandable operation by any given ruling class, since the 
alternative of publicly admitting the true basis of societal power-relations 
(something in the order of “we are in command of the means of production, 
therefore we rule”) clearly would have been a poorer rhetorical device for 
maintaining their hegemonic hold over an accommodating populace.  
This was especially true in ‘the age of revolution’ coinciding with the lives of both 
de Tracy and Marx, when popular uprisings against ‘absolute monarchy, church and 
aristocracy’ showed itself capable of toppling ancien régimes (see Hobsbawm 
[1962] 2007: 138-143). The solution for the threatened rulers was to make the 
populace acquiescent through a mixture of coercion, cunning and bribery, a package 
where the application of ideology in the Marxist sense would seem to fit under the 
rubric of “cunning”. However, that might be giving the rulers of the time more credit 
than Marx was willing to concede.  
First: ‘The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class 
which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual 
force’ (Marx [1845] 1998: 67). Second: ‘The ruling ideas are nothing more than the 
ideal expression of the dominant material relations’ (Marx [1845] 1998: 67). Third: 
‘The ruling class itself on the whole imagines’ that the dominant ideas and concepts 
of their time can be attributed an existence independent of ‘the conditions of 
production and the producers of these ideas’, even when the producers – or ‘its 
active, conceptive ideologists, who make the formation of the illusions of the class 
about itself their chief source of livelihood’ – are themselves a specialized branch of 
the ruling class (Marx [1845] 1998: 68).  
Members of the ruling classes are thereby largely (e.g. Napoleon Bonaparte could 
have been one notable exception) unconscious of the fact that the superstructure of 
ideas and concepts (i.e. the ideology) follows from the material base (or the mode of 
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production), and rather think it is the other way around. Thinking for instance that 
God’s providence has made sure they were born noblemen and that therefore they 
are naturally entitled to be wealthy. This is why Marx’s understanding of ideology is 
‘characterized by the abstraction and inversion of the real’ (Balibar [1995] 2007: 
55). For Marx ideology is in short a process which maintains existing societal 
relations, and not something used for their overturning. But this is also not 
necessarily a process the ruling class themselves are conscious of, since they too can 
suffer from a “false consciousness” as Engels had it. Ideology in this sense is then a 
delusion perpetuated by the ruling class which the lower classes buy into contrary to 
their own interests.                
Whereas for the French idéologues their ideology was an attempt to replace 
metaphysical mystification with “true” knowledge of the world, for Marx ideology 
was metaphysical mystification which needed to be replaced with ‘communism the 
real movement which abolishes the present state of things’ (Marx [1845] 1998: 57). 
And the present state of things was for Marx signified by the capitalist mode of 
production which was ideologically obfuscated by ‘the politico-ideological 
superstructure’ (Balibar [1995] 2007: 93). 
Now after having presented the two founding notions of ideology in the modern era, 
a glance further back in time is needed for some clarification. Balibar mentions that: 
Beyond [these] immediate sources [i.e. de Tracy and Marx], the 
term has a whole philosophical genealogy which, via Locke and 
Bacon, takes us back to two opposing ancient sources: the 
Platonic forms (eidè) and the ‘simulacra’ (eidôla) of Epicurean 
philosophy (Balibar [1995] 2007: 125). 
To avoid getting caught up in a long-winded philosophical discussion, allow me to 
put it as simply as possible; the Platonic forms can be said to be ideals or the 
ultimate standards of perfection (which are also ultimately unattainable in real life, 
but still worth striving for), while the simulacra of Epicurean philosophy can be 
described as idols, meaning objects of worship which are (falsely) thought to be 
divine (i.e. a false representation of reality wrongly accepted as truth).6 It is clear 
                                                 
6 The eidōla of Epicurean philosophy is by modern experts translated as ‘images’ resulting from 
‘streams of atoms constantly thrown off of the surfaces of objects that cause visual sensations 
when they strike our eyes’ (O’Keefe 2010: 100-101, 159, and 175). But ‘What sensation does 
not report is the status of the real object’ which means the eidōla can give rise to perceptions 
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that de Tracy and the other Ideologues were talking about the former when they 
referred to “ideology”, while Marx was referring to the latter with his use of the 
concept. Marx was no stranger to the former notion, but he meant communism7 
would be the perfected political system (i.e. what logically would follow his 
conception of socialism and the transitory dictatorship of the proletariat). In the 
same way de Tracy was clearly aware of the existence of the latter, but this for him 
was commensurate with metaphysics. In this sense we can say that Marx was 
attacking idology, while de Tracy was defending idealogy, in other words when 
juxtaposed these are diametrically contrasted conceptual positions.  
Ironically de Tracy’s positive notion of ideology was twisted into idology before 
Marx took up the concept, and Marx himself was in the 20
th
 Century turned into an 
idol of worship for the Marxist-Leninism of the Soviet Union. But, to return to the 
core of the matter at hand, this is a very important conceptual distinction: idology – 
or what we can call delusional ideology – and idealogy – which we can call 
enlightening ideology – can be used not just to distinguish between different 
ideologies altogether, but also to separate the conceptual make-up of a single 
ideology. This is potentially very useful since it is highly likely that many ideologies 
(understood broadly) contain elements of both types.  
It is not unusual in Western Marxism, for an example, to still maintain a somewhat 
rigid focus on class-relations (e.g. Therborn 2012) – when today people have started 
to choose their political affiliation on the basis of other guiding perceptions so that 
‘of all the political identifications available, class seems to have receded drastically’ 
(Carver 2009: 467). Class relations are therefore arguably a conceptual part of 
Western Marxism that has become a delusional ideology (or idology) where these 
have turned into an idol which instead of clarifying the real conditions might 
actually be masking them. Not that knowing about for instance economic differences 
between groups cannot tell us many important things, but in certain cases key 
differences that are not easily attributed to class might get overlooked because a bias 
                                                                                                                                         
that are not necessarily connected to an object’s true nature, i.e. they can convey a false 
representation, a distorted image, of actually existing reality (Rist 1977: 20).  
7 Marx explicitly denies that communism is a representation of idealized politics: ‘Communism is 
not for us a state of affairs which is to be established, and ideal to which reality [will] have to 
adjust itself’ (Marx [1845] 1998: 57, brackets in the original), but that notion is contrary to 
some of the most crucial insights of later scholars of ideology.  
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towards class-based differences could overdetermine the analysis. While to the 
contrary the tendency to advocate ‘a project of universal emancipation’ amongst 
most Western Marxists is undoubtedly an imprint of enlightening ideology within 
Western Marxism which aspires to a closer perfection of human society on the basis 
of the actual existence of humanity as a singular species, instead of focusing on the 
often unhelpful divisions of humanity into nationalities (Therborn 2012: 15).       
Together these different conceptions of ideology – acceptance or even use of idols 
on the one side and the unending search for ideals and their attainment on the other 
– supply us with two very important strategic coordinates as we get deeper into the 
domain of ideological discourse. As the Chinese sage Sun Tzu famously advised, 
‘know the enemy, know yourself’ (Tzu [c.400-320 BCE] 1971: 129). When it comes 
to ideology the unthinking devotion to idols, or the superstition connected to 
imaginary notions, is for the scientist “the enemy” and in opposition to this dimming 
of human faculties the scientist, or any inquisitive mind, should support the quest for 
knowledge and the systematic application of that knowledge to the politics of human 
self-governance so that they can improve dialectically together. The problem is of 
course to separate the wheat from the chaff, since “truth” and “reality” are 
‘essentially contested concepts’ (Gallie 1956). However, that should not hinder us 
from broadly delineating elements of ideological discourse that are more 
intellectually persuasive than others, in light of both pertinent historical and 
empirical evidence available in the scholarly literature and the overall desire to 
enlighten, rather than perpetuate ignorance, that should drive all forms of scientific 
inquiry.      
In short, this thesis follows the modern scientific tradition of not only seeking to 
reveal superstitious notions, which both Marx and de Tracy were attempting, but 
also to come up with an alternative to these which is securely anchored in our 
empirical understanding of the world, as it currently is understood to exist through 
the approximation of an objective viewpoint (which they also sought to do in their 
own idiosyncratic ways).  
The idol/ideal distinction clearly presupposes a claim to objective knowledge of 
reality which is far from uncontroversial, but that controversy will not be dealt with 
at any length in this thesis, since the aim here is to compare ideologies along a 
normative scale stretching from what is good for particular groups to what is 
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interpreted as the optimal holistic planetary solution. Here the “objective” or 
“universally true” logically follow from a hypothetical holistic conception of “the 
planetary good” constructed on the basis of available information and scholarly 
opinion (thus it will be rooted in arguably imperfect, but still expert, measurements 
and interpretations of empirical reality and the possibilities inherent therein), and 
not on an (obviously unattainable) insight into truly objective or universally true 
reality unmitigated by our socially laden and time-dependent perceptions. For as 
Karl Mannheim stated: 
The nature of “reality” or “existence as such” is a problem which 
belongs to philosophy, and is of no concern here. However, what 
is to be regarded as “real” historically or sociologically at a given 
time is of importance to us and fortunately can be definitively 
ascertained. Inasmuch as man is a creature living primarily in 
history and society, the “existence” that surrounds him is never 
“existence as such”, but is always a concrete historical form of 
social existence. For the sociologist “existence” is that which is 
“concretely effective”, i.e. a functioning social order, which does 
not exist only in the imagination of certain individuals, but 
according to which people really act (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 
174). 
How the concrete form of social existence and the functioning social order can 
currently be described will be addressed in the next chapter, and the immediate 
concern here is going to be a closer examination of Mannheim’s conceptual 
apparatus.  
Mannheim: Ideologies vs. Relative Utopian Thought 
  Mannheim was the author of the next major contribution to the study of ideology 
after Marx, originally published in German in 1929 as Ideologie und Utopie. In this 
work Mannheim made a further distinction to the idol/ideal dichotomy where he 
divides ideology into two different conceptions, ‘the particular conception of 
ideology’ and ‘the total conception of ideology’ (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 49). Of 
these the particular conception are mere ‘distortions’ which ‘range all the way from 
conscious lies to half-conscious and unwitting disguises’ operating on a ‘purely 
psychological level’ (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 49-50). The total conception, on the 
other hand, is an all encompassing ‘Weltanschauung’, a perception of the world 
described as ‘the whole outlook of a social group’ i.e. the prevailing worldview 
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which steers a group’s political engagement (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 52). In 
addition Mannheim puts forward the idea that utopian thought is the ideal which 
confronts the idolatry of the present, or what I have here called ideology in the 
enlightening respect (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 173-184). 
Mannheim’s concept of utopian thought is also divided into two separate categories. 
First you have the ‘absolutely utopian’ ideas of paradise and in particular the ideas 
concerning its earthly realization (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 179). These ideas, in 
contrast to the milder versions found in e.g. mediaeval Christianity with its promise 
of a pleasant afterlife for its faithful adherents, actually poses a threat to the existing 
order. In connection to this strain Mannheim mentions ‘the Utopia of Thomas More’ 
from 1517 and other tracts ‘which in a somewhat broader historical sense concerns 
themselves with “ideal commonwealths” ’ (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 180-181). To 
explain Mannheim’s intention in more detail I would add that these are usually 
socially fantastical and often somewhat naïve political visions. What they share in 
common is not just a desire to transcend the present political order, but also to 
radically rearrange family and social life along communal lines, so as to facilitate a 
novel and complete regimentation of society in accordance with the wishes of its 
author.  
This is for example what Plato offers in his The Republic (Plato [c.BCE 375] 2003), 
which is the earliest of ‘the agreed core of utopias’ for students of that particular 
phenomenon, which also includes, in addition to ‘Thomas More’s Utopia’, ‘Francis 
Bacon’s New Atlantis, Tomasso Campanella’s City of the Sun, and Etienne Cabet’s 
Voyage en Icarie’ (Levitas [1990] 2011: 14).8 These utopian visions all have 
interesting elements to them. Bacon, for example, provides a promising vision for 
the future of science and the position of universities in society which has to a certain 
extent been realized since, and Cabet’s ideas concerning a communal society made a 
mark on subsequent socialist thinking. But when considered as an interconnected set 
of ideas absolutely utopian ideas end up being somewhat overtly specific and 
idiosyncratic in their prescriptions, so that they could seemingly only be realistically 
transposed whole-scale from theory to reality by way of small, and extremely 
devoted, sects.  
                                                 
8 Of these latter three, New Atlantis and City of the Sun were written in the early seventeenth century, 
while Voyage en Icarie was published in 1840.     
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Later “absolutely utopian” ideas, such as those frequently found in the science 
fiction genre, usually presuppose some kind of technical innovation beyond the 
reach of contemporary science. From Jules Verne’s visionary 19
th
 Century 
submarines, aircrafts, and moon-travels, via H.G. Wells’ time-machine, to the 
“space operas” staple of modern science fiction (which is dependent on rapid 
interstellar travel very far beyond the means of contemporary science), these future 
visions clearly lack a grounding in the presently existing conditions. That is not to 
say that science fiction (or other absolutely utopian ideas) cannot help us ‘restructure 
our experience of our own present’ and help us imagine politically alternative 
futures, as Frederic Jameson argues (Jameson 2007: 286). But this is more of a 
mildly subversive function than the more hard-line overt presentation of a 
politically, culturally, and technologically viable alternative vision. These viable 
visions are phenomena we have historical experience of, with both for instance 
classical liberal and socialist ideas in the modern epoch. The potentially viable ideas 
that liberalism and socialism once represented are the most interesting for the 
present inquiry (though the absolutely utopian will be kept as a potential category 
for dismissal of extremely unrealistic ideas). This brings us to Mannheim’s second 
utopian category, that of relative utopian ideas, which in its relationship to the 
empirically existing immanent possibilities within the really existing political world 
distinguishes itself from absolutely utopian ideas. 
In the context of the preceding political orders, both the liberalism that rose to 




 Century, and the socialism (in both social-
democratic and communist varieties) which had such an influence on politics from 
the late 19
th
 Century to the late 1980s, where once what Mannheim describes as 
‘relatively utopian’ ideas (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 177, 179, and 184). This means 
that the utopian aspect of these ideas were only utopian in the sense that they appear 
impossible in the eyes of the upholders of the established order: ‘The representatives 
of a given order will label as utopian all conceptions of existence which from their 
point of view can in principle never be realized’ (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 176-177). 
This means that certain utopian ideas are not intrinsically unrealizable from a more 
objective viewpoint. But in Mannheim’s view the only way to really tell the 
difference between an absolutely utopian and a relatively utopian idea is through 
applying a ‘retroactive standard’ (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 184). This means that the 
difference between Marxist socialism and that of the Saint-Simonian variety for 
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example, which was influential earlier on, is that one was realizable on a large scale 
(albeit in a Marxist-Leninist sense) while the other was not. Thus we can see that the 
former was “relatively utopian” and the latter “absolutely utopian” in retrospect. 
...if we look into the past, it seems possible to find a fairly 
adequate criterion of what is to be regarded as ideological and 
what as utopian. This criterion is their realization. Ideas which 
later turn out to have been only distorted representations of a past 
or potential social order were ideological, while those which 
were adequately realized in the succeeding social order were 
relative utopias. The actualized realities of the past put an end to 
the conflict of mere opinions about what in earlier situationally 
transcendent ideas was relatively utopian bursting asunder the 
bonds of the existing order, and what was an ideology which 
merely served to conceal reality (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 184). 
What we can clearly discern from the citation above is that Mannheim uses the word 
“ideology” to mean what I have here called Marx’s delusional ideology, while he 
uses the word utopian (in the relative and not the absolute sense) as a concept close 
to identical to what I call the enlightening ideology of Destutt de Tracy. What is 
important to keep in mind is that these labels are not necessarily appropriate as 
eternal signifiers to any specific form of political thought. If we again use the 
example of Marxism, and in particular the Marxist-Leninist variety which became 
doctrine in the lands of “real-existing socialism” under Soviet influence in the 20
th
 
Century, it arguably went through an early “absolutely utopian” phase (i.e. the 
writings which influenced Marx). It then became “relatively utopian” as the 
proletariat had been identified as a presently historically existing agent which 
subsequently started acting consciously in line with their perceived “class-interest”, 
while the revolutions and the leaders it inspired quickly turned it into an ideology (in 
the delusional sense) for maintaining their grip on power.  
After the implosion of the Soviet-Union it in hindsight appears like Marxist-
Leninism was built on ultimately unrealizable absolute utopian ideas (which shows 
this particular ideology’s circular move through the different categories). Today 
other interpretations of Marxism which ‘typically abjure state control’ of the 
Leninist kind are being suggested, and this is debatably another incarnation of the 
Marxist strain of  utopian thought which we only with historical hindsight might be 
- 46 - 
able to judge as either relatively or absolutely utopian in Mannheim’s sense (Harvey 
2010: 225).  
Mannheim’s concepts are much clearer than his labeling, since “absolutely utopian” 
is identical to how most people understand “utopian” today: ‘the contemporary 
connotation of the term “utopian” is predominantly that of an idea which is in 
principle unrealizable’ as Mannheim stated ‘[a]nd this meaning of utopian remains 
common; to call something ‘utopian’ is often a means of dismissing it without 
further consideration’ as a contemporary expert on utopianism adds (Sargent 2008: 
266, Mannheim as cited ibid.). This is why I will stick with my 
“delusional/enlightening” dichotomy even though it conveys almost exactly the 
distinction Mannheim attributes to his “ideological/relatively utopian” dichotomy. 
Another problem with Mannheim’s dichotomy is of course that he assigns 
“ideological” solely to the realm of my understanding of “delusional ideology” 
following Marx’s usage. As we will see later on, this does not fit well with the 
contemporary scholarly understanding of the term, even though Mannheim has been 
credited with pioneering one of the major contributions to it, that is, the 
understanding of ideology as plural simultaneously occurring political phenomena. 
What Mannheim is usually mentioned for today, particularly by scholars of 
ideology, is for introducing the notion that ideologies are simultaneously occurring 
plural phenomena, and not just a singular phenomenon associated with perpetuating 
the domination of the ruling class as Marx would have it (e.g. Freeden 1996: 26). 
Mannheim stated that ‘the thought of all parties in all epochs is of an ideological 
character’ a character which is socially founded and changes over time, where 
‘Marxism, too, has taken on many diverse appearances’ (Mannheim [1936] 1954: 




Lenin (more than a decade before Mannheim wrote his contribution) interpreted the 
work of Marx and Engels in a peculiar fashion whereby he ended up arguing that an 
ideology, when it was founded on the class bias of the proletariat, would be 
commensurate with scientific truth (Carver 2009: 466). From this we can gather that 
Lenin saw a liberating potential in his proletarian ideology which could be usefully 
employed in the struggle against the prevailing ideology of the ruling class in its 
bourgeoisie appearance (or arguably ancien regimé in Tsarist Russia), which is 
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necessarily also a plural conception of ideology. However, Mannheim is 
remembered as the primary respectable scholar to have made the connection, and he 
thus ‘paved the way towards generalizing ideology as a omnipresent social 
phenomenon as well as a group product, to include Marxism itself’ (Freeden 1996: 
26).  
The Behavioralists Cold-War Intermezzo  
  Mannheim’s crucial insights had the misfortune of fairly rapidly being followed by 
World War II and shortly thereafter the ensuing Cold War. The McCarthy era, and 
its subsequent impact, was not conducive to the creation of a political climate open 
for unbiased academic debate concerning ideologies.  
Ideology in the first couple of decades following the Second World War was for the 
main bulk of political scientists a concept bound up with the ideologies of 
communism and fascism (Knight 2006: 621-622). This means that ideology during 
the post-war period came to be almost exclusively associated with the totalitarian 
ideologies of communism, Nazism, and fascism, which Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini 
had been the dictatorial advocates of. In contrast the notion that liberal democracies 
also happened to contain several ideologies (of a less “totalitarian” nature) was 
given less attention.  
Daniel Bell’s now infamous The End of Ideology, published in 1960, announced the 
demise of ideology altogether, but his interpretation of ideology was decidedly only 
concerned with its “leftist” variants ‘variously embodied in notions of communism, 
socialism, and “social welfare liberalism’ the latter presumably of the sort Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s “New Deal” initiated (Knight 2006: 622). We in this era see a 
tendency amongst scholars to equate centrist or center-right ideologies with 
“science” or ‘the ideology of science’, whilst all the other views were ‘isms’ or 
‘vulgar ideologies’ (Knight 2006: 622). Knight’s summation of the prevalent 
scholarly view in the United States around 1960 is as follows: “We” knew “the 
truth” and had not been misled by ideology the way “they” had (Knight 2006: 622).  
In this setting the Behavioralists ‘further domesticated the concept’ of ideology and 
created a ‘liberal/conservative continuum’ where the most extreme left was 
commensurate with the position held by the most liberal members of the Democratic 
Party and the extreme right was held by the most conservative Republicans (Knight 
2006: 622). In this sense the ‘Emphasis on the coherence of behavior along an 
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underlying spatial dimension (or dimensions) purged ideology of its pejorative 
connotations’ (Knight 2006: 622). This was useful for studying the range of 
opinions held by ‘legislators, judges, and other political practitioners’ (Knight 2006: 
622). But it also purged any political viewpoints not already shared by a portion of 
the sitting political elite completely from these quantitative studies. Because the 
alternatives offered on the Behavioralists questionnaires were usually within the 
limited mainstream range on the assumption that all other viewpoints by definition 
necessarily must be extremist or occupying the (hidden) totalitarian terrain outside 
the continuum’s extremes  
Ideology was thereby practically divided into two categories: one accepted “liberal-
conservative” range and one “totalitarian fringe” on each side of these which was so 
completely unacceptable that it was not worth mentioning. One result of this was 
that new ideological currents which arose to the surface in the late 1960s – even if 
they were attempting to be the anti-thesis of totalitarianism (as aspects of New Left 
ideology, exemplified by the writings of Marcuse, arguably were) – could only be 
dealt with by a relegation to the extreme left’s unsavory realm permanently outside 
accepted political discourse (for a discussion of this point see: Parenti 2006). It is 
almost as if the concept of ideology had been brought back to the status Marx gave 
it, but with one important caveat: There was now a range of acceptable ideological 
positions, fit for pluralistic democracy, as well as a group of essentially ideologies 
so unsavory that they were not worthy of engagement in a non-totalitarian society. 
During the last forty years, and particularly after the fall of the Soviet-Union, this 
dichotomous partition has been loosened up. When Fukuyama asked the question 
‘The End of History?’ in the title of his famous and contentious article, the 
following discussion and endorsement of the view that liberal democracy was now 
triumphant in its struggle against the ideologies of its contenders was probably the 
high-point of the Behavioralists worldview (Fukuyama 1989). Since it was they who 
had depicted the ideological range of the political status quo as the only viable 
option in the long run. However, the article still maintained the Behaviouralism 
blind-spot regarding the non-totalitarian nature of New Left and other ideological 
tendencies stemming from the 1960s (also including ecologism), and these would 
surface again by the end of the 1990s through unprecedented worldwide 
demonstrations against the undemocratic workings of ad hoc global governance 
constellations. The victory of liberal democracy over totalitarian ideology was never 
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complete to begin with, as China’s communist elite successfully quelled its internal 
opposition to state doctrine in Tiananmen Square in 1989. In another twist, 
totalitarian ideology resurfaced again on 9/11 2001, but now in the guise of Islamist 
extremism. It is within this turbulent ideological climate the contemporary debate 
about ideology has developed its own complex and nuanced understanding of a still 
highly pertinent phenomenon. 
The Contemporary Scholarly Discourse Concerning Ideology 
  Three of the most prominent scholars on ideology since the late 1990s, Michael 
Freeden (e.g. 1996 and 2001), John Schwarzmantel (e.g. 1998 and 2008), and 
Manfred B. Steger (e.g. 2001, 2004 and 2008), all share a more nuanced 
understanding of ideology than that of either Destutt de Tracy, Marx, Mannheim, or 
the Behaviorists. First they recognize that; ideologies are ‘systems of broadly held 
political beliefs, speaking in languages familiar, or accessible to, most members of 
society’ (Freeden 1996: 552). That one ideology is a ‘system of widely shared ideas, 
patterned beliefs, guiding norms and values, and ideals accepted as truth by some 
group’ (Steger 2007: 367) Or that they represent ‘a set of ideas which is normative, 
setting out an ideal, aiming at arousing support on a mass basis for those ideas, 
seeking to agitate in their favour’ (Schwarzmantel 2008: 26). Second, they all see 
ideologies as something which can be used for both facilitating elite domination and 
popular emancipation: 
Ideologies may be power structures that manipulate human 
action, but they are also ideational systems that enable us to 
choose to become what we want to become (Freeden 1996: 553). 
There has to be a plurality of political ideologies in order for the 
members of society to be able to act to improve or transform 
existing reality beyond the framework of the present structure. 
Therefore political ideologies are necessary elements in a 
democratic society, and should not be viewed simplistically as 
instruments of totalitarian power or tools used by leaders to 
manipulate credulous masses. It is not to be denied that these 
phenomena have been features of modern politics, but they do 
not warrant the conclusion that political ideologies are merely 
tools of elite domination (Schwarzmantel 2008: 28-29). 
Its pejorative connotations notwithstanding, ideology deserves a 
more balanced hearing – one that acknowledges its integrative 
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role of providing social stability as much as its propensity to 
contribute to fragmentation and alienation; its ability to supply 
standards of normative evaluation as much as its tendency to 
oversimplify social complexity; its role as guide and compass for 
political action as much as its potential to legitimize tyranny and 
terror in the name of noble ideas (Steger 2008: 4).  
In sharing this ‘neutral conception’ of ideology, the authors cited above allows for 
the complete inclusion of all manifestations of ideology in their analysis, and this is 
an effort which will be emulated here (Steger 2008: 4). What also can be discerned 
from these excerpts is that the dichotomy between the delusional, the manipulative, 
and the shrewdly dominating ideological tendency on the one side, and the 
enlightening, the guiding, and the positively transformative ideological tendency on 
the other, is something that all these scholars acknowledge. That that the former is 
condemnable and the latter is commendable, even within the framework of a 
“neutral” or “objective” perspective on ideologies in general, adds a value basis to 
the study of ideologies. In the words of Freeden: ‘certain ways of enlightened 
discourse may provide better ideological solutions than others’ (Freeden 1996: 554). 
Or as Steger puts it: ‘to opt for “neutrality” does not necessarily imply withholding 
value judgments from what the analyst might consider harmful or beneficial 
commitments of various political ideologies’ (Steger 2008: 4).  
It is important in this context to be aware of that a ‘critical’ conception of ideology 
can mean to ‘approach ideology as systems of ideas which are necessarily 
misleading, illusory, or one-sided’ i.e. to regard ideology solely in Marx’s sense, 
except for now seeing them as being co-existent phenomena (Steger 2008: 4). In that 
sense this thesis will not be critical, since that would be counter to the contemporary 
scholarly consensus regarding how the study of ideology should proceed. However, 
in the sense that a critical perspective allows for criticism on the basis of what would 
be the most beneficial course of (ideological) action taken for humanity as a whole – 
and not just for privileged parts of it – this thesis will be critical.  
In his magisterial work on ideologies, Ideologies and Political Theory: A 
Conceptual Approach (1996), Freeden argues that an ideology should be understood 
as a constellation consisting of several concepts holding different weight, so that: 
‘Central to any analysis of ideologies is the proposition that they are characterized 
by a morphology that displays core, adjacent, and peripheral concepts’ (Freeden 
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1996: 77). Here the “core” concepts are the most crucial to the meaning of an 
ideology, but the morphological characteristic Freeden emphasizes implies that (in 
particular) adjacent and peripheral concepts can be altered, or even replaced or 
discarded, to adjust an ideology to changing circumstances. Because ‘[s]ometimes 
the retention of a marginal concept or idea may be dysfunctional to the survival of 
an ideology’ (Freeden 1996: 79). Freeden provides an example of how one can 
understand a specific ideology as a cluster of concepts: 
For instance, an examination of observed liberalisms might 
establish that liberty is situated within their core, that human 
rights, democracy, and equality are adjacent to liberty, and that 
nationalism is to be found on the periphery (Freeden 1996: 77). 
As we can see from this example it is seemingly rather contestable concepts, such as 
liberty, democracy, and equality, that together can constitute an ideology, but as 
Freeden argues: ‘Ultimately, ideologies are configurations of decontested meanings 
of political concepts’ (1996: 76, emphasis in the original). This means that for 
instance “equality” in this case means “equality for the law”, so that no one should 
be treated unfairly by the courts on the basis of social standing. And not that 
everyone should have the right to an equal share of the surplus created in a 
community for example, which a socialist conception of equality could perhaps be 
interpreted, or decontested, as in its own ideological configuration. This view of 
decontested meaning as one of the central attributes of ideologies stems from the 
realization that ‘political language is employed to convey specific sets of meanings 
out of wider ranges’ (Freeden 1996: 77).  
Yet again we have an important point for the study of the particular ideologies dealt 
with in this thesis, since this kind of deconstruction of ideologies into configurations 
of specific decontested concepts is crucial to both analyzing and comparing the 
different potentially planetary ideologies scrutinized here. 
In concrete terms, an ideology will link together a particular 
conception of human nature, a particular conception of social 
structure, of justice, of liberty, of authority, etc. ‘This is what 
liberty means, and that is what justice means’, it asserts. 
Ideologies need, after all, to straddle the worlds of political 
thought and political action, for one of their central functions is 
to link the two (Freeden 1996: 76).    
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We here touch upon one the main features of political ideologies in the modern age; 
that their fortunes rise or descend in conjunction with their ability to garner public 
support for their political agenda. Schwarzmantel puts emphasis on this point and, 
following Gramsci, ‘see ideologies as links between abstract philosophical concepts 
and the political world of the mass of the people’ (Schwarzmantel 2008: 27). 
Though agreeing with Freeden that ideologies ‘are indeed assemblages of concepts, 
which seek to ‘deconstruct’ political concepts and organize them in certain 
configurations’ Schwarzmantel also maintains that ‘they are much more than that. 
Political ideologies are essentially practical forces, which are used to mobilise 
citizens to action’ (Schwarzmantel 2008: 27).  
While this mobilizing potential is certainly an important aspect of ideologies, the 
way it is presented here can give way to the presumption that an ideology is always 
a top-down product, which in the hands of an intellectual elite – be it a proletarian 
vanguard or a conservative clique – can be used to mobilize citizens. In addition the 
mobilizing potential of an ideology should also be considered as a potential bottom-
up occurrence, whereby a popular desire grips the polity and creates a political 
momentum for a cause (e.g. movements for democracy, nationhood, proletarian, 
indigenous, or religious representation), without this necessarily being in the interest 
of any existing elite. Ideological movements such as these are often partially 
founded on anti-elitist sentiments held by considerable parts of the populace. For 
example Bottomore argued that ‘modern revolutions cannot be explained by the 
activities of small elite groups – they are brought about by the actions of whole 
classes’ (Bottomore [1964] 1979: 66). And in a similar manner Rocker claimed that: 
‘Culture is not created by command. It creates itself, arising spontaneously from the 
necessities of men and their social cooperative activity’ (Rocker [1937] 1998: 82). 
In a similar manner a desire for a planetarist ideology could for instance be the result 
of a mass-media culture which constantly confronts the average citizen with images, 
text, and video that familiarize them with the idea of ‘a small, fragile and finite 
place, one planet among others with strictly limited resources that are allocated 
unequally’ (see: Gilroy 2004: 83). 
When these essentially culturally based ideological challenges to state authority 
occurs the only thing politically savvy members of the elite can do is to co-opt 
essential aspects of these ideologies by popular demand as their own. Through the 
seeming acceptance of the thereby altered ideological parameter they can maintain 
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their position as elite members in a changed political climate. This process, as both 
Rocker and Marcuse has argued, entails the elite assimilation and appropriation of 
the cultural framework the elites in all practicality have been forced to adopt from 
the mass of the people (Rocker [1937] 1998: 81-86, Marcuse [1964] 2002: 66-69). 
Through elite appropriation the intentions of the originators (e.g. the proletarian 
masses) will in all probability be perverted, or turned on its head even. But as I 
would like to add; this process has a dialectical dimension to it where the elites also 
adjusts to the demands of the more numerous, but usually much less powerful, bulk 
of ordinary men and women. This does not mean that the demands of the oppressed 
are actually met, but that a new modus vivendi is found, whereby their grievances 
are addressed sufficiently to quell the popularly voiced demands for the time being. 
Whether these grievances are first voiced through popular campaigns reported in the 
media, or through revolutionary uprisings in the streets, is not of particular 
importance. Revolutionary cadres, once successfully in power, often enough become 
an elite in themselves, separated from the masses. In some instances this process of 
essentially bottom-up ideology dissemination can tear asunder empires (such as the 
Austro-Hungarian one) and in others it can reinforce their strength (such as in the 
shift from Tsarist Russia to the Soviet Union).  
The ideology of national self-determination, or nationalism, rearranged the political 
landscape of the globe over the course of the last couple of centuries, often in 
opposition to the desire of entrenched elites, which tells us something about the 
bottom-up power inherent in the wide dissemination of popularly appealing political 
ideologies. Of course, ‘the national community’ can in a sense rightfully be viewed 
as an ‘elite-engineered construction’ (Steger 2008: 8). But the elite behind it often 
operated in a counter-hegemonic fashion where they confronted the real holders of 
power in extra-national capitals (this is the founding story of as diverse nation-states 
as e.g. the United States, Norway, Algeria and Vietnam). In these and similar 
instances the ideology of nationalism, with its belief in the principle of a people’s 
right to self-determination, worked as a unifying devise that once it had taken root 
amongst the majority of the population could not be deviated from by the elites (as 
that would amount to treason within the new national framework).  
The elites, once the specter of nationalism had become unleashed, became hostage 
to its logic, and whether they saw this as personally beneficial or not they simply 
had to accept the new political parameters once they had become embedded in 
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society as the prevailing cultural belief-system. Therefore some mostly ascending 
elites (e.g. the bourgeoisie) could take advantage of nationalism and use it to their 
advantage at the expense of other and often descending elites (e.g. the ancien 
regime) that were more strongly wedded to the old ways of rule. But if they had not 
done so, another ascending elite (e.g. radical revolutionaries) would certainly seek to 
direct the nationalist sentiments of the populace to their advantage. The point here is 
that elites either catch the prevailing wave of popular, culturally grounded (but 
intellectually identified and articulated), ideological sentiment and rule within its 
confines, or they do not rule at all (at least not by any meaningful popular acclaim, 
thus leaving tyrannical rule the only option left). This relationship between rulers 
and ruled in modern states indicates that when a mismatch between the cultural 
understanding of the populace and the way rule is conducted becomes too glaring, 
the political establishment will experience a crisis of legitimacy and the maintenance 
of rule by coercive means will increase significantly during such critical periods.  
Though a new ideological understanding of reality seldom washes away the existing 
elites completely, they often force the elites to make adjustments to their views of 
the scope of the political (who is included in the polity/treated as proper citizens), 
and its practical application (who gets what, when, and how9), which they would 
otherwise not have considered. In this sense political elites are often bearers of 
ideologies which originally stems from a popular desire for some kind of liberation, 
and it is first when they start using that inheritance as an instrument to dismiss all 
criticism, counter to the force for e.g. individual freedom or egalitarian politics that 
it originally was perceived to be in the eyes of the masses, that the ideology becomes 
a tool for elite domination in the Marxian sense. Then the continued ideological 
“mobilization of citizens” has lost its emancipatory potential and has become a pure 
top-down propaganda exercise in the name of the narrow interests of the ruling 
establishment. At this stage ideology has ceased to operate in any enlightening 
capacity, and gone over to functioning purely as the perpetuation of elite delusions.  
In short an elite faces the dilemma of whether to continue with an ideology which 
has lost its ability to keep it in a position of hegemony through the application of 
more coercive means (i.e. through pure domination) or to adopt a new ideological 
                                                 
9 As Lasswell famously put it in his Politics: Who Gets What, When, How published in 1936. 
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framework (or more often parts thereof) to reinforce rather than diminish their 
hegemonic hold on power. When the latter option is chosen it can be interpreted as a 
sophisticated maneuver on the part of the elite, but in reality they have also 
conceded to a popularly expressed desire for political change.  
I will argue here that these popularly expressed desires often emanates from changes 
in cultural perceptions amongst mass-society which the elites have failed to 
accommodate their politics to. Throughout modern history this is a recurring 
phenomenon, most markedly through the bourgeoisie revolution of the late 18
th
 
Century and through the proletarian awakening beginning in the mid-19
th
 Century. 
Intellectuals play an obvious role here, but mostly through pointing out the evidently 
newfound societal conditions and disseminating their insights:   
But while great revolutions are always fueled by pre-existing 
social grievances, to create genuine revolution these grievances 
must be articulated in new, forthright, and much broader terms 
than previously such as were actually propounded in the 1770s 
and 1780s through a veritable deluge of subversive literature in 
continental Europe, Britain, and the New World alike (Israel 
2010: 87). 
As we will see Steger pointing out in the next section, we are arguably experiencing 




 Century at the 
moment. Whether the contemporary elites will fail to accommodate to the present 
grievances and concerns expressed by the mass of the population or not is a question 
which we can only speculate about at the moment. But how far the recent crop of 
intellectuals have gotten towards sufficiently articulating the novelty and 
possibilities inherent in the present societal conditions is on the other hand a 
pertinent problematic this thesis seeks to explore in-depth. Because if people’s 
cultural understanding does indeed happen to be moving large-scale from a national 
to a global frame, this should in theory at some future saturation point precipitate 
political change in accordance with this new collective cultural mindset, and that 
could possibly spell the end of the nation-state’s legitimate existence. 
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Ideologies as Particularistic Political Articulations of Wider Social 
Imaginaries 
  Steger’s The Rise of the Global Imaginary is the central work for the argument 
presented here (Steger 2008). In it Steger argues that social imaginaries play a 
conducive role in framing the shape of all practically applicable ideologies in a 
given historical period. The social imaginary is a concept most famously used by 
Charles Taylor (see: Taylor 2004, and; 2007) who explains the meaning of this 
concept as follows: 
There are important differences between social imaginary and 
social theory. I adopt the term imaginary (i) because my focus is 
on the way ordinary people “imagine” their social surroundings, 
and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms, but is carried 
in images, stories, and legends. It is also the case that (ii) theory 
is often the possession of a small minority, whereas what is 
interesting in the social imaginary is that it is shared by large 
groups of people, if not the whole society. Which leads to the 
third difference: (iii) the social imaginary is that common 
understanding that makes possible common practices and a 
widely shared sense of legitimacy (Taylor 2004: 23, this passage 
is also repeated close to verbatim in; Taylor 2007: 171-172).   
Taylor has identified the major shift in social imaginaries historically as that from 
the pre-modern ‘enchanted world’ (Taylor 2007: 25) where religious beliefs were 
considered as descriptions of actual lived reality (which included an afterlife where 
God’s judgment would be meted out on an individual basis) to the modern ‘secular 
age’ where ‘the difference would [ ] consist in this, that whereas the political 
organization of all pre-modern societies was in some way connected to, based on, 
guaranteed by some faith in, or adherence to God, or some notion of ultimate reality, 
the Western modern state is free from this connection’ (Taylor 2007: 1).  
Steger employs Taylor’s insight but refocuses it and argues that it is not so much 
secularity that defines the modern era as the predominant belief in the nation-state as 
the only appropriate container for political life. Steger’s claim is that ‘we ought to 
treat the national not as a separate ideology but as the background to our communal 
existence that emerged in the Northern Hemisphere with the American and French 
Revolutions’ (Steger 2008: 9). Monarchs had prior to this considered the state and 
its inhabitants as their personal property, but with this shift which first took hold in 
the 18
th
 Century, the monarch (if he or she was to be allowed to continue to have a 
- 57 - 
position at all) was re-conceptualized as the foremost servant of the nation and its 
people. This was because suddenly ‘political communities, in order to count as 
“legitimate,” had to be nation-states’ (Steger 2008: 9).  
It was within this national framework, Steger argues, that modern ideologies such as 
liberalism and conservatism developed, where: ‘Liberals [ ] spoke of “freedom” as 
applying to autonomous individuals belonging to the same national community’ and 
‘[t]he conservative fondness for “law and order” received its highest expression in 
the notion of national security’ (Steger 2008: 10). In addition ‘even the ostensibly 
internationalist creed of socialists and communists achieved its concrete political 
formulation only as German social democracy or Soviet Russia’s “socialism in one 
country” ’ (Steger 2008: 10). 
The most important part of Steger’s argument is that ‘the rise of the countercultural 
“new social movements” in the 1960s and 1970s’ and ‘the ideas of the New Right’ 
which developed fully during the 1970s and ‘gained the upper hand across the 
globe’ ‘after the 1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union’ had their ‘most 
fundamental novelty’ ‘in their sensitivity toward the rising global imaginary’ (Steger 
2008: 11). The global imaginary springs from the perception that the world is now 
compressed into a single and intimately interconnected place which ‘increasingly 
makes the global the frame of reference for human thought and action’ (Steger 2008: 
11-12). It is for example the neoliberal or New Right’s focus on global trade and 
finance that shows its global orientation, while the new social movements tendency 
to advocate for instance human rights and fairness in global trade relations that 
indicates their global awareness. This tendency amongst a range of political actors 
thereby empirically grounds Steger’s assertion that: ‘The ideologies dominating the 
world today are no longer exclusively articulations of the national imaginary but 
reconfigured ideational systems that constitute potent translations of the dawning 
global imaginary’ (Steger 2008: 12). This is the point where Steger’s argument starts 
to become a bit imprecise. Because is the ideologies we have today really “potent 
translations of the dawning global imaginary”? My argument is to the contrary that 
the present ideologies in the system have not adjusted properly to the global 
imaginary yet, and the present imaginary for these ideologies is closer to being an 
international imaginary than a truly global one, at least in terms of the world order 
these ideologies are looking to uphold or institute.  
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Within this newfound global imaginary Steger identifies three major particularistic 
ideological articulations, ‘market globalism’, ‘justice globalism’ and ‘jihadist 
globalism’ (Steger 2008: 12-13).While I find Steger’s differentiation between the 
national and the global imaginary a theoretically very useful distinction to make, as 
it contains quite a lot of potential explanatory power, I disagree somewhat with 
Steger’s categorization of the major ideological players ostensibly working within 
the confines of this global imaginary. Therefore I have developed a theoretical 
device of my own to better differentiate between the diverse contenders in this 
ideological battle which, because of its global character, ultimately is a struggle for 
worldwide (and not national) ideological hegemony. This is why I use the terms 
“planetary or planetarist ideologies” instead of Steger’s “globalisms”. The reason for 
creating a new concept is because Steger’s globalisms bundles together too many 
completely different ideological visions of global politics.  
Refining the Conceptual Apparatus and the Units of Analysis 
  With the term planetarist ideology I want to convey an image of what Mannheim 
might have called a relatively utopian ideational discourse, or an enlightening 
ideology as I have chosen to call it in this thesis, that adopts the global imaginary to 
its full extent, resulting in the possibility of the complete transcendence of the 
national imaginary and its accompanying grip on humanity’s political institutions.  
Such an ideology, to be enlightening, would for instance incorporate a view of 
humanity as fully dependent on the wellbeing of the Earth and the sustainable 
preservation of the other species we share this habitat with, because this could be 
argued to be one of the fundamental facets of our existence. In addition, as 
established in the introduction, an ideal planetarist ideology would also have to be 
universal, or planetarist, and emancipatory, or democratic. Being “universal” means 
that an ideal planetarist ideology in principle would seek to promote the equal 
treatment of all human beings in legal terms, regardless of birth-place, economic 
status, race, gender, and so forth, which also means that discrimination based on 
nationality and the maintenance of borders stopping the movement of certain people 
would not be ideologically acceptable.  
When one couples universality and emancipation the result is an ideological stance 
favoring global democracy over other institutions. Particularly international 
institutions are not emancipatory in this sense, since because of their 
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intergovernmental nature they tend to disenfranchise the part of the national 
electorate who did not vote for the winning party. This mechanism functions as a 
global “first-past-the-post” system that sometimes results in a close to mono-
ideological representation at the international level. And this is one of the reasons 
why for instance neoliberalism has been allowed to shape international legislation 
practically without internal ideological opposition in international institutions the 
last couple of decades. Democracy also means that other ideological viewpoints 
would need to be allowed a fair hearing in an atmosphere of pluralistic competition 
at all levels, not just at the local one. Competition would in theory only strengthen a 
genuinely enlightening ideology, because it would reveal the ignorance of its 
competition.  
On this basis it is clear that not all of Steger’s globalisms would qualify as potential 
planetarist ideologies. Steger’s jihadist globalism with its Christian corollary in 
certain versions of Evangelicalism should for instance be considered as belonging in 
Mannheim’s category of the absolutely utopian. These religious worldviews do unite 
people across borders and continents, but if we take into account the early attempts 
to define ideology, these are the arch-examples of ideology in its negative delusional 
“idology” sense. In fact religion is nothing other than the original example of the 
superstitious notions the first advocates of enlightening ideology defined themselves 
in opposition of. To see where the other globalism categories belong they need to be 
further unpacked to allow for a deeper level of analysis, as they are not as 
straightforwardly dismissible as examples of pure delusional ideologies at this early 
stage. This is the task of most of the coming chapters. 
Of Steger’s main categories the only one it seems relatively unproblematic to 
include wholesale as a potential planetary ideology is his market globalism, and I 
will save a more penetrating analysis of this ideology and its contradictory 
tendencies to the chapter devoted to neoliberalism (a term which in my reading 
describes almost exactly the same ideological phenomenon). However the issues I 
have with the justice globalism category needs to be addressed straight away, since I 
have decided to separate this into two different ideological discourses for my 
upcoming analysis: cosmopolitanism and alter-globalism.   
As one commentator has pointed out, Steger’s ‘ “justice globalism” contains an 
excessive diversity of currents – radical and reformist, Marxist and social 
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democratic, unequivocally globalist as well as more protectionist – that do not add 
up to a coherent category’ (Soborski 2012: 338). Yet this is the closest we get to an 
articulated, potentially globally aware, alternative to the ‘ideas of neo-liberalism 
which provide the dominant framework for thought and political action in the 
contemporary world’ (Schwarzmantel 2008: 146). As Schwarzmantel argues, this 
incoherent mass of diffusive arguably left-leaning ideas, seemingly only united in 
protest against neoliberalism, does anyway have the markings of ‘a counter [-
hegemonic] ideology which exists at the moment in embryonic form’ 
(Schwarzmantel 2008: 171). This is an insight which makes it a most promising path 
to follow in the search for a potential planetarist ideology.   
It seems as if Steger has played down the significance of cosmopolitanism, which I 
would consider perhaps the most fully developed global ideological alternative to 
neoliberalism. Steger has been accused of ‘slighting the cosmopolitan debate [ ] 
which appears as one aspect of global justice ideology, but not as a comprehensive 
alternative’ (Brysk 2010: 18). Raffaele Marchetti used cosmopolitanism as a unit of 
analysis when he identified ‘four alternative interpretations of the notion of global 
politics: namely Neo-liberalism, Cosmopolitanism, Alter-globalism, and Dialog 
among Civilizations’ (Marchetti 2009: 134-135). Marchetti calls these four positions 
‘ideal models of global politics’ and excepting the last one which again seems to be 
grounded in religious proliferation done in mediaeval times his is a reasonable 
approach to the global political discourse and essentially the framework I will follow 
here (Marchetti 2009: 136). Taking into account the criticism that Steger mixes 
radical and reformist views in his justice globalism category, I will here separate this 
category into one (more) reformist cosmopolitan discourse and one (more) radical 
alter-globalist10 discourse.  
Conclusion 
  In the framework that has been set out in this chapter I have first identified two 
major political manifestations of ideological phenomena, delusional ideology and 
enlightening ideology. Whereas for example nationalism, especially when it was 
bound up with liberal democratic notions, once was an enlightening ideology facing 
the delusional ideology of absolute monarchism (and other ancien regime variations 
                                                 
10 I.e. ”alternative-globalist”. 
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based on aristocratic and clerical privilege), I have argued that today it mainly11 
works as a delusional ideology hindering functional global governance at the level 
of humanity. In my experience people tend to think that internationalism is the 
pinnacle of progressive thinking, but I argue that this is not true. Internationalism is 
still a notion tied up with a view of national sovereignty as a sacred principle, which 
is a fundamentally reactionary viewpoint in light of the enlightening quest for 
human unity on planet Earth. It has its roots in the kind of Romantic era 
ethnocentrism that was taken to its extreme by the rulers of Nazi-Germany, and 
though the internationalism that has been developed as a governing principle in the 
aftermath of World War II is a very progressive force in comparison, it represents 
only a partial dislodgment from the idea of the nation-state as the supreme force in 
world affairs. If Steger’s global imaginary were to be fully adopted as the 
Weltanschauung of a majority of the populace, this would in my reading be logically 
followed by an eventually irresistible desire for world sovereignty and institutions 
for ensuring the wellbeing of both humanity as a whole and the diverse ecosystems 
of the planet that our species finds itself intimately embedded in. The purpose of this 
thesis is to, through an analysis of the major globalization ideologies, see how far 
these have developed towards being actual post-national planetary ideologies.  
Since ideologies become forces for change through both bottom-up and top-down 
processes, by more or less reciprocal relationships between societal conditions, 
popular cultural identification, intellectual articulations, and political elite behavior, 
ideologies in this sense are extremely complex phenomena. But since they also need 
to be relatively easily communicable to ‘move masses of people to political action’ 
it should make sense to approach them as bundles of fairly simply identifiable 
concepts which will allow for their deconstruction, and this should facilitate a 
critical analysis of what is in essence different discourses concerning ‘the good 
society’ at the global level (Schwarzmantel 2008: 28). By applying a planetarist 
normative vision as a guiding principle the intention is to see if there really does 
exist an enlightening ideology (or indications of one or several) with actual global 
                                                 
11 Some nationalisms, such as the Palestinian, Kurdish and Tibetan varieties, might still have 
enlightening aspects to them, as they seek to emancipate populations that practically live under 
occupation by domineering nation-states. 
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scope, or whether that is a major gap in the contemporary and supposedly 
“globalist” ideological discourse.     
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Chapter 2. Nationalism – Internationalism/Globalism – 
Planetarism 
Introduction 
  Ideologies begin to falter and decline in their political usefulness when they cease 
to authorize the hold on power of those that employ it as an instrument of rule in the 
eyes of the masses, or what was the case in the pre-modern era; amongst the 
aristocracy. This happens as irreconcilable contradictions at an ideology’s very core 
become revealed. Once an undeniable and persistent mismatch between the rhetoric 
ideologues use to justify their political supremacy and their actual deeds unmasks 
them as irredeemable hypocrites the period of that ideology’s hegemony is done for. 
Rulers might still be able to hold on to power, but from then on they have to rely 
more and more on forms of domination of a less subtle kind – such as through 
economic and military means – coarse instruments whose constant use are likely to 
further grind down the reigning elite’s position of political primacy. In the end rulers 
relying on ideologies which have long since passed their prime heighten their 
chances for becoming perceived as tyrants, i.e. leaders with no legitimacy 
whatsoever to back up their rule, and the prospect of their popularly supported 
removal from power appears as an imminent possibility. The soundness of this 
theory of spiraling political degeneration – which in the last instance can only be 
reversed by adopting a new ideology – is something I will seek to both illustrate and 
validate through a series of historical examples in this chapter. The aim of this 
exercise is to argue that current forms of ideological hegemony is equally beholden 
to the same dynamics as found in the historical examples and later to be able to 
pinpoint possible irreconcilable contradictions inherent in these contemporary 
ideologies.  
For example I will in this chapter seek to show that the universalism inherent in 
Christianity authorized the amassing of temporal power by the papacy during a 




 Century. When European kingdoms 
regained their strength there then followed a period of ideational interregnum which 
by way of the Reformation resulted in the birth of the sovereign state system. The 
dynastic state managed to territorially compartmentalize the universalism which had 
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made the Church such a challenge to their authority earlier through the nascent 
development of a national imaginary that would eventually completely replace the 
mediaeval hegemony of Christendom and the enchanted worldview it had inherited 
from earlier. That a fragmentation of power following the breakdown of the Western 
Roman Empire should lead to a fragmentation of authority might sound logical, but 
how to rhetorically justify this, which pragmatically speaking was a needed turn 
away from universal authority, took many centuries to figure out in practice. An 
understanding of the long and winding road from the European ‘Christian-imperial 
style of thought’ to the nation-state worldview, which in the course of the twentieth 
century would become applied universally, is crucial to the argument here presented 
(Heater 1996: 57). My contention is that it is only through grasping the dynamics at 
work in the rare historical occasions when fundamental ideational change has 
actually happened that we will be able to understand the gravity of the ideological 
challenges presently facing humanity.             
Another aim in this chapter is to criticize and elaborate on Steger’s 
conceptualization of ‘the rising global imaginary’ and how it relates to 
contemporary ideologies (Steger 2008). I will do this on the basis that even though 
the notion of a global imaginary represents a very important advance in ideology 
studies which is worth building on, it is too imprecise in the way it is currently used 
to be able to convey what I here will argue should be viewed as a crucial theoretical 
difference between faux global ideologies, which I will call “international 
ideologies”, and true global ideologies, which I here will use the term “planetary 
ideologies” to denote. The point of this is to be able to properly delineate between 
ostensibly “global” ideologies that employ the term “global” as a rhetorical device to 
simply advance older internationalist ideas in new guises and those ideas which 
actually indicate a theoretical novelty pointing towards a true democratic polity of 
planetary proportions. I would therefore like to advance the argument that instead of 
viewing the historical progression of the ‘background’ setting for ideologies as now 
moving from a national frame to a global frame or ‘social imaginary’, as Steger does 
(Steger 2008: 6-15), we can amplify the explanatory power of Steger’s theory by 
adding a middle category I here call “the international imaginary”. I will also argue 
that Steger’s examples of ideologies employing a supposed “global” imaginary 
ought to be predominantly categorized as using this “international” imaginary on the 
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basis that their proponents are not taking part in a project aiming to replace the 
international system which is anchored in the sovereign nation-state.  
The existence of strands of ideological thought that does aim to replace the 
international system with a planetary polity, which we for example find in a radical 
version of cosmopolitanism (and which is a strain that differs from the better known 
reformist Kantian internationalist version of cosmopolitanism) enunciates the 
applicability of a theoretical global imaginary for categorizing ideological thought. 
But since it now has become commonplace to use the word “global” to describe all 
kinds of international and transnational forums and phenomena, I view it as a 
necessary clarification measure to abandon the term “global” when describing a 
universalism grounded in human civilization (versus a parochialism grounded in the 
nation-state, which intergovernmental internationalism to some extent continues to 
legitimate) and instead use the term “planetary” for this purpose. This latter 
operation brings us to the final aim of this chapter, which is to formulate the 
minimal requirements of an ideal planetary ideology on the basis of relatively recent 
theory concerned with the phenomenon of globalization in its wider understanding, 
i.e. where globalization denotes the long ongoing creation of a civilization 
encompassing the whole globe and not solely the creation of a global economic 
sphere since the end of the Cold War. The purpose of this is to create a Weberian 
‘ideal type’ (i.e. ‘Idealtypus’) which is a ‘conceptual tool with which to approach 
reality’ by means of ‘an attempt to capture what is essential about a social 
phenomenon through the analytical exaggeration’ or ‘accentuation’ ‘of some of its 
aspects’ (Swedberg 2005: 119-120). The main utility of creating an ideal type is that 
this makes it possible ‘to order several phenomena’ which in this particular case 
means that it will aid in creating a scale which stretches beyond contemporary 
phenomena such as actually existing globalization ideologies, and thereby facilitate 
the analysis and criticism of current claims to universality within these discourses in 
light of this ideal type (Swedberg 2005: 120). 
Viewing the ideational frames for a range of different ideologies through this 
“national – international/global – planetary” continuum which the inclusion of the 
ideal type allows for then guides me to the inference that only the latter category 
ought to be considered a properly developed theoretical background framework for 
the present articulation of enlightening ideologies and to advance the hypothesis that 
current globalization ideologies (i.e. neoliberalism, cosmopolitanism, and alter-
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globalism) are not fully planetary ideologies in this ideal sense. This is the 
hypothesis I will then seek to test in the following chapters:  
- Because they fail to deal with the irreconcilable contradiction between the 
current nation-state political framework and the rising “people-planet” 
imaginary (which now more and more authorizes political action in the eyes 
of significant portions of humanity and which in theory foreshadows a truly 
global political framework) contemporary globalization ideologies are not 
planetary ideologies.  
The crucial question in the analysis to follow in later chapters then becomes how 
severely (given that the hypothesis should not be rejected instead) these ideological 
discourses fail to take this contradiction into account.   
My conclusion to this chapter is that both the national and the international/global 
imaginaries at the foundational level now fit the category delusional ideologies as 
prospective enlightening ideologies would necessarily have to utilize the planetary 
imaginary as their ontological grounding. Crucially “enlightening” now also implies 
advocating a change from a nation-centric to a planetary centric polity, which 
potentially foreshadows a radical institutional reordering at the global level. The 
arguments presented in this chapter forms the categorical framework for the critique 
and analysis of contemporary globalization ideologies that follows in later chapters. 
The normative foundation for my argument is also laid bare, as the desirable 
ideological progression through time as I understand it ought to be the step-wise 
abandonment of delusional forms of ideology in favor of enlightening types, but 
with the added caveat that “enlightening” ideologies come with a limited shelf-life 
of their own which necessitates continuous ideological innovation and contestation. 
In a social and physical universe whose main characteristics happens to be the 
perpetuity of impermanence this is the only realistic assumption in regards to 
ideology if we want a polity able to adjust its bearings when encountering what 
earlier generations could not have expected.  
The conceptual framework described here hinges on an understanding of a broad-
brushed politico-historical trajectory where the sovereign nation-state is seen as only 
a contingent stage on the path towards a theorized future sovereign planetary polity, 
where today’s ‘complex sovereignty’ embodied in international institutions is 
thought of as a logical half-way point between the historical national polity and the 
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recurrently theoretically anticipated world civilizational polity (Grande & Pauly 
2007). To explain how such a wide-ranging historical interpretation makes sense in 
relation to contemporary ideological developments I have to start with a narration 
which accentuates how historically contingent the modern nation-state actually is. 
Importantly it took shape during more than a millennia of struggle with a universal 
form of authority (and at times also power) which took the unity of the Church and 
the Roman Empire during the reign of Constantine the Great as its ideal type.  
Universal Authority versus Territorial Power  
Created in the aftermath of the wars of religion, the idol of the 
“nation” haunts a world that now needs more adaptive ways to 
meet its human needs (Toulmin 1992: 195, emphasis in the 
original). 
  Before Toulmin’s “idol of the nation” fully entered the world political scene with 
the French Revolution – which is a pivotal event in the process of creating what  
Steger terms the national imaginary (Steger 2008: 19) – there had for quite some 
time been an uneasy relationship between ‘secular and religious authority’ (Strayer 
[1970] 2005: 20). This relationship, between what is more accurately called 
authority derived from conceptions of the sacred (right) and power derived from the 
capability to project coercive force (might) is a distinction which for example Frank 
Furedi recently have argued a persuasive case for the theoretical importance of 
(Furedi 2013: 1-2). In the European context this relationship had from the days of 
Constantine, the first Christian Roman emperor who ‘between 331 and 334 [ ] 
closed down all pagan temples in the Empire’, taken the form of collaboration 
between Christian clergy in different guises and the political leadership embodied 
for the most part in kings and emperors (Norwich 1999: 16). Pope Gelasius 
described it succinctly ‘in AD 494’: ‘There are two principles which chiefly serve to 
order this world: the hallowed authority of pontiffs and the power of kings’ (cited in; 
Holland 2008: xv). A befitting example of this form of collaboration is St 
Augustine’s ‘powerful, and Christian, justification for [ ] ungodly or unchristian 
behaviour by Christian emperors and kings’ (Wood 2008: 161).  
Initially the religious dimension was very much subsumed to the will of the king: 
‘over the centuries, while no emperor had clung to the protection of a pope, many a 
pope had clung to an emperor’ so ‘partners they might have been – but there had 
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never been any question, in brute practice, of who was the junior’ (Holland 2008: 
xv). This relationship was importantly put to the test after the year 1000 AD: 
Kings had been considered semi-religious personages and had 
had extensive influence in Church affairs. They appointed 
abbots, bishops, and often popes; they even intervened (as 
Charlemagne did) in matters of doctrine. Leading churchmen, on 
the other hand, played an important role in secular affairs, as 
advisers to kings, as administrators, as rulers of ecclesiastical 
principalities. The new leadership which grew up in the Church 
in the eleventh century at first sought only reform of the clergy. 
But it gradually became apparent that to reform the clergy the 
Church needed to be more independent of lay authority, and that 
to gain and preserve its independence the Church had to be 
centralized under the headship of the pope (Strayer [1970] 2005: 
20-21). 
These reforms strengthened the position of the Church vis-à-vis the holders of 
secular power, but ‘this program, most forcefully expressed by Pope Gregory VII 
(1073-1085), destroyed essential parts of the earlier political structure of Europe’ 
and the ‘Investiture Conflict’ that followed resulted in that ‘the Church gained 
leadership, if not complete control, of European society’ (Strayer [1970] 2005: 21-
22). This development, where the Church to a certain degree appropriated secular 
power from the kings in Europe and turned the earlier balance on its head, was made 
possible by the decentralization of secular power on the one hand (see; Wood 2008: 
170-171) and the centralization of religious authority on the other. The pan-
European organization of the Church was key in this respect. Whereas the kings and 
princes in search of new territory quickly came up against stern opposition from 
local lords or other competitors for wider territorial dominance, the Catholic Church 
had by the early 12
th
 Century a network of bishoprics spanning all of Western 
Europe (including parts of Central Europe and Scandinavia that was never included 
in the territory of the original Western Roman Empire). As Michael Mann puts it: 
‘The church provided normative regulation over an area wider than the lord’s sword 
could defend, than his law could order, than market and production relations could 
spontaneously cover’ (Mann [1986] 2012: 337).  
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries Augustine’s notion of a ‘heavenly fatherland’ 
or ‘patria communis’, though articulated by him much earlier ‘in the early fifth 
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century AD’, for a time replaced the classic pagan Roman patriotism12 which had 
been connected to the earthly fatherland, and which had been expressed in ‘Horace’s 
famous verse: It is beautiful and honorable to die for the fatherland (dulce et 
decorum est pro patria mori)’ (Hirschi 2012: 64-66). The Gregorian era was a 
period when the pope basically sought to act as priest-king, employing the immense 
authority of the prevailing Christian worldview at the time in an effort to gain 
earthly power at the expense of the kings who at this stage had no comparable 
ideational-authoritarian basis for their claim to power other than acting according to 
the will of God. This happened to be a guiding principle ‘ecclesiastical powers’ were 
in a supreme position to interpret ‘on the grounds of their privileged access to the 
spiritual domain’ especially in times when the earthly princes’ coercive capabilities 
were too weak to allow them superior influence over the body politic (Wood 2012: 
67). But as Papal command over the affairs of Europe reached its historical peak it 
set in motion a counter-balancing trend since ‘the Gregorian concept of the Church 
almost demanded the invention of the concept of the state’ (Strayer [1970] 2005: 
22). What happened was that ‘by separating itself so clearly from lay governments, 
the Church unwittingly sharpened concepts about the nature of secular authority’ 
(Strayer [1970] 2005: 22). This ‘led to a renewed approach to classical patriotism, 
though under markedly different terms [than those existing in ancient Rome]. The 
decisive steps happened from the twelfth century onwards, during the long and often 
critical consolidation period of Western monarchies’ (Hirschi 2012: 65). This late 
medieval ‘rise of royal patriotism’ would eventually significantly diminish the 
temporal power of the Church (Hirschi 2012: 71). By the early fifteenth century, as 
‘the Great Western Schism’ internal to Roman Catholicism came to a head, the 
kings had so decisively gained the upper hand that ‘three popes were simultaneously 
claiming to be the only one, and all were backed by different secular powers’ 
(Hirschi 2012: 81-82). 
                                                 
12 What distinguished Roman patriotism from its modern equivalent is that for the Romans 
the ‘common fatherland had constituted a city and not a territory; it was Rome, not the 
Empire, which held the title patria communis’ (Hirschi 2012: 70). Hence St Augustine’s 
“city” in the City of God might perhaps be literally construed as actual Rome’s heavenly 
opposite instead of being a metaphor. 
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That the kings of Europe were so eager to have the backing of a (preferably 
impressionable) pope indicates that they were acutely aware of the authority this 
connection bestowed on their rule. That they were not going to accept just any pope 
also goes to show that they had few qualms with using papal authority 
instrumentally as part of a wider calculus for amassing political capital and staying 
in power almost whatever the cost incurred in a supposed afterlife. We can assume 
by their actions that these were not political leaders easily blindsided by the 
papacy’s claim to be Christ’s appointed stand in on earth (i.e. Vicar of Christ, or 
officially; Vicarius Iesu Christi), but they also knew the risk it carried to be 
perceived by the populace and the nobles to be acting completely without 
ecclesiastical cover, since this was an era when both ‘revolt and repression alike 
were cloaked in the fervor of Christian justification’ (Mann [1986] 2012: 338). In 
the heavily religiously saturated climate of the late Middle Ages having God on 
one’s side could only be a boon for one’s future prospects as a successful regent. 
The point is that there are ways to power where the backing of authority, or what we 
in modern language could call employing an ideology, does not play a crucial role: 
having a superior fighting force and the will to use it (as e.g. the Vikings and 
Mongols had at different times during this era) is the most obvious of these, but also 
being excessively wealthy and thereby in a position to create an extensive network 
of economic dependants can accomplish the same goal of political dominance only 
through different means. But when rivalry for power grows fiercer even being in a 
position where one can utilize both coercive and economic instruments of rule is not 
necessarily going to be enough to maintain an edge over the competition. An 
aspiring conqueror therefore also ought to desire to be able to mobilize all the people 
potentially under his or her command into a normative community, which is one of 
the major political selling points for the different world religions, or in this context 
Christianity (Mann [1986] 2012: 369). As Michael Mann argues about the role 
religion played earlier, referring back to the work of Durkheim:  
…stable social relationships require prior normative 
understandings among the participants. Neither force nor mutual 
self-interest offered a stable basis for stability. Thus society 
depended on a normative, and ritual level, somewhat removed 
from the “secular” world of force, interests, exchanges, and 
calculations. Society in the sense of social cooperation was 
sacred (Mann [1986] 2012: 369). 
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It is this “sacred” normative layer provided by Christianity which both enables and 
constrains the actions available to the rulers of the mediaeval period. On one hand 
they are often able to utilize Christianity for their own gain, primarily by letting 
monarchs claim that their rule is divinely sanctioned, but on the other hand rival 
rulers with privileged access to the incumbent pope, or alternatively the pope on his 
own accord, can turn this religious authority against them – through ecclesiastical 
censure like an interdict or excommunication – and potentially undermine the 
popular foundation of their power, thereby suddenly turning a ruler’s claim to 
supremacy within their own realm into a venture purely based on their coercive 
and/or economic capabilities. Because these latter cases occurred with relative 
frequency it is easy to see what benefits it ought to bring to a monarch’s endeavors 
to have one’s exclusive supplicant pope and why it was possible that when ‘the 
Council of Constance’ started in ‘1414’ there were ‘three Popes simultaneously 
claiming to be the only [legitimate] one’ (Hirschi 2012: 81-82).  
The royal infighting that resulted in the historic ‘Western Schism’ of the early 
fifteenth century undermined the authority of the Church which the different royal 
dynasties themselves depended on for the proper functioning of their own rule, as 
the schism ‘helped to generate a climate of reform and outright heresy’ (Wood 2012: 
58). Since there was already a Patriarch in the east following ‘the lasting separation 
of the Eastern and Western Churches’ which occurred in ‘1054’, then in 1414 the 
office that was supposed to be the physical link between God and mankind was for a 
short time embodied in not only two, but four conflicting personages, something 
which could only give the office a lesser distinction than originally intended 
(Norwich 1999: 229-230). The political machinations of the earthly princes and the 
ecclesiastical elites themselves had by the early 1400s repeatedly put the sacred 
unity of Christendom at stake, keeping in mind that this was originally a Church that 
had derived its claim to universal authority from the formulaic early Byzantine idea 
that ‘the single king on earth corresponds to the single king in heaven’ with the pope 
as the exclusive mediator between these two (Peterson 1994 cited in; Agamben 
2011: 10, emphasis in original). At the time of the Western Schism a new pan-
European emperor of Constantinian caliber was evidently not forthcoming since 
early 15
th
 Century Europe had the following ‘big secular players: France, England, 
Castile, Aragon and the Holy Roman Empire’ – where no player could securely 
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attempt to eliminate one of the others,13 and even less found themselves in a position 
where it could have been feasible to subdue all of them – and this disparity between 
the ideal religious unity and the actual political fragmentation posed both a political 
and a religious conundrum only unwittingly helped solved by Martin Luther about a 
century later (Hirschi 2012: 83).  
Luther is perhaps most widely known for his criticism of ‘the mediaeval Church’s 
practice of indulgences’ and its monopoly on the interpretation of scripture, but as 
Ellen Meiksins Wood argues: ‘Inextricably connected with his attacks on the 
Church, not only its corruptions but its very claim to jurisdiction, are his views on 
secular government [ ] there hardly exists in the Western canon a more 
uncompromising case for strict obedience to secular authority’ (Wood 2012: 59). 
The essence of Luther’s intervention was that he challenged ‘the Church’s claim to 
temporal power and its usurpation of secular authority’ on the basis that ‘the 
spiritual realm is the domain of the Word, with no business in the sphere of 
jurisdiction or coercion’ and therefore the latter ‘is the preserve of secular 
government’ (Wood 2012: 64 and 70). Luther also gave ‘secular government an 
unambiguous claim to divine ordination’ since he maintained that both ‘temporal 
and spiritual realms’ should be understood as ‘divine’ and that they ‘reflected the 
dual nature of humanity, the simultaneous unity of sin and justification that 
characterizes Christians, whose human sinfulness requires the temporal sword’ 
(Wood 2012: 70). In short it is because humans ‘are at once sinners by nature and 
saints by faith’ that ‘humanity requires temporal authorities to whom all Christians 
owe obedience’ (Wood 2012: 63). The role of secular or temporal authority is then 
not to administer God’s punishment as the Catholic Church saw itself fit to do, since 
this is an abomination for Luther who thought it an act of sacrilege to place oneself 
in God’s stead and claim to know “His” ultimate intentions, and this led Luther to 
understand the role of temporal authority in the following terms: 
Since all human beings and all human institutions are tainted by 
unholiness and sin, no truly just and rightful order is possible in 
this world; and they must all subject themselves, by divine 
ordination, to the earthly powers whose purpose is not to achieve 
some higher principle of holiness or justice on this earth but 
                                                 
13 Castile and Aragon united through the marriage of Isabella I and Ferdinand II in 1469. 
- 73 - 
simply to maintain peace, order and a degree of physical comfort 
(Wood 2012: 66). 
Luther’s logic helped reinforce two already existing trends. Firstly it further 
weakened the centralized structure of the Roman Catholic Church and its claim to 
universal jurisdiction by turning “the Word” against it in a manner that could only 
have been accomplished from within the ranks of the clergy. But in a gradual 
process beginning while Luther was still a small child ‘the Spanish monarchy’ for 
example ‘had extended its control over many church appointments, from newly 
conquered Granada, to its lands in the New World and finally to the historic Spanish 
territories’ (Breuilly 1982: 46). Secondly it strengthened the position of secular 
rulers by tasking them, instead of the Church, exclusively with the maintenance of 
earthly order. Initially the ‘major beneficiaries of [Luther’s] attack upon Rome were 
the princely states of Northern and Central Germany’ (Breuilly 1982: 46). The 
English king Henry VIII’s historically well-known ‘divorce proceedings begun in 
1527’ is another example of the impact of Luther providing an alternative Christian 
legitimation for going against papal authority, since these ‘were not just about the 
separation of husband and wife, but a divorce between king and Pope’ (Furedi 2013: 
162).  The end result in the parts of Europe that one way or the other severed their 
formal ties to the papacy was ‘to produce national churches whose leaders were 
loyal to the monarchy’ (Breuilly 1982: 46). The mismatch between a universal 
religion and a plurality of secular realms is thereby solved, not explicitly by Luther, 
but by the princes taking advantage of his attack on the papacy to achieve autonomy 
over their territorial affairs through the gradual creation of a plurality of churches 
congruent with early modern states. However, it took more than a century of war 
(the European wars of religion, from about 1524 to 1648) before this state of affairs 
reached the point of institutional permanence in the Peace of Westphalia (see; 
Philpott 2001: 80-89).  
Machiavelli (1469-1527) with his ‘separation of the pursuit of political interest from 
morality’ which ‘represented a clear argument in favor of the autonomy of the 
political’ had foreshadowed this occurrence, but as Frank Furedi argues it ‘would 
take more than a century for Machiavelli’s separation of politics from morality to 
become clarified as a separation between power and authority’ (Furedi 2013: 167-
168).  It is not coincidental that modern realist international relations theory takes 
1648 as its historical starting point, because what happens is that medieval religious 
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authority is undermined to the point that this initiates an era of more or less naked 
societal power relations. A replacement for the religious authorization of power is in 
this period of ideological interregnum still only in the process of being articulated 
(e.g. with the work of Bodin and then by Hobbes), and once this is resolved – which 
is only properly achieved with the invention of nationalism in the late 18
th
 Century – 
it almost immediately backfires on the monarchs which have been basing their rule 
in the intermediary period primarily on a coercion founded mode of governance (i.e. 
pure power) while lacking the firm authority that justifies the exercise of power and 
provides it with a meaning grander than mere royal self-indulgement. Simply put the 
authorizing function Christianity once fulfilled for the secular rulers ceased to do the 
required work for them.  In the sense that Christianity operated as a political 
ideology – which grounds or more explicitly authorizes the exercise of power in the 
consent of the governed and functions as an instrument or technique for linking 
authority and power – it had provided a common meaning for a normative European 
community with the pope as its figurehead. This had given the pope a status above 
that of the secular regents. To counter this status the monarchs, in many instances by 
way of Lutheranism, appropriated the temporal power wielded by the pope earlier 
for themselves. This strengthened the regents and opened up for the creation of a 
nascent national normative community or ‘the Adelsnation, the nation of the 
nobility’ (Habermas [1996] 2012: 283). But it also weakened the hold Christianity 
had over the population more generally and thus also its capacity to provide a 
needed measure of authority to the actions of the rulers.  
The unquestioned moral foundation of medieval authority could 
not survive the loss of Christian unity in the post-Reformation 
era. It is likely that, at least in part, the loss of moral authority of 
the Church encouraged reliance on more explicit forms of 
absolutist coercion. It also led to the clarification of the secular 
distinction between the moral and the political and between 
authority and power. The process of clarification occurred in a 
roundabout way through the unconscious convergence of 
advocates of religious reform and secular rulers seeking to 
consolidate national sovereignty. Through this convergence, 
churches became increasingly territorially differentiated and 
subordinated to the imperatives of national sovereignty. But the 
cumulative outcome of the convergence of church and state was 
to establish the precondition for the crystallistion of political 
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autonomy and the detachment of the moral from political 
authority (Furedi 2013: 167). 
While Europe in the thirteenth century, as Charles Tilly argues, could have gone in 
the direction of both ‘a political federation or Empire controlled, if only loosely 
from a single center’ or ‘a theocratic federation – a commonwealth – held together 
by the structure of the Catholic Church’14 instead of ‘the form of nation-state which 
actually emerged’ the two former options were no longer a possibility after the 
Reformation and the Peace of Westphalia that followed in its wake (Tilly 2005: xiv). 
Universalism was practically shut down as a historical contingency for a period as 
multiple instances of ‘absolutist sovereignty’ asserted its dominance throughout 
various parts of Europe in the 17
th 
- and early 18
th
 Century (Teschke 2003: 171). But 
by the late 18
th
 Century ideas of a universalist tint again momentarily came into 
vogue as the Enlightenment experienced its high-point.  
The ideologies which saw their incipient formulation during the Enlightenment such 
as ‘liberalism and socialism’ were part of a ‘universal assault on privilege and 
prejudice’ of the kind associated with Habermas’s nation of the nobility found in 
early modern Europe (Bronner 2004: xii). It was also at this time ‘the idea of the 
nation as an organic cultural unit’ came to the fore (Schwarzmantel 1991: 35). ‘The 
democratic transformation of the Adelsnation [ ] into a Volksnation, the nation of the 
people, required a deep mental change on the part of the general population’ and this 
was a change which was set in motion first by ‘the work of academics and 
intellectuals’ that inspired ‘the urban educated middle-classes’ and later went on to 
seize ‘the imagination of the masses’ (Habermas [1996] 2012: 283).15  Once this 
ideational transformation has reached the societal outer rung of the masses, which it 
did for the most part in the European context ‘during the course of the nineteenth 
century’ (Habermas [1996] 2012: 283), the ancien regimes’ grasp on power got 
seriously imperiled, especially when those regimes existed in the form of  absolute 
monarchy.  
                                                 
14 Tilly also adds ‘an intensive trading network, without large-scale, central political organization’ 
presumably on the model of the Hanseatic League and ‘the persistence of the “feudal” structure 
which prevailed in the thirteenth century’ as other potential routes available at the time (Tilly 
2004: xiv).  
15 This is a description which relates to Gramsci’s ideas concerning the role of counter-hegemonic 
intellectuals. 
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The change from one hegemonic idea to another happened so fast in the early 
French case that when in ‘the France of the 1750s, [even] constitutional monarchy 
was perceived as a radical and subversive idea’ (Toulmin 1992: 141), by the end of 
1792 the newly minted French nation had established itself as a republic and 
abolished royalty altogether, albeit after a short and completely unsuccessful attempt 
at creating a much less radical reformist constitutional monarchy in the first years of 
the revolution. Marcel Gauchet points out what the foundation for this sudden 
political change could be when he suggests that ‘the historical effectiveness’ of 
religion was no longer operational from the moment the ‘reality of the sovereign 
State permits the new conception of a society carrying its constitutive principle 
within itself’ (Gauchet 1997: 58-59). What Gauchet is getting at here is the inherent 
tension created between authority and power when the regents of the post-
Reformation, a time when a process of ‘disenchantment’ had begun to set in, sought 
to distance their budding states from papal interference while simultaneously 
clinging to the pre-Reformation notion of a Great ‘Chain of Being’, which belongs 
to an ‘enchanted’ worldview, to justify their dominant position (Taylor 2007: 25-26 
and 192). The kings of Europe had momentarily gained in power at the expense of 
what would ultimately be a fatal loss in authority for their kind: 
…the more administrative authority develops and the more any 
imposition from above loses legitimacy, the more the logic of 
representation gains credibility. The legitimate organization of 
the collective body can only result in the explicit cooperation and 
instituting operation of its members. This idea and its practical 
development is given credence and disseminated by the action of 
a State which, while attempting to renew previous forms of 
hierarchical constraint, definitively undermines them. This State, 
in an almost suicidal manner, creates individual independence 
while continuing to presuppose the primacy of the social order 
(Gauchet 1997: 58).     
It is an established historical fact that the French Revolution (together with its less 
radical American counter-part) represent a pivotal event in world history, but just as 
Tilly argues that there were multiple optional routes open for Europe in the 
thirteenth century, the eventual success of the nation-state model was far from 
preordained in the early 19
th
 Century. Though the ‘final collapse of the ideals of 
Christian and Imperial unity in Europe in the sixteenth century soon led to a search 
for other methods of ensuring some cohesion’ it was not a given that this search 
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would lead to a coalescence around the idea of the nation even if representation 
becomes a logical next step as Gauchet argues (Heater 1996: 74). In the French 
Revolution the ‘forces of cosmopolitanism and nationalism struggled for 
supremacy’ and Robespierre in one instance at least saw ‘the human race’ as ‘the 
sovereign of the earth’ and not the people of France as the sovereign of the nation 
(Heater 1996: 76-77). It was not Enlightenment ideals per se that led to the 
formation of the territorially delimited nation-state, but a series of coincidences, not 
least amongst these the counter-revolutionary war imposed on the revolutionary 
government in France by the royal leadership of e.g. England, Austria, and Prussia 
(Bell 2001: 100-101). For a short time in the early 1790s the course of history again 
found itself at a fork in the road where going down the path towards political 
universalism was a possible outcome, but when this did not happen and eventually 
‘the nation-state had been reified as an inescapable fact of human life’ instead ‘the 
idea of world community’ retreated into the background like never before in 
European history: ‘What had been an indispensable part of the background 
understanding of political reflection from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment had 
now finally been relegated to the status of an unattainable utopia’ (Bartelson 2009a: 
170).         
The Enlightenment, Nationalism and Class 
  Nationalism boils down to the idea that the rational or natural container for political 
life is the territorially delimited nation-state (Hutchinson 1994: 122). For 
Christianity, as we have seen, the container was an empire commensurate with the 
Christian ecumene. And as I will try to show in the last section of this chapter, for 
those that do not agree with the rationality of subdividing the human-race into 
national peoples the appropriate container for political life is the planet Earth. 
 ‘Rousseau established the political importance of “the people” and of their cultural 
homogeneity and identity’ and this was a ‘democratic concept of the nation’ where 
‘the people were the nation’ (Schwarzmantel 1991: 28). But who specifically 
constituted the people has been a recurring problem ever since: 
But who were the people? How ‘inclusive’ was the nation? The 
history of this strand of nationalism, and in a sense the history of 
democracy as such, can be seen as the history of the attempt to 
widen the number of those participating in politics and hence in 
the life of the nation (Schwarzmantel 1991: 28).    
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The nation-state ideology initially had many progressive credentials, especially 
against the privileged position of the aristocracy, and it was because of the 
connection to the French Revolution that nationalists were perceived as the new 
“radicals” in the mid Nineteenth Century. ‘Nationalism’ was ‘at its beginning a great 
inspiration, widening and deepening the understanding of man, the feeling of 
solidarity, the autonomous dignity of the masses’ and it widened the conception of 
the people to include less privileged members of society, albeit universal suffrage 
was to come much later (Kohn [1944] 1967: 22).  
An ideology is here seen fundamentally as being a political technique which in itself 
carries no normative content. The normative content is added to it the first moment 
an ideology is infused with the needed specificity to operate in a given setting. 
Crucially the normative basis of an ideology cannot be the peculiar worldview of 
some eccentric ideologue. Political ideologies of any consequence need to have the 
‘power to move masses of people to political action’ (Schwarzmantel 2008: 28). The 
creation of an ideology with the potential for gaining a mass following usually 
means the utilization of some widely shared preconceived identity. This is because 
‘ideology always has the function of preserving an identity, whether of a group or 
individual’ (Ricoeur 1986: 182).  
One can throw an identity into sharper relief, like Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 
did with their conceptions of ‘Bourgeoisie and Proletariat’ as ‘two great hostile 
camps’ or ‘two great classes directly facing each other’ and then present one’s 
ideology, in this case communism, as the cause of the latter (Marx & Engels [1848] 
1998: 3). It is interesting to note that the empirical basis for seeing the proletariat as 
an agent of historical change did not really exist at the time they made this argument 
‘Marx and Engels must have been projecting the future tendencies that they saw at 
work in the present. In Germany at the time the proletariat in fact comprised less 
than 5 per cent of the population, and even in England the rule of the bourgeoisie 
was far from being “universal” ’ like they had claimed in support of their above 
statement (David McLellan in his introduction to The Communist Manifesto, Marx 
& Engels [1848] 1998: xvii). This discrepancy between reality and the main premise 
of their theory is somewhat ironic considering how much emphasis Marx puts on 
understanding the underlying empirical conditions as the real drivers of change with 
his influential ‘materialist conception of history’ (e.g. Marx & Engels [1845] 1998: 
36-62). But as McLellan points out; in 1848 Marx and Engels managed to identify a 
trend, and with time the variables identified as the drivers of this trend turned out to 
make a major political impact as the importance of both the industrial working class 
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and the influence of capitalists rose in political significance over the following 
century.  
Marx and Engels did however in their influential analysis miss out on a crucial 
variable which is of essential importance for the present argument. They assumed 
that the economic homogenization of human civilization would result in its political 
homogenization as well, and in this assessment they did not foresee the resilience of 
the third and still mightiest class at the time they launched their theory. This was the 
conservative faction in European society that in 1848 was largely the same ancien 
regime that had been temporarily overthrown in France during the revolution that 
began in 1789 (see: Mazower 2012: 4-9). This theoretical blind-spot continued later 
as a property of Marxism in general:  
Many Marxists have stumbled over the problem of the nation. To 
them the nation is merely an ideology produced by the modern 
capitalist economic structure, and hence it can and should be 
easily dissolved through enlightenment. In reality, however, 
Marxist movements that downplayed the importance of the 
nation found themselves unable to resist fascism, which rose 
under the banner of nationalism. Moreover, even socialist states 
resorted to nationalism, to the point that armed conflicts broke 
out among them (Karatani 2014: 213). 
There was a new liberal order in the making in 1848 that Marx and Engels could 
barely conceive the contours of when they penned The Communist Manifesto.16 The 
shape it took was not what they had expected. The bourgeoisie, understood mainly 
as the capitalist section of society which operates with an exclusively economic 
rationale (see: Marx & Engels [1848] 1998: 4-10), had not decisively beaten the 
enemies within its own ranks or those from the old aristocratic upper class. These 
enemies were described by Marx and Engels as ‘the remnants of absolute monarchy, 
the landowners, the non-industrial bourgeois, the petty bourgeoisie’ and together 
with other parts of society referred to as ‘the middle estates’ which included ‘the 
shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant’ they formed a political tendency that was not 
just conservative, but ‘reactionary’, as these groups ‘try to roll back the wheel of 
history’ (Marx & Engels [1848] 1998: 11 and 13). In addition there is a class 
beneath the proletariat, ‘the lumpenproletariat’, which because ‘of its conditions of 
                                                 
16 The latest of the texts here used as a basis to criticize the analysis of Marx and Engels is The 
Communist Manifesto and from the various prefaces that accompany its more recent editions we can 
see that it was either completed in ‘December 1847’ (Marx & Engels [1848] 1998: 42 and 51) or in 
‘January, 1848’ (Marx & Engels [1848] 1998: 45). In any case the work was finished prior to what 
Marx and Engels in 1882 described as ‘the Revolution of 1848-49’ (Marx & Engels [1848] 1998: 52).  
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life’ is liable to play ‘the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue’ (Marx & 
Engels [1848] 1998: 14). Aware of this array of conservative forces aligned against 
the universal interests of both the bourgeoisie and those of the proletariat it is quite 
surprising that Marx and Engels go on to remove these variables from their analysis 
and instead premise it solely on the existence of two world historical classes; the 
bourgeoisie, which they bizarrely given the historical circumstances claim have 
ruled for ‘scarce one hundred years’ (Marx & Engels [1848] 1998: 7) and the 
proletariat, whose future victory over the bourgeoisie they deem ‘inevitable’ (Marx 
& Engels [1848] 1998: 16).   
As the European wide revolution of 1848 came to its final stages there were 
widespread concerns that the radicals – the ones Marx and Engels put their hopes on 
for the future and whose strength had helped the liberals to overthrow the 
conservatives, at least momentarily – ‘would seek to exploit the widespread distress 
and kill the new liberal order at the very moment of its birth, by pushing for a 
second social revolution’ (Rapport 2008: 261). The conservative faction Marx and 
Engels had given so little importance to in their theoretical forecast managed to 
stoke fears ‘that the workers were intent on destroying the social order, or even 
civilization itself’ and this made ‘liberals and middle-class people [ ] willing to 
sacrifice some of their hard-won political freedoms if that would ensure a return to 
social order’ (Rapport 2008: 261-262). And so ‘the liberals [fell] in line with the 
forces of authority’ with the result that an accommodation between the 
conservatives of the ancien regime and the bourgeoisie liberals became the 
immediate result of the 1848 revolutions (Rapport 2008: 262). Not surprisingly, and 
in line with Marx and Engels assessment of the situation (but in the end not with 
their prediction) ‘it was the rural population that in 1848 lent its considerable 
support to the counter-revolution’ (Rapport 2008: 262).  
With the exception of France, which experienced a short-lived Second Republic due 
to the revolution of 1848, all the countries affected made reforms that instituted a 
constitutional monarchy, with a constitution, a legislature, and limited suffrage in an 
effort to end arbitrary dynastic rule (Rapport 2008: 411). The revolutions of 1848, 
instead of representing the triumph of the bourgeoisie and the fulfillment of its 
ruling class destiny, does instead represent an accommodation between the interests 
of the bourgeoisie with those of the more conservative faction of society. The 
ideational nostrum that ties the liberal bourgeoisie together with the conservative 
remnants of the old order is nationalism. This by Marx and Engels unforeseen event 
serves to severely diminish the cosmopolitan character of the bourgeoisie. The 
bourgeoisie does not cease ‘to nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, [and] establish 
connexions everywhere’ because of its ‘need of a constantly expanding market for 
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its products’ as Marx and Engels had observed, but it cements its foundation in its 
nation-state of origin in a way that did not fit as well with the universal nature of 
their enterprise. A political imperative, i.e. the need to share power to gain some of 
it, comes in the way of a purely economic rational.  
We can see this development through the transformation of nationalism, which as 
already noted in the beginning had very liberal characteristics: ‘Between 1789 and 
1848 nationalism was generally associated with republicanism and liberal reform 
movements seeking to overthrow the ancien regime’ (Delanty 2013: 173). As a 
result of the liberal-conservative accommodation after 1848, there were conservative 
elements of society that realized that the ancien regime worldview needed 
modification if they wanted to keep their position in power. Crucially this entailed 
not provoking the sensibilities of the mass of the populace to the point of rebellion. 
The solution the ancien regime moderates came up with was to appropriate the 
formerly liberal concept of nationalism to their own ends. In the process they 
removed nationalism’s progressive potential and made into a force with reactionary 
potential: 
By the late 1870s nationalism manifested itself as a doctrine 
aspiring more to territorial aggrandizement than to linguistic or 
communal self-determination. This transformation of an 
ideology that had accompanied liberal and revolutionary 
aspirations into a set of xenophobic attitudes by which antiliberal 
leaders sought to organize mass constituencies was a 
fundamental development of the late nineteenth century (Maier 
2012: 178). 
The conservative right’s embrace of ‘a populist nationalism’ that ‘could win them 
votes’ showed not only that they had come to accept living ‘in an age of mass 
suffrage’, but also that they could do this on their own terms (Maier 2012: 178). The 
conservatives this way managed to acquiesce to the liberal worldview, and that is 
arguably a more important ideological development coming out of the nineteenth 
century for the present than the supposedly predetermined clash between workers 
and capitalists as foreseen by Marx and Engels. Both developments were highly 
consequential of course, but the liberal-conservative accommodation – because it 
resulted in two of the three major classes being programmatically opposed to a 
further internationalization of politics instead of two of them being in support of it, 
which was what Marx and Engels had predicted – meant that nationalism solidified 
its cultural hold over the populace despite the countervailing economic trend which 
was towards the creation of a global system. In short, a conservative irrationality 
based on the elevation of cultural constructs to a sacred status (in this case the 
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nation) trumped a Marxist rationality founded on economic imperatives. That this 
was what happened can be further defended with a glimpse into the theory of 
perhaps the foremost liberal nationalist of all time; the Italian contemporary of Marx 
and Engels; Giuseppe Mazzini. 
Mazzini, famous for being a ‘proponent of Italian unification and independence’ in 
the first half of the nineteenth century, was also a great proponent of ‘modern 
republican nationalism’ which was a ‘liberal nationalism’ inspired by ‘the French 
Revolution and modern liberalism’ (Delanty 2013: 172-173). Mazzini also had a 
vision of ‘a united Europe based on democratic nation-states’ which meant that he 
was an inspiration to liberal nationalists all over Europe (Delanty 2013: 173). 
Mazzini offered one of the most influential liberal visions of peaceful co-existence 
among nations produced during the 1800s. But Mazzini’s was importantly a vision 
more inspired by Romanticism than by a desire to promote the economic concerns 
of the bourgeoisie. 
The Nation, for Mazzini, imposed a sense of obligation and duty. 
Its cause was altruistic and therefore ethical. Old-fashioned 
cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, idealized the self-centered 
individual and was thus egotistical. Mazzini despised Bentham 
and the utilitarians for this as well as for their materialism. 
Nationalism was for him above all about the spiritual elevation 
achieved through mutual aid and collective action, and as such 
rose above individual self-interest. Just as the family as a unit 
existed above the interest of any of its members, so did the 
Nation – and beyond the Nation, Europe itself, embracing all its 
constituent peoples (Mazower 2012: 49). 
It is evident that Mazzini thought mainly in terms of peoples, not classes, and that 
his concern was with the defense of ‘the sacredness of Nationality’ (Mazower 2012: 
53, and as cited on: 60). Mazzini’s pseudo-religious elevation of the idea of the 
nation was noted by the later anarchist critic of nationalism Rudolf Rocker who 
described Mazzini’s ‘whole philosophy’ as ‘a curious mixture of religious ethics and 
national-political aspirations which, in spite of their democratic exterior, were of a 
thoroughly autocratic nature’ (Rocker [1937] 1998: 60) Rocker further remarked 
that Mazzini’s ‘slogan, “God and the People,” was strikingly characteristic of his 
aim, for the nation was to him a religious concept which he strove to confine within 
the frame of a political church’ (Rocker [1937] 1998: 60). We can see now that 
liberal nationalism as it stood in the mid-nineteenth century really did not need that 
much corrupting before it could be made to suit a remodeled conservative agenda. It 
certainly had a side to it that had very little to do with economic rationality. In 
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hindsight Marx and Engels overestimated the rationality of the liberals while they 
also underestimated the cunning and resilience of the conservatives.  
When the irrational inclinations of the liberals melded with the conservatives’ 
willingness to accept reform on terms that could be favorable to themselves, a new 
ruling elite with a wide enough base to stay in power in the age of mass suffrage had 
been created. What is important to take away from this experience is that one 
ideology seldom rules alone, they often operate in partnerships, such as the one 
established between liberals and conservatives in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, which means that a society often in reality is ruled by a hybrid ideology that 
no one has properly articulated in theory beforehand. These are much easier to 
discern after the fact, but possible alternatives can be theorized if one is careful to 
include the relevant variables in one’s analysis. Though a lesson we can draw from 
Marx and Engels’ theory is that it is impossible to know which variables we can 
observe in the present it is that are going to be most relevant for future 
developments. Marx and Engels’ failure to see what was coming should be taken as 
a methodological warning; one should not try too hard to distinguish between one 
ideology who the present conditions indicate will rise at the expense of ignoring one 
that is perceived to be on the decline, because some kind of balancing act between 
all the ideologies operating in society at a given time is the more likely outcome.  
The impossible part to indicate with any confidence is what shape the balance of 
ideological forces will take more specifically. Any number of collaborative 
outcomes could result in one otherwise serious contender being excluded from 
having much influence. The radical socialists were the ones that were immediately 
excluded after 1848, not the ancien regime conservatives as was implicit in Marx 
and Engels’ analysis.  
And for instance in the aftermath of World War II it was the conservatives’ turn to 
suffer politically due to their failure to oppose Nazism and fascism in a convincing 
manner. This change was partially reversed in the late 1940s when: 
…the new anticommunist consensus and a growing fear of the 
Soviet threat helped the traditional bourgeois ruling elites, 
discredited either by their collaboration with the National 
Socialists or by their defeat in the face of Nazi expansion, 
rehabilitate themselves and resume their positions of power 
(Loth 2014: 37). 
After 1989, when the Iron Curtain was dismantled by the Eastern Europeans, the 
social democrats who had as their raison d’être the balancing of capitalist demands 
from the top and communist demands from the bottom of society (see e.g. Negri 
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2003: 246-247) had to give way to a reinvigorated neoliberal and conservative right 
and the ideological center moved further to the right again. 
The progressive notion of nationalism, where the association between ‘the 
nationalist idea’ and ‘the revolutionary ideas of democracy, implying national self-
determination’ had in the aftermath of the Second World War ‘been preserved in the 
form of anti-colonial or “Third World” nationalism’ (Schwarzmantel 1991: 33). In 
this ‘liberationist’ respect ‘secessionist anti-colonial nationalisms’ continued to work 
as an “enlightening” ideology for the oppressed throughout the latter half of the 20
th
 
Century (Vincent 2007: 172). But the anti-colonial liberation struggles were largely 
provoked by the more sinister type of nationalism developed in Europe by the late 
1800s where ‘nationalism assumed the aggressive and expansionist form of 
imperialism, concerned not with the self-determination of nations, but with 
colonialism and national rivalry, leading to the domination of some nations over 
others’ (Schwarzmantel 1991: 34).  
This is the mixed heritage of the Enlightenment; firstly it initiated modern 
democracy and gave us a crop of ideas which still ‘retain their radical character’ in 
‘political liberty, social justice, and cosmopolitanism’ (Bronner 2004: 1). But 
secondly, if we agree that ‘the French Revolution marked the political triumph of the 
principles of the Enlightenment’, it also bestowed to us nationalism, an ideology 
whose enlightening aspects today only apply to a handful of nations under various 
degree of control by foreign states (Schwarzmantel 1991: 34). These nations (e.g. 
Palestine, Kurdistan, and Tibet) can be considered mere statistical outliers in the 
context of the larger international system. Meanwhile in a Western post-war context 
‘the ideological practices of national socialism and fascism marked out nationalism 
for especial odium’ which proved to be an association that led to ‘both liberal and 
democratic socialist theories, particularly, developing more internationalist stances’ 
(Vincent 2007: 171-172). This form of internationalism is still in many circles 
considered the most advanced and progressive form of world political thinking, a 
point which will get particular elucidation in the later chapter on cosmopolitanism.  
Globalism (i.e. Global Internationalism) 
  Internationalism has been defined by Akira Iriye as ‘the idea that nations and 
peoples should cooperate instead of preoccupying themselves with their respective 
national interests or pursuing uncoordinated approaches to promote them’ (Iriye 
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2004: 9-10). According to Iriye there have historically been two main modes of 
international cooperation a) ‘cooperation and interchange between [ ] sovereign 
states’ or ‘what is meant by “diplomacy” ’ which typically takes the form of ‘a 
military alliance, a security treaty, or the like that does not alter the geopolitical 
character of a given world order’ (Iriye 1997: 3). And b) ‘an internationalism of a 
different sort, one that aspires to a more peaceful and stable world order through 
transnational efforts’ (Iriye 1997: 3). The first mode (a) I would call 
intergovernmental internationalism, while the second mode (b) can be termed 
transnational internationalism. Furthermore Iriye points out that there are three 
main strains of transnational internationalism:  
[i] legal internationalism, with a stress on international law and 
arbitration; [ii] economic internationalism, envisaging a global 
network of economic exchanges; and [iii] socialist 
internationalism, promoted by those who believed that world 
peace must be built upon the solidarity of workers everywhere 
(Iriye 1997: 3). 
This typology of transnational internationalisms could have been used to describe 
the core Western political ideas concerning how to ease tensions in the international 
realm around the end of the 19
th
 Century, because it respectively fits the designs for 
world peace associated with the works of: i) Immanuel Kant, ii) Adam Smith, and 
iii) Karl Marx. Interestingly there is also another conception of a mode of 
internationalism in addition to Iriye’s intergovernmental and transnational modes: 
Internationalism can be defined in two ways, either as a supra-
national organization of society which includes, preserves, and at 
the same time controls and limits nation-states, or as a state of 
mind which tries to visualize mankind as a whole, as a unit 
transcending all parochial (national or otherwise) groupings 
(Kohn 1971: 119). 
Hans Kohn’s first definition is not identical to Iriye’s (a) intergovernmental 
internationalism, but it describes the institutionalization it started to take in the 
aftermath of World War I when supra-national organization was gradually and 
partly turned into reality with ‘an imperfect institutionalization in the League of 
Nations and a more perfect yet still very inadequate one in the United Nations’ 
(Kohn 1971: 119). The other of Kohn’s internationalisms he describes as ‘a vision of 
the unity of mankind, frequently called cosmopolitanism or universalism’ which ‘is 
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a concept much older than nationalism is’ (Kohn 1971: 119). I will tentatively call 
this third mode (c) universal internationalism.  
Kohn’s universal internationalism is problematic primarily in two ways: firstly it 
equates universalism and cosmopolitanism, but what Marchetti calls ‘global 
cosmopolitans’17 do nowadays not argue for universal internationalism of this sort: 
“Global governance cosmopolitans” tend to recommend a multi-
layered, decentralized and fuzzy governance structure 
characterized by multiple decision-making centres in which 
states still retain a certain degree of national autonomy and, most 
importantly, only those agents who are part of a given socio-
political interaction are entitled to join in the decision-making 
process (Marchetti 2006: 295-296). 
This kind of cosmopolitanism is closer to (i) legal internationalism, which if we 
follow Iriye’s scheme is a subgroup of (b) the transnational mode, i.e. it functions in 
a cross-border capacity, where legislation is promoted as a tool to “control and 
limit” nation-states through intergovernmental institutions like the United Nations, 
so in the last instance it is states that agree on limiting their own scope for action. 
This is not a transcendence of the nation-state framework as such.  
Nation-states, and in particular the most powerful of these, are still the final arbiters 
on any question concerning the implementation of an intergovernmental legal 
framework. However, the moment a considerable proportion of states have ratified a 
law agreed on through negotiations at e.g. the United Nations or the World Trade 
Organization, it becomes supranational in a sense, but only if the most powerful 
states allow it to be enforced, which keeps the dominant states constantly in the 
loop. Kohn means another, earlier, form of cosmopolitanism here, which is 
primarily distinguished from legal internationalism by its advocates’ tendency to 
propagate the institution of a world-state. But as we will see later the now dominant 
form of cosmopolitanism do not seek to fully transcend the state-system or 
“parochial groupings” as he describes it. Secondly: Kohn’s universal 
internationalism is also problematic because if it is a vision of ‘mankind as a whole, 
as a unit transcending all parochial (national or otherwise) groupings’ the word 
                                                 
17 Exemplary scholars fitting this designation are ‘global cosmopolitans such as Archibugi, Held, 
and Linklater’ (Marchetti 2006: 295, footnote no. 13). 
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“international” in its literal sense meaning “between nations” does no longer relate 
to the concept as described (Kohn 1971: 119). This discrepancy is primarily a sign 
of a limited political vocabulary, not particular to Kohn, but in the scholarly 
community in general when it comes to dealing with novel phenomena through the 
use of now antiquated terms which were originally almost exclusively employed in a 
nation-centric context where everything on the outside of one’s own nation-state 
was in the “international sphere”.  
What Kohn alludes to with universal internationalism is the quest for a global polity 
which incorporates all of humanity into one all-embracing governing structure no 
longer centered on nations, or nation-states, as its constitutive units. The goal is, as 
Herder once described it, ‘to educate all peoples to become one people’ (as cited in 
Kohn 1971: 120). This is a political vision that properly transcends nationalism in 
the same manner as nationalism once transcended the absolutist monarchical state, 
but with the added bonus of also ending the distinction between inside and outside – 
‘friend and enemy’ in Carl Schmitt’s well known phrase (Schmitt [1932] 2007: 26) 
– which the nationalists inherited when they adopted sovereign statism from the 
former dynastic modus of political world ordering: 
The external sovereignty of the state is compatible with a variety 
of holders of internal sovereignty. A monarch, the people, a 
constitution, a dictatorship, a theocracy, can each represent the 
state within borders and be immune from external intervention. 
Compared with internal sovereignty, external sovereignty has 
remained relatively constant (Philpott 2001: 18). 
It is implicit that the sovereignty of the nation-state is sought replaced with a 
sovereign humanity in Kohn’s ‘internationalism as [ ] the unity of mankind’ (Kohn 
1971: 119). I therefore interpret it to be only “international” in the same way that the 
word “international” can be used to connote “worldwide” or “global”, lest it would 
be no purpose to make the initial distinction between the ‘supra-national 
organization’ he finds fairly developed in the United Nations of his day on the one 
hand and ‘mankind as a whole’ on the other (Kohn 1971: 119). This is an 
interpretation which is supported by a brief glance in the index of Hans Kohn’s work 
The Idea of Nationalism, where following the heading ‘Internationalism’, it simply 
says ‘See Universalism’ (Kohn [1944] 1967: 729). Quite clearly these terms were 
considered synonymous by the author. 
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Kohn’s universal internationalism is in other words a political concept so far 
removed from Iriye’s definition of “internationalism” and its political connotations – 
i.e. cooperation between peoples and nations – that we need a better word to 
describe it to avoid unnecessary confusion. Cosmopolitanism, as already discussed, 
does not fit perfectly since that is an essentially contested concept which often, now 
arguably predominantly, is taken to mean legal internationalism. Universalism is a 
term usually reserved for describing religions who will let any person convert to it 
regardless of ethnic or social background, and it is also somewhat archaic in its 
political usage, for example, introducing “universal” education means having a 
“nation-wide” educational system for children of all classes. Globalism could 
perhaps once have been a faultless match, but here we encounter a term with a very 
troubling conceptual connotation, especially in light of the contemporary usage of 
the word “global” which it is derived from. So here we end up on “planetarism” as 
an alternative with the same connotation that at least for the moment is less sullied 
by everyday use and abuse.  
The main problem with the term “global” is that it in the last couple of decades has 
in large part replaced the word “international” in popular, political and academic 
discourse. Often for no other apparent reason than it simply being in vogue or the 
fashionable thing to do. For instance, this is what “global” governance today means 
according to Ian Goldin: 
By global governance, I mean the institutions and processes 
which seek to manage global problems. Global implies they 
transcend national and regional borders and involve many 
countries. This definition captures traditional global governance 
structures, including [ ] the UN, WTO, IMF, and WHO. It also 
refers to the different players that participate and influence 
global governance and the management of global issues 
including regional alliances, the nation-state, and private-public 
partnerships at the global level as well as civil-society 
engagement in global affairs (Goldin 2013: 4).     
Here we can see that what Goldin means by “global” is at heart the involvement of 
many countries. His examples are intergovernmental institutions (the UN and so on), 
regional alliances which again are intergovernmental (the main regional military 
alliance involving Western Europe since World War II has been NATO, but the 
most important regional body has by far been the European Union), the nation-state 
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(which is the pivotal governmental unit), private-public-partnerships (read 
corporate-governmental), and civil-society. Civil society ‘is a much contested 
concept’ but it can be described as a term for any ‘formal or informal associations’  
one can find ‘organizing around shared interests that is distinct from the state and 
the market, though in practice these spheres are often blurred and interwoven to 
varying degrees’ (Howell & Lind 2010: 280). Typical examples of the larger, most 
prominent, civil society actors (the type Goldin likely refers to in the global affairs 
context) would be what are known as international non-governmental organizations 
(INGOs) such as Amnesty International, Oxfam International, or CARE 
International.  
 
“Global” is here then used by Goldin to describe what is essentially all the main 
actors in the international sphere of politics. All the above mentioned examples are 
either fully or partly integrated parts of the current nation-state based world political 
matrix. They work with the foundational status-quo in world politics, i.e. they 
revolve around nation-states, and none of them works towards transcending that 
basic structure. At best these overwhelmingly pragmatist entities advocate better 
functioning international organizations and internationally binding legal 
frameworks. Since Goldin evidently writes mainly about (a) intergovernmental 
internationalism and otherwise only includes the sub-category of (b) transnational 
internationalism, that INGOs like Amnesty International belongs to, namely; [i] 
legal internationalism, why not stick to the perfectly descriptive word 
“international” instead? The answer can only be that “global” has overtaken the 
meaning “international” used to connote in the professional discourse concerning 
what we could with more precision still call “international” and not “global” 
politics. If it was not for this semantic fad we would have a nicely descriptive term 
for (c) universal internationalism with “global” or “globalism” but contemporary 
usage has muddled these terms and made them too unrefined conceptually to get 
across that distinct meaning.  
 
There is one instance where Goldin gets it completely right with his use of the term 
global: properly global problems or global issues do exist, even though there are no 
“global” governance structures as such to deal with these, since these structures to 
be precise are still highly international or intergovernmental in character. If we 
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collectively as a species abandoned the nation-state and the attendant conception of 
intergovernmental internationalism tomorrow and replaced it with true global 
government structures for a unitary planetary polity, the truly global problems of 
climate-change, bio-diversity loss, financial-crisis, pandemics, and intractable 
poverty, to list some of Goldin’s examples, would not go away, but they would 
ideally become more manageable than they are now (Goldin 2013: 5-9). These are 
human-civilizational problems and to a large degree exist independently of the 
current international system. We are currently attempting to deal with them by 
employing an international governance system which Goldin himself argues have 
become outdated, though again in muddled language: ‘Global institutions which 
may have had some success in the 20
th
 Century are now unfit for purpose’ (Goldin 
2013: 2). The reason these are so useless is precisely because these institutions are 
international, and not global as Goldin claims, to begin with. Calling the 
contemporary political system “global” as is currently fashionable is nothing short 
of a category mistake. This conceptual conflation of “global” with “international” is 
making it impossible to fully address the core problems with the current system 
properly without further conceptual clarification. 
 
Martin Shaw argues that the national idea cannot be seen separately from the idea of 
the international, since: ‘Each idea presumes and is constituted in relation to the 
other’ (Shaw 2000: 28). Shaw observes that ‘it is a national and international 
principle, or nationality-internationality, that is pervasive’ in the present 
‘institutionally defined order of national-international relations’ (Shaw 2000: 27, 
emphasis in original). International relations, and here under also the prospect of 
international cooperation, follows from the existence of the national. Even if the 
result is cooperation between nations this does not lead to the transcendence of the 
national dimension of politics as some uses of internationalism imply (such as 
Kohn’s). Internationalism understood from this perspective then means cooperation 
between states, which still is what the closest form of international organization we 
have today in the European Union is about. Cooperation between nations does not 
inexorably lead to universalism, but it leads to a usually much more limited 
internationalism. The national-international system would be transcended in internal 
European affairs if the states in the union agreed to be incorporated into a singular 
sovereign entity and dropped the current intergovernmental practice, but that is not 
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the present reality. Had a similar fusion of political sovereignty happened worldwide 
a global state would have been founded and we would have decisively transcended 
today’s national-international system. This universal or – if we acknowledge that no 
member of our species has ever been outside the gravitational bounds of the Earth – 
planetary polity is what represents the opposite of the nation-state. Shaw explains 
why nationality and internationality are more closely related concepts than what 
many people think: 
Internationality is [ ] not, as sometimes supposed, the general 
opposite of nationality. The idea of internationality understands 
relations between and beyond nations in terms of the national 
principle. However, in a national-international world, 
antagonistic international relations reinforce separated 
nationalities. Cooperative international relations, in contrast, 
internationalize and partially transcend nationality. In a national-
international order the tension between universal and particular 
can only be expressed in terms of inter-nationality. In this sense, 
in some circumstances, internationality is opposed to nationality 
(Shaw 2000: 28, added emphasis). 
What Shaw here calls “the national principle” is pretty much the same as Steger’s 
“national imaginary”. Shaw nonetheless argues that the relationship between the 
national and the international is so intimately connected that he calls the present era 
‘the national-international era’ (Shaw 2000: 29). Shaw’s insistence that we are 
dealing with two interlinked phenomena with the national and the international 
spheres, and not two poles in contention, raises an objection to Steger’s use of the 
terms the national- and the global imaginary. Because if one is not careful to 
distinguish between international ideological varieties and truly global ones, one 
could inadvertently be categorizing ideologies that represent two sides of the same 
“national-international” coin into camps that are supposedly much more starkly 
differentiated.  
My contention is that the concept of planetarism can be employed to more fully 
identify the qualitative ‘rupture’ Steger’s concept of the global imaginary really is 
aiming to denote (Steger 2013: 221). The categorization system Steger operates with 
therefore needs to be supplemented for the purpose of conceptual clarification. So 
that instead of operating with articulations of the national and the global imaginary, 
it would add a middle category with an “international imaginary” which as Shaw 
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puts it could be a category for the kind of internationalism that ‘partially transcend 
nationality’ – but not fully – and which ‘in some circumstances’ – but not always – 
‘is opposed to nationality’ (Shaw 2000: 28). That would leave the global imaginary 
as a category for ideologies that completely transcend the national imaginary, 
because at present it is mostly used in the capacity here reserved for the proposed 
international imaginary (see: Steger 2005a, Steger 2008, and Steger 2013).  
Planetarism (i.e. Planetary Polity-ism) 
  Since “Globalism”, “global”, and “globalist” now are used to describe what in 
essence are still international projects, phenomena, and actors, we need a more 
precise term for describing (c) universal internationalism, because that is itself a far 
too imprecise term because its nominal connection to internationalism confuses its 
diametrical conceptual difference to internationalism proper when this is ultimately 
grounded in the nation-state. Since universal internationalism is grounded in a 
holistic conception of humanity, whose species habitat is broadly co-extensive with 
the planet, I therefore employ the terms “planetarism”, with the attendant terms 
“planetary”, and “planetarist”, to more accurately convey the exact meaning of what 
once was sought described with the imprecise term “universal internationalism” 
which nonetheless was used by Kohn as a signifier for a concept of monumental 
theoretical significance.  
 
These terms derived from “planetary” are semantically synonymous to the family of 
global terms, but they are conceptually linked to (c) universal internationalism, 
which seeks to transcend the nation-state system completely and replace its 
international/global governance matrix with a planetary polity of ultimately 
worldwide geographical proportions and all-inclusive membership, and not to (a) 
intergovernmental internationalism or (b) transnational internationalism, which only 
seeks to either ensure the existence of institutional diplomatic channels or reform 
how the nation-state system operates in specific respects. That is not to claim that 
intergovernmental internationalism and transnational internationalism are so closely 
related to an older nationalist worldview as to make the proponents of these 
international strains ideationally indistinguishable from nationalists. There is a world 
of difference between Marx’s socialist internationalism or Smith’s economic 
internationalism and the autarchic nationalism/statism it distances itself from, but 
the ideas relating to international free-trade and the international proletarian class 
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should be interpreted as signposts of a move from Steger’s theorized national 
imaginary to a global imaginary that indicates the arrival at a half-way point 
between these, namely the international imaginary I argued for above (Steger 2008).  
 
My theory hinges here on the application of the planetary terms to indicate how the 
painstaking evolution from the Westphalian “year zero” of the sovereign state-
system in 1648 has now led to a discernible trend towards novel planetarist 
ideologies, whose existence, as I also will argue, is a necessary precondition or 
formative step on the way towards the institution of a novel post-national planetary 
polity.  
 
It took the national imaginary roughly 200 years to replace the “dynastic imaginary” 
that initially resulted from the Peace of Westphalia in Europe. The national 
imaginary had substantially been replaced by an international imaginary by the mid-
twentieth century (with World War II being the crucial event which hastened its 
descent from ideational predominance). The international imaginary began to be 
challenged already by the late 1960s when Keynesianism, embedded liberalism, 
communism, social democracy, and all the winning political formulas adopted 
worldwide at the end of the Second World War began to lose their hegemonic 
position in the minds of significant parts of the populace, with 1968 as the pivotal 
year in this respect (see: Katsiaficas 1987).  
 
Steger has then argued that ‘the global imaginary’ started its rise to prominence 
around this time, particularly in economic globalist form, and this essentially 
capitalist ideational mode received a tremendous boost with the implosion of the 
Soviet-led communist Eastern-bloc in 1989-1991 (Steger 2008). But as I argued 
above, there is no clear conceptual demarcation between what I have here chosen to 
call “the international imaginary” half-way point and Steger’s presentation of the 
global imaginary. I therefore think these better could be understood as two different 
stages of the international imaginary, where the first co-exists with the Cold War era 
(late 1940s to late 1980s) and the other with what we can call “the era of 
Globalization” (early 1990s to the present). In this manner you get the international 
imaginary mark one and mark two, with the latter being informed the most by what 
Steger calls the global imaginary (which paradoxically is still internationalist).  
- 94 - 
 
The global imaginary I suggest – that would be a conceptual category capable of 
separating planetarist ideologies from internationalist ideologies – would then be 
different from the global imaginary the way Steger so far has chosen to employ it in 
the same way that the term “global” in regular usage equals international while 
“planetary” could be one alternative employed if you want to denote a pan-global 
political phenomenon. Bluntly put one could say that internationalism is far from 
dead, since today it continues to exist under the alias of globalism. This might be an 
exaggeration though, because even if there is not a difference in kind between the 
post-war hey-day of internationalism and the internationalism that still exists in our 
supposedly “globalized” present, there is a difference in degree. The 
internationalism we observe today is vastly more complex and integrated than the 
internationalism of the 1950s and 1960s, and it is also farther removed from the 
foundational unit of the nation-state. But the point is that it has by no means yet 
transcended the old internationalism completely and reached the planetary stage here 
theorized, where human civilization and the polity in charge of its political course is 
commensurate entities. For that to become a theoretical possibility we first need 
planetarist ideologies which I will claim currently are non-existent in popular 
politics. I write “in popular politics” because the development of diverse planetarist 
ideologies has been attempted theoretically numerous times already. What follows 
are some of the more pertinent examples. 
 
Approximations of Planetarist Thought 
  Ernesto Balducci, a Catholic priest, argued for a new understanding of ‘planetary 
man’ as the basis for a necessary paradigmatic shift away from ‘the domination 
paradigm of modernity’ because now (Malucchi 2011: 522): 
…at last man understands that [ ] the biosphere is not the space 
under his dominion, but the organism in which his spiritual life 
throbs. His love of water, fire, the sun, the moon, plants and 
animals is a condition of his love for himself: if he is the master 
that all creatures must obey, he is also the servant that must obey 
all creatures (Balducci 1989: 176, as cited in; Malucchi 2011: 
522).  
Balducci’s argument, perhaps not surprisingly when we take his vocational training 
into account, shares a universalist streak with the erstwhile rhetoric of medieval 
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Christendom. But the important realization here is based on the relatively novel 
understanding that the interdependence between our own species and life on planet 
Earth in general forms an organic unity, which humanity has no choice but to serve 
in the future if it desires to perpetuate its existence. This builds on a whole range of 
authors which, particularly from the 1960s on, began to theorize about the adverse 
effects of the increasing industrialization of human civilization with its concomitant 
pollution of the natural world (prominent examples are; Carson 1962, and; 
Meadows, et al. 1972). According to Malucchi ‘this planetary interdependence was 
affirmed on a scientific level by Lovelock’ and I therefore infer that Lovelock’s 
famous Gaia theory also helped influence Balducci’s thought (Malucchi 2011: 524, 
see also: Lovelock [1979] 2000).  
This heightened awareness of humanity’s place in a larger more or less fine-tuned 
ecological system – which we thanks to the industriousness and inventiveness of our 
species in recent centuries have gained the collective power to alter negatively – has 
led to a novel change in ethics: ‘While the old ethics were anthropocentric, founded 
on the supremacy of humankind over the world and nature, the new ethics are 
planetary, meaning that humankind must no longer be used as the parameter, but 
instead the global horizon over which the effects of his action extend’ (Malucchi 
2011: 524). Others who agree with Balducci’s tenets have reached the conclusion 
that this ‘community of planetary destiny imposes a civilization policy of the Earth 
on all humanity’ (Bocchi & Ceruti 2004: 145, as cited in Malucchi 2011: 524). 
Another important theorist with a planetarist inclination, Edgar Morin, is also 
associated with ideas similar to Balducci’s (Malucchi 2011: 524).  
Edgar Morin’s work Homeland Earth (1999) is one of the most lucid explications of 
the planetary imaginary to date. In this work Morin sets out most of the important 
hallmarks of ‘the Planetary Era’ which he claims starts already with the European’s 
discovery of the Americas which thus united ‘the Old and the New Worlds’ into a 
nascent planetary system (Morin & Kern 1999: 6). Though it has been 500 years in 
the making, humanity still finds itself in what Morin call’s ‘the Planetary Iron Age’ 
(Morin & Kern 1999: 8).  
Morin recognizes that ‘economic globalization’ and ‘the global economy is 
increasingly manifesting the nature of an interdependent world’ (Morin & Kern 
1999: 17). But his most interesting contribution is his focus on ideational aspects of 
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this interdependence such as his claim that ‘there now exist [ ] indications of a 
planetary consciousness’ (Morin & Kern 1999: 19). This embryonic planetary 
consciousness is according to Morin evident in: 1) the threat still posed to all 
humanity by nuclear weapons, 2) ‘the emergence of a planetary ecological 
consciousness’, 3) the inclusion of ‘the Third World’ with ‘the process of 
decolonization’ whereby problems specific to the Third World, relating to 
‘demography, nutrition, development’ are ‘being recognized as problems of the 
entire world as such’, 4) ‘for better or worse, the development of a global 
civilization’, 5) a burgeoning ‘cosmopolitan culture – the culture of the Planetary 
Era’, 6) ‘the formation of a planetary folklore’ mainly ongoing since the 1920s 
through movies, television, and music, 7) ‘planetary teleparticipation’ beginning in 
the 1950s when televised images of wars and disasters made possible ‘fleeting 
transports of compassion and the feeling of belonging to the same community of 
destiny, which henceforth is the community of planet Earth’, 8) and finally images 
of the whole Earth captured from space which have made ‘the sense that there is a 
planetary entity to which we all belong, and that there are problems of a global 
nature [ ] more concrete’ (Morin & Kern 1999: 19-24). Taking into account this 
whole array of factors Morin concludes that: 
To the ancient bioanthropological substrate that constitutes the 
unity of the human species is henceforth added a 
communicational, civilizational, cultural, economic, 
technological, intellectual, and ideological fabric. The human 
species henceforth takes the form of humanity. From now on 
humanity and the Earth can manifest themselves in their unity, 
which is not only a physical and biospheric, but a historical 
unity: that of the Planetary Era (Morin & Kern 1999: 24).  
Morin is well aware that ‘there is not yet a common consciousness’ of this 
‘community of destiny’, and his claim is therefore qualified to that ‘Globalism is on 
the rise, but we are just waking up to the fact’ (Morin & Kern 1999: 24-25). When 
one notes Morin’s use of the word “Globalism” here, it is conceptually speaking 
“Planetarism” he is talking about. 
Another advocate for a change away from a nation-centric mindset to a planetary-
centric one is Kennedy Graham who defined and elaborated on ‘the planetary 
interest’ as follows: 
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…the interest of the planet, comprising: (1) the survival and 
viability of humanity, contingent on maintenance of the physical 
integrity of the Earth and the protection of its ecological systems 
and biosphere from major anthropogenic change; and (2) the 
universal improvement in the human condition in terms of basic 
human needs and fundamental human rights. Use of the word 
“planet” here signifies more than the physical properties of the 
Earth. It denotes a political construct comparable in kind to, but 
different in scale from, the nation-state. No institutional reality 
currently reflects this; that is the problem [ ]. But the absence of 
the institutional reality does not preclude the introduction of the 
political construct - indeed it necessitates it (Graham 1999: 7). 
Graham, who is a prominent member of New Zealand’s Green Party, here goes to 
the core of the problem, the mismatch between institutional reality and the ideal 
political construct which I would call a planetary polity commensurate with our 
human civilization, which now is manifestly planetary in scope (as opposed to the 
chauvinistic notion that civilization was something that only existed in Europe or for 
example if human civilization were to settle other planets in the solar-system in the 
distant future and become “interplanetary”).  
Karl-Otto Apel is also aware of this contradiction at the heart of contemporary 
politics. Apel argues that ‘the development of social institutions itself has passed 
that stage where the regulation of human interaction can find its most integrative and 
its highest moral authority in the (national) state, as had been suggested by Hegel’ 
(Apel 1991: 263, added emphasis). One of the reasons this stage is now passed is for 
Apel that ‘there is a new relationship between humankind and nature, or, rather, 
between us and our ecosphere’ thanks to the recently acquired knowledge that 
nature, with its bounty and its resources, is not ‘inexhaustible, as people have 
thought it to be throughout history’ (Apel 1991: 264). Seen in relation to the 
simultaneously occurring globalization of ‘the international economy’ this leads 
Apel to conclude that we are in the process of developing ‘a planetary macroethics 
for humankind’ (Apel 1991: 261 and 263). 
…each of us is now expected to share at least some 
responsibility for the emissions of industrial plants [ ] or for the 
preservation of forests on a global scale, for the very climate and 
the atmosphere of the entire planet, and at the same time each of 
us must feel responsible as a citizen – [ ] as the reader of a 
newspaper or a voter – for the politics, say, of the World Bank 
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with regard to Third World debt. Thus it appears that in both 
dimensions of cultural evolution, namely that of technological 
interventions in nature and in social interaction, a global 
situation has been brought about in our time that calls for a new 
ethics of shared responsibility [ ] for a type of ethics that in 
contradistinction to the traditional or conventional forms of 
ethics, may be designated a (planetary) macroethics (Apel 1991: 
264). 
A planetary macroethics of the kind Apel here argues for comes about through a 
change in empirical circumstances, just like national ‘mesoethics’18 once developed 
as a consequence of the centralization of dynastic power in budding states (Apel 
1991: 261). Similar to how Marx viewed the idea of communism, this macroethics is 
for Apel not the expression of some fantasist utopian desire –  where one seeks to 
mould the world into an idealized image – but rather the other way around; it is an 
ethics that is in the process of being adjusted to fit the presently existing conditions. 
According to Apel: ‘We are living today, for the first time in history, in a planetary 
civilization that at least in some vital respects – culture, science, technology, and 
economy – has been unified to such an extent that we have become members of a 
real communicating community’ (Apel 1991: 269, added emphasis).  
Apel’s assertion that there is a really existing global community is controversial. 
Jens Bartelson for example argues that: ‘If democratic governance presupposes a 
community in order to be legitimate, global governance cannot be democratically 
legitimate since there is no corresponding community at the global level that could 
bestow it with legitimacy’ (Bartelson 2009b: 36). I think both Apel and Bartelson 
are partly right here, because what is going on can be described with greater 
precision as ‘now we are beginning to live in a global community’ (Singer 2004: 
196, added emphasis). And that is a global community which at present is just 
organized in the most rudimentary and haphazard fashion.  
It is this just emergent property which makes it currently possible to wonder what 
‘the political institutions serving the self-constitution of the planet-wide human 
community’ will be like as Zygmunt Bauman does (Bauman 2011: 25). At the same 
time one ‘may ponder, in a worried way, whether the presently available frames of 
“international politics” can accommodate the practices of the emergent global 
                                                 
18 Apel’s ‘microethics’ is confined to ‘small groups’ (Apel 1991: 261). 
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polity’ especially in light of the countervailing rationale of organizations like ‘the 
United Nations’ which was ‘briefed at its birth to guard and defend the undivided 
and unassailable sovereignty of the state over its territory’ (Bauman 2011: 25). We 
can here with Bauman see the contours of an irreconcilable contradiction at the heart 
of the dominant ideology (in this case nationalism or the national imaginary), with 
the existence of fragmented power – unevenly divided as it is amongst modern-
states – and a newfound source of universal authority grounded in what is perceived 
to be the interests of the human species and life on Earth. The last time a similar 
ideational discrepancy occurred at the threshold where authority is meant to fuse 
with power the universal authority of the Church lost out in the end to the particular 
power of the monarchs. The monarchs then went on to create their own mini-
versions of the early Byzantine Empire, which in their own territorial bubbles fit the 
neat formula of “the single king on earth” that mirrored “the single king in heaven”. 
This time around the victory of the challenger to the status quo would imply a 
reversal of that outcome, where particularity again has to give way to universality. 
Theoretically a turn to universality would accord a planetary polity with 
unprecedented legitimacy since, as Bartelson argues: ‘the only prima facie 
legitimate demos must be coextensive with mankind as a whole’ (Bartelson 2009b: 
37). But as Gallopín and Ruskin reminds us: ‘In the absence of a widely shared 
awareness of the necessity for change and a positive alternative vision of the future, 
the inertia of complacency and vested interest restrains social transition’ (Gallopín 
& Ruskin 2002: 8). One way this awareness can be raised and a positive alternative 
vision of the future can become widely shared is through the articulation of a single 
or several enlightening planetary or planetarist ideologies. 
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Chapter 3. Why Neoliberalism is Not a Planetary 
Ideology 
Introduction  
  The argument I will present here is that in its earliest phase when neoliberalism 
was still being formed the different proponents of the ideology had widely differing 
views on which kind of world order it was that was going to be preferential to the 
furthering of the neoliberal project. Global universalism or globalism in its original 
form was still an option very much on the table in the late 1930s, but by the late 
1940s the neoliberals had abandoned the idea in favor of a more pragmatic 
Atlanticism which still lingers at its ideological core to the present day.  
As will be explained in greater detail the notion of which world order was the best 
had after a period of contestation become “decontested” or fixed. Since the 1940s 
the internal ideological development of neoliberalism has seen it move even further 
away from globalism in its universalist meaning, to the point that contemporary 
neoliberalism actively opposes any attempts at politically controlling globalization 
or the workings of the world economy other than facilitating cross-border flows of 
capital. I therefore conclude that it is misleading to use the term “globalism” to 
describe neoliberalism in any of the forms it has taken since its first phase. Because 
the first formative phase concluded with the consolidation of a different Atlanticist 
view on world order at the ideology’s core.  
Because neoliberalism is found to be an ideology that does not promote political 
globalization or global democratization, but instead actively opposes these 
civilizational developments, it is clearly not an example of a planetarist ideology. A 
more fitting description of neoliberalism in its present state would be to call it an 
ideology of elitist internationalism which still retains much of its Atlanticist roots. In 
short neoliberalism is an ideological obstacle on the road to the kind of world 
integration that would be beneficial to humanity in aggregate and for enhancing the 
conditions for life on this planet. Opponents and supporters alike are 
misrepresenting the ideology by referring to it as “globalism”, since the neoliberals 
are not here to dominate the world politically but rather to ensure the absence of any 
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properly dominating force. This state of affairs ensures that the corporations and the 
super-rich who profit the most from these overwhelmingly anarchic conditions as 
concerns the world economy are left alone to maneuver economically and that they 
remain unrestrained by any global political apparatus of any consequence.        
Crucial aspects of the neoliberal ideology were cemented during its first formative 
phase which ‘lasted from the 1920s until about 1950’ (Steadman Jones 2012: 6). The 
effort to consciously shape an ideology that could compete as a coherent alternative 
in the battle of ideas, where the different individual strands of proto-neoliberal 
thought were sought combined into a collective ideological body, only began in 
earnest in the late 1930s. In this respect the first major event was the Colloque 
Walter Lippmann which was held in 1938 where many of the key neoliberal 
theorists were introduced to each other (Turner 2008: 63-64, Denord 2009: 46-49, 
Steadman Jones 2012: 31, and; Fawcett 2014: 276-277).  
The second and more pivotal event in the history of neoliberalism was the founding 
of the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947 (Turner 2008: 71-74, Phillips-Fein 2009: 41-46, 
Mirowski & Plehwe 2009, Burgin 2012: 101-108). If the Colloque Walter Lippmann 
was the event where all the theorists who took part in the formation of neoliberalism 
in its first phase initially met, then the Mont Pelerin Society was the event where the 
theorists who shaped its second phase were to be congregated for the first time. In 
that latter group were economists that would prove to be influential for the further 
development of neoliberalism such as Milton Friedman and Frank Knight, but their 
ideas are of little import to the present argument (Phillips-Fein 2009: 44). I will here 
focus on the first cohort of neoliberals whose ideas concerning what would be the 
ideal world order for the neoliberal project were not yet fixed.  
It was the Mont Pelerin Society which was going to propel neoliberalism slowly but 
steadily into the political limelight where we find it today. Philip Mirowski suggests 
‘that the Mont Pèlerin Society evolved into an exceptionally successful structure for 
the incubation of integrated political theory and political action outside of the more 
conventional structures of academic disciplines and political parties in the second 
half of the twentieth century’ (Mirowski 2013: 42-43). What will be the focus here 
is the period up to and including the formation of the Mont Pelerin Society. The 
argument is that by the time the Mont Pelerin Society was founded neoliberalism 
had fixed its position on what would be the ideology’s preferred world order and it 
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was not “globalism” of a conventional universalist nature it settled on, though this 
alternative had been entertained as part of the process. It was instead an Atlanticism 
that fit the novel version of ‘American nationalist globalism’ that grew out of 
victory in World War II (Fousek 2000: 7). This particular ‘American globalism or 
internationalism’ became the decontested neoliberal world order perspective, which 
with slight modifications managed to accommodate new elites around the capitalist 
world as the portfolios they held became too large to ignore (Fousek 2000: 7).  
This internationalism with the American national interest at the center was partly 
articulated by Walter Lippmann as the realist alternative to the utopianism he meant 
plagued many of his contemporaries (see: Steel 1980: 410). But at the end of the 
Second World War Lippmann was much more interested in the national interest of 
the United States than in any ‘Wilsonian universalism’ which he saw as ‘delusory 
and dangerous’ and ‘he eschewed the globalism central to it’ (Steel 1980: 410). 
Lippmann ‘attempt[ed] to steer between’ the competing visions of ‘sentimental one-
worldism, missionary imperialism, and Fortress America’ and find a ‘pragmatic 
realist’ alternative (Jackson Lears 2012: 106-107). What made Lippmann 
internationalist rather than isolationist was more the need for ‘spheres of influence’ 
since this ‘would give the great powers a sense of security’ (Steel 1980: 410). In 
other words, the main point of maintaining an alliance across the Atlantic was to 
ensure that there was a buffer zone in place in case the Soviets attempted to expand 
in the direction of America. Lippmann clearly differs from the other early 
neoliberals in being primarily concerned with foreign policy over economics. For 
the other early neoliberals it was mainly the other way around. 
The neoliberal view on which kind of world order would be the most conducive for 
the promotion of their ideology in 1947 were heavily influenced by the tectonic 
shifts the geopolitical landscape had just gone through. Prior to the outbreak of 
World War II neoliberalism’s major advocate at this time (and for much of the 
duration of the century), Friedrich von Hayek, had actively supported designs for 
world federalism put forward by an overwhelmingly British cohort of international 
theorists and concerned intellectuals (Spieker 2014). Ludwig von Mises, Hayek’s 
mentor and arguably the second most influential theorist in neoliberalism’s 
formative phase, had as early as 1927 advocated instituting a borderless world polity 
as the only way to create a properly functioning free market economy (Mises [1962] 
1985). By the end of World War II the neoliberals de-emphasized such notions of 
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political unity at the global level, though this has to be inferred since it simply no 
longer figures with any prominence on the neoliberal agenda (see: Plehwe 2009: 
238). What had happened?  
The argument I put forward here is that the influence of what possibly was the third 
most influential neoliberal in this period, Walter Lippmann, infused the neoliberal 
discourse with a realist bent that – no doubt in combination with the way world 
events unfolded at the time – resulted in neoliberalism adopting the novel American 
creed of ‘globalism’ (Ambrose & Brinkley [1971] 2011: xiv-xv, and; Fousek 2000: 
7). Instead of focusing on political unity worldwide this was a version of American 
nationalism that emphasized the primacy of the United States in world affairs and 
the creation and maintenance of an economic world order that above all would be 
beneficial to its domestic economy. It was internationalist in the sense that allies of 
the United States were also set to benefit, provided that their interests did not clash 
with those of the United States itself, or that of its elites to be more precise.  
In the context of the immediate post-war period this meant that the neoliberals 
adopted an Atlanticist form of internationalism that primarily served the American 
elite and its capitalist partners on the opposite European side of the North Atlantic. 
This was a direct negation of an actual globalism that perhaps uniquely in the history 
of modern politics was considered as an ideological alternative in the 1940s (see: 
Jonas 2001, Frankman 2004: 77-78, Baratta 2004, 2 Vols.). But as Kees van der Pijl 
has argued the interest the capitalist class had in taming the ambitions of labor had 
too much to profit from nurturing a hostile posture towards the Soviet Union for 
their interest to be aligned with projects for world peace and the harmonization of 
foreign policies (Pijl [1984] 2012: 133-134). And in such ‘circumstances a more 
restricted concept of Atlantic unity could again reassert itself over the global 
universalism [i.e. true globalism] still espoused by Wallace19 and other New Deal 
veterans’ (Pijl [1984] 2012: 134).  
The leading neoliberal of the time, Hayek, could not afford to go against the 
interests of the right-wing American businessmen he and the whole neoliberal 
venture were by then dependent on for support. Immediately before the founding 
                                                 
19 Henry A. Wallace had been Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Vice-President during the latter’s 
third term and Wallace was perceived as both a naïve idealist and one of the foremost 
of the “One Worlders” by Lippmann (Steel 1980: 410-412).  
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meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society ‘The Volker Fund’ one of Hayek’s main 
backers ‘had successfully leveraged their financial support to narrow the ideological 
horizons of the society Hayek was hoping to fund’ (Burgin 2012: 101). The next 
year ‘in October 1948’ when ‘the University of Chicago agreed to hire’ Hayek ‘his 
salary of $15,000 a year for ten years [were] to be fully covered by the Volker Fund’ 
(Phillips-Fein 2009: 42). And the Volker Fund was just one of several influential 
sources of funding that expected some measure of ideological compliance in return 
for their investments (see: Phillips-Fein 2009: 46-51). We do not know exactly how 
neoliberalism was shaped by these efforts to lean on Hayek at a crucial moment in 
the ideology’s development, but we can infer from the political climate in the United 
States at the time that Hayek’s rather conservative businessmen backers would be 
more interested in promoting a new kind of economic thinking conducive to further 
their business interests than in backing the introduction of a world order that was set 
to diminish the scope for unilateral American action in foreign affairs.  
With isolationism being the foreign policy equivalent of economic protectionism 
and the routes to both a globally inclusive internationalism and a truly global 
universalism blocked by Cold War rhetoric the only option left to adopt for the time 
being was Lippmann’s Atlanticism. The historical circumstances of the world, and 
especially in the United States, in the late 1940s made the early neoliberals shirk 
away from globalism at this crucial moment in the ideology’s development, but once 
that decision was made it turned out to be a rather fortuitous coincidence for its 
financial backers.  
The Critical Assessment of Contemporary Neoliberalism 
  The comingling of neoliberal ideas and business interests that started for full when 
Hayek set out to launch the Mont Pelerin Society has now reached a level where it is 
almost impossible to discern the contemporary tenets of neoliberal theory from that 
of the interests of the corporate lobby. Colin Crouch has expressed this observation 
in the following terms: ‘At every point we find that democratic market societies 
under the influence of neoliberal ideas throw more and more power, influence and 
privilege at the extremely wealthy, especially the wielders of large corporate 
resources’ (Crouch 2011: 168-169). This is exactly what one would expect as a 
result from the political employment of a neoliberal ideology which has been given 
over half a century to further and perfect its symbiotic relationship with the 
corporate world.  
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Neoliberal ideological domination is an ongoing event that according to the theorist 
Wendy Brown has led to the end of ‘individual or collective mastery of existence’ 
and replaced it with the idea that ‘letting markets decide our present and future’ is a 
better course of action, and this is a development which has revealed neoliberalism’s 
‘deep antihumanism’ (Brown 2015: 221-222). If we take Brown’s criticism at face 
value this makes contemporary neoliberalism seem as less than a conducive 
ideological vehicle for the project of bringing democracy into the global realm. But 
is the ideology in its current form at least globalist, in the sense that it would 
advocate the establishment of institutions with planetary jurisdiction even if they 
were not democratically controlled?  
Colin Crouch accords to neoliberalism the quality that the transnational corporations 
that benefit the most from it are at least ‘refreshingly cosmopolitan forces, 
responding flexibly to the post-national geography appropriate to a globalized 
economy’ in comparison to the ‘political parties and governments’ that ‘continue to 
try to define interests in national terms’ (Crouch 2011: 173-174). If we combine 
Crouch’s claim with Adam Harmes’ argument that the benefactors of neoliberalism 
thrive on the lack of a properly global legal framework, then the cosmopolitan aspect 
Crouch identifies is stringently limited to the creation of a functionalist structure that 
facilitates international capital mobility, the opening of markets, and their 
liberalization (Harmes 2014).  This makes even the supposed cosmopolitan strength 
of neoliberalism a hindrance to global political integration rather than a facilitator 
for it.  
Harmes calls the global legal framework contemporary neoliberals support a 
‘competitive or market-preserving federalism’ and again this makes perfect sense 
from a self-serving corporate standpoint (Harmes 2014: 148). This is a type of 
federalism that has been promoted in the writings of such influential neoliberal 
theorists as the aforementioned Hayek, but also by Milton Friedman, and perhaps 
most notably by James Buchanan (Harmes 2014: 149-151). It revolves around two 
principles, the first ‘is to centralize those policy capabilities that relate to protecting 
property rights, enforcing contracts and creating/maintaining markets’ (Harmes 
2014: 148). The second is ‘to decentralize the policy capabilities the neoliberals do 
not support’ such as those relating to ‘taxing powers’ and ‘public education, 
healthcare and social security’ (Harmes 2014: 148). The whole ‘intent is to prevent 
national policies on issues related to wealth redistribution and market failures and to 
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confine as many of the undesired tax and regulatory powers as possible to the 
subnational level’ since there ‘they will be constrained by inter-jurisdictional policy 
competition and the need of governments to compete for mobile citizens and firms’ 
(Harmes 2014: 148). This federalism is modeled on the United States (Harmes 2014: 
148). But the states that are the most obvious subnational units in the US are 
interchangeable with nation-states in a federation at e.g a European or a global level.  
Because of this contemporary neoliberalism is extremely ambivalent to the creation 
of international regimes. On the one hand international regimes are indispensable for 
the facilitation of e.g. the free movement of capital, but on the other hand ‘the 
creation of supranational institutions’ with ‘policy capabilities that relate to wealth 
redistribution and the correction of market failures’ is one of the worst scenarios 
contemporary neoliberals can imagine (Harmes 2014: 153). This is because global 
political institutions exercising globally sovereign power would potentially ruin the 
leverage capital has built up over the current state-form because it always (in theory 
at least) is in a position to move to another jurisdiction ready to better cater to its 
demands. This also ‘means that, while we can expect neo-liberal social forces to 
support economic globalization, we can also expect them to oppose any forms of 
political globalization that undermine policy competition’ (Harmes 2014: 155, 
emphasis added). Political globalization, even in an internationally construed 
fashion, is therefore not in the neoliberal interest. This underlines the notion that 
contemporary neoliberalism is not a planetarist ideology.               
Neoliberalism had by the end of the twentieth century evolved into an elitist 
ideology of global scope which was less centered on the United States. It 
nonetheless retains its commitment to an elitist internationalism that is far removed 
from the globally inclusive polity once envisioned by its first generation of 
supporters. “Globalism”, in the sense of a universal ideology, is therefore a 
misleading term for the contemporary ideology of neoliberalism because it fails two 
of the basic requirements for a properly planetarist ideology. First neoliberalism is 
not an ideology meant to emancipate humanity as a whole, but instead an exclusive 
elite situated primarily in the Western world and to a lesser extent in the economic 
centers of the rest of it. Second neoliberalism does not advocate political 
globalization or political universalism in the planetarist sense, because doing so 
would essentially allow for the regulatory control of the world economy at the 
global level. This could in turn seriously jeopardize both the neoliberal elite’s 
- 107 - 
politically dominant status and the lucrative economic position they find themselves 
in after having been able to shape the rules for economic conduct unopposed. 
Neoliberalism was meant to ensure the free reign of this economic elite early on, as I 
will now go on to show in greater detail. 
Decontested Neoliberal Concepts 
  For this argument it is important to note that neoliberalism is more than a narrow, 
neatly confined, and easily identifiable ideology. The phenomenon which 
contemporary critics associate with the word “neoliberalism” should be understood 
as only a relatively momentary ideological crystallization of a broader discourse 
which operates with both a wider temporality and spatiality than that suitable at any 
one time if a given political ideology is to be perceived as both coherent and easily 
communicable. If we follow Michael Freeden’s insight that ‘ideologies are 
configurations of decontested meanings of political concepts’ then there will be a 
process of conceptual contestation at some point before an ideology takes this more 
mature form where meanings have become decontested, and this stage we can call 
an ideology’s formative phase (Freeden 1996: 76, emphasis in original). Ideologies 
are constantly undergoing processes of conceptual contestation or ‘ideological 
morphology’ to use Freeden’s term (Freeden 1996: 75-91). Neoliberalism 
experienced such a period of contestation concerning what kind of ideal world order 
it was meant to advocate during its first phase. And as I argue here, this topic had by 
the late 1940s been settled in favor of a specific kind of Atlanticist internationalism 
which meant that this from then on became part of neoliberalism’s core of 
decontested concepts. With the exception of some slight variations that with the 
economic rise of Western Europe and Japan in particular at first, and the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the communist alternative later, ended up turning neoliberalism 
into an economically elitist internationalism of more worldwide scope, the ideology 
has retained this part of its core to the present day.  
Whether or not the nation-state was the ideal container for the political life of 
humanity was a notion that was being contested in the inter-war era (see: Carr 
[1939] 2001, and; Long & Wilson 1995). This question is however one signified by 
a high level of political abstraction and speculation in this regard can draw attention 
away from more pragmatic and immediate concerns. If an ideology is going to 
present itself as a challenge to the existing order tout court or alternatively just to 
certain aspects of its functioning is something that needs to be “decontested” at 
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some point during an ideology’s formative phase. Obviously the level of 
confrontation being envisaged vis-à-vis the present political authorities will affect 
the potential mass appeal of an ideology. If the level is too low it will attract fewer 
followers at critical moments, since it might appear as too reformist or lenient 
compared to a more radical alternative, but if the level of confrontation is too high it 
might scare away potential followers worried that it has taken on an unnecessarily 
aggressive stance.  
During an ideology’s formative phase how it aligns itself with radical or conformist 
positions on a variety of issues has not yet been fixed. It is especially at times like 
this that it is helpful to think of a budding ideology as being just elements of a wider 
discourse. A discourse which for the time being incorporates such a range of 
positions that what shape a hardened ideological end-state coming out of it would 
take is an impossibility to predict. The term “discourse” is here used for the purpose 
of conveying the notion of a long-ongoing debate involving conflicting viewpoints 
(i.e. juxtaposed positions on specific issues which it would be illogical to include in 
an ideology that is meant to potentially inform policy), but which nonetheless shares 
a basic level of commonality that makes the participants in it relatively close 
political affiliates in the broader picture.20  
In this sense one could state that contemporary neoliberalism is the result of a 
discourse of the political right, but it would be a mistake to claim that it involves the 
whole right side of the political spectrum, which ranges from social liberalism – an 
ideology which is nowadays barely distinguishable from the social democratic one 
found immediately on the left side of the divide (though the latter emphasizes 
equality more than liberty and the former vice versa) – and which further right 
reaches ‘a reactionary, right-wing tradition which is religious’ that ‘includes De 
Maistre, Donoso Cortés, and Carl Schmitt’ before it ends with the Fascist and Nazi 
extreme right positions (Bobbio  1996: 43). But neoliberalism also draws on ideas 
                                                 
20 On a related note Terry Eagleton has stated the following: ‘It may help to view ideology less as a 
particular set of discourses, than as a particular set of effects within discourses’ (Eagleton 2007: 
194, emphasis in original). It would however be too much of a digression to go into detail about 
the intricacies of how discourse is used in the literature, exemplified by Eagleton’s position 
here, and it must therefore suffice to say that my conception of discourse as it is employed here 
differs in the sense that I am only using the term to denote a “macro” discourse (spanning years, 
decades, even centuries, and primarily advanced through published works), while discourse is 
amongst other things often used to denote everyday ‘semiotics’, or “micro” discourse as well, 
which also can be mined for ideological content (Eagleton 2007: 210).   
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emanating from the left side of the political spectrum (Turner 2008: 69-70, and; 
Davies 2014: 130). And it is therefore to a limited degree also an ideology 
influenced by left discourse. For the most part however, one finds that the neoliberal 
debate is situated somewhere between the social-liberal and conservative-
reactionary points on the right side of the left-right spectrum as it is commonly 
portrayed (see: Heywood 2007: 16).  
Certain conflicting neoliberal positions can be separated on the basis of where they 
can be situated along a statist - libertarian dimension that does not fit as neatly 
within the one-dimensional portrayal of politics we tend towards when identifying at 
what point on the left-right axis some idea belongs. Though if we concentrate on the 
particular ideological shape neoliberalism has ended up taking in its present capacity 
as ‘the dominant ideology’ (Schwarzmantel 2008) – where neoliberalism is 
understood as having been ‘the only game in town’ for the last several decades 
(Patomäki 2008: 144) that predominantly informs the policies of governments 
around the world as well as international governmental organizations such as the 
International Monetary Fund (Brenner, et al. 2010) –  then this specific shape is 
primarily owed to the participants in the neoliberal debate with a more statist, rather 
than anti-statist or libertarian, inclination (see: Mirowski 2013: 39-41). This means 
that the statist - libertarian dimension is no longer a key area of contestation.  
What is of more contemporary relevance is instead to follow the debates pertaining 
to both the democratic - elitist and the international - planetary dimensions within 
neoliberal debate and see how these developed during the formative phase of 
neoliberal thinking. Because it seems that the neoliberal discourse early on ended up 
on an elitist and internationalist trajectory that have not significantly been altered in 
the time since. This development is traced here through the work of the three central 
theorists during neoliberalism’s formative phase already mentioned; Walter 
Lippmann, Friedrich von Hayek, and Ludwig von Mises. The conclusion is that 
neoliberalism is elitist and not democratic, and internationalist bordering on 
Atlanticist as opposed to planetarist, and that this appears to have been a constant 
and decontested part of neoliberalism’s ideological core since the late 1940s. 
Origins 
  When neoliberalism was articulated beginning in the 1930s it was as a counter-
movement to the main strain of liberalism that was then prevalent within Western 
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politics, namely social liberalism. Social liberalism, especially when the designation 
“new liberalism” is used in its place ‘refers to the late Victorian and Edwardian 
development in British liberalism’ in a social direction (Leopold 2012: 11). This was 
a form of liberalism developed in particular by T. H. Green, L.T. Hobhouse and 
John A. Hobson (Schwarzmantel 2008: 51, Jackson 2012: 36, and Soborski 2013: 
44). Theirs was a liberalism which took a cue from the work John Stuart Mill 
produced later in his life, wherein ‘Mill’s liberalism’ can arguably be seen ‘as 
blending into a form of socialism’ (Jackson 2012: 38).  
What made this new liberalism “social” was that its theorists ‘argued that the 
intervention of the state was necessary in order to establish an equal starting point 
from which individuals could develop their capacities’ (Schwarzmantel 2008: 51). 
The distinguishing trait between the new liberals of the early 20
th
 Century and the 
social democratic socialists of the same era can be rather hard to pin down, as for 
example the former did not even see ‘the private ownership of productive property’ 
as ‘a fundamental liberal principle’ (Jackson 2012: 51). But it is more common to 
‘define [this form of] liberalism as located within the liberal domain but spilling 
over to the socialist area’ (Soborski 2013: 44). Socialism, i.e. as expounded by 
social-democrats, and social liberalism should therefore not be seen as 
commensurate or largely overlapping entities, but instead as bordering on each 
other: ‘Mill went no further’ in a socialist direction ‘than adopt a type of cooperation 
and issue a plea for social (and economic) reconstruction’ as Hobson, for one, had 
‘rightly realised’ (Freeden 2005: 96). It was this social strain of ‘left liberalism’ 
(Jackson 2010: 136) which inspired President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal in 
the aftermath of the Great Depression and which came to its fullest development 
when liberals such as John Maynard Keynes and William Beveridge laid a 
substantial part of the theoretical foundation for the post-war British welfare-state in 
the 1930s and early 1940s (see: Keynes 1936, and Beveridge 1942).  
The early neoliberals on the other hand found inspiration for the alternative they 
sought to left liberalism in the works of the neo-classical liberals of the late 19
th
 
Century such as the ‘uncompromising defender of the free market’ and author of 
‘Man versus the state (1884)’ Herbert Spencer (Micklethwait & Wooldridge 2014: 
59, and Jackson 2010: 132, see also: Steger 2005: 9-10). Spencer had for example 
claimed that: ‘Social reform would inevitably lead to national degeneration because 
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it would punish the respectable classes while rewarding the profligate poor and their 
hordes of children’ (Micklethwait & Wooldridge 2014: 59-60).  
Spencer and other neo-classical liberals were theoretically closer to such classical 
liberals as; John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith, and David Ricardo, than to the 
older J. S. Mill – i.e. once Mill had reached the point of his career where he had 
become ‘increasingly critical of his father’s laissez faire certainties’ (Micklethwait 
& Wooldridge 2014: 56). When Herbert Spencer died in 1903 he had – because of 
his political stance one is led to assume – come to be viewed ‘as a callous eccentric’ 
by contemporaries (Micklethwait & Wooldridge 2014: 60).  
Social-liberalism, or left-liberalism, would rise to prominence in the Anglo-
American world over the ensuing decades, while the neo-classical liberal ideas 
Herbert Spencer had stood for at the end of the 19
th
 Century would lay largely 
dormant until they were revived by a small group of theorists beginning in the 
1930s. The neoliberals of that era would go on and see their form of thought as a 
further development of liberal ideas originally aired during the Enlightenment, 
especially by Adam Smith, but they also found support for an Enlightenment 
heritage in the writings of for example David Hume (Steadman Jones 2012: 100-
101).  
The Formative Phase  
  Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973), Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992), and Walter 
Lippmann (1889-1974), were key figures during the first formative phase of the 
neoliberal discourse in the 1930s and 1940s. Mises and Hayek ‘in many ways [ ] 
represent the founding fathers of neoliberalism, providing the theoretical backbone 
for the political and ideological claims made by others’ (Birch & Mykhnenko 2010: 
3). Lippmann is not given nearly as much credit for influencing the subsequent 
shape of neoliberalism, but the argument put forward here is that he in his own 
unique way plays a central role in defining the parameters of neoliberal discourse.  
First Lippmann is interesting because his position in the debates that initially shaped 
neoliberalism has been seen as occupying ‘the left-most flank’ (Jackson 2010: 142). 
Secondly Lippmann’s participation in neoliberal discourse in its formative phase 
embodies a direct link to the vast repository of near Machiavellian knowledge 
concerning the practical workings of modern day politics which Lippmann had 
acquired through being engaged in high level politics and the formulation of 
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wartime propaganda in the First World War  (Steel 1980). Thirdly, and this is 
something not many scholars analyzing early neoliberalism has made a note of, 
Lippmann’s realist views on foreign policy puts him at the rightmost extreme within 
neoliberal discourse, while this is also a position that comes much closer to the 
mainstream neoliberal position in the second half of the 20
th
 Century than Mises’ 
and Hayek’s own idealist positions do (see: Porter 2011).  
Mises especially holds a contrasting position within neoliberal discourse compared 
to that of Lippmann. Mises, at one point Hayek’s tutor (Steadman Jones 2012: 3), is 
generally referred to as ‘a free market libertarian’ (Steadman Jones 2012: 53). Mises 
has been characterized as holding ‘the rightmost flank of the discussion’ in 
neoliberalism (Jackson 2010: 140-141). Economically speaking this is probably 
correct, for reasons that will be explained below. But Mises also occupies what 
might very well be the leftmost flank within neoliberal discourse when it comes to 
his idealist or “utopian” views on foreign policy and world order (for Mises’ view 
see: Mises [1962] 1985: 105-151). Though Hayek can be positioned to the right of 
Lippmann economically, but not nearly as far right as Mises, Hayek’s opinions on 
foreign policy and world order are found to be very much closer to Mises’ idealism 
than to Lippmann’s realism (for Hayek’s views see: Hayek [1944] 2007: 223-236, 
Hayek 1948: 255-272, Turner 2008: 133, and 187-188, and Spieker 2014). 
In an effort to delineate the ideological parameters of neoliberalism at its inception I 
will therefore now aim to substantiate the claims I have made here about the relative 
positions of these proto-neoliberals vis-à-vis each other and try to figure out how 
they relate to the wider left-right continuum taken as a whole. I will focus on 
Lippmann, Hayek and Mises as global political theorists rather than the more 
typical approach which is treating them as more or less accomplished economists. 
Due to this rearranged focus Lippmann’s more philosophical contribution to the 
debate takes precedence, while Mises’ and Hayek’s economic ideas shrink in 
relevance. I will limit the analysis to the initial phase in the formation of neoliberal 
discourse and therefore texts authored by either of these three after about 1950 are 
excluded, save for a few rare exceptions.  
- 113 - 
Walter Lippmann: The Realist Proto-Neoliberal 
  To put more emphasis on Lippmann’s political views and how these were shaped 
should be useful primarily for three reasons; first it is my contention that 
Lippmann’s contribution to the formation of neoliberalism in the ideology’s budding 
phase is underrated in comparison to that of Hayek and Mises (e.g. in; Jackson 2010, 
and Steadman Jones 2012: 30-84). Second I will argue that Lippmann, contrary to 
the more commonly held opinion, helped pull neoliberalism rightward in several 
respects. This is a pronounced tendency in particular when it came to articulating a 
realist view of world order that countered the utopian or idealist leanings of Mises 
and Hayek. Third, Lippmann appears to be the neoliberal worldview personified. I 
cannot prove decisively that Hayek based his long term plans for neoliberalism on 
the works Lippmann wrote in the 1920s and 1930s, but that conclusion could be 
inferred from it. 
Generally Lippmann is dismissed as someone who made economic policy proposals 
in the 1930s that in comparison to certain later libertarian strains of neoliberal 
thinking makes it seem as if he harbored ‘a socialist agenda’ (Denord 2009: 62). 
This description of Lippmann’s position as the furthest to the left of all neoliberals is 
based on for instance Lippmann’s expressed concern that ‘liberalism have to take 
into account the provision of social security’ at the neoliberals’ first colloquium 
(Denord 2009: 48). But Lippmann did in no way need to be a bona fide socialist to 
hold this view, and in any case this rather progressive position was not 
representative of the rest of his political views. One prominent historical figure who 
also held a similar position without being a socialist was the arch-conservative first 
chancellor of the German Empire, Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck’s drive to provision 
social security in the 1880s was done with an aim to ‘cripple the growing Social 
Democratic movement’ that was then starting to become a counter-hegemonic force 
in Germany (Clark 2007: 617). In other words, Lippmann’s position on that 
particular issue could likewise have been pragmatically motivated by the urge to 
undermine an opposing political contingent. Lippmann’s professional output in the 
decades before the Second World War, which reveals his own political trajectory, 
further underscores an interpretation of this kind.  
Lippmann’s ideological viewpoint as it stood in the late 1930s and the 1940s was the 
result of years spent variously at the center of high politics and in the midst of 
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theoretical debates, though his primary means of income was as a journalist and 
public philosopher. Lippmann had his own ideas honed through contact with a 
remarkable array of eminent thinkers and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic. 
The fact that the tensions feeding into the broader ideological developments of the 
first half of the twentieth century is here concentrated in one man, who on top of that 
came to distill his personal ideational solution to this conundrum into a proto 
neoliberal formula, makes a look into the way his work developed relevant here. 
In 1914 the young Lippmann began writing for the newly established The New 
Republic, a publication staffed by ‘progressives in the [Theodore] Roosevelt mold – 
believers in strong leadership, civic responsibility, regulation of Big Business, and 
greater sympathy toward labor and the poor’ (Steel 1980: 62). Though the 
publication in the words of one of its founders aimed to ‘be radical without being 
socialistic’ it in reality promoted reform as a ‘way of heading off more disruptive 
change’ (Steel 1980: 62). Trough his engagement at The New Republic Lippmann 
was introduced to a whole range of influential people and among these ‘very few 
were radical’ and instead ‘[t]hey were progressive in a patrician way, with a sense, 
like Theodore Roosevelt’s, of noblesse oblige’ (Steel 1980: 63). It was at this 
juncture of his career that Lippmann had a crucial realization that would come to 
bear on his later worldview: ‘Influence, he now believed, rested not on trying to 
convert the masses, but on reaching the people whose opinions mattered’ (Steel 
1980: 63). This was an insight that later was to become an integral part of neoliberal 
strategy, though it was Hayek who officially entered this position into the annals of 
neoliberalism more than three decades later in 1947 (Turner 2008: 69-70).  
Lippmann had a socialist inclination while he was a young student at Harvard. There 
he: ‘In search of reform without revolution’ had ‘found what he wanted in the 
British Fabians’ (Steel 1980: 23). This was an elitist form of socialism that fit with 
Lippmann’s ‘questioning of equality’ (Steel 1980: 24). The Fabian Society’s mode 
of organization would later also inspire Hayek’s designs for a neoliberal equivalent 
(Davies 2014: 130). Bearing in mind that Lippmann’s conversion happened in 1908 
(Steel 1980: 23-24), almost a decade before the Russian Revolution, “socialism” 
was a rather unrefined and broad category at the time and would only later – after 
the experience of communists in power in the Soviet Union, the anarchists losing out 
in the Spanish Civil War, the conquest of Nazi-Germany, and post-war social-
democratic hegemony, to name just some of the pivotal events yet to occur – 
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become as sharply defined as we are now accustomed to. Reading Lippmann’s 
biography one gets the impression that the younger Lippmann appears to have 
needed some time to realize that his political allegiance really always had laid a bit 
farther to the right21: 
What attracted Lippmann to socialism was not a fiery passion for 
justice and equality, [ ] but an impatience with how badly society 
was managed. The Fabians, with their statistics, their elaborately 
detailed programs, and their emphasis on leadership from the 
top, were far more in key with his own temperament than the 
well-meaning [good government liberal] reformers or the bomb-
throwing labor militants. Society had to be organized, plans 
drawn up, the “scientific method” invoked (Steel 1980: 40). 
Lippmann’s attraction towards the technocratic tendencies of the Fabians and dislike 
of what he called the ‘cult of democracy’ was something which put Lippmann’s 
views  ‘more in line with big-city Progressives than with [ ] American socialists, 
who [ ] exalted the masses’ (Steel 1980: 40). This dissonance with the position 
Lippmann claimed to hold and the position he actually held lessened at the age of 
twenty-four when he ‘switched from a loose socialism to a left-wing progressivism’ 
which in practice meant moving a step rightward on the ideological spectrum (Steel 
1980: 66). 
Lippmann was going to strike a tone that squarely put him on a divergent “realist” 
course away from the more idealistic thinking of the Fabians and their associates 
(McClay 1993: xlii). Lippmann was in no way a parochial isolationist, to the 
contrary it has been claimed that his cosmopolitan outlook was one of his defining 
characteristics (see: Blum 1984). But if Lippmann was a cosmopolitan – and since 
he was a secular member of a wealthy Jewish family from New York he fits an old 
stereotype of that distinction (Steel 1980: 3-11, and 186-196) – his 
“cosmopolitanism” was one barely reaching beyond American shores and across the 
Atlantic. This middle-position, between more globally inclusive internationalists 
than he and those adhering to a completely myopic nationalism, where Lippmann 
was a “realist” placing himself between “idealists” and “parochials”, was a position 
                                                 
21 Assuming that “right” indicates a propensity towards hierarchy and egoism while “left” means the 
same towards societal levelling and equality (as argued for example by: Bobbio [1996], and 
Dunn [2006]). 
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he appears to have held consistently from the First World War to the aftermath of 
World War Two.   
Lippmann had by 1914 replaced the socialist conviction he had harbored since late 
adolescence ‘with a Wellsian vision of an elite of enlightened managers who would 
run society along scientific grounds for the public good’ (Steel 1980: 79, and also; 
23-24). This was an elitist aspect of Wells’ thought22 which fit with the Fabian 
program Lippmann (who had been a member of the Fabian Society since 1909) had 
earlier been a supporter of (Steel 1980: 43). But it was also a view he could hold on 
to as he moved to the right politically. Lippmann’s short infatuation with socialism 
appears to never have centered on the sort of ideas that made up what Iriye have 
termed ‘socialist internationalism’ which emphasized the unification of the 
proletarian classes into a worldwide movement for world revolution (Iriye 1997: 3).  
Lippmann did not even hold a more conventional liberal internationalist outlook – 
which was quite common amongst the social-democrats and left-liberals of the era, 
who advocated various forms of international organization and diverse globally 
binding legal frameworks (see: Long & Wilson 1995).  
In contradistinction to for example Norman Angell, ‘the British internationalist’ and 
‘well-known anti-imperialist’ who on occasion wrote for The New Republic and 
‘saw the war [i.e. the First World War] as an opportunity to achieve world 
government’, Lippmann took a ‘less utopian’ approach to foreign policy (Steel 
1980: 110-111). Lippmann opted instead for an approach of more limited scope, 
where he replaced what he perceived to be the unrealistic grand schemes of Angell 
and others, with the institution of an Atlantic community (Steel 1980: 111). This 
was a notion of a closer-knit North America and Western Europe, which amounted 
to a conception of Western Civilization that did not even include Germany in its 
ranks (Steel 1980: 111). This latter point makes sense in light of Germany’s 
antagonistic role as the “Atlantic” nations’ primary rival at the time, but it also 
illustrates Lippmann’s extreme focus on the near abroad compared with that of most 
of the idealists.  
                                                 
22 There is a debate over whether or not Wells’ view is misrepresented when it is labeled elitist or 
anti-democratic. Some experts argue that Wells was not anti-democratic (Partington 2003: 11), 
while others seem convinced that ‘Wells’s World State was to be dependent on a special caste’ 
thereby attributing to him a sentiment which might be interpreted as anti-democratic (Heater 
1996:137).  
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Lippmann, even though he ‘predicted that the old nationalism would be replaced by 
a new internationalism’, did not endorse an internationalism of global scope and 
therefore adopted a stance more in line with a conservative politics acquiescing to 
the demands of new 20
th
 Century realities. ‘America, he argued, was an integral part 
of the community of nations bordering the Atlantic’ or what he called ‘the Atlantic 
community’ (Steel 1980: 114 and 111). Lippmann insisted that an ‘attack on that 
community was a threat to America’s own security’ and that ‘Germany’s war 
against Britain and France’ therefore should be considered an attack ‘against the 
civilization of which we are part’ (Steel 1980: 111). This made Lippmann more of 
an Atlanticist than a full-fledged internationalist (see: Pijl [1984] 2012). Lippmann 
during World War I, on the merit that he had advocated this Atlantic community, got 
to play a central role in working out a policy proposal for president Wilson as an 
answer to the Bolsheviks’ recent calls for world revolution (Pijl 2014: 69).  
Lippmann landed a job with an outfit created as the US entered World War I that 
was meant to advise on strategic options for postwar order which was ‘Woodrow 
Wilson’s forerunner to the National Security Council’ (Jackson Lears 2012: 97). 
Lippmann in this capacity became ‘a trusted presidential advisor’ to Woodrow 
Wilson ‘and the author, in part at least, of the document that was to serve as the 
basis for the peace settlement’ known as ‘the Fourteen Points’ (Steel 1980: 134). Of 
Wilson’s Fourteen Points ‘the president’s Points 6 to 13 of January 1918 on national 
self-determination’ were used almost to the letter as they were presented to him by 
Lippmann’s ‘own outfit’ (Pijl 2014: 69). By November of the same year ‘the 
armistice was concluded on the basis of [these] Fourteen Points’ (Manela 2007: 17). 
At this point Lippmann was clearly an influential person at the highest level of 
foreign policy formulation. Lippmann had before the war’s end taken in the lesson 
that government is steered by a mighty few, responsive to good council if this was 
offered to them persuasively, as he had experienced being one of these ‘evidently 
well placed’ councilors himself (Steel 1980: 139).  
Another lesson Lippmann would learn before the cessation of hostilities was how to 
conduct propaganda.  He ended his job at the Inquiry in favor of beginning work as 
the ‘American representative to the Inter-Allied Propaganda Board in London’ 
(Steel 1980: 142, see also 141-152). The propaganda effort Lippmann started 
working with was not by definition about misinformation – Lippmann aimed to 
‘avoid all the tricky and sinister aspects of what is usually called propaganda’ (Steel 
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1980: 142) – but the propagation of ideas (and ideally truthful ones) for a desired 
end. Propaganda, just like ideology, can be seen as a political technique, and can 
neutrally be ‘defined as a deliberate attempt to persuade people, by any available 
media, to think and then behave in a manner desired by the source’ (Taylor 2003: 7).  
When Lippmann entered the Propaganda Board the Bolsheviks had just recently 
risen to power and turned ‘propaganda’ into ‘a fact of everyday life’ propagating a 
worldview that was in direct competition with the one used as the basis for Wilson’s 
plans for peace, which Lippmann had helped formulate earlier in the war and which 
he now was tasked with promoting to the enemy (Taylor 2003: 198). This conducive 
climate to learning about propaganda’s different intricacies gave Lippmann a 
springboard to become an authority on the phenomenon, and that was a position he 
cemented for posterity with the publication of his 1922 book Public Opinion (see: 
Taylor 2003: 325-326). 
In Public Opinion Lippmann states that since public opinion had essentially become 
a construct – rather than a naturally formulated Rousseauan general will – it should 
be possible to manufacture democratic consent (Lippmann 1922, summary 
paraphrasing; Freedman 2013: 338). This meant a return to top-down rather than 
bottom-up management of politics in other words, with the added difference that 
now the populace would be under the illusion that they were running things.  Unlike 
in for instance an absolutist monarchy where the inhabitants of the realm are fully 
aware of their subject status in society and where this conscious subordination can 
accumulate into a veritable powder keg of grievances, Lippmann suggested a more 
devious approach. Once the possibility of manufacturing consent fully arose – which 
according to Lippmann it had done ‘within the life of a generation now in control of 
affairs’ – it was ‘no longer possible [ ] to believe in the original dogma of 
democracy; that the knowledge needed for the management of human affairs comes 
spontaneously from the human heart’ and instead by believing in this fallacy ‘we’ 
would ‘expose ourselves to self-deception, and to forms of persuasion that we 
cannot verify’ (as cited in; Taylor 2003: 320-321). In other words, following 
Lippmann, what is the prevailing popular opinion at a given time ought, by the end 
of the First World War, to be viewed as the result of the most successful propaganda 
effort. Lippmann in Public Opinion used the notion of “stereotypes” in its modern 
psychological meaning:  
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For the most part we do not first see, and then decide, we define 
first and then see. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of 
the outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined 
for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in 
the form stereotyped for us by our culture (Lippmann 1922: 81).  
Therefore people do not perceive reality as such, and what they ‘assume to be 
“facts” are often really judgments’ or older preconceptions passed on from 
preceding generations (Steel 1980: 181). In this way stereotypes aid in the 
perpetuation of traditional worldviews no matter how loosely these happen to be 
grounded in physically existing conditions. But eventually ‘the day of reckoning 
comes, and the stereotype is shattered’ (Lippmann 1922: 112).  
Implicit in this insight into human cognition is the notion that new stereotypes can 
be instilled in the public through a successful propaganda effort. Though certain 
older stereotypes can by their nature be hard to get rid of, these can be replaced 
more easily if they can be convincingly argued to be false, because – as a more 
recent student of propaganda has asserted – the ‘substance and myth’ propaganda 
and stereotypes are based on ‘needs to be rooted in some reality if [it] is to succeed’ 
(Taylor 2003: 4).  
Truth, or at least a selective rendering of the truth, is an important element of 
effective propaganda. But it is also of the essence to not “cloud the message” by 
reporting all the minute details or by delving into the deeper complexities of every 
position: ‘An essential characteristic of propaganda’ or ‘the manipulation of 
opinion’ is the holding back of certain elements of the truth (outright lying should 
ideally be avoided, though it is of course always an option the propagandist can 
choose to employ) so ‘that it rarely tells the whole truth’ (Taylor 2003: 10). As 
Lippmann was to put it in his follow up work; ‘a public [ ] discerns only gross 
distinctions [ ] and is interested only when events have been melodramatized as a 
conflict’ (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 55). Jo-Anne Pemberton has argued that 
Lippmann in Public Opinion calls for ‘a period of expertocracy’ which ‘could save 
democracy from itself’ (Pemberton 2001: 78). This is a call for the elite to get back 
in control after they were momentarily caught unprepared by the burgeoning 
development of mass-democracy. But it requires a silver-tongued elite versed in the 
arts of mass-communication and clever deception, not a return of the decorated 
aristocrat who publicly scoffs at the common man. Brainy men like Lippmann in 
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other words should form the new ruling class of capable individuals, in a decisive 
break with the predominant elitist mentality in much of Europe and Asia that saw 
military prowess as the main marker of distinction, a view which had its wellspring 
in the daring warrior-class of medieval times.  
The public might be the final arbiter in contests for political power in modern 
democracies, but there is a whole lot that can be done to frame the debate favorably 
for either side before it reaches the stage where it is actually paid attention to by the 
masses. The appearance of objectivity is central for getting the public to support 
one’s side in such contests, but it can be feigned for rhetorical purposes if necessary, 
since it only has an instrumental function and is not sought as a goal in and of itself. 
After all propaganda is not to be confused with education; the former ‘tells people 
what to think’ while the latter ‘teaches people how to think’ (Taylor 2003: 14, 
emphasis in original). One of the primary uses of propaganda historically has been 
to convey an ideology (Taylor 2003: 7). It is in this connection that it is important to 
take note of the fact that Lippmann was one of the earliest experts on the topic.  
Lippmann did not only possess knowledge of how to shape public opinion and what 
constituted the building blocks of ideologies, he could also see how real executive 
power is actually distributed within a modern democracy, i.e. primarily in relatively 
small elite networks. Or as he put it; ‘a kind of professional public consisting of 
more or less eminent persons’ who function as ‘proxies’ for ‘the random collection 
of bystanders who constitute a [lay] public’ but which cannot ‘intervene in all the 
problems of the day’ and therefore: ‘Most issues are never carried beyond this ruling 
group’ despite all rhetorical flourishes commonly espoused to the contrary 
(Lippmann [1925] 1993: 115). This again is an insight made by Lippmann that is 
later adopted as an essential element of neoliberal strategy by Hayek at the founding 
meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947 (see: Turner 2007: 69-70). It also 
follows from this that there is no need for forming an explicitly neoliberal party. 
Because as long as one is able to gain access to the inner circle of decision makers it 
is conceivably possible to exert influence on any party that is elected to power, 
provided that said party is not too strongly committed to an opposed economic 
program. As we can see today this strategy has allowed the core economic part of 
the neoliberal program to stand virtually unopposed in many an election.   
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Lippmann followed up Public Opinion with The Phantom Public in 1925, a work in 
which he continued his argument that the notion of the commanding public is a 
modern myth or fiction and proposed that, as he put it concisely: ‘We must abandon 
the notion that the people govern’ (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 51). Instead Lippmann 
argues that in the modern polity the ‘fundamental difference which matters is that 
between insiders and outsiders’, or leaders and led, and that it is only the former 
who are in a position to take ‘executive action’ (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 140 and 
134).23 Public opinion only plays an auxiliary role at certain crucial moments when 
it can be ‘a reserve of force brought into action during a crisis in public affairs’ 
(Lippmann [1925] 1993: 59). Otherwise the insiders are in a position to do nearly as 
they please, as long as they do not govern so badly that they provoke a crisis on their 
own accord: 
Public opinion in its highest ideal will defend those who are 
prepared to act on their reason against the interrupting force of 
those who merely assert their will. The action of public opinion 
at its best would not, let it be noted, be a continual crusade on 
behalf of reason. When power, however absolute and 
unaccountable, reigns without provoking a crisis, public opinion 
does not challenge it. Somebody must challenge arbitrary power 
first. The public can only come to his assistance (Lippmann 
[1925] 1993: 59-60).  
This is interpreted as Lippmann taking an elitist stance, as in the introduction to the 
1993 edition of The Phantom Public by Wilfred M. McClay where he describes 
Lippmann’s position as ‘fundamentally conservative’ (McClay 1993: xxxi). But it 
can also be seen to be meant more as a descriptive statement of fact – a revelation of 
the actual conditions one must be aware of to successfully operate in this 
environment – than as prescriptive and normative. Lippmann was (to a certain 
extent) an insider himself and was able to draw on his own experience. It is 
particularly evident in The Phantom Public that Lippmann possessed a 
                                                 
23 Lippmann’s argument appears to owe a great debt to ‘the founding fathers of elite theory’ Vilfredo 
Pareto (1848-1923) and Gaetano Mosca (1848-1941), in addition to Robert Michels’ (1876-
1936) theory concerning “the iron law of oligarchy” (Bellamy 1987: 34, see also: Bottomore 
1966). Michels is the only one of these theorists Lippmann makes a reference to (see: Lippmann 
1922: 225, and Lippmann [1925] 1993: 9, and 12-13). 
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Machiavellian24 streak, and because of this quality it is said to be one of the original 
works that ‘exemplified and pioneered’ ‘the “realist” approach to political analysis’ 
as this term was to be understood in the twentieth century (McClay 1993: xlii).  
Lippmann has been criticized widely for having displayed anti-democratic 
sentiments in his works on the public and on foreign policy (e.g. Porter 2011: 572), 
but this is arguably a distortion of his position (Schudson 2008). Lippmann might 
instead have been looking for a way ‘to harness experts to a legitimately democratic 
function’ (Schudson 2008: 1041). It does in any case appear to be the consensus that 
Lippmann’s work displayed ‘overtones of elitism’ (Schudson 2008: 1031), and that 
this makes his an ‘elitist philosophy’ (Porter 2011: 570). The nuances separating 
“anti-democratic” from merely “elitist” become important when one wants to find 
the exact political position of proto-neoliberals such as Lippmann. The importance 
of that distinction becomes even more pronounced in the context of an analysis of 
neoliberalism in the early 21
st
 Century.  
Lippmann was not against democracy per se, his was an ‘alternative – elitist – vision 
of democracy’ (Rogers 2012: 17), and as he puts it in The Phantom Public ‘an 
election based on the principle of majority rule is historically and practically a 
sublimated and denatured civil war’ so Lippmann clearly sees that periodic 
democratic elections are beneficial to society because the alternative would be to go 
through irregular episodes of revolutionary convulsion instead (Lippmann [1925] 
1993: 48). Lippmann’s elitism went as far right as was possible within democratic, 
meritocratic and secular confines. It had nothing to do with reverence for 
aristocracy, monarchy, or a religiously founded order (which separates it from 
typical 19
th
 Century European conservatism). Neither was it explicitly authoritarian 
(i.e. where a single faction rules the state without legitimate opposition), the reason 
being that Lippmann could see the utility in having both competing political groups 
– or more to the point ‘competing elites’ (McClay 1993: xliv) – within the polity and 
                                                 
24 Lippmann both expressed admiration for, and showed his insight into, Machiavelli’s works in 
Public Opinion (See: Lippmann 1922: 264-266). E. H. Carr, whose work The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis did much to define “realism” in international relations theory, sees Machiavelli as ‘the 
first important political realist’ and approvingly quotes his dictum that ‘it appears to me more 
appropriate to follow up the real truth of a matter than the imagination of it’ (Carr [1939] 2001: 
62, and Machiavelli as quoted on the same page). Lippmann endeavors to make a similar effort 
to Machiavelli’s, and this McClay finds especially pronounced in The Phantom Public (McClay 
1993: xlii). 
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regular elections, where the public chooses which of these groups to lead them: ‘It is 
the function of public opinion to check the use of force in a crisis, so that men, 
driven to make terms, may live and let live’ (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 64).  
The aspect of democracy Lippmann had an issue with was the tendency, as he 
perceived it, of a crude majoritarianism to exert power over policy makers – forcing 
experts to bow to the wishes of an incompetent public – and that this was getting in 
the way of formulating sound policies in key areas such as in economic and foreign 
policy. Note that Lippmann did not perceive experts as in any way superhuman; 
Lippmann assumed ‘only that they might know better than the common folk’ (Steel 
1980: 214). And since ‘competence exists only in relation to function’ so ‘that men 
are not good, but good for something’ theirs was an expertise that was only valid 
when it came to making decisions within the fields they mastered (Lippmann [1925] 
1993: 140).  
What Lippmann apparently did not realize was that if a sufficiently detached 
technocratic elite becomes too insulated from pressures exerted by public opinion, 
they will be able to formulate any policy essentially unchallenged, whether sound or 
not. And in the event that propaganda is actually successful in manufacturing 
consent among the public at large there might not be enough independent thought 
among the public to check an elites’ excesses. Lippmann viewed democracy more as 
a handy tool than a principle worth defending on its own merits. This is a slippery 
slope which for Lippmann in practice culminates in a defense of the pretense to 
democracy more than anything else. John Dewey was one of the contemporary 
observers of Lippmann’s work that picked up on this. 
When John Dewey wrote his The Public and Its Problems, published in 1927, 
Dewey acknowledged his ‘indebtedness’ for ‘ideas involved in my entire discussion’ 
to both Lippmann’s Public Opinion and The Phantom Public (Dewey [1927] 2012: 
104, footnote). Dewey was ’unquestionably the leading progressive intellectual, 
before, during, and after World War I’ and he ‘wrote frequently for The New 
Republic in this period and was clearly its leading theoretician’ or so Murray 
Rothbard asserts, thereby ranking Dewey above Lippmann in what arguably appears 
to be a fair assessment by a leading libertarian who was no fan of either (Rothbard 
1989: 96). Dewey was in contradistinction to Lippmann consistently a progressive in 
- 124 - 
the 20
th
 Century,25 and he had for example early in his career been influenced by T. 
H. Green (Weinstein 2012: 157, footnote 34). Ideologically Dewey therefore 
belongs to the same social liberal category as the new liberals.  
What came to be known as the ‘Lippmann-Dewey debate’ about half a century after 
it was supposed to have been conducted was in reality not a debate, as this assumes 
a certain back and forth dialogue, and can more accurately be described as Dewey 
being inspired by Lippmann’s two works on the public to produce a work of his own 
in response to these (Schudson 2008: 1031-1032). In parts of this response Dewey 
castigates Lippmann for making the case for expanding already present elitist 
aspects of democracy: ‘No government by experts in which the masses do not have 
the chance to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy 
managed in the interests of the few’ (Dewey [1927] 2012: 154). But Dewey 
simultaneously gives away how such an oligarchy, if it should become a political 
fact, can be best preserved: 
Representative government must at least seem to be founded on 
public interests as they are revealed to the public belief. The days 
are past when government can be carried on without any 
pretense of ascertaining the wishes of the governed. In theory, 
their assent must be secured. Under the older forms, there was no 
need to muddy the sources of public opinion on political matters. 
No current of energy flowed from them. To-day the judgments 
popularly formed on political matters are so important, in spite of 
all factors to the contrary, that there is an enormous premium 
upon all methods which affect their formation (Dewey [1927] 
2012: 140, added emphasis). 
What is a warning from Dewey, who goes on to state that ‘The smoothest road to 
control of political conduct is by control of opinion’, can be seen as an opportunity 
for how to instigate the rule of experts Lippmann recently had advocated (Dewey 
[1927] 2012: 140). It is as if Dewey reminds Lippmann that a project for rule by 
experts, if it is to succeed in its goal, must necessarily have to be a two-faced 
exercise to work sufficiently well in a democratic context. First it has to present 
itself as outward looking through propaganda aimed at the masses, claiming that 
                                                 
25 According to Rothbard, Dewey promoted ‘postmillennial progressive Christian statism’ up to 1900 
and then changed to promoting a ‘secular progressive statism’ from then on (Rothbard 1989: 
96).  
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governance is a collective endeavor and that the public are the ones ultimately in 
charge of how its affairs will be conducted. Here the aim is to keep “the outsiders”, 
to employ Lippmann’s terminology, onboard. Then there is another inward looking 
part of the same campaign, clandestinely operating but more earnest, informing “the 
insiders” what is actually going on (presumably on a “need to know” basis to limit 
the damages from potential leakage) so that nobody in a leading position works in 
contradiction of the real goals.  
Though the first, publicly disseminated, line is in and of itself true, it is as Lippmann 
conceded in The Phantom Public only true on the rarest of occasions when ‘Public 
opinion’ acts as ‘a reserve of force brought into action during a crisis’ (Lippmann 
[1925] 1993: 59). Otherwise politics is a matter handled through institutions steered 
by the ‘Ins’ currently in power, sometimes in conjunction with the ‘Outs’ awaiting 
their chance to get their turn at the helm, because in Lippmann’s words: ‘To support 
the Ins when things are going well; to support the Outs when they seem to be going 
badly, this, in spite of all that is said about tweedledum and tweedledee, is the 
essence of popular government’ (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 116). It is first the moment 
institutions fail that the public becomes momentarily significant, ‘The hardest 
problems are those which institutions cannot handle. They are the public’s 
problems’ (Lippmann [1925] 1993: 121). But in most instances the public’s 
influence on politics ‘in stable and mature societies’ is limited to choosing between 
‘very small’ ‘differing tendencies [ ] compared to the immense area of agreement, 
established habit, and unavoidable necessity’ as they elect this or that elite faction 
(Lippmann [1925] 1993: 117-118).  
Lippmann’s insights coupled with what can in addition be derived from Dewey’s 
“words of advice” gives us three lessons that should be applied if an oligarchic rule 
by experts is viewed as preferable to a more democratic rule which – as we can see 
by definition – would be conducted in liaison with a better informed electorate. 
These principled lessons are:  
1) Make the public believe its interests are being served and they will reciprocate 
with providing vital support, and if it is necessary to curry the public’s favor then a 
sustained propaganda campaign of deceitful misinformation ought to be applied, 
because having the most substantial part of the public on ones’ side is of the essence 
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when it comes to both gaining and holding on to power, and especially so in a 
democracy.  
2) Keep the original project of elite rule a secret and do not under any circumstances 
admit to this publicly (because it would undermine the effort for securing public 
acquiescence and also expose the project to much more damning attacks from 
countervailing forces and thereby strengthen these). 
3) The moment one is in a position to create an institutional framework which 
supports said program then do so immediately, because nothing short of something 
akin to a revolution26 is likely to be able to overturn a fully institutionalized agenda, 
as both Inns and Outs (the latter might otherwise have constituted a threat) will now 
be operating within a structure created with the expressed purpose of upholding and 
furthering that very same program or project or ideology.  
In short the watchwords relating to Lippmann’s Machiavellian understanding of how 
one can succeed in modern politics should therefore be; public deception, 
operational secrecy, and enthusiastic institutionalization (at opportune moments). 
There are, to say the least, interesting corollaries between these insights made by 
Lippmann in the 1920s and the methods by which the ideology of neoliberalism 
have become dominant later on. 
If we go back to the notion that Lippmann represented early neoliberalism’s leftmost 
side, there is very little remaining room within neoliberal discourse for any overlap 
with social-liberalism as exemplified by John Dewey. It is also quite clear that even 
early- or proto- neoliberalism on its most leftward side, as exemplified by 
Lippmann’s writings, in some respects at least, teeters on the edge of an anti-
democratic authoritarian conservatism. We must take into account that Lippmann 
promoted a common conservative stance; the belief that since the ruling class is 
(supposedly) at any time also in a position to be the best informed segment of 
                                                 
26 I here use “revolution” in a broad sense where the creation and successful rise of a contender party 
which manages to displace both the establishment “Inns” and the “Outs” and gain power can be 
viewed as the slow implementation of a revolutionary agenda, though one which results in 
significantly less of the mass-uprisings and the bloodletting in the streets which accompanied 
the revolutions that toppled the ancien regimes in France and Russia. The social-democratic 
parties’ gradual displacement of the reigning conservative and liberal parties in much of 
Western Europe in the first half of the 20
th
 Century was in this sense a fairly pacific (with 
exceptions to how this transition worked out in countries such as Spain, Germany and Italy) 
“revolution” in politics.  
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society, there is little to be gained for society as a whole by “outsider” interference 
with the insiders’ executive decision-making. The conclusion, thus far based on 
Lippmann’s purported left-most position within early neoliberal discourse, is 
therefore that the early neoliberal spectrum did not really overlap with the social 
liberal domain on its left. But this does not indicate that the other early neoliberals, 
whom ostensibly are to be found further to the right of Lippmann, are reactionary-
conservatives of the old school with a belief in God-given order and aristocratic 
privilege. This is because neoliberal discourse operates with a different left-right 
spectrum than the more commonly applied one that moves between egalitarianism 
on the left and authoritarianism on the right which was the framework which first 
incorporated Republicans versus Monarchists on the eve of the French Revolution. 
Neoliberalism’s Peculiar Ideological Orientations 
  The early neoliberals viewed the political spectrum as moving between full 
government interference on the far left and complete freedom from government 
interference on the far right, in an operation which first of all served to jumble 
Nazis, Fascists, Communists, social-democrats, and social liberals into a statist 
category of “collectivists”. But in addition this also served to obfuscate any 
connections or similarities between their own socially and economically rightward 
positions and those of preceding conservative-authoritarian regimes, who especially 
by the end of World War II had lost considerable public standing in many Western 
countries.  
The early neoliberals’ counter-posed freedom from government as the alternative to 
the authoritarian tendencies they argued existed within all the competitor creeds. 
Ludwig von Mises for example, who as we can recall is said to represent the 
rightmost Neoliberal viewpoint during this period, defended a libertarian view in 
texts such as “Laissez Faire or Dictatorship” originally published in 1949, a work 
whose title pretty much gives away the content (Mises [1952] 1974: 36-49). It is this 
libertarian stance against state interference in the economy that makes Mises a hard-
right neoliberal and Lippmann’s apparent lack of sharing in it which makes him a 
leftist within neoliberal discourse. 
Lippmann’s reputation as being furthest to the left within neoliberal discourse stems 
mainly from his inconsistent advocacy of a free enterprise system in his 1937 book 
The Good Society. In this work Lippmann tries to reconcile his adaptation of 
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Hayek’s stance against collectivism with what is still his own lingering eagerness to 
promote social progress and, as his biographer Ronald Steel observes, this is not a 
task Lippmann is particularly successful at finding a solution to: 
[Lippmann’s] second half of The Good Society [ ] was designed 
to show that opposition to collectivism did not make him an 
enemy of social progress. There he drew up a blueprint – 
including public works, social insurance, income equalization 
through taxation, counter cyclical spending, and the abolition of 
monopolies – that was not very different from what FDR had 
been trying to achieve with the New Deal. The result was 
perplexing. The book seemed intellectually split down the 
middle: half classic laissez-faire, half welfare state liberalism 
(Steel 1980: 323). 
Lippmann did not go as far as advocating complete state ownership of the means of 
production, but that he in many respects leaned towards the social liberal John 
Maynard Keynes’ economic ideas is not just evident from the regulative measures 
Lippmann recommends (see also: Jackson 2010: 141-142), but in addition from his 
introduction to the same work, where Lippmann praises Keynes because he ‘has 
done so much to demonstrate to the free peoples that the modern economy can be 
regulated without dictatorship’ (as cited in: Jackson 2010: 142). Lippmann was 
however no clear-cut Keynesian because of this. In the same work he gives Hayek ‘a 
sweeping bow’ and makes it clear they share the notion ‘that political and economic 
liberalism [goes] hand in hand’ (Steel 1980: 323).  
In certain segments of The Good Society Lippmann’s preferred arrangement of the 
economy appears to mirror Hayek’s prescriptions, at least in crucial respects. 
Lippmann harbored deep concerns about “collectivism”, the catch-all term that for 
Lippmann and the other early neoliberals applied to basically every non-liberal or 
anti-free market ideological variants. These antagonistic ideologies to the neoliberal 
project, Lippmann argued, were found in two basic forms; the ‘gradual collectivism’ 
present in Western democracies and the ‘total collectivism’ primarily found in 
Stalin’s Soviet Union and Hitler’s Nazi-Germany (Lippmann 1937: 173). Hayek 
meant that centralized planning was the hallmark of collectivism/socialism in all its 
variations, and in this category he included Roosevelt’s New Deal liberalism, 
Western European social-democracy, communism, and fascism (Hayek [1944] 
2007: 84-85 and 100). When it came to Nazism it was evidently ‘short for National 
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Socialism, [as] Hayek never tired of reminding his readers’ (Phillips-Fein 2009: 40, 
emphasis in original). That socialism was nominally a part of Nazism was one point 
which ‘these liberals always emphasized’ (Gamble 2013: 409).  
Mises also uses a similar distinction in an address he delivered in 1945. There Mises 
sees two kinds of planned economy he identifies as ‘interventionism’ and 
‘socialism’ (Mises [1952] 1974: 1-2). The first “interventionist” category Mises 
subdivides further into the American New Deal model and the social-democratic 
model exemplified by ‘Lord Keynes’ and ‘Sir William Beveridge’ and Mises sees 
both these as a furthering of ‘the Bismarck orthodoxy’ (Mises [1952] 1974: 1-5). In 
the second “socialist” category he sees socialism following a Russian pattern which 
‘is purely bureaucratic’ as one variety with socialism following a (Nazi-) German 
pattern where ‘[t]he authority, not the consumers, directs production’ while 
maintaining ‘the outward appearance of capitalism’ as another (Mises [1952] 1974: 
1-5). For Mises the latter “socialist” category is ‘the antithesis of free enterprise, 
private initiative, private ownership of the means of production, market economy, 
and the price system’ while the “interventionist” solution is ultimately ‘a method for 
the transformation of capitalism into socialism by a series of successive steps’ which 
therefore makes it only a different ‘tactic to be resorted to for the attainment of an 
end that both groups are aiming at’ (Mises [1952] 1974: 1 and 28).27 This 
designation of collectivism as the primary enemy which had to be fought in any 
ideological guise it reared its head appears to have united the whole neoliberal 
spectrum at its early stages, from Lippmann on the left to Mises on the right.  
Curiously the positioning of Lippmann to the left of both Hayek and Mises based on 
economic disposition becomes the inverse on a scale measuring their political 
beliefs on an internationalist (or globalist) to nationalist scale. When it comes to 
their views on foreign policy and world order Lippmann, by taking a position that 
can be defined as realist, distinctly distinguishes himself from the idealists Hayek 
and Mises. But Lippmann does this in a way that corresponds to a much higher 
degree with the view that has come to dominate not just the neoliberal debate, but all 
mainstream political debate, since the Cold War hardened to in the late 1940s. In 
                                                 
27 The undesirability of ‘collectivist ideas’ was something Milton Friedman would also address later 
in his seminal 1951 paper “Neoliberalism and Its Prospects” where Friedman ‘like Hayek and 
Mises before him, conflated [collectivism] with socialism and New Deal liberalism’ (Stedman 
Jones 2012: 97). 
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this sense Lippmann can be viewed as a progenitor of what by default came to be the 
neoliberal view, or in the least an exemplary proponent of it. Meanwhile the views 
of Mises and Hayek on the matter appear to have been largely neglected, perhaps 
since these can be viewed as byproducts of ‘the monopoly of international studies 
between the two wars by the utopian school’ (Carr [1939] 2001: 135). But far from 
being naively idealistic Mises and Hayek were instead aware that the boundless 
logic of capital identified by Marx much earlier, if it was not to be haphazardly 
constrained, would sooner rather than later require a form of political 
accommodation at the global level. 
Mises’ and Hayek’s “One Worldism” vs. Lippmann’s Realism  
  Foreign policy was for Lippmann one of his primary areas of expertise, something 
that cannot be said of either Hayek or Mises. Lippmann had, in addition to his 
practical experience of the conduct of foreign policy during the Great War, also as 
an author published several influential books on the topic. Amongst these are two 
works he produced during World War II – U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the 
Republic (1943) and U.S. War Aims (1944). Lippmann is partially because of these 
said to be ‘a central figure in American diplomatic history’ (Porter 2011: 557). The 
fact that Lippmann ‘is often given credit for’ coining ‘the phrase’ “The Cold War” 
and that he was ‘on close terms’ with George F. Kennan (Steel 1980: 445) – the US 
diplomat behind the doctrine of containment that came to be adopted by successive 
US administrations as The Cold War progressed (Ambrose & Brinkley 2011: 95-96) 
– also gives further credence to his position as a specialist on foreign policy.  
In U.S. Foreign Policy Lippmann argued that American attitudes to the rest of the 
world had been distorted by Wilsonianism for too long. Though Lippmann was ‘a 
lapsed Wilsonian himself’ he claimed that ‘Wilsonianism is a conflicted protean 
concept’ and that it had come to be represented by ‘not the muscular crusading 
version of 1917, but the pacific “one world” idealism that followed the war’ (Porter 
2011: 561).  Lippmann further argued that ways ‘to peace that lost sight of tough-
minded considerations of power could not work, whether insulation from the world 
or excessive faith in international institutions’ (Porter 2011: 561).  
In other words Lippmann maneuvered to find a middle-way between an isolationist 
‘withdrawal to Fortress America’ and pursuing ‘world federalism’ (Steel 1980: 406). 
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With these extremes in mind Lippmann recommended a more prudent course 
‘America’s war aims should not be a universalist effort to transform world politics, 
but to work with Great Powers to achieve a long period of security from “world 
conquerors”’ (Porter 2011: 562). Lippmann meant that American policy towards the 
rest of the world in the inter-war years had seen itself ‘lapsing into utopian naivety’ 
as too much wishful thinking had made its way up from the general population and 
into national politics and he therefore ‘urged restraint in domestic political 
competition, imploring elites to guide the democracy’ (Porter 2011: 566). Taking on 
a familiar refrain ‘Lippmann argued that because the democratic mass was 
incompetent to judge foreign affairs, it was best to leave it to seasoned elites’ and as 
a consequence he admonished ‘The political class’ to ‘close ranks and protect 
foreign policy and public opinion from each other’ (Porter 2011: 566). It is hard to 
interpret this stance as anything else than that the same public opinion which 
otherwise secures a polity from arbitrary rule should count for naught when it comes 
to the conduct of foreign policy.  
Lippmann tried to warn the United States of the imminent ‘overstretch’ that he could 
see happening thanks to ‘the idealistic masses’ and their notion ‘that America could 
re-order the world away from power politics towards permanent peace’ (Porter 
2011: 562 and 567). Lippmann stood firm to his earlier belief that America should 
only see itself as tied to the Atlantic nations of Europe, and even ‘opposed the 
expansion of America’s formal alliances and the creation in April 1949 of a greater 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) beyond the Atlantic area’ though 
NATO at that date (with the inclusion of Italy) only had one member without an 
Atlantic coastline (Porter 2011: 570). Lippmann did not appreciate the fact that 
‘America’s conception of its outer defences’ which had once been ‘continental and 
hemispheric’ had now become ‘extra-regional and global’ (Porter 2011: 560).  
Lippmann in the end not only opposed what he saw as the public’s naïve belief in 
creating world peace through international institutions, but he also thought that the 
elites’ who pursued ‘America’s rise to globalism’ through military means needed to 
realize the futility of that particular cause as well (Ambrose & Brinkley 2011: xiv, 
see also: Steel 1980: 408). For Lippmann the world was simply too large and the 
forces arrayed against the success of such adventurist ventures too manifold for the 
United States to stand a realistic chance at accomplishing such efforts even at the 
pinnacle of its national power immediately after World War II. ‘Deliberately 
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rejecting the idealists’ belief in world law and international parliaments, Lippmann 
grounded his policy in national interest and alliances’ (Steel 1980: 405). As he put it 
in U.S. Policy: Shield of the Republic ‘If it is to be peace in our time [ ] it will have 
to be peace among sovereign national states’ (as cited in; Steel 1980: 405). This 
idea, that ‘great power cooperation’ was going be the commanding principle once 
the war was over turned out to be ‘an instant success’ because it ‘seemed a realistic 
alternative both to bankrupt isolationism and to wishful universalism’ (Steel 1980: 
406). Lippmann expected that there would be ‘spheres of influence’ and that these 
‘would give the great powers a sense of security and prevent a scramble for control 
of fringe areas’ but this arrangement was threatened by ‘Wilsonian universalism’ 
and ‘the globalism central to it’ (Steel 1980: 410). Lippmann contended that ‘the 
danger of the universalism preached by the One Worlders was that it invited 
intervention in the name of self-determination’ and that ‘the results of such 
meddling, however well-intentioned, could be disastrous’ (Steel 1980: 410).  
In a world where an ‘attempt to enforce peace against’ any of the great powers in the 
newly minted Security Council of the United Nations ‘would simply be a polite 
introduction to another world war’ Lippmann thought that those who saw a budding 
universal society in the United Nations organization were getting things in the 
wrong order (as cited in: Steel 1980: 411). These people had ‘failed to grasp that’, as 
Lippmann wrote; ‘pacification must precede the establishment of a reign of law’ and 
the ‘major premise that [the United Nations] organization can and should be a 
universal society to pacify the world’ was therefore ‘false’ since ‘the truth is that 
only in a reasonably pacified world can there be a universal society’ (as cited in: 
Steel 1980: 411). This last Hobbesian insight by Lippmann is noteworthy, as his 
realist inclination not only made him argue that world government was a futile 
venture in the international political climate that existed at the end of World War II, 
but also to identify what had to be a precondition for it to become a possibility at 
some future point – the military pacification of all opposing factions by one 
universally victorious force.  
The United States might have been the strongest state in the history of the world at 
the end of World War II, in light of its short-lived monopoly on nuclear weapons, 
but it was not even close to being the equivalent in the global realm to the monarch 
who had subjugated all competing noble pretenders within the borders of the 
budding absolute state at an earlier juncture for the constitution of world order. The 
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Soviet Union, with its more numerous conventional forces, was only the most 
massive obstacle in this regard. Lippmann, very aware of this momentous limitation 
to American power even in its moment of victory, instead ‘fashioned an “imagined 
community” of Atlantic nations that was both strategically and ideologically 
coherent’ which basically was the same he had argued that the United States had to 
protect during the First World War (Porter 2011: 571). That was also to a lesser 
extent what came to pass as the West united in an alliance under American auspices 
mounted against the gravely perceived Soviet threat.  
What makes Lippmann’s prophetic realism so interesting in relation to the 
development of neoliberalism is that his position was so far to the right of Hayek 
and Mises, provided that one assumes that this can be measured on an 
internationalist/cosmopolitan to nationalist/parochial continuum where the former 
“left” position is less conservative than the latter which therefore ought to be 
considered “right” in this scale. I am not claiming that Lippmann was not at all an 
internationalist or that he did not exhibit cosmopolitan qualities, but that his 
opinions were closer to the right than to the left at a point along this scale because 
what he advocated was only a severely limited Western-centric Atlanticist 
internationalism. In contrast Mises’ attitudes shows just how much further it is 
possible to move to the left on this ideological dimension. 
Ludwig von Mises the Ultra-Cosmopolitan 
  Mises’ views on foreign policy and world order can be found in his book 
Liberalismus originally published in German in 1927, published in English first as 
The Free and Prosperous Commonwealth in 1962 to avoid using the term 
“liberalism” which by then had become associated with heavy government 
interference in the United States. The same work is called Liberalism: In the 
Classical Tradition in more recent editions. In his Preface to the English Language 
Edition Mises informs that he ‘has not changed anything’ from the original text of 
the book (Mises [1962] 1985: xviii). More specifically it is from his chapter entitled 
‘Liberal Foreign Policy’ that I will now relate Mises views form the inter-war years 
(Mises [1962] 1985: 105-154). Mises maintains that liberalism is a universal creed; 
‘liberalism is, from the very outset a world-embracing political concept, and the 
same ideas that it seeks to realize within a limited area it holds to be valid also for 
the larger sphere of world politics’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 105). Further: ‘Its thinking 
is cosmopolitan and ecumenical: it takes in all men and the whole world. Liberalism 
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is, in this sense, humanism; and the liberal, a citizen of the world, a cosmopolite’ 
(Mises [1962] 1985: 106). So far Mises is entirely in line with a pre-national 
Enlightenment ideal, and being aware of this he elaborates:  
It is thought that an irreconcilable conflict exists between the 
interests of the nation and those of mankind and that one who 
directs his aspirations and endeavors toward the welfare of the 
whole of humanity thereby disregards the interests of his own 
nation. No belief could be more deeply mistaken. The German 
who works for the good of all mankind no more injures the 
particular interests of his compatriots – i.e., those of his fellow 
men with whom he shares a common land and language and with 
whom he often forms an ethnic and spiritual community as well 
– than one who works for the good of the whole German nation 
injures the interests of his own home town. For the individual 
has just as much of an interest in the prosperity of the whole 
world as he has in the blooming and flourishing of the local 
community where he lives (Mises [1962] 1985: 106). 
When Mises wrote these words in 1927 he contrasted his own views with those of 
‘chauvinistic nationalists’ but also saw their concerted efforts at creating ‘domestic 
unity’ as not only analogous to the liberal hope for the world as a whole, but also as 
an achievement the liberals had started out working for that when accomplished 
ought to be repeated at the level of world politics (Mises [1962] 1985: 106). This 
argument also reveals that Mises cannot be fairly described as an anti-democrat; ‘a 
country can enjoy domestic peace only when a democratic constitution provides the 
guarantee that the adjustment of government to the will of the citizens can take place 
without friction’ and for Mises the recipe for world peace follows neatly from this 
realization: ‘Nothing else is required than the consistent application of the same 
principle in order to assure international peace as well’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 108).  
Mises is no simple internationalist, he also wants to see the application of ‘The right 
to self-determination’ so broadly that any territory ‘large enough to count as 
territorial units in the administration of the country’ can elect to ‘form an 
independent state or to attach themselves to some other state’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 
109-110). Mises here goes beyond mere internationalism and makes it clear that ‘the 
right of self-determination of which we speak is not the right of self-determination 
of nations, but rather the right of self-determination of the inhabitants of every 
territory large enough to form an independent administrative unit’ a view which puts 
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him very far from the conservative defenders of the nation-state and into the ranks of 
only the most radical cosmopolitans (Mises [1962] 1985: 109). But Mises is no 
Kropotkin-like figure that thinks complete decentralization into largely self-
sufficient villages could be the solution, because he sees the technical imperatives 
that have arisen in the age of modernity. Mises, in the more well-known economist 
version, argues that there is ‘an international division of labor’ because ‘the division 
of labor has for a long time now gone beyond the boundaries of any one nation’ and 
as a consequence ‘anything that would have the effect of preventing or stopping the 
international exchange of goods would do immense damage to the whole of human 
civilization’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 107).  
Mises’ primary motivation for arguing the liberal cause appears to be ‘the necessity 
of perpetual peace’ as he expresses it in Kantian terms and not for example profit or 
the freedom of the individual (Mises [1962] 1985: 109). But the means to 
accomplish this peace is through universalizing liberal principles, and first of all that 
‘private ownership of the means of production prevails everywhere’ since this is for 
Mises seen as the foundational principle necessary ‘to create the social conditions 
that will eliminate the causes of war’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 112 and 111). Since 
Mises intellectually was so alien to what is now called “methodological 
nationalism” (see: Beck 2000: 22-26, and; Chernilo 2006) he could follow a 
universal liberal logic to its conclusion: ‘A capitalist world organized on liberal 
principles knows no separate “economic zones”. In such a world, the whole of the 
Earth’s surface forms a single economic territory’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 113). In this 
single economic territory there can be no restrictions on the freedom of movement, 
such as on immigration, without this being a violation against liberal principle 
comparable to raising protective tariffs (Mises [1962] 1985: 137-138).  
Mises is essentially arguing for a completely borderless world, even to the point that 
he argues against what is still today by many viewed as the realization of a properly 
cosmopolitan polity – the then only theoretical ‘idea of a Pan-European union’ 
(Mises [1962] 1985: 143). A European union would according to Mises only serve 
to create conditions where: ‘A European chauvinism is to take the place of the 
French, the German, or the Hungarian variety; a united front formed of all European 
nations is to be directed against “foreigners”: Britons, Americans, Russians, 
Chinese, and Japanese’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 145). This scaling up, without 
universalizing the polity completely, would not get at the root problem of 
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chauvinism, whether national or otherwise, but only recreate it in inflated form; 
‘what is needed is not the replacement of national chauvinism by a chauvinism that 
would have some larger, supranational entity for its object, but rather the recognition 
that every sort of chauvinism is mistaken’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 144).  
For Mises the only theoretical way to end discord between nations is to unite them 
‘on an equal basis’ ‘in a world state’ which follows from the fact that: 
…for the liberal, the world does not end at the borders of the 
[nation] state. In his eyes, whatever significance national 
boundaries have is only incidental and subordinate. His political 
thinking encompasses the whole of mankind (Mises [1962] 
1985: 148).  
Mises, who did not look favorably upon the League of Nations, did however ‘hope 
that from these extremely inadequate beginnings a world superstate really deserving 
of the name may some day be able to develop’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 150). For Mises 
‘the problem involved’ in creating a world superstate to supplant the League ‘is not 
at all a matter of organization or of the technique of international government, but 
the greatest ideological question that mankind has ever faced’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 
150, added emphasis). Mises here seems to be in agreement with both Julian Huxley 
and the Anthropocene authors mentioned previously about the need for a world 
control. This also goes completely against contemporary neoliberal intentions as 
these are understood at the beginning of the twenty-first century.  
The solution Mises offers is that ‘the unqualified, unconditional acceptance of 
liberalism’ is necessary on a global scale if ‘the prerequisites of peace are to be 
created and the causes of war eliminated’ (Mises [1962] 1985: 150). Through 
accepting Mises’ version of liberalism the world populace would self-pacify and 
create the necessary conditions – the same conditions which Lippmann realized 
were lacking when the United Nations was formed – through becoming the 
“universal society” which they both thought had to precede the formation of a 
worldwide polity.  
Even though Mises can be placed far to the left on the cosmopolitan-national 
continuum, it has to be taken into account that this is an ideological dimension that 
does not operate with a clear position on social class, except the inherent inclination 
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of cosmopolitans to treat foreigners and co-nationals equally. At the extreme end of 
the nationalist side there is of course also the tendency to perceive outside groups as 
being composed of inferior beings. Mises’ thoughts as these are expressed in 
Liberalismus shows that he can be placed far over on the cosmopolitan side of this 
dimension. This indicates that in this particular sense Mises’ thought is actually 
extremely progressive (i.e. we can see that he is working towards realizing the 
Enlightenment goal of instituting the universal republic of mankind and he has 
identified national chauvinism as the main obstacle to this). The catch, which in any 
case makes it wrong to categorize Mises as belonging to the progressive side of 
politics, is that his universalism as expressed in the stance he has on the ideal world 
order configuration is sharply countered by his even more pronounced leaning 
towards ‘philosophical conservatism’ on another relevant ideological dimension 
(Müller 2006: 363). If we assume that the most progressive placement one could 
have on an egalitarian-hierarchical dimension – stretching from advocating for a 
complete classlessness at the left end and then towards defending a complete social 
stratification at the right end – it is clear from much of Mises’ work that his views 
often were aligned with the right side of this dimension, albeit closer to the center 
right than the far right position.  
Mises took an extreme position against government intervention in the economy, 
which is how he earned his reputation as a libertarian, such as when he argued that: 
‘Mankind has a choice only between the unhampered market economy, democracy, 
and freedom on the one side, and socialism and dictatorship on the other side’ while 
he simultaneously claimed to have proved that: ‘A third alternative, an 
interventionist compromise, is not feasible’ (Mises [1940] 1998: 92). The practical 
implication of this is that one for example must accept; great disparities of wealth 
amongst individuals, very low levels of taxation of the more well to do, that the 
minimum wage and the amount of the working age population that are under 
employment at any one time will be set by “the market”, and that the funds available 
for redistribution to people that cannot cope within the economic framework 
dictated by unhampered market mechanisms will be minimal (see: Mises [1940] 
1998: 91-93).  
Mises argues that it is ‘in the interest of the masses of the people’ with minimal state 
interference in the economy and not just that of ‘the entrepreneurs and capitalists’ 
(Mises [1940] 1998: 79). But if we assume that a typical state intervention is the 
- 138 - 
imposition of a progressive tax rate – where the rich pay a higher percentage of their 
earnings in tax than the poor do – then it is very likely that removing this form of 
intervention would result in lowering the amount of funds that are being 
redistributed from the top echelons of society to its lower ranks. When it has been 
tried in the real world it has, not surprisingly, made the rich richer; ‘the spectacular 
decrease in the progressivity of the income tax in the United States and Britain since 
1980, even though both countries had been the leaders in progressive taxation after 
World War II, probably explains much of the increase in the very highest earned 
incomes’ (Piketty 2014: 495-496).  
Mises willingness to advocate economic solutions that would give more 
predictability for the rich in exchange for more insecurity for the rest makes Mises a 
conservative in the sense that he is ‘invested in the importance of hierarchical 
relationships, or some more or less natural conception of inequality’, ‘attribute 
differential value to particular sets of human beings’ and ‘emphasize that certain 
social arrangements distributing power unequally are unalterable’ (Müller 2006: 
363). Mises only to a certain degree fulfill these criteria for being a conservative, for 
instance he was not the kind of conservative that is against ‘change’ since he wanted 
a liberal post-national world order and neither was he ‘committed to “particularism” 
’ as he to the contrary was for a rather pronounced universalism (Müller 2006: 362 
and 360). But it is primarily because Mises evidently takes the side of capital against 
labor, or that of the rich against the rest of society (though this is not a stance he 
makes explicit), which makes Mises closer to being a conservative than he is to 
being a progressive. Mises nonetheless articulates a close to planetarist version of 
conservatism which is further removed from nationalism than most ideologies found 
to the left of neoliberalism. Mises worldview shows us that conservatism can be 
accommodated to work within the confines of a planetary polity.  
Mises did not see any purpose in “attributing differential value” to specific groups 
purely based on their nationality or religion, as many conservatives have done in the 
past, but he was very open to do so on the basis of their individual economic 
position in society, a view which made him defend the social stratification of a 
universal polity in a similar manner as a standard conservative would defend the 
same in domestic affairs. To put it simply; Mises accepted a central part of the 
communist worldview – that the modern world is composed of ‘two great classes [ ] 
Bourgeoisie and Proletariat’ (Marx & Engels [1848] 1992: 3) – but as a liberal 
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member of the upper middle class he identifies with the former class and not the 
latter.  
While Mises did argue that: ‘A world order must be established in which nations and 
national groups are so satisfied with living conditions that they will not feel 
compelled to resort to the expedient of war’ and acknowledged that ‘we cannot do 
without the apparatus of government in protecting and preserving the life, liberty, 
property, and health of the individual’ he also pointed out David Ricardo’s early 19
th
 
Century insight that ‘in the world economy’ it is bound to be that ‘the countries with 
comparatively favorable conditions of production will be richer than the others’ 
(Mises [1962] 1985: 111, 116 and 132). Mises did not believe in inherent racial 
capacities and he deplored colonialism (see: Mises [1962] 1985: 125). What he saw 
as a potential redeeming factor for the imperialists was that they (generalizing 
broadly) had introduced capitalism to the colonies, and that this could act as a 
freeing agent in the phase of colonial liberation to come:  
As capitalism has penetrated these territories, the natives have 
become self-reliant; there is no longer any cultural disparity 
between their upper classes and the officers and officials who are 
in charge of the administration on behalf of the mother country 
(Mises [1962] 1985: 129). 
This quotation gives us a glimpse into an essential element of early neoliberal 
thought, it can be portrayed as emancipatory in its desire for universal participation 
on theoretically more or less equal terms, regardless of one’s national, religious, or 
racial category, but it is less emancipatory in its tendency to see the world through 
class-tinted spectacles.  
Early neoliberal thought is horizontally egalitarian as it sees few if any excuses for 
national, religious or racial exceptionalism, but it is vertically hierarchical because 
it thinks in terms of exceptional individuals who by their contribution to the 
economy makes such a valuable service for the material well-being of the rest of 
society that they deserve to be able to accumulate as much capital as they desire. 
There is no purpose in the early neoliberal mind to objecting to this arrangement, 
because everyone will ultimately benefit from the allocation of as much profit as 
possible into the hands of this uniquely able entrepreneurial elite. It is the economic 
elite, the meritocratic part of the upper classes, or the bourgeoisie capitalists, that is 
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the driving force behind progress and it is only natural that they accrue the largest 
portion of the fruits it yields.  
The solidarity that matters is the one that leads to the cohesion of this elite across 
borders, not the one that strives to even out the differences between all segments of 
society domestically or internationally. Their inclination is therefore close to 
conservative, but of a much less nationalistic kind than earlier versions and more 
distant from the far right than a typical conservative stance would be in these 
respects. Their inclination can also be said to be liberal with their focus on 
meritocracy rather than inherited status, but it is a liberalism purged of the more 
progressive and socialist aspects that characterized the earlier social-liberals. 
Neoliberalism in the end takes liberalism a bit to the right economically and 
conservatism a bit to the left culturally and becomes “right-liberal” or “left-
conservative”. What really distances the early neoliberals from the conservatives, 
not in the case of Lippmann, but definitively so in the case of Mises, and also Hayek 
as we will now see, is their willingness to assert that the world political system 
centering on the nation-state ought to be considered dangerously outmoded.  
Friedrich von Hayek and Right-Wing World Federalism 
  Hayek, like Mises, had a much more idealistic notion of what kind of world order 
one should aim for than the view Lippmann harbored. But here again Hayek does 
not move as far towards the extreme position as Mises does. ‘For Hayek’, as Jorg 
Spieker points out, ‘international liberalism meant federalism’ and that presumably 
on a worldwide scale (Spieker 2014: 7). This entailed ‘not an association of 
sovereign states, but a federation held together by an international governmental 
authority’ or more than ‘the mere association of sovereign states’ that was the 
League of Nations, while it was less than a full proposal ‘for a centralised world 
state’ (Spieker 2014: 7 and 19).  
Hayek did not say anything about the possible dismantling of contemporary states 
into smaller units that then could make up a world federation of administrative units 
comparable in size to those many modern states are composed of at the sub-national 
level, like the more radical proposal Mises had dared to venture in Liberalismus. It is 
in this sense that Mises theoretically went further beyond a simple integration of the 
nation-state system than Hayek did. But Hayek did share ‘a predilection for states 
which are both small and multinational’ with classical theorists he admired such as 
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‘Tocqueville’ (Gamble 1996: 130). Liberal world federation would for Hayek 
nonetheless mean the creation of a supra-national authority or ‘an international 
government’ sufficiently equipped ‘to prevent states from interfering with the global 
market’ and where ‘the scope for the independent economic policy-making of 
member states must be strictly limited’ (Spieker 2014: 10 and 9).  
Hayek’s ‘basic argument was that an inter-state federation would be necessary, 
desirable, and feasible if and only if it is built on the basis of an essentially liberal 
economic regime’ (Spieker 2014: 12). In reality this meant for Hayek that an inter-
state federation where approximately half of the members would be advocating 
socialism in one form or another was not worth pursuing. Here Hayek differed 
markedly from other prominent inter-war idealists advocating world federalism, 
such as Lord Lothian and Olaf Stapledon, who both thought that the major issue at 
hand was ending the anarchical structure of the world political system, and not for 
example agreeing once and for all on the degree of state interference that was 
acceptable in the economy (Spieker 2014: 8). Hayek was adamant that a common 
economic policy was the necessary foundational first step that later moves towards 
world integration had to proceed from (Spieker 2014: 9).  
Here Hayek was in line with Wendell L. Willkie, the author of One World or the 
book that had given rise to Lippmann’s use of the expression ‘One Worldism’ to 
mockingly describe the idealist conception of world order and the ‘one-world 
euphoria’ that he saw as part of it (Steel 1980: 404-407). Willkie’s claim was that 
‘political internationalism without economic internationalism is a house built upon 
sand’ (Willkie 1943: 160-161).  
When it came to the creation of a world state Hayek meant that a liberal constitution 
must be seen as a necessary prerequisite since, as he put it after the Cold War had 
started, without that ‘the creation of a world state probably would be a greater 
danger to the future of civilization than even war’ (as cited in: Spieker 2014: 15). 
Hayek ‘envisaged a constitution which preserves liberal order by ensuring that 
democratic government remains within the bounds of the rule of law’ (Spieker 2014: 
16). It is so important to Hayek that successive governments should not be able to 
significantly alter the way the economy operates that he is in essence willing to 
sacrifice an important part of the democratic process. This is the legislative function 
elected representatives have which gives them the power to – ideally within the 
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bounds of what the governed would consent to – both create new and rescind older 
legislation. Here Hayek betrays similar elitist inclinations as those entertained by 
Lippmann and Mises: 
Hayek’s model constitution reflects his insistence on the priority 
of individual liberty over democracy: democratic decisions are 
binding if and only if they produce liberal outcomes. Hayek’s 
views on the relationship between liberalism and democracy also 
bear the controversial implication that an authoritarian regime 
committed to liberal principles could be preferable to a non-
liberal, democratic one. In effect, his constitutional framework 
limits democratic control over economic policy (Spieker 2014: 
16). 
This brings us back to Lippmann’s insistence that there should be an elite of experts 
freely deciding foreign policy, or in the instance of Hayek, economic policy. The 
experts should be insulated from democratic pressures so that they instead can 
concentrate fully on their task of creating an optimally functional order. But what 
the early neoliberals appear to be forgetting in the process is that an optimally 
functioning order might not be able to ignore public opinion for long and still remain 
optimally functional. This because the very act of ignoring public opinion 
undermines the authority the rulers have, based on the understanding that the rulers 
of modern mass society have what amounts to a contractual obligation to exercise 
the will of the governed. Any circumspection of this arrangement is tantamount to 
declaring a Schmittian ‘state of exception’ whereby the modern “social contract” is 
momentarily suspended – thereby replacing democracy with arbitrary rule for the 
time being (Agamben 2005, see also Davies 2014: 172-177).  
Spieker concludes that ‘Hayek’s conception of international government was radical 
in its insistence on the a priori isolation of a free-market capitalist economy from 
democratic politics’ (Spieker 2014: 20). Combined with Lippmann’s insistence that 
foreign policy should be treated in the same manner, the conclusion is that the early 
neoliberals – for all their rhetoric to the contrary – set out on a campaign to 
dismantle democratic influence in key areas; economic and foreign policy, and to 
put in its stead a rule by the elite in the elite interest. It is hard to see what it is left 
for the public to influence once these areas are insulated from electoral pressures, as 
any cultural and social policy for example will ultimately hinge on what kind of 
economic policy priorities a government makes. 
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In the mid-nineteenth century both Marx and Bakunin had reached the conclusion 
that the overturn of the capitalist system required a ‘simultaneous world revolution’ 
by which was meant that ‘the dominant peoples’ would have to act in concert ‘all at 
once’ as Marx put it, a feat that, as Bakunin added ‘could only be achieved by a 
union of all the national and international associations into a single universal 
association’ (Karatani 2014: 292, citations ibid.). For this reason ‘Marx and 
Bakunin, among others, organized the First International in 1863: it was supposed to 
provide the foundation for a simultaneous world revolution’ because as they had 
realized: ‘Without an alliance among revolutionary movements around the world 
established beforehand, simultaneous world revolution is impossible’ (Karatani 
2014: 292). As late as the 1930s Trotsky’s Fourth International was established on a 
similar pretense (Karatani 2014: 294).  
For the first generation of neoliberals the emulation of socialist ideas included the 
creation of what they envisioned as a liberal “International”28 in 1947 with the Mont 
Pèlerin Society (MPS), where: ‘Liberal scholars of all nationalities were drawn 
together by a sense of crisis, to discuss the intellectual revival of liberalism’ (Turner 
2008: 71). The expressed aim of the thinkers that comprised the MPS was ‘to 
construct a “liberal utopia” based on the principles of free trade and freedom of 
opportunity, regardless of how small its prospects of early realisation may be, so as 
to challenge the present socialist one’ (Turner 2008: 70). At the end of World War II 
Hayek, who was the principal architect behind the MPS, wrote:  
That there is little hope of international order or lasting peace so 
long as every country is free to employ whatever measures it 
thinks desirable in its own immediate interest, however 
damaging they may be to others, needs little emphasis now. 
Many kinds of economic planning are indeed practicable only if 
the planning authority can effectively shut out all extraneous 
influences; the result of such planning is therefore inevitably the 
piling-up of restrictions on the movements of men and goods 
(Hayek [1944] 2007: 223).   
                                                 
28 Not to be confused with the actual Liberal International founded in Oxford in 1947, which is an 
international organization for national parties still in existence with uniting principles in the 
social-liberal vein. This is a self-styled “World Federation of Liberalism” of which for example 
the UK’s Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems) are members as well as the ALDE group led by Guy 
Verhofstadt in the European Parliament (see: Liberal International 2014). 
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We can here see that Hayek had knowledge of the flaw in socialist planning Marx 
and Bakunin had realized earlier: it is only practicable if one can “effectively shut 
out all extraneous influences” ideally both politically and economically. This aspect 
of Hayek’s liberal utopia, which is that it cannot be based on a system of 
economically autonomous nation-states, but needs a global rule based order with ‘a 
true system of law which guarantees both that certain rules are invariably enforced 
and that the authority which has the power to enforce these cannot use it for any 
other purpose’ shows that his political ideas had characteristics that can be described 
as universalist in a limited respect (Hayek [1944] 2007: 224). It also indicates that 
Hayek was not against upholding a legal framework which made economic 
transactions feasible and their results predictable – i.e. which makes “planning” 
outcomes possible to a certain extent – and that what he really was against was the 
micro-management of economic activity in all spheres by the state and not its 
overall macro-management through facilitating the economy’s broader functioning.  
But Hayek’s vision was not of a liberal world state either: ‘While for its task of 
enforcing the common law the supranational authority must be very powerful, its 
constitution must at the same time be so designed that it prevents the international as 
well as the national authorities from becoming tyrannical’ (Hayek [1944] 2007: 224-
225). For Hayek ‘[a]n international authority which effectively limits the powers of 
the state over the individual will be one of the best safeguards for peace’ and the 
‘international Rule of Law [note the capitalization] must become a safeguard as 
much against the tyranny of the state over the individual as against the tyranny of 
the new superstate over the national communities’ for what should be sought is 
‘[n]either an omnipotent superstate nor a loose association of “free nations” but a 
community of nations of free men must be our goal’ (Hayek [1944] 2007: 235). This 
is internationalism understood as international cooperation.  
Hayek was aware that “the Rule of Law” necessarily implies a coercive apparatus 
that enforces it, and his concern was how this apparatus could be upheld at the same 
time that it should not impinge on the freedom of individuals. As he put it to at the 
founding meeting of the MPS: ‘It is the first general thesis which we shall have to 
consider that competition can be made more effective and more beneficent by 
certain activities of government than it would be without them’ and that ‘the 
interpretation of the fundamental principle of liberalism as the absence of state 
activity’ ought to be reconsidered in this light (Hayek 1948: 110).  
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What Hayek wanted was a ‘competitive order’ maintained by a state which instead 
of using ‘progressive income taxation’ for ‘extreme egalitarian ends’ protected ‘that 
most important element in any free society – the man of independent means, a figure 
whose essential role in maintaining a free opinion and generally the atmosphere of 
independence from government control we only begin to realize as he is 
disappearing from the stage’ (Hayek 1948: 111 and 118, added emphasis). We can 
here sense which “individuals” it is exactly that Hayek alludes to when he is talking 
about the importance of “freedom for individuals” and it certainly is not the working 
poor he has foremost in mind, though they are not entirely forgotten either: 
…in modern society we must take it for granted that some sort of 
provision will be made for the unemployed and the 
unemployable poor. All that we can usefully consider in this 
connection is not whether such provision is desirable or not but 
merely in what form it will least interfere with the functioning of 
the market (Hayek 1948: 112). 
Here Hayek’s progressive credentials break down, though he might be inclined 
towards both cosmopolitanism and liberty, the latter is primarily the liberty of the 
relatively wealthy, and, as can be seen elsewhere, his egalitarianism stretches only to 
one single aspect: ‘Equality of the general rules of law and conduct [ ] is the only 
kind of equality conducive to liberty and the only equality which we can secure 
without destroying liberty’ (Hayek 1960: 85). This aversion towards egalitarian 
policies does not affect his cosmopolitanism, in his “The Economic Conditions of 
Interstate Federalism” originally published in 1939 Hayek maintains that an 
international economic union, or ‘interstate federation’, would be preferable to 
economically independent nation-states, as this would remove ‘communities of 
interest’ formed on a national basis and remove ‘severe frictions’ between nations 
(Hayek 1948: 255-258). Still, ‘[t]hat there will always be communities of interest 
which will be similarly affected by a particular event or a particular measure is 
unavoidable’ such as when it comes to classes existing within all the states in the 
union as one can here assume, but it would for Hayek solve one of the greatest 
impediments to lasting peace; the existence of antagonistic nations. For ‘it is clearly 
in the interest of unity of the larger whole that these groupings should not be 
permanent and, more particularly, that the various communities of interest should 
overlap territorially and never become lastingly identified with the inhabitants of a 
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particular region’ (Hayek 1948: 258). Hayek here comes very close to articulating 
the same argument for maintaining transnational classes that Mises had developed 
earlier. Nationality does not matter, and only your economic stature does.  
Conclusion 
  Some recent exponents of neoliberalism have made the following claim: ‘What 
unites the pro-globalization [read “neoliberal”] literature is the way in which its 
authors appeal explicitly to an established philosophy of liberal cosmopolitanism’ 
(Steil & Hinds 2009: 35).29 More critical observers have also identified a form of 
universality in ‘neoliberal cosmopolitanism’ (Gowan 2001: 79). In a similar manner 
neoliberalism has also been called ‘globalism’ (Steger 2005). And it is certainly true 
that both Mises and Hayek could be described as exponents of some form of liberal 
cosmopolitanism in the 1930s and early 1940s. But if we remove Mises’ 
conservative planetarist stance from the equation, which continues to exist purely in 
the theoretical realm, there is little to indicate that neoliberalism in its globally 
applicable guise is anything more than another internationalist ideology.  
From its early beginnings in the 1930s and 1940s the core supporters of 
neoliberalism have ‘maintained a [ ] transnational agora for debating solutions to 
perceived problems’ and a focus that ‘was never parochial, and was globally 
oriented before “globalization” became a buzzword’ (Mirowski 2013: 47). But 
though early neoliberals thought in terms of ‘the whole wide world’ (Lippmann 
1937: 175), the shape the neoliberal community first took in the late 1940s – if we 
use membership in the Mont Pelerin Society as a proxy – was exclusively Western 
and very much in line with Lippmann’s Atlanticist thinking (see: Mirowski  2013: 
47). Using the international membership of the Mont Pelerin Society as a proxy 
again we can see that only much later, by the end of the Cold War in 1991, had the 
neoliberal community reached properly global proportions (see: Mirowski 2013: 
48). The underlying concentration of economic power (which translates quite readily 
to political power in a neoliberal world) still remains North Atlantic (Carroll & 
Carson 2006: 63).  
                                                 
29 One good reason for claiming that this work is an example of exoteric neoliberalism is that 
according to the front-cover of the paperback version it was the ‘Winner of the Manhattan 
Institute’s 2010 Hayek Prize’ (Steil & Hinds 2009). 
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Politically neoliberals have had to ally themselves with conservatives exhibiting 
‘cultural nationalism’ to gain power (Desai 2006: 230-231). This does not bode well 
for a neoliberal turn towards the world state configuration Mises had in mind, and in 
combination with Harmes observation that contemporary neoliberals are principally 
against any form of political globalization (as opposed to economic globalization), it 
to the contrary appears as if neoliberal ideology these days have become anti-
planetarist rather than planetarist. In addition ‘national competitiveness’ or the idea 
that nation-states should see themselves as brands in competition for entrepreneurial 
investments lends further support to the fragmentation of the world’s neoliberal 
politicians into national factions (Davies 2014: 110-116).  
If neoliberalism is actually turning against the advice of its progenitors towards ‘a 
post-liberal, more mercantilist neoliberalism’ as William Davies suggests, then this 
probably would have profoundly disturbed Mises and Hayek (Davies 2014: 152). Is 
that the case, then conservatism has got the better of neoliberalism, not just by 
replacing its politically liberal aspects – which was something Lippmann, Mises and 
Hayek appears to have been less concerned with from the start – but also through 
replacing the vital economically liberal-cosmopolitan component that was the sine 
qua non of the original ideology. The neoliberals would then have become victims 
of their own social-conservative outlook, which made the conservatives their closest 
allies instead of the social-liberals.  
Though the neoliberal project ‘may have been about the restoration of class power’ 
or ‘the power of economic elites’ as David Harvey argues (Harvey 2007: 31 and 19), 
it was also for Hayek about diminishing the scope for “severe friction” 
internationally, if not domestically. Another side-effect of economic union Hayek 
foresees is that ‘[o]nce frontiers cease to be closed and free movement is secured, all 
[ ] national organizations, whether trade-unions, cartels, or professional associations, 
will lose their monopolistic position and thus, qua national organizations, their 
power to control the supply of their services or products’ which (unless they manage 
to unite internationally to recreate e.g. trade-unions or cartels in that dimension one 
can add) will spell the end of the privileged positions of certain groups nationally. 
Far from all privilege is upheld in Hayek’s vision, only that which survives 
economic restructuring in the international sphere, and as Harvey observes, 
subsequently as neoliberal policy has been put into practice; ‘restoration of class 
power [ ] has not necessarily meant the restoration of economic power to the same 
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people’ (Harvey 2007: 31). Hayek is in this sense truly of the bourgeoisie, there is 
little indication that he wants to restore power to the nobility save for as far as their 
economic position coincides with that of “the man of independent means”, Hayek’s 
is more of a program for the rise of the global upper-middle class, and not 
coincidentally would he receive the bulk of the funding for the promotion of his 
ideas from wealthy American (non-aristocratic) donors (see: Phillips-Fein 2009: 34-
52).  
The counter-revolution the neoliberal program sought to initiate was only “counter” 
or “reactionary” in respect to its anti-egalitarian stance and its admiration for the 
liberalism found in Europe after 1848 but before the socialists managed to start 
influencing policy by the end of that century. In its cosmopolitan outlook in regards 
to both nationalism and the international economy the neoliberal program 
represented a revolution, not a counter-revolution, of the right, because ‘[t]he great 
innovation of Hayek and Mises was to create a defense of the free market using the 
language of freedom and revolutionary change’ where they in tactical and strategic 
respects, but not in substance, sought to mirror the rise of international socialism 
(Phillips-Fein 2009: 39). This was bourgeoisie conservatism with a revolutionary 
twist, far from the reactionary ancien regime conservatism prevalent in the 19
th
 
Century. It also differed in two important respect from the 1920s and 1930s center-
right; it had adopted the internationalism of the proletariat and put the petty-
bourgeoisie nationalism that aided the rise of the Nazi-party on the scrap-heap. To 
their advantage the neoliberals would find themselves in a much better economic 
and technological position to exploit the channels opened by internationalism than 
the workers of the world had done previously.  
It would however be intellectually dishonest, on the basis of the material discussed 
in this chapter, not to conclude that neoliberalism appears to have been stripped of 
the progressive world order features Mises and Hayek once brought into the 
discourse. In the first formative phase neoliberalism included a planetarist option as 
shown with Mises’ work, but once its world order perspective became decontested it 
was Atlanticism that was the result. Neoliberalism would still have been elitist, but 
now it is elitist in a way that conforms with the national-international conception of 
politics. Present claims that neoliberalism amounts to “globalism” – if this is meant 
to convey a post-national universalism or planetarism – are therefore completely left 
without support by this particular assessment of the ideology. To the contrary, it 
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appears that present day neoliberals would actively work against any such fully 
global or planetarist ideological tendency, since proper political globalization is 
seemingly anathema to the goals of the neoliberal ideological project.  
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Chapter 4. Why Cosmopolitanism is Presently an 
Internationalist and not a Planetarist Ideology 
Introduction  
  Cosmopolitanism is an ideology that has been around for much longer than 
neoliberalism. My argument here is that while neoliberalism experienced its 
formative phase in the period 1920 to 1950, cosmopolitanism for its part had already 
entered its second round of contestation on the theme of world order in the modern 
epoch. The first had been experienced during the initial years of the French 
Revolution. The second began at the tail end of the First World War. Both these 
rounds of contestation ended with internationalism being the decontested preferred 
option. Cosmopolitanism has in the aftermath of the Cold War entered a third round 
of world order contestation which we have yet to see the outcome of. The old guard 
and its supporters are overwhelmingly defenders of internationalism as I will go on 
to show in this chapter. But it is being confronted by an identifiable grouping of 
global universalists and this supports the notion that there is now a third round of 
intra-ideological contestation currently going on between internationalists and 
planetarists. The interesting aspect in this regard with cosmopolitanism compared to 
neoliberalism is that while the issue of world order appears as an afterthought in the 
largely economic neoliberal literature – even though it really should be seen as a 
central part of the neoliberal project as I argued in the preceding chapter – for 
cosmopolitanism the question of world order is much closer to the core of the 
ideology.  
What Cosmopolitanism is About 
‘Cosmopolitanism’ as recently argued ‘is generally regarded as a body of thought 
consisting of elaborations on the idea that all human beings belong to a single 
community and that such a community should be cultivated’ (Helliwell & Hindess 
2015: 26). This could be taken as a loose description of cosmopolitanism in all its 
varieties since its first early articulations in the ancient world (see: Heater 1996: 1-
26). Politically it might perhaps be hard to imagine cultivating a unitary human 
community without recourse to global universalism or planetarism ‘since a 
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community cannot be fully inclusive and still have boundaries’, provided of course 
that we subscribe to the notion ‘that communities need to be bounded’ (Bartelson 
2009: 19). But twentieth century cosmopolitans have largely spent their energies on 
finding ways to stitch the current multifarious political landscape together 
institutionally, in an effort not to erase boundaries or national borders, but to 
facilitate cross-border cooperation and in the process make the presence of borders a 
less repressive factor. This institutionalization of international cooperation can be 
seen as a stepping stone on the path to ‘one world sovereignty’ as UNESCO’s first 
Director-General Julian Huxley argued it should be (Huxley [1946] 1991: 41). Or it 
can be viewed as an end in itself on grounds similar to the argument here presented 
by Cristina Lafont; ‘a heterarchical political structure for the world order is in 
principle more desirable than a world government, since it minimizes the risks of an 
excessive concentration of political power’ (Lafont 2008: 43). Both Huxley’s and 
Lafont’s positions can be traced back to the late eighteenth century.30 Huxley’s to 
the theory of Anacharsis Cloots and Lafont’s to Immanuel Kant’s.   
Cosmopolitanism in the 1790s: Immanuel Kant contra 
Anacharsis Cloots 
  Stephen Toulmin has argued that: ‘The years from the 1690s to 1914 saw the high 
tide of sovereign “nationhood” in Europe’ and in this period ‘few people seriously 
questioned that the nation-state was the central political unit, in either theory or 
practice’ (Toulmin 1992: 139). Toulmin’s assessment exaggerates the import the 
notion of “nation-state” had before the French Revolution, even possibly the mid 
nineteenth century, because many thinkers particularly during the Enlightenment era 
were willing to see things in more global terms, for instance Condorcet ‘who 
believed a universal state to be desirable’ (Bartelson 2009: 159). Anacharsis Cloots’ 
(1755-1794) advocacy of world-state cosmopolitanism during the first years of the 
French Revolution likely represents this Enlightenment tendency’s peak moment 
(Kleingeld 2012: 40, and; Bevilacqua 2012).31 Cloots argued ‘that the only 
                                                 
30 Both these positions can be traced further back in time, but for the present argument it is here 
considered sufficient to go back to the French Revolution. 
31 The relevant works by Cloots are not to my knowledge available in English translation, so I 
therefore have to rely on secondary literature. 
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consistent political theory requires that there be only one state, a “universal 
republic” in which all humans would be citizens’ (Kleingeld 2012: 40). Cloots’ 
came to his position by expanding on Rousseau’s understanding of sovereignty 
which he then took it to its logical extreme: 
[Cloots] imagined a universal will of mankind, which replicated, 
on a larger scale, Rousseau’s notion of a republican sovereignty 
constituted by the general will of its citizenry. Sovereignty was 
necessarily despotic he wrote, but since mankind’s sovereignty 
would unite interests and create no artificial oppositions, it 
would not have the same deleterious effects as a clash of 
multiple national sovereignties. He theorized the sovereign unity 
of mankind on logical grounds by arguing that sovereignty, a 
property inherent in people rather than institutions, was by its 
nature indivisible, and therefore could not be plural. All divisions 
and distinctions between individuals were arbitrary and 
irrelevant to the purposes of sovereignty, which inhered in 
mankind collectively as the only indivisible and therefore 
relevant category. In other words, Cloots derived human unity 
from the concept of sovereignty. The only true natural barrier 
was the one “between the Earth and the firmament”. As long as 
there was no bridge to other planets – and presumably intelligent 
life there – sovereignty resided in the entirety of mankind 
(Bevilacqua 2012: 555).  
Cloots not only extended the concept of sovereignty to an ideal unitary global form, 
but he also extended the concept of the nation to global proportions, the universal 
republic of mankind he proposed would therefore preside over the unitary nation of 
man and not a conglomeration of distinct peoples (Bevilacqua 2012: 563). This kind 
of thinking was quite novel for the time and Cloots’ work was ‘the first to envisage a 
world state that was not monarchical in constitutional form’ (Heater 1996: 79). 
Cloots was also so far ahead of his time that what he proposes comes closer to 
having the transcendental quality of the earliest form of cosmopolitanism – 
describing a spiritual, if not religious, yearning for oneness – than it does to being 
even a relatively utopian political project for the era it was expressed in. 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is by far the better known of these two cosmopolitan 
thinkers from the Enlightenment period. Amongst Kant’s works two in particular 
can be seen as crucial to understanding the development of his cosmopolitan 
thought; first his Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784) 
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which is representative of Kant’s early cosmopolitan thought, and second his 
Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795) which is representative of Kant’s 
later thought on cosmopolitanism (Kant 1970: 15, 41-53 and 93-130). Between the 
former and the latter there is what can be considered a substantial change to the 
renowned philosopher’s sketch for world peace, because in the Idea for a Universal 
History Kant shows some ambivalent support for the idea of a universally sovereign 
political entity, while in Perpetual Peace he appears to reject any such notion.32 In 
the 1784 text Kant makes several proposals which are hard to reconcile with the 
ideal of state sovereignty at the national level, for example that ‘every state’ ought: 
…to take the step which reason could have suggested to them 
without so many sad experiences – that of abandoning a lawless 
state of savagery [between states] and entering a federation of 
peoples in which every state, even the smallest, could expect to 
derive its security and rights not from its own power or its own 
legal judgement, but solely from this great federation [ ], from a 
united power and the law-governed decisions of a united will 
(Kant 1970: 47). 
This is a proposal that comes close to advocating a global sovereign political entity. 
Kant also maintains that ‘the depredations caused by war’ inevitably must ‘have a 
beneficial effect’ since ‘they compel our species to discover a law of equilibrium to 
regulate the essentially healthy hostility which prevails among states and is 
produced by their freedom’ (Kant 1970: 49). It is this “law of equilibrium” which 
compels men to introduce ‘a system of united power, hence a cosmopolitan system 
of general political security’ which Kant also calls ‘the union of states’ (Kant 1970: 
49). Since Kant seemingly interchangeably employs the terms “federation of 
peoples” and “union of states” he apparently in 1784 saw a federation of what we 
would today call nation-states as the ideal. Albeit that federation would in its 
executive power vis-à-vis its constituent parts closer resemble the at the time soon to 
be independent United States of America writ global than it would the much later 
                                                 
32 Kant seems to waver between two different lines of argument in both these texts, first; what the 
desirable endpoint ought to be down the road (what “providence” has in store for humanity, 
eventually), and second; what it is realistic to expect to achieve given the present political 
conditions (what “peoples” might go along with now). Kleingeld points out that Kant, in 
Perpetual Peace, ‘does not mean [ ] that one should reject the ideal of a federative world 
republic’ and that Kant considered a league the next logical step in the process of ‘leaving the 
state of nature and moving toward peace’ rather than a conclusive ideal in itself (Kleingeld 
2012: 51, first emphasis in original, the second added). 
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League of Nations, yet the units themselves would have been closer to the “peoples” 
that the latter was ideally perceived to be composed of.  
To make political-institutional sense of Kant’s cosmopolitan vision as of 1784, one 
could say that he envisions the delegation of the ‘external’ aspects of the different 
states’ sovereignty to one overarching federation that would facilitate ‘a law-
governed external relationship’ among states (Habermas 1997: 118, Kant 1970: 47). 
The peoples that in essence constitute these states will nonetheless continue to live 
within their borders and be free to establish perfect civil constitutions (Kant 1970: 
45-47) – through upholding the ‘internal’ aspect of their sovereignty (Habermas 
1997: 118).33  
Kant in this manner ends up advocating a two-tiered approach to world-governance; 
1) an international association of states where member-states are to conduct their 
external affairs without recourse to war, and 2) a plurality of states governing their 
own respective domestic affairs. States (or peoples) would thus be heavily 
dependent on cooperation between all parties in international affairs, but largely 
independent from any external interference in domestic affairs. This is not a world 
state, at least not one resembling any modern state, but Kant several times over 
repeats that the logical end point, ‘the highest purpose of nature’ or ‘a plan of 
nature’ is ‘aimed at a perfect civil union of mankind’ or ‘a universal cosmopolitan 
existence’ (Kant 1970: 51). Statements like these coupled with Kant’s already 
mentioned insistence that the human race sooner or later will be forced by 
circumstance to introduce ‘a system of united power’ makes it entirely possible to 
interpret the Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose as a tract 
which at least partially advocates the institution of a world federation capable of 
exercising global sovereignty. Kleingeld’s interpretation is representative of this 
view when she asserts that ‘the federation mentioned in the “Idea for a Universal 
History” is not a loose league’ and instead ‘has the same features as a state’ 
(Kleingeld 2012: 46).  
                                                 
33 This reading presupposes that Kant, together with many other political theorists such as e.g.  John 
Rawls, when discussing to e.g. ‘administer justice universally’ does not mean “globally” but 
amongst all the members of a territorially delimited society of lesser scope (Kant 1970: 45, see 
also; 46).   
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Kant does not explicitly write that he would like to see the development of a world 
state in his early cosmopolitan essay, though one can arguably see the presence of a 
rudimentary version of that particular idea in it. What makes his more mature work 
Perpetual Peace remarkable, in this respect, is that there Kant distances himself 
considerably further away from the idea of a world republic – through ‘expressly 
exclude[ing] form [his] contract among states the constitution of a new political 
entity’ (Lutz-Bachmann 1997: 68). Even though a closer reading would reveal that 
Kant does not entirely reject it in a longer perspective (see: Kleingeld 2012: 51). But 
if we put this latter, arguably important, but oft overlooked, nuance aside; it is with 
seemingly explicitly going against the idea of a globally sovereign political entity in 
the name of ‘a league of free republics’ that Kant creates the foundation for what 
can be called the Kantian strain of cosmopolitan thought which dominates 
cosmopolitan discourse today (Lutz-Bachmann 1997: 61, see also; Kant 1970: 102-
105). 
Kant’s work of 1795 Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf is 
completed after the French Revolution finished its most open phase. The title of this 
work is usually translated into Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch 
(e.g. Bohman & Lutz-Bachmann 1997, and Kleingeld 2012: xi) or Perpetual Peace: 
A Philosophical Sketch (e.g. Kant 1970). It revolves around the ‘Preliminary’ and 
‘Definitive Articles of a Perpetual Peace Between States’ as Kant has articulated 
these (Kant 1970: 93-108). For our purposes it is worth mentioning the following 
articles; the fifth preliminary article is ‘No state shall forcibly interfere in the 
constitution and government of another state’, the first definitive article is ‘The Civil 
Constitution of Every State shall be Republican’, and the second definitive article is 
that ‘The Right of Nations shall be based on a Federation of Free States’ (Kant 
1970: 93, 99, and 102). Kant here puts forward a distinctly international and 
intergovernmental set of articles; his explicit goal is “perpetual peace between 
states”, and he upholds the Westphalian ideal of noninterference in the internal 
workings of other states, neither of which appears to be very original for the period.  
As both Kant himself and later commentators have pointed out, Charles-Irenée 
Castel (1658-1743), who is best known as Abbé de Saint-Pierre, his clerical title, 
had made a similar suggestion earlier (Kant 1970: 47, Archibugi 1992: 297, and 
Spoltore 1994). Saint-Pierre wanted ‘an Everlasting Peace amongst all Christian 
states’ (cited in Spoltore 1994: 227) and to this purpose he suggested ‘to draw up a 
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Treaty of European Union which provided for the submission of kings, and hence of 
the States, to a superior law’ (Spoltore 1994: 223). Saint-Pierre is again following 
ideas already presented by Emeric Crucé in his The New Cyneas published in 1623 
(Archibugi 1992: 298). Crucé is in one respect actually closer to Kant than to Saint-
Pierre, because he wanted to include all nations, while the latter diminished his 
project ‘in restricting the proposed Union to the single continent of Europe and the 
sole religion of Christianity’ (Archibugi 1992: 298). But importantly both Crucé and 
Saint-Pierre differs from Kant in respect to the preferred internal system of 
government to each state, since whereas they still thought within the confines of 
dynastic sovereignty (Archibugi 1992: 299), Kant wrote in a political climate where 
republican ideas had started to make a substantial imprint on the politics of the day. 
This explains why it was possible for Kant to insist that every state ought to be 
republican for his scheme to work in practice.  
If we take Kant’s promotion of a republican government to mean that he favored 
‘parliamentary democracy’ within the confines of each state, which is considered a 
permissible interpretation (Reiss 1970: 25), then that would be a sufficient condition 
to make Kant a liberal in his age, but not to make him a cosmopolitan of the kind 
that genuinely works towards realizing the conditions where bestowing formal world 
citizenship on all human beings is possible. What makes it defensible to call Kant a 
cosmopolitan after he penned Perpetual Peace is not so much the internationalist 
political model for the organization of states he presents there as the fact that he 
maintains a moral cosmopolitan outlook in describing the details of his third 
definitive article: ‘Cosmopolitan Right shall be limited to Conditions of Universal 
Hospitality’ (Kant 1970: 105-108). It is in his discussion of this third and final 
definitive article that Kant offers up the following much repeated passage: 
The peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees 
into a universal community, and it has developed to the point 
where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt 
everywhere. The idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not 
fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the 
unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it 
into a universal right of humanity (Kant 1970: 107-108, 
emphasis in original). 
Martha Nussbaum employs this quote to show how cosmopolitan Kant’s thinking 
was, though she herself quite sensibly translates Kant’s original German “Recht” 
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into “law” instead of “right”’ (Nussbaum 1997: 1). If Kant wanted to aid in the 
formulation of “a universal law of humanity” one which supersedes “international 
law“, as Nussbaum’s translation renders Kant’s text, why has Kant just spent the 
preceding part of his treatise on perpetual peace ‘considering the right of nations in 
relation to one another in so far as they are a group of separate states which are not 
to be welded together as a unit’ (Kant 1970: 102)?  
What Kant appears to want is not a universal law of humanity, but one universal law 
governing the relations between states, while the states (insofar as these are 
republics) can go about their internal affairs in peace from externally imposed laws 
impacting on their domestic affairs, i.e. there are to be no external legal/executive 
constraints affecting the relationship between the state and the individuals making 
up the populace living on its territory (see: Kant 1970: 104). This appears to be an 
oversight of Kant’s, where he abandons the different peoples (who invariably must 
collectively constitute “humanity” for Kant) to their singular fates. It is probable that 
Kant saw this move as freeing the peoples for their own benefit – to allow for them 
to govern themselves. In this Kant follows ‘the fundamental political ideal’ which 
during the French Revolution34 ‘define[d] revolutionary experience to an almost 
obsessive degree’ which was that ‘in deliberation all opinions were to be strictly 
individual, for there was no other way to arrive at the authentic general interest’ or 
the people’s unitary will (Gauchet 1996: 244).  
Kant ignores the existence of political differences within nations, but in this he does 
not distinguish himself from the prevailing revolutionary theory of the age where 
internal political rifts were not taken account of in any substantial way as 
supposedly ‘there were to be no “parties” or “factions”,’ because ‘the unity and 
universality of collective representation would emerge naturally, it was believed, 
from the diversity of individual points of view’ (Gauchet 1996: 244). In this 
revolutionary theory, heavily indebted to Rousseau35 – who was a ‘patent influence’ 
on Kant (Reiss 1970: 11) – government would simply be grounded in the consent of 
                                                 
34 On the historical timeline the writing and publication of Perpetual Peace (1795) coincides with the 
French Revolution (1789-1799), and the argument Kant puts forward must necessarily be 
evaluated in that context. 
35 Rousseau’s original theory was more nuanced than the simplified version of it the revolutionaries 
employed. 
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the governed people and therefore a republic would never be governed contrary to 
the people’s will.  
That there is such a thing as “the people” sharing one collective political will that 
also is commensurate with the better part of a population living on a vast territory 
and that this ought to be the natural basis for the formation of a state is a new idea 
that had not yet occurred when earlier cosmopolitan works were authored. This 
presupposed territorial/cultural/political unity was suddenly of immense importance 
when Kant wrote his Perpetual Peace, even though the notion is an immense over-
generalization when dealing with culturally and politically complex countries like 
18
th
 Century France. The theory received what could have been a debilitating blow 
from actual events almost the instant the revolutionary French assembly was 
constituted, since ‘from late August 1789, revolutionary assemblies would always be 
divided’ along the lines – of what we today would recognize to be – ideological 
positions (Gauchet 1996: 44). But nonetheless this idea of the politically singular 
people is one of the pillars Kant employs in support of his theory for achieving 
eternal concord amongst mankind. It is not that Kant is blind to ideological 
difference, he perceives a dichotomous ideological divide with defenders of 
‘despotic’ absolute monarchy on one side and supporters of ‘Republicanism’ on the 
other – clearly a political cleavage of great import in his time – but in Perpetual 
Peace he pays little attention to the fact that the republicans in France happen to be 
spread into what we today could call ideological factions as well (Kant 1970: 101).  
Kant’s political ideal on the nation-state level is not that a republican assembly 
should abolish monarchy (which is what eventually happened in France, and the 
reason why Kant’s native Prussia from 1792 to 1795 participated in the War of the 
First Coalition against Revolutionary France), but rather that it should act as the 
legislative branch of the state so that ‘the will of the people’ which was reflected by 
the assembly could restrain the executive branch – which would still be headed by 
the monarch – from acting ‘arbitrarily’ (Kant 1970: 101). This ideal is basically a 
description of the ‘constitutional monarchy’ that ‘France was effectively’ from late 
1789 to ‘August 1792’, but Kant’s description also allows for a stronger 
monarchical presence than what was found in France in those years, and in this 
respect it resembles more the mode of governance which already existed in the 
United Kingdom of the time (Hanson 2009: 70).    
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It is perhaps because Kant does not operate with the more nuanced view of the 
national body politic we are now used to – for him there are no classes or political 
affiliations other than the almost wholly interchangeable units of particular 
“nations”, “states” and “peoples” – that he finds it rational to use these as the 
autonomous base units for his proposed federation of nations. In this view of politics 
particular to the late 18
th
 Century, representatives of the state negotiating at the 
international level would directly represent the political view of the people as a 
whole, and not just indirectly do so in their capacity as being in the service of the 
party that is legally presiding over the state after having won that privilege through 
e.g. an election in competition with other political factions. In this manner no 
grouping within the state, since the state equals the politically indivisible people 
following the view Kant adopts, will have to lose its direct political representation 
on the journey from the domestic to the international level. In this way no-one is 
disenfranchised at the international level through being nationally represented there. 
This mode of thinking introduces us to a paradox, because this way of reasoning 
does not really square with the way Kant is portrayed as the cosmopolitan thinker 
par excellence by contemporary cosmopolitans such as Nussbaum.  
Nussbaum has claimed that ‘Kant, more influentially than any other Enlightenment 
thinker, defended a politics based upon reason rather than patriotism or group 
sentiment, a politics that was truly universal rather than communitarian’ (Nussbaum 
1997: 3). But how can Kant be said to be a spokesperson for “a politics that was 
truly universal rather than communitarian” when he puts this much faith in the 
politically indivisible nature of the different “peoples”? Kant’s incessant 
employment of “people” as the core political unit might not make Kant a 
communitarian, but it is hardly a concept that can be said to represent the anti-thesis 
of communitarian sentiment either. “The people” nationally defined is at best a 
concept that describes an approximate half-way point between the extremes of a 
conceivably sub-national communitarian ideal and the universal concept of 
humanity. One possible answer to the question is that Nussbaum overemphasizes 
some of Kant’s passages and completely ignore others to reach the conclusion that 
‘Kant’s Perpetual Peace is a profound defense of cosmopolitan values’ (Nussbaum 
1997: 4). There is reason to believe that this is actually what has happened as 
Nussbaum admits ‘leaving aside the “superficial” aspects of “institutional and 
practical goals”’ (Dallmayr 2003: 435, and as cited ibid.).  
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A more correct assessment, if one to the contrary also does include the aspects 
Nussbaum set aside, would perhaps be that Perpetual Peace should be viewed as the 
result of a co-mingling of cosmopolitan and national-international ideas – which 
both were only at a very early stage of theoretical refinement before Kant grappled 
with them. Kant’s text therefore represents a snapshot of ongoing developments in 
political thought that were very specific to the late eighteenth century, and not an 
articulation of the cosmopolitan ideal that is especially well fit for posterity. Kant’s 
writing from 1795 should then perhaps instead be seen as an attempt at bridging two 
distinct ontologies; an Enlightenment universalism that is seen as ‘culminating in 
Kant’ which by the time he wrote Perpetual Peace was rapidly losing its momentum 
as a political force and in the process of being replaced by ‘the advent of the 
nineteenth century and its oncoming force of nationalism’ (Dallmayr 2003: 423, 
and; Behr 2010: 138). This is not to claim that Kant’s Perpetual Peace does not 
include the expression of several truly universal sentiments, but rather to insist that 
these ought to be firmly demarcated by way of separating Kant’s truly cosmopolitan 
(i.e. universal/planetary) ethics from his accompanying international (i.e. less than 
universal) political design.  
Fred Dallmayr uses the term ‘moral globalism’ to describe the kind of ‘universal 
ethic’ Kant shares in common not only with ‘Cynics and Stoics’ but also with 
‘medieval Jewish, Christian and Muslim thinkers’ (Dallmayr 2003: 428, 424 and 
423). One could here make the case that rationally underpinned cosmopolitan 
thought should be separated from the religiously grounded universalism one finds in 
for example the Abrahamitic religions Dallmayr mentions, because there is a 
fundamental distinction between an ethic propped up by an inner conviction about 
what is the right thing to do for the betterment of humanity and religions founded on 
a belief in a monotheistic deity that employs the promise of divine retribution for the 
transgression of societal norms as an external motivation to keep the faithful morally 
in line. But putting that argument aside, the more important thing is that Dallmayr 
argues that this moral globalism or alternatively ‘moral cosmopolitanism’ should be 
viewed as a corresponding to what ‘theory’ is contra ‘praxis’, where the ‘notion of 
praxis [ ] brings to the fore a domain usually shunned or sidelined by universalist 
morality: the domain of politics’ (Dallmayr 2003: 421 and 434).  
It is to Kant’s credit that he attempts to create a viable bridge between theory and 
praxis in Perpetual Peace, but the end result is that he ends up undermining the 
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prospects for turning the cosmopolitan ethic into the founding ethos for a universal 
polity with his attempt to reconcile that ethic with the concept of what later came to 
be known as “the self-determination of peoples”. This is because Kant, even though 
he in places provide us with a very well thought out cosmopolitan ethic grounded in 
the universal species that is humanity, goes on to portray what he argues would be a 
workable international political system, which on the other hand is grounded in the 
indivisible nature of peoples. Kant therefore displays a hybridized form of 
“cosmopolitan-nationalist” thought that I think should be more precisely described 
as an early form of internationalism.  
As Perry Anderson remarks; ‘universalism’ was ‘one of the most striking features’ 
of the ‘Enlightenment patriotism’ that fuelled the revolutionary struggles in America 
and France (Anderson 2002: 7-8). Kant was writing during an ‘era’ when ‘the ideals 
of patriotism and cosmopolitanism marched together; on the plane of values there 
was no contradiction between them’ (Anderson 2002: 8). This all changed over the 
course of the succeeding century, when the ‘rationalist patriotism’ which Kant had 
based his design for world peace on was replaced by a ‘romantic nationalism’ whose 
‘essential definition of the nation was no longer political but cultural’ (Anderson 
2002: 9). The latter would in turn evolve into a chauvinistic form of nationalism that 
by the Belle Époque, 1871-1914, increasingly defined the nation in ethnic terms 
(Anderson 2002: 11-12).  
The leap from a cosmopolitan ethos to a defense of a loose organization composed 
of sovereign peoples was not a breach of logic that came lightly to Kant. As we have 
seen, Kant both in his earlier writings and in passages in Perpetual Peace asserts 
what that the political result of following a cosmopolitan ethic ought to be. Kant 
writes as late as ‘1792’ in Theory and Practice36 that ‘the principle of right [ ] 
recommends to us earthly gods the maxim that we should proceed in our disputes in 
such a way that a universal federal state might be inaugurated’ (Kant 1970: 15 and 
92). Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann have written a convenient digest of how Kant’s 
standpoint evolved: 
                                                 
36 Full title: On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice’ 
(Kant 1970: 61). 
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Kant had argued that “a world state” would represent the 
perfection of a republican constitution, but later he came to fear 
it as a potentially “soulless despotism.” In “Toward Perpetual 
Peace” Kant admits that a world republic is “the one rational way 
to achieve peace,” but he maintains that peace will be attained 
through the inevitable spread of the institutional and legal 
structure of “a peaceable federation” among independent 
republican states, each of which represent the basic right of its 
citizens and establishes a public sphere in which people can 
regard themselves and others as free and equal “citizens of the 
world” (Bohman & Lutz-Bachmann 1997: 3). 
Kant in other words stops to promote the logical political consequence of the ideal 
and begins to argue for a more pragmatic approach, making the final leap sometime 
in the two intervening years between Theory and Practice and Perpetual Peace, i.e. 
sometime between 1792 and 1795. Of the events that might have provoked Kant to 
rethink his position which occurred in the meantime, two stand out for their world 
historical significance; firstly the execution of Louis XVI in January 1793, and 
secondly the subsequent Reign of Terror, perpetrated under the Jacobin leader 
Robespierre from September 1793 to July 1794 (Hanson 2009). The latter would 
dampen anyone’s enthusiasm for what kind of desirable political changes the French 
Revolution could possibly bring in its wake, while the former could be seen as a 
direct provocation against the Prussian monarch, who the year before, together with 
his Austrian counterpart, had threatened nothing less than the ‘complete destruction’ 
of Paris in retaliation if any of the French royals were hurt by the revolutionaries 
(Clark 2007: 287-288). Kant due to ‘his admiration for the French Revolution’ 
would have taken notice of these events, and he certainly was well aware at the time 
that ‘the Prussian government’, of which he was a subject, ‘would not have tolerated 
an overt attack on the government and the laws’ so this ‘Kant carefully avoided’ 
(Reiss 1991: 269). The overhanging threat of government sanction in the form of 
censorship and/or punishment might help explain the presence of several apparently 
contradictory passages in Perpetual Peace and particularly Kant’s sudden insistence 
on the inviolable nature of national sovereignty.  
Given the circumstances Kant’s work is already enough of a covert attack on the 
form of government in Prussia, which at the time could be described as ‘benevolent 
dynastic despotism’ which was quite far away from the type of ‘republican 
government’ Kant sees as ‘rightful government’ (Reiss 1970: 29 and 11, see also: 
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Kant 1970: 101). If Kant had in clear terms also questioned the reasonableness of 
the concept of state sovereignty, which he would have done by arguing overtly for a 
sovereign world republic to replace it, then that line of argument could have turned 
him into a pariah for the whole governing class,37 and not just those among it that 
personally favored absolute monarchy – which was a perilous exercise in itself – and 
thus possibly gotten Kant intractably into trouble. It is worth taking into account at 
least the possibility that considerations like this could have swayed Kant as he 
penned Perpetual Peace. Kant was clearly aware that there were limits to how much 
one could ‘disobey the powers that be’ before grave consequences were to be 
expected, and this at one point led him to come to the conclusion ‘that it was not 
necessary to tell the public all that one knew’ (Reiss 1991: 268).  
Even with all the above considerations taken into account Kant still does not write 
that any “world state” is bound to lead to a “soulless despotism” in Perpetual Peace 
as Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann claims in the passage quoted above. It is actually 
Hans Reiss, the editor of Kant. Political Writings which makes that particular 
interpretation in his introduction to the collection (Reiss 1970: 34). When Kant first 
raises a similar objection, in Theory and Practice, he writes that ‘a cosmopolitan 
commonwealth under a single ruler’ ‘may lead to the most fearful despotism’, which 
is why he favors ‘a lawful federation under a commonly accepted international 
right’ (Kant 1970: 90, emphasis in original). It is at the end of that very same text, 
two pages later, that Kant adds his recommendation that we should always aspire 
consciously to work towards the goal of ‘a universal federal state’ (Kant 1970: 92). 
The next and only other time the subject of world government leading to despotism 
comes up38 is in Perpetual Peace when Kant states that what we today call 
international anarchy ought to be ‘preferred to an amalgamation of the separate 
nations under a single power which has overruled the rest and created universal 
                                                 
37 ’Whereas men of independent means or free-lance writers played an important role in 
contemporary French letters, the dominant group within the Prussian enlightenment was that of 
civil servants. A study of the Berlin Monthly [Berlinische Monatsschrift, where e.g. Kant’s ‘Idea 
for a Universal History’ was first published (Kant 1991: 273)] has shown that [ ] over the 
thirteen years of its existence (1783 -96) [ ] more than half of the contributors were in paid state 
employment’ (Clark 2007: 251). In other words, Kant, provided that he did not take his theories 
too far, was partially protected by ‘the social location of the Prussian intelligentsia’ of which he 
was part (Clark 2007: 251). 
38 At least in the texts by Kant included in Political Writings (Second Enlarged Edition, 1991). 
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monarchy’ (Kant 1970: 113). This ‘universal monarchy’ is what Kant equals to a 
‘soulless despotism’ which, because of its inherent centralized nature, is bound to 
‘lapse into anarchy’ ‘after crushing the germs of goodness’ (Kant 1970: 113). We 
can here see that Kant’s notion of “universal monarchy” is simply a projection of 
Hobbes’ sovereign on the globe – though it is a caricature even of this, with all 
coercive capability and no legitimizing authority (see: Hobbes [1651] 1998). 
In light of these passages it seems that the pertinent point Kant is making is not that 
he warns against the dangers of a “world state” without reservations, but that a 
world state is only ever desirable in the form of “a universal federal state”, because 
the for him conceivable alternative; a world state “under a single ruler” – which he 
in Perpetual Peace calls “a universal monarchy” – is what would be “the most 
fearful despotism”. The hallmark of ‘despotism’ is for Kant the lack of a 
‘representative system’, and it is the latter that ‘alone makes possible a republican 
state’ because ‘without it, despotism and violence will result, no matter what kind of 
constitution is in force’ (Kant 1970: 102). To sum up; Kant rules out “universal 
monarchy” as a despotic abomination, but he does not rule out an equivalent 
universal polity with a representative political system. Instead he sees the ideal of 
the universal republican state as valid in theory, and as he earlier had put it; ‘it [ ] 
remains true to say that whatever reason shows to be valid in theory, is also valid in 
practice’ (Kant 1970: 92).  
The most interesting aspect of Kant’s thought for the present purposes is that in 
these texts just dealt with he manages to present a cause for i) moral 
cosmopolitanism, e.g. with his concept of “Cosmopolitan Right”, and for iii) 
institutional planetarism, i.e. with his allusions to a world republic, but the main 
thrust of his argument is nonetheless most often interpreted as being in favor of ii) 
institutional internationalism, which I have here aimed to argue has basis in his 
grounding of the whole argument in the presumed existence of “peoples” to the 
detriment of a grounding in “humanity” which would have been more consistent 
with the institutional planetarist position Kant ultimately ends up rejecting.  
One view representative of present day cosmopolitans is that ‘Kant sustained a very 
consistent critique of world government and clearly sought to provide an alternative 
to both Westphalian and world state archetypes’ (Brown 2009: 110). As we have 
seen I have disputed that Kant’s was “a very consistent critique of world 
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government” as it should rather be seen as more specifically a critique of his own 
conception of despotic universal monarchy, but the claim that Kant was looking for 
a middle of the road approach to world order is indisputably correct. Kant in the end 
seeks to reconcile a plurality of peoples’ right to freedom with that of the need for 
some kind of universally recognized rules of right conduct. This way Kant ends up 
on an institutional internationalist position that fits more or less squarely in the 
middle between the anarchic Westphalian international relations that already existed 
and the global domestic relations of a true global polity or world state that 
Anacharsis Cloots was so much in favor of.  
To sum up, what Cloots did was to posit an ideal unitary polity, which for the first 
time was severed from both religious superstition and the potentially tyrannical rule 
of one strongman in the form of a monarch or emperor. Cloots thereby describes a 
distinctly modern version of a political ideal that in theory would forge a stronger 
peace amongst mankind than what is offered through Kant’s international 
compromise. Kant’s suggestion basically follows Rousseau in elevating national 
differences to an ordering principle. Cloots, meanwhile, wanted all humanity to 
become one global nation, not constituted along national lines (i.e. being 
international), where all humans occupy the same territorial entity – or post-
territorial polity – which ideally ought to be coextensive with the Earth. This makes 
Cloots’ model planetarist or truly global in contrast to Kant’s whose model ends up 
being one of international political organization. 
Cosmopolitanism in the First Half of the Twentieth Century: 
Angell, et al versus H. G. Wells 
   Kant’s cosmopolitan model of international organization was partially put into 
practice once the League of Nations was founded after the First World War had 
come to an end. At this time key authors of the liberal internationalist tradition 
‘drew on Kant’s reflections in Perpetual Peace, where Kant emphasized the 
importance of republican constitutional government and what came to be understood 
as a confederation of states for the future peace of international relations’ (Long 
1995: 313). Representatives of this liberal internationalist view were thinkers such 
as ‘Norman Angell, Leonard Woolf, and Alfred Zimmern’ who nowadays are often 
referred to as ‘Idealist writers’, particularly in International Relations theory 
(Osiander 1998: 409). The theories of Angell, Woolf, and Zimmern all played a role 
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in the formation of the League of Nations (Miller 1995: 102, Wilson 1995: 138, and; 
Rich 1995: 84). Woolf for instance authored the book International Government in 
1916 and this work did in substantial ways form the basis for how the British 
envisaged a League of Nations covenant (Wilson 1995: 138, and; Mazower 2012: 
129).  
In International Government Woolf’s ‘main prescription was that organization along 
cosmopolitan lines should be extended, especially in the political sphere’ (Wilson 
1995: 133). But crucially this notion, in line with Kant’s earlier argument, was 
tempered by the fact that all these liberal internationalists ‘supported the 
development of national self-determination’ (Long 1995: 313). This tendency 
becomes more pronounced when we see that Woolf for example feared; 
    …being labeled ‘utopian’ and consequently steered clear of 
suggestions he felt states would not accept. This is clearly 
evident in the Fabian plan, drawn up by Leonard Woolf and 
Sidney Webb, for ‘A Supranational Authority that will Prevent 
War’. Despite the bold title, the plan does not advocate the 
merging of independent units in a ‘world state’ or the creation of 
a ‘world government’ or a ‘world parliament’. Woolf maintained 
that such ideas were impracticable since they did not have the 
slightest chance of being accepted by the world’s statesmen 
(Wilson 1995: 126). 
Because of this inclination Woolf instead ‘recommended the establishment of 
machinery and procedures whereby states could settle their differences short of war’ 
(Wilson 1995: 126). In short, the liberal internationalists recommended international 
organization. This was the view which prevailed when the League of Nations was 
founded since no one in power ‘sought a superstate or world government’ but  
instead looked into establishing ‘some kind of post-war security pact’ (Mazower 
2012: 134). 
That the League of Nations was set to become a monumental failure was not 
obvious at this point since a Kantian scheme along international lines had never 
really been attempted in practice (and it has not yet been attempted globally if one 
takes into account Kant’s proviso for a functioning international organization that 
“The Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican”). It appears that for a 
time the ideas of H. G. Wells were aligned with those of the aforementioned liberal 
internationalists (see: Deudney 2007: 204-208). Wells even suggested during the 
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First World War that a ‘League of Free Nations’ should be established at its end 
(Partington 2003: 73). But what makes Wells ideas important for this period in the 
development of cosmopolitan thought was that he came to abandon internationalism 
and put in its stead what Wells himself called cosmopolitanism (see: Partington 
2003: 82). Wells’ version of cosmopolitanism was planetarist – like Cloots’ model 
had been earlier – in contrast to Woolf’s international cosmopolitanism which 
followed Kant’s model  
By cosmopolitan Wells meant a condition where the ‘competing sovereignties’ of 
different nations were a thing of the past and where a ‘world government’ had taken 
over which is ‘managed by suitably equipped groups of the most interested, 
intelligent, and devoted people’ but whose ‘activities should be subjected to a free, 
open, watchful criticism’ (Wells [1928] 2002: 71). Wells stopped thinking in 
internationalist terms when he realized that the League of Nations that was actually 
established at the end of the war ‘was for all practical purposes a league of victors 
and a diplomatic rendezvous for the foreign offices of the world’ which on top of 
this was doomed to be ineffective even at this narrow task since it ‘excluded 
Germany, Russia, and Turkey and was deserted by the USA’ (Partington 2003: 82). 
Wells was provoked to articulate his own ‘image of a desirable cosmopolis’ in 
greater detail by ‘the evident refusal of the statesmen to cast the League of Nations 
in the form of an embryonic world government’ (Heater 1996: 128). 
It has been noted that Wells never produced a ‘classic’ outlining all his ideas 
concerning the ideal cosmopolis, but instead ‘habitually produced’ numerous ‘slight, 
slipshod volumes’ (Wagar 1961: 267). But what can be drawn from his numerous 
and diverse literary output is that Wells ‘preached the world state as early as 1902’ 
and that by the time the First World War was over his only reason to extol the 
virtues of ‘the idea of a European federation’ or ‘an Anglo-American federation’ 
was because either of these schemes would represent ‘the first step in the building of 
a world state’ or ‘a bridge to the world state’ (Wagar 1961: 203-204). When the 
Second World War had just started Wells had the following to say about 
international organization: ‘It is the system of nationalist individualism and unco-
ordinated [sic] enterprise that is the world’s disease, and it is the whole system that 
has to go. It has to be reconditioned down to its foundations or replaced. It cannot 
hope to “muddle through” amiably, wastefully and dangerously, a second time’ 
(Wells 1940: 17).  
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Wells saw ‘the only sane objective’ as ‘a planetary Utopia, a unified human 
community’ and he expressed his position in the following unambiguous terms: ‘I 
am for the super-state [ ] and not for any League. Cosmopolis is my city, and I shall 
die cut off from it’ (Wagar 1961: 205, and as cited ibid.). Wells had ‘the worried 
conviction that the nation-state is dangerously obsolete’ (Heater 1996: 128). And 
after seeing how little effort the statesmen of the world were willing to put into the 
creation of anything resembling an international federation Wells thought that ideas 
along these lines ‘might even prove entirely irrelevant to the cause of world order’ if 
all they accomplished with for instance a ‘union of the Atlantic communities’ were a 
‘simple reduction of the competing states in the state-system’ (Wagar 1961: 205). 
Any such project ‘that did not see itself as a small way station along the high road to 
world integration would scarcely matter’ (Wagar 1961: 205, see also; Partington 
2003: 164). Wells here comes much closer to advocating a planetarist position of 
global universalism than he does to siding with the liberal internationalists.  
The only debatable objection to thinking Wells a full-fledged planetarist is that he 
was scarcely consistently committed to pluralism or democracy. According to W. 
W. Wagar’s account Wells thought that there would no longer be a need for politics 
in the conventional sense once his vision of the world state had been realized, 
because there would only be one ideology of ‘progressive world-socialism’ and that 
‘the collective human intelligence, as it evolved, could have only one generally 
acceptable worldview, based on the only one possible existing state of all scientific 
knowledge’ (Wagar 1961: 221). Derek Heater has made a similar conclusion that 
Wells’ vision was of ‘a world state withering to an administrative essence, but 
formed by the benevolent enlightenment of technocracy’ (Heater 1996: 138). In 
contrast comes statements by Wells, such as in his suggested “Declaration of the 
Rights of Man” written in 1940 that ‘There is no source of law but the people’ 
(Wells 1940: 145). John Partington argues that Wells waged a campaign for human 
rights which lasted from 1939 to 1944 where Wells was not acting as an elitist 
against democracy, but rather tried to promote  alternative modes of democratic 
governance instead of parliamentarianism (Partington 2003: 11). The above 
quotation from Wells’ The New World Order published in 1940 fits this observation. 
It is however not too difficult to understand that Wells has ended up being 
represented as a thinker who ‘rejected democracy and supported elite rule’ as 
Partington puts it (Partington 2003: 11), considering that he held on to this notion at 
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least from his first ideas of world order were published in Anticipations in1902 and 
up until the late 1930s, i.e. not consistently throughout the duration of his career as a 
writer, but for most of it (see: Wagar 1961: 165-174).  
Wells died in 1946, just a few years before the whole idea of international 
association was completely sidelined by the Cold War (see: Jonas 2001: 115-133, 
and; Mazower 2012: 214-243). The Cold War put a lid on speculations concerning 
cosmopolitanism. First of all there was the general belief in the West that the Soviet 
Union was intent on establishing a communist world state through the fomenting of 
a genuine world revolution. This plan had admittedly figured in the minds of leading 
Bolsheviks such as Lenin, Trotsky, and Nikolai Bukharin at the time of the Russian 
Revolution (Goodman 1960: 25-36, and; Mazower 2012: 176-177). But this fear 
also ignored that the Kremlin’s designs for world domination had been toned down 
considerably by Stalin over the decades that followed those initial years of world 
revolutionary fervor.  
Stalin’s doctrine of “socialism in one country” worked out after a debate that peaked 
in 1925 to 1926, where Trotsky as the defender of “world revolution” lost out, 
pointed in this direction (see: Ree 1998). And so did Stalin’s deliberate dismantling 
of the Third, or Communist, International in 1943, which was also known as “the 
Comintern”: ‘On May 15, 1943, Stalin dissolved the Comintern, a move most likely 
designed as a further encouragement to the Allies to give all-out aid in the common 
fight against the Axis’ (Goodman 1960: 44). This was at the time interpreted by one 
leading American newspaper as not ‘merely a gesture’ but as ‘the climax of the 
process that began when Stalin won his duel with Trotsky for leadership in Russia – 
the organization of that country into a national state, run on Communist lines, rather 
than a center of world revolution’ (as cited in; Goodman 1960: 44). This could also 
be interpreted as a strategy to appease the capitalist enemy until a more opportune 
moment arrived, but it seems like Stalin was more interesting in holding territory 
already occupied as a consequence of the Soviet defense against Nazi aggression 
than in furthering schemes that could be interpreted as extreme provocations by the 
United States. The latter’s troops were by the end of the Second World War amassed 
at the territorial edges of the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, armed with nuclear 
weapons that nullified the Red Army’s numerical advantages in terms of tanks and 
troops.  
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This relative parity of force between the new superpowers made Western designs for 
a world federalism expressed through ‘the World Movement for World Federal 
Government’ from ‘1947’ into a stillborn attempt at political world integration 
(Goodman 1960: 415). The world federalists were initially dismissed by the Soviets 
as ‘a mob of reactionaries’ that ‘do not have any influence among the masses’ and 
that ‘exist and function chiefly on the dollars that Wall Street sends them’ (as cited 
in; Goodman 1960: 415-416). But the Soviets changed tack and supported a similar 
communist ‘Partisans of Peace’ movement which in 1950 held a congress ‘in 
Warsaw where a resolution was adopted advocating “cooperation” with world 
government groups’ (Goodman 1960: 416). In the end however, when ‘the 
Executive Council of the World Movement for World Federal Government’ had 
invited ‘the Partisans of Peace to send observers’ to their conference in Rome the 
year after this ‘threatened to wreck the World Movement’ (Goodman 1960: 417). 
This was because the ‘largest American world government organization, the United 
World Federalists’ threatened their resignation ‘unless the invitation was 
immediately withdrawn and the congress was held without the presence of any 
Communist group’ (Goodman 1960: 417). After ‘this mild flirtation with the world 
government movement, Moscow reverted to its generic hostility toward Western 
federalists’ (Goodman 1960: 417-418). The lessons from this, where the creation of 
what could have been a useful back-channel to wind down Cold War hostility was 
being aborted by the Americans supposedly most inclined to institute world peace at 
the time, were plain to see: 
Groups like the United World Federalists must face the fact that 
they are pursuing two incompatible goals. On the one hand, they 
claim to seek a world government, that is, a government that 
would include the Communists and necessarily accord them a 
conspicuous role. On the other hand, they dare not deal with the 
Communists for fear of having a Red label pasted on them, a 
stigma which they know would promptly ruin the standing of the 
organization in the West (Goodman 1960: 418, emphasis in 
original). 
The conclusion Goodman reaches in this regard is quite damning: ‘If it is held 
dangerous or even impossible to deal with Communists, then it must be concluded 
that campaigning for a world government can no longer be a meaningful activity’ 
(Goodman 1960: 418, emphasis in original). In short, the ideological stalemate 
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where liberal capitalists occupied one half of the Earth’s northern hemisphere and 
the communist the other half was not conducive to the furthering of real-life 
cosmopolitan ventures. This was particularly true in the circumstances of 
McCarthyism, when a climate of communist paranoia had successfully been 
generated in the United States of such severity that anything else than a hostile 
inclination towards the enemy camp would appear as treason. But what happens 
once the ideological hostilities wind down at the end of the 1980s and the liberal 
camp is free to exert its influence globally?    
Cosmopolitanism after the Cold War: Internationalists against 
Planetarists? 
  The contemporary variety of cosmopolitanism has been described as ‘a form of 
radicalism that has flourished since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and goes by 
the name of the new or actually existing cosmopolitanism’ (Fine 2003: 452). 
According to Robert Fine it is not only ‘a way of thinking that declares its 
opposition to all forms of ethnic nationalism and religious fundamentalism’ but also 
‘to the economic imperatives of global capitalism’ (Fine 2003: 452). It has been 
expressed in ‘the field of political philosophy’ as a series of deliberations on Kant’s 
late 18
th
 Century cosmopolitan thought, it sees ‘cosmopolitanism as the fulfillment 
of the Enlightenment project’, and places ‘its faith [ ] in the attainment of a 
postnational, transnational or global democracy’ (Fine 2003: 453-454).    
At first sight the way cosmopolitan thought is described by Fine can give the 
impression that cosmopolitanism should constitute an ideal planetary ideology; it is 
presented as diametrically opposed to nationalist parochialism and irrational 
religious beliefs – but with an idea of human brotherhood that would take the best 
social aspects of these formerly regionally unifying ideologies to new heights – and 
as coming with a promise to fulfill the Enlightenment project through the attainment 
of some form of rational polity, ideally global in scope. In other words, if this 
describes cosmopolitanism correctly, then it appears to be an ideology which is 
prospectively synchronous with the notion that everything now ‘has to be placed in 
the context of transnational, human interests’ and that the ensuing ‘task’ of the 
coming generations will be the facilitation of ‘the world’s further 
transnationalization’ (Iriye 2014: 847). However, the conclusion I will arrive at here 
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is that this planetarist, or truly global, quality should only be ascribed to one 
particular, half-neglected, subdivision of the wider cosmopolitan discourse; the 
institutional planetarists. The majority position within contemporary cosmopolitan 
discourse lies squarely with the internationalist cosmopolitans or what I here call the 
institutional internationalists. Here I will use Richard Falk, Jürgen Habermas, 
Martha Nussbaum, and Ulrich Beck as representatives of this institutional 
internationalist strain that is now dominant in current cosmopolitan thought. 
The Internationalist Cosmopolitans    
  Fine’s informative account overemphasizes the universalistic aspects of 
contemporary cosmopolitanism and neglects the tendency, shared by many of its 
central advocates such as Falk, Habermas, Nussbaum, and Beck, to be only halfway 
distanced from the national imaginary. This is instead of being diametrically 
opposed to it as one would assume them to be if one took the idealized account first 
presented here at face value. In short there is an identifiably reformist streak within 
the contemporary discourse which is far from ‘a form of radicalism’ as Fine boldly 
asserted (Fine 2003: 452). In light of this empirical observation I will argue that 
there are prominent parts of cosmopolitan discourse which practically, and contrary 
to popular belief, work against “the world’s further transnationalization” because of 
its proponents’ tacit tendency to reify the conceptual ‘relational triad: people, nation, 
state’ which as we can recall from earlier represent the conceptual core of the 
national imaginary (Jewsiewicki & Mudimbe 1995: 195, see also; Hobsbawm 1990). 
This part of cosmopolitan discourse could therefore at worst serve to perpetuate and 
legitimate the nation-state system, putting it in stark contrast to what originally 
appears to have been the aim of cosmopolitan discourse: To unite humanity at the 
expense of the kinds of parochial loyalties that are currently being nurtured and 
perpetuated within the nation-state system.  
What is a perplexing tendency in light of the original aim is that many contemporary 
cosmopolitan scholars end up arguing for a sort of “nationalism lite” approach that – 
even though this position at first appears to be less of a contradiction to the aim of 
cultivating a single community of human beings than Chauvinistic nationalism 
represents – ends up creating what in reality might actually be a more insidious 
obstacle to achieving the goal of unifying humanity politically. This is a tension 
found within cosmopolitan discourse which is particularly pronounced along a “soft 
moral” to “hard institutional” ideological dimension. It can be described as a 
- 173 - 
continuum where on one end we find promoters of a comparatively apolitical moral 
cosmopolitanism and at the other advocates of a unitary world state (Pogge 1992: 
49; Lu 2000: 244, and; Kleingeld 2012: 38-39). In the middle between these two 
there is a reformist vision of a perfected (mostly) inter-governmental 
internationalism (largely) within the confines of presently existing institutions, 
whose proponents can be called institutional internationalists (see: Heater 1996: 
186-187, for all three positions, and; Beardsworth 2011: 16-47, for a not too 
dissimilar division of ‘the Cosmopolitan Spectrum’ into seven categories, though 
without one for the world statists).  
It is a common occurrence in critiques of cosmopolitan thought to inflate the 
universalizing properties of institutional internationalist thinkers, as when Danilo 
Zolo describes the elder cosmopolitan Richard Falk’s ideological thrust as one of 
‘centralizing globalism’, when all Falk proposes is a relatively modest addition to 
the United Nations system with the creation of a ‘global parliament’ consisting of 
‘the peoples of the world’ which for example might be ‘a subsidiary organ of the  
UN Assembly or take some more autonomous character within the UN system’ 
(Zolo 1997: 33, and; Falk 2009: 22-24, see also; Falk 1975, and 1995). To be fair to 
institutional internationalists like Falk, his suggestions could easily be viewed as an 
early steps in the direction of genuine post-national world government, but what he 
and those like him primarily concentrate on proposing – Falk is suggesting 
“peoples”, the ethno-nationalist concept par excellence, as base units in his global 
parliament – is a reform of the current international order and not its radical 
reordering along post-international, truly global or planetary lines.  
In addition to the already mentioned Richard Falk, there is a range of contemporary 
scholars that share a predilection for Kant’s intergovernmental political design, such 
as; Habermas, Nussbaum, and Beck. My aim in this section is to substantiate the 
claim that these theorists share one particular thing in common which makes it 
meaningful to categorize them as institutional internationalist- cosmopolitans 
alongside Kant. This quality they share is their theoretical backing of a political 
world order which quintessentially bears resemblance – due to the international 
nature of its composition – to the organizational structure Kant ultimately 
recommends in his Perpetual Peace (e.g. Habermas 2006: 113-193; 2012: 53-70, 
Nussbaum 2011: 113-114, and Beck 2006: 176-177). I seek to show this by means 
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of an analysis of particularly salient statements they have made in texts of particular 
relevance (i.e. where discussions of cosmopolitan questions are central).  
We see the same political institutional problem with Habermas, Nussbaum, and 
Beck as with Kant earlier, which is that the commendable moral cosmopolitanism 
which infuses all their work, just as with Kant’s defense of national sovereignty in 
Perpetual Peace, does not translate directly into adopting an equally universal 
political cosmopolitanism. This is because they all, together with Kant before them, 
end up grounding their notion of a cosmopolitan polity in a plurality of nations, and 
not in individuals or transnational phenomena. Theirs is therefore at heart an 
international and not a planetary conception of a future world polity. 
Habermas makes his support of international institutional designs particularly 
evident in some of his most recent publications (Habermas 2006: 113-193, and; 
2012: 53-70), but the essence of his preferred solution is basically found in the 
following:  
The United Nations still clings to features of a “permanent 
congress of states.” If it is no longer to be a mere assembly of 
government delegations, the General Assembly must be 
transformed into a kind of parliament that shares its powers with 
a second chamber. In such a parliament, peoples will be 
represented not by their governments but by the elected 
representatives of the totality of world citizens (Habermas 1997: 
134). 
This is very similar to Falk’s suggestion, whereby through adding a democratic 
appendage to the UN framework it becomes a more legitimate institution for world 
governance. Habermas’ suggestion is again reformist, and it is vague on the details 
of how this improved United Nations General Assembly “Senate/House of 
Representatives” is going to be able to sway even the reformed Security Council 
Habermas would like to see accompany it into action (see: Habermas 1997: 135). 
Under the heading ‘From the international to the cosmopolitan community’ 
Habermas has much more recently rephrased what is essentially the same argument; 
where ‘the international community of states could be complemented by the 
community of world citizens so that it develops into a cosmopolitan community’ 
(Habermas 2012: 53 and 58, emphasis in original). This is not supposed to be 
accomplished through abolishing the nation-state, but through diminishing its 
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freedom of action: The cosmopolitan community ‘would not constitute itself as a 
world republic, however, but as a supranational association of citizens and peoples 
in such a way that the member states retain control over the means for a legitimate 
use of force, though not the right to use them as they please’ (Habermas 2012: 58).  
In short Habermas suggests that a global parliament under the auspices of nation-
states would be compelled to act against their interests when that would be required, 
though it has no other power than that derived from the supposed authority it would 
get from being elected by the “world citizens”. This is a way of saying that world 
opinion should trump political power, but that assumption ought to be considered 
politically unfeasible unless world opinion is formalized into a supreme political 
power – but in that scenario nations can no longer be politically in control of their 
own armies, because that would leave them as sovereign entities able to disregard 
world opinion. Which means that Habermas global parliament no longer would be a 
sovereign authority. This is not problematic for Habermas, who presupposes that 
‘the world community is not supposed to assume the character of a state’ or that the 
‘democratic federal state writ large – the global state of nations or the world republic 
– is the wrong model’ (Habermas 2012: 61, and; 2006: 134). Even though that 
model seems to be exactly what is required to get around this theoretical 
contradiction.  
The reason Habermas thinks the world state is the wrong model is because 
organizations like the United Nations and the European Union can secure 
compliance from their members even though they lack ‘a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force’ (Habermas 2006: 137). In this Habermas conveniently 
ignores that in the cases when the United Nations is capable of achieving 
compliance the organization tends to function as an instrument of US foreign policy, 
which is the state wielding the most military power on the planet. And that the chief 
reason the European Union is respected by the member states is because 
membership comes with a considerable economic advantage which in case it was 
withdrawn could spell disaster, in other words the EU is fully capable of wielding its 
own sort of coercive power. Provided that the above is a correct representation of 
Habermas’ views on the matter, and if we take his familiar defense of human rights 
also into account (e.g. Habermas 1998), I think it is safe to conclude that Habermas 
on a moral basis would like to see the present international paradigm stretched to its 
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limits, but that he is not willing to engage with a possible politics that would go 
beyond that paradigm.     
Nussbaum stands out as especially focused on the moral dimension at the expense of 
the political. She is much more concerned with promoting a moral cosmopolitanism 
than with discussing the inevitable political consequences of founding a political 
ideology on the basis of that clearly spelled out ethos (see; Nussbaum 1996: 3-17, 
and 131-144). According to Nussbaum we should see beyond ‘the fact that there is 
no world state’ and try to work around ‘the fact that the nation-state is the 
fundamental political unit’ by acting morally as if we were genuine world citizens 
already: 
The absence of a world state does not thwart cosmopolitan 
conduct, then, for those who are genuinely committed to it. But 
cosmopolitanism does not require, in any case, that we should 
give equal attention to all parts of the world. None of the major 
thinkers in the cosmopolitan tradition denied that we can and 
should give special attention to our own families and to our own 
ties of religion and national belonging. In obvious ways, we must 
do so, since the nation-state sets up the basic terms for most of 
our daily conduct, and since we are all born into a family of 
some sort. Cosmopolitans hold, moreover, that it is right to give 
the local an additional measure of concern. But the primary 
reason a cosmopolitan should have for this is not that the local is 
better per se, but rather that this is the only sensible way to do 
good (Nussbaum 1996: 135-136). 
This way Nussbaum avoids the question of whether core cosmopolitan ideas should 
be seen as the fundamental ontological basis for a potential political ideology – 
something which would have serious potential consequences for the present nation-
state centered structural mode of world politics – and instead treats pillars of 
cosmopolitan thought, such as the notion of world citizenship, as little more than 
moral maxims that should inform, not the political struggle for a universal state of 
mankind everyone could be an actual legally binding citizen of, but a comparatively 
apolitical mode ‘of action for the world citizen [ ] ranging from financial support for 
Human Rights Watch to thinking and writing to (where it is open to individuals) 
more direct participation in deliberations about the welfare of children and women’ 
(Nussbaum 1996: 135).  
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When Nussbaum states that ‘none of the major thinkers in the cosmopolitan tradition 
denied that we should give special attention to [ ] our own ties of religion and 
national belonging’ and that while we should adopt a cosmopolitan worldview: ‘We 
need not give up our special affections and identifications, whether ethnic or gender-
based or religious’, it appears that she considers “cosmopolitanism” to be just 
another level one can add to an individual’s moral ambit (Nussbaum 1996: 135 and 
9). This is a suspicion which appears to be confirmed when we note that Nussbaum 
base these claims on the Stoics’ suggestion ‘that we think of ourselves not as devoid 
of local affiliations, but as surrounded by concentric circles’ where ‘the first one 
encircles the self, the next takes in the immediate family, then, in order, neighbors or 
local groups, fellow city-dwellers, and fellow countrymen – and we can easily add 
to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, historical, professional, gender, or 
sexual identities’ before finally adding that: ‘Outside of all these circles is the largest 
one, humanity as a whole’ (Nussbaum 1996: 9).  
Nussbaum then goes on to argue that: ‘Our task as citizens of the world will be to 
“draw the circles somehow towards the center” [citing the Stoic philosopher 
Hierocles] making all human beings more like our fellow city-dwellers, and so on’ 
(Nussbaum 1996: 9). Superficially this argument seems reasonable enough, as the 
closer we can draw these circles together the better the chances of achieving lasting 
peace would be. But Nussbaum’s insistence on the point that morally embracing 
humanity does not entail giving up any other cherished identities cuts off the most 
logical way of “drawing the circles tighter together” which would be to simply 
abandon, or at least heavily de-emphasize, some of the exclusive loyalties extended 
towards e.g. fellow countrymen, ethnic-brethren, and co-religionists, which together 
make up so many extra confounding circles between the self and the ultimate human 
Other inhabiting the most peripheral circle. Most laws beneath the nation-state level 
were seen as detrimental to national cohesion earlier and were ether incorporated 
into state law or discarded, since as Jacques Ellul observed a while ago; in the 
modern nation-state ‘the law is no longer anything but an instrument of the state’ 
(Ellul 1964: 295).    
As the foundational morality or ethos for a polity Nussbaum’s Stoic concentric 
circles approach is arguably theoretically infeasible. Historically there is the 
tendency to solely emphasize a single of these so-called circles at the expense of all 
the others, be it; the family (clans), the city-dwellers (the city-states of antiquity and 
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the renaissance, with a territorial corollary in medieval feudal society), the 
countrymen (the vast majority of contemporary nation-states), ethnicity (e.g. the 
Third Reich), or co-religionists (e.g. during the Reformation). The political history 
of human civilization is a series of testaments to the fact that to ‘not give up our 
special affections and identifications’, as Nussbaum recommends, at these levels 
always serves to relegate any notions of a wider common humanity held among the 
members of these respective polities to political obscurity (Nussbaum 1996: 9).  
Ultimate loyalty has to rest somewhere politically, and in the modern nation-state 
one therefore only enters the legal territory of treason if one deliberately works 
against the interest of the state (i.e. the stand-in for Nussbaum’s “fellow 
countrymen”). But one is not considered punishable for treason if one, in for 
example the economic or the national interest, works against the interest of one’s; 
family, city, ethnicity, religion, or – and this is the crucial point – one on purpose 
works against the interest of humanity. On the contrary, within the current nation-
state framework one is actually expected to willingly work against the interest of 
humanity, as far as the interest of humanity does not by happenstance coincide with 
the national interest.39 So why does Nussbaum then view e.g. national and religious 
belonging as intrinsically worthy forms of human morality, which only needs to be 
supplemented with a sense of cosmopolitan belonging, and not replaced by it, for 
everything to work out fine? The answer must be that Nussbaum, like Kant before 
her, implicitly anchors her moral theory in the national people and not in humanity. 
Nussbaum’s use of the pseudo organic “concentric circles” metaphor in combination 
with her repeated defense of feelings of national and religious belonging indicates 
that she actually holds these forms of allegiance in too high esteem (alternatively 
sees these as held in too high esteem by those around her) for her to willingly point 
out that these “circles” more closely resembles incompatible obstacles between a 
nationally, and still to a degree religiously, defined present and a truly cosmopolitan 
future.  
I would argue that a good measure of pluralism and tolerance are essential features 
without which a democratic polity, no matter its scope, cannot function properly, but 
                                                 
39 There is every indication that in intergovernmental reality these two, the national and the human 
interest, only correspond at the very rarest of occasions (see: Ross 2011: 136-149, for a 
revealing insider account of the nation-centric diplomatic workings of the present 
intergovernmental system). 
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at the same time one cannot allow for an omni-pluralist or omni-tolerant political 
design of the order inherent in Nussbaum’s moral cosmopolitanism and expect it to 
turn into anything other than a hopeless muddle. Any state would in theory have to 
work within certain parameters of a constitutional nature, and every mode of 
expressing group-belonging cannot be elevated to a sacred status within it, because 
some of these have to be nurtured while others necessarily must be suppressed, 
simply for the sake of the maintenance of political cohesiveness, and by extension, 
peace within the polity. In an analogous manner regional fealty to the lord and 
religious subservience to the papacy had to give way to a heightened allegiance to 
the royal head of the burgeoning nation-state in its dynastic early stage, as these 
older forms of adherence were deemed to be incompatible with the desire for a more 
cohesive form of political organization. There is no reason to dispute that Nussbaum 
would prefer a new form of moral grounding for society, one of a decidedly post-
national nature, but it does not appear like she is interested in discussing the 
accompanying institutional implications of this change in moral focus.  
It is this shared ambiguity towards their own position, which is neither fully national 
nor fully cosmopolitan in its nominal universal sense, which makes it possible to 
conclude that Nussbaum, as Kant before her, have a fundamentally internationalist 
and not a planetary outlook. Internationalism, as I have argued elsewhere (see above 
Chapter 2), should not be understood as the opposite of nationalism, even though 
this was normally the way it was understood earlier (see: Anderson 2002: 5 and 23). 
Internationalism as I conceive of it should instead be understood as a point in the 
middle of a continuum, stretching from an ultra-nationalist (autarkic/Chauvinist) to 
an ultra-universalist (planetary/all-inclusive) position, where the first half is 
grounded in the nationally delimited people and the second half in humanity. 
Internationalism as I conceptualize it here is still grounded in the people, but it 
makes (politically more or less meaningless) gestures towards the acknowledged 
existence of a common humanity.  
Both Nussbaum and Kant (in his later writings) seem to presuppose that what we 
today would call nation-states happen to be an unalterable fact of human existence. 
Cosmopolitan morality thereby becomes the best way for these scholars to moderate 
the excesses of states – since a world state is considered too utopian (or alternatively 
too risky to defend in the environment they operate in at the time of writing) it is 
therefore dismissed as a possibility not worthy of serious contemplation. What we 
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get from these authors is thereby not so much an ideology grounded in humanity (as 
that would correspond with a universal republic or a planetary polity), as an 
ideology grounded in the nation-state (which has since the end of World War II in 
1945 corresponded with intergovernmental international organization). This is 
combined with the message that there is nothing structurally wrong with the nation-
state per se, only the level of Enlightenment amongst its populace, and if only they 
could be led to see the light of reason everything would be fine. My contention is 
that there is something structurally wrong with the nation-state as the fundamental 
unit in world politics, because it is impossible to act “enlightened” in the human 
interest, as Kant and Nussbaum appears to think, and at the same time be the leader 
or representative of any of the contemporary nation-states for long.  
The human interest the institutional internationalists presuppose would be defended 
with Kant’s international federation simply completely goes against the today still 
underlying governing principle of any nation-state, that of raison d’état or reason of 
state, which dictates that the primary objective is to ensure the continued existence 
of the state (Viroli 1992). “Reason” in this sense means ‘the capacity to calculate the 
appropriate means of preserving the state’ (Viroli 1992: 4). This is a highly 
conservative view of what reason is supposed to further, in the sense that it seeks 
above all else to preserve the status quo political arrangement. This is not 
compatible with Kant’s notion of reason as something which can solely be advanced 
if it is subject to unconstrained critique:   
Reason must subject itself to critique in all its undertakings, and 
cannot restrict the freedom of critique through any prohibition 
without damaging itself and drawing upon itself a 
disadvantageous suspicion. Now there is nothing so important 
because of its utility, nothing so holy, that it may be exempted 
from this searching review and inspection, which knows no 
respect for persons. The very existence of reason depends upon 
this freedom, which has no dictatorial authority (Kant [1781] 
1998: 643). 
Reason of state is founded on the notion that furthering the interests of the state 
necessarily must be viewed as a sacred objective beyond reproach. It was at first a 
progressive notion, as it replaced the arbitrary nature of decisions made by 
monarchs’, decisions which could be based on nothing other than their personal 
whims, and turned these monarchs primarily into heads of state rather than the 
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former lords of realms which they could, and often did, treat as their own private 
property. That this development was already in place also allowed for a fairly 
smooth transition from ancien regimes to constitutional monarchies in many 
countries, as monarchs had gradually gotten used to acting more as presidents than 
dictators in line with the logic inherent in the concept of reason of state. But that it 
was in place before e.g. the French Revolution made it possible for de Tocqueville 
to argue ‘that the most important contribution of the revolutionary era was to 
continue the centralizing and modernizing work that had begun in the French state 
under Louis XIV’ (Hanson 2009: 3). Likewise the notable group of Enlightenment 
thinkers in France known as ‘the Encyclopedists’ did not question ‘the national basis 
of the state’ but instead ‘challenged the autocracy of the French state’ (Toulmin 
1992: 142). The reason of state overlaps the transition from monarchic to national 
rule exemplified by the French Revolution, and this signifies that this wider 
revolution experienced worldwide from the 18
th
 to the 20
th
 century does not at all 
represent a complete break with pre-modern political conceptions.  
Ulrich Beck defends the very Kantian concept of ‘realistic cosmopolitanism’ or 
‘cosmopolitan realism’ through coupling the furtherance of European integration to 
the benefit this gives to the individual states taking part in it (Beck  2006: 57-58, 
and; Beck & Grande 2007: 20-21). This means ‘that in the past European unification 
was less a product of idealistic enthusiasm than the result of rational calculations of 
interest’ by the different states (Beck & Grande 2007: 21). This “realistic 
cosmopolitanism” can therefore only go as far as is allowed by the reason of state, to 
which it appears to be completely beholden. Beck’s “cosmopolitan vision” is based 
on the idea of ‘the enlightened self-interest of transnational states’: 
In order to consolidate and increase their power, states must (a) 
cooperate and (b) negotiate international rules and found 
corresponding international institutions. In other words, because 
states want to survive they have to cooperate. However, long 
term cooperation transforms the self-definition of states to their 
core. Their egoistic drive to survive and extend their power 
compels them to unite and reform themselves – not rivalry, but 
cooperation maximizes national interests. Anti-cosmopolitanism 
is at the same time anti-national, because it fails to understand 
that, in an age of global interdependencies and dangers, there is 
only one way to pursue and maximize national interests, namely 
the cosmopolitan way. We must make a distinction between a 
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self-destructive way (autarchy) and a power-maximizing way of 
interweaving national interests, the latter being the 
internalization of cosmopolitanism by the nation and the state 
(Beck 2006: 177). 
In this way Beck manages to appeal to the reason of state logic in an effort to 
ameliorate the undesirable consequences resulting from states following that very 
same logic. He does this without going for the obvious target if putting an end to 
such consequences really was his goal, which would be the integrity and 
cohesiveness of the nation-state as such, which can be more specifically identified as 
the bonds holding the ‘relational triad: people-nation-state’ together, where I suggest 
one can think of each component of the triad as being one layer supporting the 
following one (Jewsiewicki & Mudimbe 1995: 195, see also; Hobsbawm 1990: 22-
23). Or, to see it from another angle, aiming in on the cohesiveness of the nation-
state is perhaps exactly what Beck is doing, except that he appears to have gotten the 
whole conceptual package the wrong way around, because he is appealing for the 
state to cut off its supporting structure, and not for the individuals that constitute the 
people to stop holding it up. The latter would arguably be more realistic to expect in 
real life than that the leaders of the state would risk surrendering their position of 
privilege voluntarily.       
Perhaps because of the radical nature of any argument proposing the formation of a 
world state, the first and the second of these types of articulating the cosmopolitan 
ideal, the moral and the institutional internationalist, are sometimes presented in a 
way that makes it seem as if these two positions within cosmopolitan discourse were 
constitutive of its totality (e.g: Brown & Held 2010, Hooft 2009: 120-123, and; 
Brock & Brighouse 2005). This is a way of perceiving contemporary cosmopolitan 
discourse which turns it into a subdivision of liberal internationalism which can be 
called ‘normative liberal theories’ (Jahn 2013: 136-138). If cosmopolitanism were 
only to be seen in this light it would simply represent the conscientious side within 
an intra-liberal debate where neoliberalism would be the currently most prominent 
of the corresponding ‘economic liberal theories’ (Jahn 2013: 102-110). Habermas, 
Nussbaum, and Beck would all fit into a liberal international category, especially if 
we allow for the inclusion of social-democratic ideas into a wide, but still centrist, 
understanding of what it means to be a liberal nowadays. 
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While cosmopolitanism as liberal internationalism leans more towards politically 
centrist social liberal and social democratic views (e.g. Held 2004) and 
neoliberalism as liberal internationalism overwhelmingly tilts more towards a right-
of-center moderate conservatism,40 there is nonetheless not much room left for 
articulating an independent political stance in the space between these two partly 
overlapping positions. Daniele Archibugi who, both through his own work and that 
done in collaboration with David Held, have been one of the central contributors to 
the contemporary cosmopolitan debate’s institutional internationalist faction 
(Archibugi 1992, 1993, 2003, 2008, and; Archibugi and Held 1995), have 
commented that Held’s explicit advocacy of ‘a cosmopolitan social-democratic 
program’ could easily be ‘opposed’ by ‘a cosmopolitan liberal-democratic program’ 
such as would have been found in ‘the neoliberal program’ if it was not for its 
‘absence of democratic accountability’ (Archibugi 2008: 142, emphasis in original). 
So if present neoliberalism were to move incrementally to the left (and in the 
process gain better democratic credentials), it would quickly become very similar to 
institutional internationalist cosmopolitanism, especially since both forms of 
liberalism prefer (loose) global governance to (cohesive) global government. This 
observation points to an inherent ideological weakness found within current 
cosmopolitan thought, i.e. if we conceive of it solely as a manner of liberal 
internationalism. Even though a critique of current international institutions and 
suggestions for their improvement are essential elements of this part of the 
cosmopolitan discourse, it does give the impression of coming a bit too close to 
being a theory for the legitimation of international best practices as presently seen 
through a privileged Western gaze (see: Fine 2003: 466). 
This means that cosmopolitanism when perceived as a variety of liberal 
internationalism ends up presenting a ‘project’ which can appear ‘liberal or even 
conservative, designed to make fine adjustments to international institutions in the 
hope that all will then be well with the world’ (Fine 2003: 466). In short it can easily 
be perceived as the propagandistic side of a broader liberal discourse, serving to 
perpetuate the structures that make neoliberal economic dominance possible, 
through presenting what is in essence a false alternative. Such a conclusion would 
perhaps be overly harsh, but what there is a basis for suggesting is at least that 
                                                 
40 See the preceding chapter on neoliberalism. 
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liberal internationalism cum cosmopolitanism should be thought of not as 
diametrically opposed to either the present world order or neoliberal capitalism, but 
instead as an ideological force aiming to assuage the worst excesses associated with 
each, through reforms that would pull the present center of politics incrementally 
leftwards so to speak. This can only be perceived as radical from a standpoint so 
conservative as to block out all political influences further away from theirs than 
what we find in institutional internationalist cosmopolitanism. 
The Planetarist Cosmopolitans 
But there is an alternative tendency within contemporary cosmopolitan discourse 
which follows in the footsteps of Cloots and Wells. The cosmopolitans of today that 
comes closer to being planetarists than the internationalist cosmopolitans discussed 
above argue for a type of global universalism that begins to resemble that of the 
historian and Wells enthusiast Walter Warren Wagar, the scholar who almost 
singlehandedly kept alive the planetarist cosmopolitan tradition during the Cold War 
(see; Wagar 1961, 1963, 1971, 1991, 1996, 1999 and 2002). There were a few others 
of course, Wagar himself mentions ‘the distinguished biologist Julian Huxley’ and 
‘nuclear physicist Leo Szilard’ in addition to ‘the historian Arnold J. Toynbee, the 
humanist Lewis Mumford, the philosopher F. S. C. Northrop’ and ‘the sociologist 
Pitirim A. Sorokin’, among others (Wagar 2002: 32-33). But many of these were not 
active for the duration of the Cold War and none were to my knowledge as explicit 
in their support of Wells’ earlier vision as Wagar himself was.  
Wagar identifies his own position as ideologically cosmopolitan, albeit in a manner 
consistent with Cloots’ and not Kant’s conception: ‘As nationalism demands 
unqualified loyalty to the nation, Marxism to the working class, and Christianity to 
the Biblical God, so cosmopolitanism – the ideology of world integration – will 
demand unqualified loyalty to mankind’ (Wagar 1971: 52). Wagar then makes the 
explicitly political prescription that ‘to bring into being an authentic world 
government, we must first bring into being an authentic world political party’ 
(Wagar 1971: 59). This party’s ‘final goal [ ] in every country will be the 
mundialization [sic] of national power, the transfer of sovereign power intact and 
complete to the world republic’ (Wagar 1971: 66). One has thus instituted ‘the world 
state’ which ‘will be unitary, democratic, socialist, and liberal’ but since ‘any of 
these ideas, pushed to its logical conclusions, might accomplish the destruction of 
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the other three, the constitution of the world state must be finely balanced’ (Wagar 
1971: 142).  
The chief contributions to Wells’ earlier model for a world state made by Wagar was 
that Wagar in contrast to Wells insisted on the need for a democratic World 
Republic as the only feasible long-term solution (e.g. Wagar 2002: 37-39). It would 
have to be based on a relationship between the World Republic, the World Party, 
and the world populace, but it was not meant to be an unflagging global one party 
state: 
…the Party will [ ] hold itself accountable to the world’s people 
and will compete democratically with any other political 
formations that arise to challenge it. In short, the coming of the 
World Republic spells not the end of politics, as Wells 
anticipated, but its ascent to a higher plane, freed from the 
malodorous manipulations of big capital. The World Republic 
will be ruled not by science or expertise, invaluable as these 
things might be, but by the minds of all humankind, by what 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau called more than two centuries ago the 
“General Will”. This great Will must remain at all times the only 
true sovereign power on earth (Wagar 2002: 39). 
The latest cohort to take over the planetarist mantle have shown a bit more 
theoretical sophistication in terms of their models for the ideal world polity; Wagar 
here after all comes perilously close to arguing for one humanity, one party, and one 
state, in a manner that can be confused with the earlier totalitarian schemes for 
communist world domination. In Wagar’s futuristic novel A Short History of the 
Future (1999) he imagines that if the World Party were to come into power with the 
majority needed for it to implement its program then the question might arise 
whether the global polity it was in charge of was ‘a true democracy or a stage-
managed dictatorship of the World party?’(Wagar 1999: 147). In comparison the 
contemporary cosmopolitan planetarists come into the debate with a heightened 
awareness that democratic governance of a global polity would necessarily be a bit 
more pluralistic than this.  
Raffaele Marchetti’s concept of ‘cosmo-federalism’ is one case in point (Marchetti 
2008: 153-167). Marchetti argues that: ‘Either democracy is global or it is not 
democracy’ (Marchetti 2008: 1). This assertion can only be made on the assumption 
that the only true demos in the global age is the theoretical one that is coextensive 
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with the entire adult population of our species. Marchetti does not argue for 
replacing all other layers of democracy with the proposed global one. He does 
advocate a reform of the United Nations that is consistent with most international 
cosmopolitan schemes as the most realistic pathway towards its realization. But in a 
manner not too different from the aforementioned Richard Falk he does end up 
advocating reforms of such magnitude that one has to start speculating if this would 
not actually amount to the introduction of a world government by stealth (Marchetti 
2008: 161-162; and see Falk as cited on; Marchetti 2008: 163). In a later work 
Marchetti argues for the constitution of a ‘non-unitary world state’ that would make 
possible ‘joint action on a specific set of global issues’ (Marchetti 2012: 39). It is 
“non-unitary” in the sense that national units would still exist and the citizens would 
‘be subject to two powers’ which implies that they would have ‘dual loyalty’ 
(Marchetti 2012: 40). This might have the appearance of the internationalism earlier 
advocated by Kant, but once one sees the legal framework Marchetti suggests, then 
it becomes apparent that the nation-state has been replaced with something 
resembling a subsidiary department: ‘A new covenant would be signed among 
individuals, states and a world organization, according to which states would 
delegate power to a superior institution in charge of both addressing global issues 
and allocating competences on the sub-levels’ (Marchetti 2012: 40). If this was not 
spelled out clearly enough Marchetti goes on to suggest that the resulting 
‘institutional framework would comprise a world government, a world parliament, a 
world supreme court and a global constitution’ (Marchetti 2012: 40). Marchetti 
insists that the states would still retain ‘a portion of their sovereignty’ but he does in 
large part advocate the institution of a United States of the World where in the event 
‘of conflict between the different institutional layers, the supranational authority 
must prevail over the lower ones’ (Marchetti 2012: 40-41). 
Alexander Wendt is another contemporary theorist that has argued that ‘a world 
state is inevitable’ and who thinks that this outcome ‘would be desirable’ as well 
(Wendt 2011: 55). But Luis Cabrera is probably the theorist that has done the most 
to reinvigorate the debate on world or global government on this side of the 
millennium without uncritically adopting the internationalist doctrine that accept 
Kant’s ostensible premise that full political integration is bound to be the highroad 
to a world despotism (Cabrera 2004, 2005, 2010, 2011, and 2015). Cabrera argues 
that: ‘Ultimately, we should want to put in place an institutional framework where 
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the interests of all persons [i.e. every member of the human species] will be 
vigorously protected and promoted’ and that this institutional framework ‘would 
most likely be some form of democratic global government’ (Cabrera 2004: 141-
142). But again the vision of a global government offered by Cabrera is a lot more 
complex than what for instance Wagar suggested:  
The global system could be composed of partially sovereign, 
semi-autonomous units. I say units because, in the context of a 
more integrated system, we need not think only in terms of states 
and regional organizations composed of states. Substate regions 
and municipalities likely would have an important role to play, 
as they increasingly do in Europe. Above regions could be 
historic states, and above states, democratic supranational 
organizations. Above supranational regional organizations would 
be the global governing bodies, with representatives elected and 
public servants drawn from all regions (Cabrera 2004: 94-95).  
What Cabrera suggests here is not that there should be a “dual loyalty” for citizens 
as we saw Marchetti doing previously, but that the sovereignty of the world state 
level would be diluted by the existence of in all four or five democratic levels (the 
municipality and/or provincial region, the nation-state, the supranational region, and 
then the global government). One earlier articulation of this notion of the world state 
as ideally a bundle of democratic layers in the post-Cold War era was made by Yael 
Tamir, who in 2000 presented the following vision of a global democratic state: 
A democratic global state should aspire to delegate as much 
authority as possible to smaller units. It would want to allow 
cultural groups to preserve their uniqueness, voluntary 
associations to pursue their interests, religious groups to practice 
their religion, neighborhoods to determine their specific 
character and the like. It would also aspire that political, 
economic or ecological problems which could be solved at lower 
levels will be dealt with at these levels. Hence, a global state can 
foster at once both centralization and decentralization (Tamir 
2000: 263-264). 
This might sound as the eminently sensible way to arrange things, but then one 
discovers what the main point of retaining this loose structure is: ‘One might object 
that such a functionalist vision contradicts nationalist aspirations. I beg to differ. 
Even if a global state were ever to be formed, it is likely to be divided into a 
plurality of national units. Emphasizing a thin layer of common values need not 
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undermine the desire to retain national distinctiveness’ (Tamir 2000: 264). Tamir’s 
version of cosmopolitanism in other words does not seek to contradict nationalist 
aspirations. We are here squarely back to Kant’s insistence on internationalism as 
opposed to planetarism. This is not what Marchetti and Cabrera intended with their 
similar designs, but it appears to be a conundrum within the present cosmopolitan 
discourse that even those who are in favor of world government cannot remove 
themselves sufficiently from the national imaginary to realize that to continue to 
foster loyalty to the nation is not something that is likely to be compatible with the 
goal of political world integration.  
Wells and Wagar had understood that nationalism was the enemy, and not the 
facilitator, of their designs for a world state. Even those that come closest to 
following on the course they set out today appear to be enthrall to the notion that a 
democratic cosmopolitan world must be so layered with complexity that it is hard to 
begin to understand how it is supposed to work. How can this be democratic in a 
world where the proper functioning of democracy requires that the layman 
understands what different political parties actually are meant to stand for? I think 
Marchetti’s solution comes closest to the planetarist solution promoted by Wells and 
Wagar, but for it to fit completely Marchetti would need to lower the local level of 
loyalty so close to the provincial or municipal level that we are in fact talking about 
a sovereign state of global proportions. This would in theory remove the 
confounding mid-levels which Nussbaum’s “concentric circles” argument makes a 
virtue of including and which Kant in the end elevated to prime importance. But in 
the end you cannot defend the special status of your own countrymen or co-
religionists and at the same time maintain a planetarist outlook. When it comes to 
creating planetary political designs you either have to choose between being a 
communitarian or a global universalist, because you cannot be both and at the same 
time expect to come up with a logical polity.    
Conclusion: Cosmopolitanism as Two Distinct Political Ideologies   
   There is an ideological contradiction at the heart of cosmopolitan discourse today. 
The national imaginary maintains its grip on the imagination of virtually all its 
current theorists to different degrees. This is especially pronounced for cosmopolitan 
theorists like Habermas, Nussbaum, and Beck, who have not moved very far from 
Kant’s international cosmopolitanism. The few theorists that has managed to see the 
contradiction; Cloots, Wells, and Wagar, amongst those presented here, have been 
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lonely voices in the wilderness in comparison to the mainstream of the cosmopolitan 
discourse which apparently cannot fathom that global institutions is something that 
in the realm of theory can be forged anew. A new generation of cosmopolitans have 
come closer to adopting a planetarist vision, scholars like Wendt, Marchetti, and 
Cabrera. But so far, as we have seen by example of the theory of Marchetti and 
Cabrera, there is a tendency even amongst these to accommodate their designs to the 
national imaginary. The nation-state they should instead, following Wells and 
Wagar, see as an obstacle that has to be removed rather than be retained, if their 
designs are going represent a meaningful advance away from the present state of 
anarchy in international affairs. Nonetheless, Marchetti and Cabrera in particular 
comes close to advocating a form of global democracy – that if a bit further 
developed – could become an improved variety of the planetarist cosmopolitanism 
put forward by Wells and Wagar in the twentieth century.      
The crucial difference between the internationalist and the (approaching) planetarist 
side is a reformist promotion of ‘intergovernmentalism’ contra a radical advocacy of 
the institution of a ‘global polity’ where only the latter treat humanity as one 
potential ‘global demos’ and not as a group of separate demoi which the 
internationalists do, as indicated by for instance Falk’s use of the term “peoples”, 
and by their general insistence that meaningful change can be accomplished within 
the confines of the UN system (Marchetti 2012, see also; Bohman 2007).  
Given this rather substantial internal difference the question needs to be posed 
whether cosmopolitanism as presented here can be considered to be a unitary 
ideology at all. We are in fact looking at one reformist and one radical political 
project that share a cosmopolitan morality, but which interprets the political 
consequences of holding that moral view in vastly different terms (see: Dufek 2013). 
I would suggest that the current crop of cosmopolitan theorists have to realize that 
they are taking part in the formulation of an ideology, and are not just participating 
in an academic discourse, which is what I get the impression that they perceive 
themselves mainly as doing. To spread this ideology so that it can become a real 
force for change it has to be possible to communicate it in no uncertain terms to a 
large number of people. If they want to become professional purveyors of a 
cosmopolitan ideology they would have to make a decision concerning what they 
actually are trying to do so their core message can be clarified for the masses; is it to 
preserve the nation-state within a loose framework which varies little from what we 
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already have today or is it to build a democratic world state that would be a 
qualitative improvement over today’s international institutions?  
If it is the former then cosmopolitanism is internationalist and does not present much 
of a threat to neoliberalism, which as we saw in the last chapter is an ideology for a 
global elite that thrives economically on a multilayered legal framework. If it is the 
latter then cosmopolitanism is planetarist and it would represent a threat to 
neoliberalism like no other ideology, since a global institution able to tax and 
redistribute at the global level is the neoliberals’ biggest fear. The last option would 
also be an indication that the era of the national imaginary is on the wane. It is clear 
that the former option is the more realistic in the short term, but it also promises 
more of the same just slightly reformed, and this in an era when radical solutions 
might be worth going for even if they are harder to arrive at. To me it seems like 
cosmopolitanism, ironically given its name, at present is overwhelmingly a less than 
fully global ideology. But at its theoretical fringes there has always been the 
stubborn presence of what could be a burgeoning planetarist ideology which I have 
here traced from the French Revolution, via the interwar years, through the Cold 
War, and all the way to today’s cosmopolitan discourse. We therefore presently have 
two distinctly different cosmopolitanisms, one dominant internationalist one and the 
kernel of an aspiring planetarist one. Whether that difference will be resolved 
internally – as has happened previously several times in the favor of internationalism 
–  or if cosmopolitanism might split into these two constituent parts before that 
happens and in the process make this qualitative disparity plain for all to see, is 
impossible to tell at this present juncture, but that seems to be the options.    
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Chapter 5. Alter-Globalism 
Introduction 
  The aim of this chapter is to investigate the ideological coherence of a political  
phenomenon widely perceived as both global in scope and leftist in political 
orientation. This is an ideological phenomenon whose essence has been attempted 
captured through the employment of terms such as the following; ‘the 
antiglobalization movement’ (Yuen, Burton-Rose, and Katsiaficas 2004, and; Held 
& McGrew 2007), ‘the anti-globalization movements’ (Bhagwati 2004: 29, added 
emphasis), ‘the antiglobalists’ (Steger 2005a, and 2005b, and; Micklethwait & 
Wooldridge 2000: 275), the ‘anti-globalizers’ and ‘the new millennium collectivists’ 
(Wolf 2004: 3-12), ‘the anti-capitalist movement’ (Callinicos 2003), ‘the new 
anarchists’ (Graeber 2002), ‘a global resistance movement’ (Korten 2006), ‘the 
global justice movement’ (Porta 2007), ‘the global left’ (Santos 2006), ‘the largest 
social movement in history’ (Hawken 2007), ‘alter-globalization’ (Pleyers 2010, 
and; West 2013), and ‘justice globalism’ (Steger 2008, and; Steger, Goodman, and 
Wilson 2013).  
The above list of terms is by no means exhaustive, but it can serve as an indication 
of the political range this phenomenon is perceived as inclusive of. We also have to 
take into account that these are labels that have been employed by proponents, 
opponents, and scholarly observers over a period of many years. What is important 
to notice here is that there is a huge discrepancy between some of these terms. When 
David Graeber employs the term “the new anarchists” this is a much more 
ideologically restrictive term than for instance Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ term 
“the global left”. Santos’ latter term, when we understand Graeber’s use of the term 
anarchism to mean a libertarian socialist left position and not the right-wing 
libertarianism sometimes confused with neoliberalism, is the more precise one, 
albeit this term is still not entirely inclusive of all the aspects of the phenomenon at 
hand. What all the terms mentioned above, and not just those employed by Graeber 
or Santos, fail to communicate is the important role ‘the ecological movement’ plays 
in shaping the alter-globalist ideological discourse (Löwy 2006: 7). The political 
project of the alter-globalist discourse and the many ‘emancipatory social 
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movements’ that take part in it has been described succinctly as ‘to birth a new 
civilization that is more humane and respectful of nature’ (Löwy 2006: 9). Jorge 
Riechmann has argued that ideologically this project ought to be inclusive of the 
following range of political positions:  
This project cannot reject any of the colors of the rainbow – 
neither the red of the anti-capitalist and egalitarian labor 
movement, nor the violet of the struggles for women’s liberation, 
nor the white of non-violent movements for peace, nor the anti-
authoritarian black of the libertarians and anarchists, and even 
less of the green of the struggle for a just and free humanity on a 
habitable planet (as cited in Löwy 2006: 9).  
To cover the whole range Riechmann could also have included the rainbow flag of 
the movement for LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) rights and the 
multicolored flag of the native population of the Andes (which notably has been 
used as the emblem of the Bolivian indigenous population) to serve as a stand-in for 
all the marginalized indigenous populations worldwide to complete his description. 
Not only is ‘the valorization of diversity’ when it comes to sexual, ethnic, and 
cultural identities a key feature of alter-globalist discourse (Pleyers 2010: 26-27). 
But an equally central feature is a focus on improving the life-conditions of people 
living in the global South, or what during the Cold War era was known as the Third 
World (see: Pleyers 2010: 25).   
It has been argued that the alter globalist discourse has developed into a coherent 
ideology of ‘justice globalism’ (Steger, et al 2013: 147). The ideological coherence 
Steger et al argue for having identified is ‘reflected in seven core concepts’ (Steger, 
et al 2013: 148). These seven core concepts are; i) ‘participatory democracy’, ii) 
‘equality of outcome and access’, iii) ‘social justice, restorative, and 
(re)distributive’, iv) ‘universal rights, including economic, social, and cultural’, v) 
‘global solidarity in social movements’, vi) ‘sustainable ecologies and societies’, and 
vii) ‘transformative change from below’ (Steger, et al 2013: 148). What is 
conspicuously missing from this catalogue of justice- or alter-globalism’s core 
concepts is a decontested world order perspective. We will see later on in this 
chapter that the link between “participatory democracy” and global democracy is a 
rather weak one, and that for some leading participants in the alter-globalist 
discourse the first does not necessarily have to lead to the other. There seems to be 
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some confusion on this point as the term “global democracy” crops up repeatedly in 
academic treatments of alter-globalist discourse as its logical goal, but this claim 
might be less warranted if we look closer at the entire breadth of the contemporary 
discourse (see: Teivainen 2002, Smith 2008, and; 2015, Reitan 2012). Not that there 
is anything strange about the notion of global democracy rising to the fore in the 
cited treatments and others. If one notices such core concepts or programmatic goals 
within the discourse as “redistributive social justice”, “sustainable ecologies” and 
“universal rights” one might start pondering about what it would take to actually 
institute these politically.  
Fulfilling the aspiration to for instance “social justice” at the global level would 
presumably have to involve the power to levy taxes, which further means a global 
legislative and executive political apparatus that all humanity can somehow 
participate in giving democratic input to if this power to tax and redistribute globally 
is to be legitimately exercised. In short we are talking about the creation of a global 
democratic polity. But this bridging of local aspirations with their logical political 
repercussions (if they were to become the universal norm) at the global level does 
apparently not come that easily to many of the participants in the alter-globalist 
discourse. Centralization in any form seems to be anathema to quite a number of the 
alter-globalist theorists, which in practice rules out global representative institutions. 
If this is the dominant tendency within the alter-globalist discourse it lacks the 
decisive features that would clearly make it a planetarist ideology: i.e. a refusal to 
see the world as naturally or rationally divided into nation-states, in combination 
with support for a universalist project of political globalization to replace the current 
international world order.  
The decontested core concept I am looking for within the discourse that would 
counter this initial assumption would be to find a coherent set of viewpoints within 
the discourse that advocates a preferred world order that goes beyond promoting 
democratic participation at the local level. Ideologies in the final analysis are after 
all ‘projects, or at least encapsulate practical projects which give rise to political 
strategies and tactics, models of political action which seek to transform the world’ 
(Schwarzmantel 2008: 26). Such world transformation must necessarily involve the 
implementation of a specific program, which in order to be set out to begin with, 
will require the existence of some clearly defined core objectives. The question I 
will seek to answer in this chapter is therefore; is there a core world order objective 
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present in the alternative globalization discourse? And if so, is the desired world 
order planetarist, internationalist, or something else entirely? To answer this we will 
have to see if there is a shared and specific position on what form a desired world 
order should take for the participants in the contemporary discourse. But first we 
have to see what makes alter-globalist thinking a distinct ideational tendency.  
Emergence 
  Alter-globalism as a political movement emerged on the world scene, particularly 
in the eyes of the media, when protests were held against the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in Seattle in late 1999 (see: Yuen, et al 2004). The protests in 
Seattle ‘involved some thirteen hundred civic, social movement, and trade union 
organizations from over eighty countries’ (Katsiaficas 2004: 3). Because the protest 
in Seattle was directed against the neoliberal pattern of economic globalization 
promoted by institutions such as the WTO this kind of protest was named 
‘antiglobalization protests’ (Katsiaficas 2004: 3). For the more seasoned observers 
signs of its emergence can be seen almost immediately after the Cold War ended. 
One of its earliest instantiations as a protest movement has been recognized as being 
in ‘Bangalore in 1993, when half a million Indian peasants pledged to resist the 
classification of seeds as private property’ thereby ensuring that ‘protests against the 
WTO began at its birth’ (Shiva 2005: 2, and; Collins 2004: xxxix, see also; Pleyers 
2010: 3). And though there is little doubt that the ‘best known of Seattle’s precursors 
is the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico’ which was a direct response to the 
introduction of NAFTA in 1994, another important precedence was set about five 
years earlier by a ‘Venezuelan uprising in 1989’ where ‘thousands of people rose up 
against the imposition of IMF-ordered austerity measures’ (Katsiaficas 2004: 4).  
In 2001 the World Social Forum (WSF) was initiated to get all the groups that 
shared the same political concerns about the dominant pattern of neoliberal 
globalization together. The forum was meant as ‘a space and process for those 
wanting another kind of global integration that emphasizes human needs over 
economic growth, environmental protection over corporate profits, and social 
inclusion over a competitive economic race to the bottom’ (Smith, et al 2008: xii). It 
was not meant to be a party or a movement of its own: ‘The WSF is not an 
organization with a common political platform for devising strategies’ but the most 
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important commonality of the organizations that made it up was that these 
‘organisations must adhere to a charter saying they are opposed to neoliberalism’ 
albeit ‘not necessarily to capitalism’ (Amin 2008: 4). 
The important thing to note here is that the source of the concerns that first led to 
protests and then to the formation of the WSF was top-down economical 
(de)regulation imposed by international institutions and through free trade 
agreements. Not just against those mentioned above; the WTO, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
Other international institutions and high profile gatherings, such as the World Bank, 
the European Union, the World Economic Forum, the G7, G8, and G20, have also 
been targeted for the same reasons (Collins 2004: xxxiv-xlvii). The common 
denominator for all these institutions that became a target for the so called 
antiglobalization protesters in the 1990s and early 2000s was their promotion of 
economic measures associated with the neoliberal ideology. In time this realization 
has led observers to the conclusion that ‘Alter-globalization activists do not oppose 
globalization but an ideology: neoliberalism’ (Pleyers 2010: 16). This idea that alter-
globalist discourse is not against globalization per se, is often presented as an 
essential property of the discourse:  
The movement is not “anti” but internationalist and deeply 
engaged with the world as a whole and the fate of everyone that 
shares the planet. It also has plenty of concrete proposals to 
offer, making it easily more “pro-globalisation” than its 
adversaries. It all depends on what kind of globalisation one 
means, and for whom (George 2004: ix). 
The notion that the participants in the alter-globalist discourse are generally in favor 
of globalization took some time to figure out, not only on the part of observers, but 
also for those participating in the discourse itself (see: Katsiaficas 2004). But it 
appears that ‘the phrase “antiglobalization” is a coinage of the U. S. media’ as David 
Graeber asserts (Graeber 2003: 326). And, Graeber continues, ‘if one takes 
“globalization” to mean the effacement of borders and the free movement of people, 
possessions, and ideas’ this means that ‘the groups involved’ should be seen as 
‘more supportive of globalization in general than supporters of the IMF or World 
Trade Organization’ (Graeber 2003: 327). 
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From Anti-Globalization to Alternative Globalization 
  What does it mean to be against globalization if the term is not considered 
coterminous with following a neoliberal blueprint for the world economy? The term 
“globalization”, at least in academic usage, does not exclusively mean economic 
globalization following neoliberal tenets but more ambiguously often means ‘a set 
of social processes defined and described by various commentators in different, 
often contradictory ways’ (Steger 2005b: 23). It is only in one way “anti-
globalization” correctly can be employed to signify the project of the alter-globalist 
discourse, and that is if globalization is taken to solely mean neoliberal 
globalization. In more advanced works on globalization it is often pointed out that 
globalization as a phenomenon should not be viewed as exclusively economic (and 
even less as exclusively neoliberal), because it denotes a long-term process whereby 
a web of global interconnections is spun denser and denser, though the temporary 
setback occurs from time to time (see: McNeill & McNeill 2003, Rosenberg 2012, 
and; Iriye 2014). The weaving of this net also happens in cultural, social, and 
political dimensions (e.g. Robertson 1990, and; Porta 2005). And in several of these 
dimensions the globalizing dynamic is not necessarily driven by particularly 
neoliberal notions. Or as put in one discussion of globalization particularly sensible 
to the political dimensions of it; ‘it is clear that globalization has several aspects to it 
that have had nothing much to do with neo-liberalism’ (Agnew 2009: 17). Following 
a similar multi-faceted understanding of the processes behind the phenomenon of 
globalization one of the leading authorities on the alter-globalization movement also 
arrives at the same fundamental realization: ‘Globalization cannot be identified with 
the ideology and practice of a global free market’ (Porta 2005: 676).   
Before neoliberalism had made much of an impact on world politics globalization 
was described in the following terms: ‘The process by which a number of historical 
world societies were brought together into one global system might be referred to as 
globalization’ (Modelski 1972: 41). This process of becoming a global civilization is 
something we, both temporally and spatially speaking, are still very much in the 
midst of. Understanding globalization this way makes it an extensive phenomenon 
that is only tangentially related to for example capitalism. Being “against” 
globalization in this sense is also a rather futile position to take because it means 
being against ‘the large community’ that humanity already has become which ‘is 
here and can no longer be avoided’ – whether individual human beings on a personal 
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level approve of this fact or not (Modelski 1972: 56). Therefore ‘Globalization 
ultimately raises the problem of whether the large community, indeed the 
community of mankind, can be a good community’ rather than whether or not such a 
community is desirable (Modelski 1972: 56).  
Globalization in this sense is a historical fact and not an ideological project that 
somehow can be undone. Neoliberalism has adapted to it in a limited and narrow 
way. Neoliberal successes stems mostly from going with the flow of the general 
globalization tendency, for instance through removing barriers to trade among 
equally developed countries, while its failings stem from ignoring other imperatives 
stemming from the same globalizing dynamic. One noteworthy failure related to the 
rise of alter-globalist discourse is for instance the elitist neoliberal stance which has 
led to efforts to stem the tide of political globalization through hindering the creation 
of working mechanisms for substantive democratic input at the global level. The 
only thing we can do when it comes to globalization, as George Modelski 
presciently argued already in the early 1970s, is to try to make the conditions for this 
large community which we are now inadvertently saddled with ‘better’ (Modelski 
1972: 56). It is safe to say that one of the basic premises for the whole alter-globalist 
discourse is that following neoliberalism’s tenets has made the large community’s 
conditions worse. A similar multi-dimensional understanding of globalization as the 
one argued for by Modelski gradually came to replace an early one-dimensional 
understanding of globalization, as solely economic and neoliberal, within the alter-
globalist discourse.  
This general realization meant that it would be inconsistent for an ostensibly 
progressive ideology to be against globalization when understood multi-
dimensionally as a much deeper and drawn out process – one which neoliberal 
actors have simply temporarily been able to exploit to their benefit. And it dawned 
on many of the intellectual contributors to the discourse (such as George) that they 
were only playing into the hands of their ideological opponents by allowing 
themselves to be called “antiglobalists” or similar monikers.   
The point is that globalization – however much it is a process that currently is being 
shaped by neoliberal imperatives (see: Peck, et al 2009, and; Brenner, et al 2010) – 
is not exclusively the domain of neoliberalism. Globalization was for instance being 
handled within a left of center Keynesian and social democratic political framework 
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during the postwar era. And later this world-historical trend of world integration 
could come within the ambit of a more progressive form of global politics (as 
envisioned by for instance; Patomäki & Teivainen 2004). Whoever has the 
ideological upper hand globally can steer the institutions already present in new 
directions, or replace, deemphasize, or even abandon the old ones to make way for 
new ones.  
One apparent sign that the formal political power to manage the process of 
globalization lies completely with the neoliberals is the rise of a ‘new 
constitutionalism’ that currently ‘locks in the neoliberal pattern of global 
development’ and makes ‘it more difficult for alternative solutions to common 
global problems to emerge’ (Gill 2014: 43). Following Gill’s argument it would be 
harder to topple neoliberalism from its dominant position the longer it is left in 
power. This is a concern that seemingly only animates parts of the alter-globalist 
discourse. The “new constitutionalism” along neoliberal lines, which can be seen as 
an attempt to create a neoliberal world constitution with minimal democratic 
consultation, can for example be sought replaced through the formation of a global 
ideological alternative that can seize control of the institutions that sets the legal 
parameters for global social, economic, and political intercourse. But it is not really 
clear if that is the goal of all the participants in the alter-globalist discourse. They are 
far from united in an attempt to gather an institutional challenge to neoliberalism. 
The ideas that animate the protests go much deeper than just mounting a challenge 
to neoliberalism. At least one major faction wants to completely topple the system 
by growing a new more organic one that can replace it from the bottom up. This is a 
radical challenge, but not one that has anything to do with the radical right. 
The Ideological Bounds of the Alter-Globalist Discourse 
  As mentioned the one uniting factor among those that turned up to protest in 
Seattle in 1999 was ‘frustrations with neoliberal capitalism’ (Rowe & Carroll 2014: 
154). This sense of frustration could come from people situated both to the left and 
right of the center of the political spectrum. By the center I mean the parts occupied 
by e.g. the pro-business Republicans and Clinton democrats in the United States or 
Thatcherite conservatives and Third Way social-democrats in the United Kingdom, 
which are some of the political elite factions that have done the most to advance the 
neoliberal ideology up until now. A further source of confusion caused by the “anti-
” terminology has been that it was not strictly incorrect as a way of describing some 
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of the groups which partook in for example the protests in Seattle. There has been 
genuine antiglobalization demonstrators – opposing globalization in any form, not 
just the neoliberal one – within the ranks of protestors at rallies directed at the 
political elite – or globalism – as both ‘the political left (internationalist-egalitarians) 
and the political right (nationalist-protectionists)’ can be equally opposed to e.g. 
neoliberal trade practices without sharing the same motivational basis for the 
opposition (Steger 2005b: 31, see also; Rupert 2000: 94-131).  
It would also be a mistake to think that all “national-protectionists” necessarily 
belong to the right, though the groups Steger refers to as national-protectionist are 
most likely of the type that by now have coalesced into the Tea Party in the United 
States. The Tea-Party which now compose the right wing of the Republican Party 
(its left-wing is pro-business), with sympathizers so nationalistically inclined that 
they are hostile to any kind of internationalism, irrespective of whether the 
motivation for it is founded in an economic or solidaristic standpoint (see: Lieven 
2012, and; Skocpol & Williamson 2012). 
The empirical basis for claiming that the alter-globalist discourse involves right 
wing elements is basically non-existent – even if there are elements within it that 
above all emphasize the national setting for their struggle ‘against the state or the 
dominant national civil society’ (Santos 2006: 115). There is no theory available in 
the general literature – which constitutes the discourse in its most clearly articulated 
sense – that in any way can be described as belonging further to the right on the 
political spectrum than the neoliberals themselves do. But there is a marked 
tendency amongst the neoliberals to present it differently. This (perhaps deliberate) 
confusion about who participates in the alternative globalization discourse on the 
neoliberal right could serve a propagandistic function, but it should in any case be 
noted.  
The defenders of (neoliberal) globalization see the neoliberal ideology as being 
confronted by ‘a movement dedicated to self-sufficiency’ which includes such 
varied fare as; ‘trade unions’, ‘farm lobbies’, ‘conservationists and 
environmentalists’, ‘lobbies for development’, ‘consumer groups’, ‘human rights 
groups’, ‘Church groups of all denominations’, ‘women’s groups’, ‘campaigners for 
indigenous groups and traditional ways of life’, ‘old-fashioned socialists and neo-
Marxists’, ‘mercantilists, nationalists, and assorted anti-liberal groups of the right’, 
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the last group inclusive of those ‘supporting Patrick Buchanan in the United States 
or Jean-Marie Le Pen in France’ (Wolf 2004: 4-7). Or in a similar vein that 
‘contemporary anti-globalist thinkers [ ] aim to elevate the moral status of the 
nation-state and to reclaim what is seen as its lost authority to impose law on 
commerce’ (Steil & Hinds 2009: 18). In both these cases we see that the sweep is so 
broad that it ends up tarring the whole discourse as basically nationalist in nature.  
In addition the arguably least accurate (or most mean-spirited) presentation of the 
alternative globalization discourse due to its opposition to neoliberalism is 
accomplished in the work of Micklethwait and Wooldridge who, under the sub-
heading ‘Rage Against the Machine’ and in the space of less than three pages, 
manages to weave together a narrative which equates the following ‘antiglobalist 
groups’; ‘nongovernmental organizations dedicated to halting, or at least 
emasculating, globalization’, ‘the left and its army of trade unionists, 
environmentalists and students’, ‘Timothy McVeigh’ and various other Christian 
fundamentalists and anti-Semites, ‘Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo [a group infamous for its 
sarin attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995] and Mexico’s Zapatistas’, and, finally, 
‘the most powerful antiglobalist group [which] is militant Islam’ (Micklethwait & 
Wooldridge 2000: 274-276).  
Let it suffice to say in response to these claims here that there is a faction within the 
alternative globalization discourse interested in regaining control of the nation-state 
so as to impose protectionist measures meant to save its population from the 
vagaries of neoliberal capitalism (for example; Bello 2013: 249-276). But those 
behind the claims that try to intimate an ideological affinity between the alternative 
globalization discourse and “anti liberal groups of the right” up to and including 
fundamentalists of one or the other religious persuasion, have all failed to pick up on 
the discourse’s most cohesive feature – excepting its opposition to neoliberal 
practice and ideology – which is its generally leftist political orientation. It is 
certainly wrong to depict the discourse as encompassing any and all positions on the 
global ideological continuum excluding the center part of it where some 
contemporary neoliberals present themselves as residing in solitude.  
It is typically claimed that the alternative globalization discourse is furthered by a 
‘myriad [of] social movement organizations and networks that rebel, resist, petition, 
campaign, and create alternative practices’, but even though these constituent parts 
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are ‘incredibly diverse’, they are also ‘quite clearly of the “left” ’ (Reitan 2012: 
324). That the alternative globalization discourse should be conceived of as located 
on the left side of the political spectrum is one of the major conclusions scholars 
studying this phenomenon have reached (see also: Porta 2007: 242-246). Another 
major finding that crops up repeatedly in the relevant literature is that the other 
aspect that truly unites the participants in this discourse is their ‘blanket opposition 
to neoliberal globalization’, which therefore unifies them in a common ‘struggle 
against the “neoliberal ideology” ’ (Funke 2012: 353, and; Pleyers 2010: 156). 
These are still fairly wide parameters for the alter-globalist discourse. Within the 
area thus encapsulated one can find basically every political position originating on 
the left, except for the single caveat that it also has to incorporate an oppositional 
stance towards neoliberal globalization/ideology.  
This initial narrowing down of the ideological nature of the alternative globalization 
discourse leaves us with a rather wide conception of the “left”. Befittingly perhaps 
since the alter-globalist discourse has been described by Ruth Reitan as following 
from ‘the three broad traditions and fractious relations of the political left, namely 
liberalism, marxism, and anarcho-autonomism’ (Reitan 2012: 324). Reitan identifies 
the most recent articulations of these different strains as being, respectively; ‘social 
democratic reformism and liberal cosmopolitanism’, ‘neo-marxism’ and ‘neo-
anarchism’ (Reitan 2012: 324). Reitan captures the scope of the alternative 
globalization discourse fairly well, but her categorization is certainly in need of 
some qualification. The border between anti-neoliberals and pro-neoliberals is much 
less clear cut than simply stating that more or less every political position found to 
the left of conservatism ought to belong in this category.  
What most of all makes Reitan’s classification of the left untenable without further 
qualification is the explicit tendency among present day neoliberals to self-identify 
as “liberal cosmopolitans”, such as in the following excerpt: ‘What unites the pro-
globalization [here meaning neoliberal] literature is the way in which its authors 
appeal explicitly to an established philosophy of liberal cosmopolitanism’ (Steil & 
Hinds 2009: 35, my emphasis). When we note this usage of the term liberal 
cosmopolitanism the distinction employed by Reitan becomes too imprecise to do 
the required categorical work. For logically the neoliberals should not be counted as 
making up part of a group opposed to the neoliberal ideology. It is not that Reitan’s 
classification is necessarily in the wrong with its inclusion of liberal 
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cosmopolitanism on the side of the alternative globalization discourse, but the 
existence of some liberal cosmopolitans that also can be categorized as alter-
globalists does not in itself exclude the fact that certain other liberal cosmopolitans 
could also be neoliberals. In the latter case, as we can recall from the discussion of 
neoliberalism previously, the neoliberals are not entirely incorrect in using the term 
“liberal cosmopolitan” as a label for their own position, as it is certainly both more 
“liberal” and “cosmopolitan” than that held by the conservative nationalists they 
once struggled to distinguish themselves from. To be precise the terms which 
describe the difference in ideological position that we are looking for here, as argued 
earlier, would be “social-liberal internationalist” and “neoliberal internationalist”, 
where the group which is most commonly referred to as liberal cosmopolitans would 
be those of the former description and not those of the latter. Ideally, these groups 
should be quite easy to separate into center-left and center-right factions (see: 
Schwarzmantel 2008: 49-68, and; Freeden 2005: 137) as in principle the social 
liberals should, for example, be in favor of more democratic institutions instead of 
the more elitist ones favored by the more conservatively inclined neoliberals, but in 
the world of corresponding party politics the line between these two varieties is far 
harder to locate.    
Contemporary cosmopolitans tend to distance themselves from neoliberalism (e.g. 
Held 2004), but they also acknowledge that the ‘cosmopolitan social-democratic 
program’ which they have a tendency to promulgate could be replaced with ‘a 
cosmopolitan liberal-democratic program’ that resembles the ‘neoliberal program’ 
within the same ‘institutional framework’ that they strive to realize (Archibugi 2008: 
142). This makes the center-left cosmopolitan position at least potentially neutral in 
its relationship to neoliberalism, as this could be read as less than an expression of 
outright opposition. This somewhat tentative relation is further underlined if we take 
e.g. Held’s expressed support for a social democratic program as potentially 
translating into a support for the ideological course which present day social 
democratic parties have followed over the last couple of decades, such as Britain’s 
New Labour, Germany’s SPD, or Spain’s PSOE. Though in all fairness this is 
probably not exactly what Held aims to convey, it is in any case a connection 
allowed for when “social democracy” is the term he centers his argument around. 
This social democratic position, as enunciated by Held – albeit it is also demarcated 
from ‘neoconservatism’ and ‘neoliberalism’ – explicitly names ‘radical anti-
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globalism’ as the last of its three ‘key political opponents’ (Held 2004: 17). This 
separates social-democratic aims from that of the alternative globalization discourse, 
at least when conceived of as a whole which includes a variety of radical positions. 
As we will now see, Held’s argument that social democracy and neoliberalism are 
different ideological positions can be seen as a rearguard defense of the kind of 
distinctions which supporters of the alter globalization discourse tend to dismiss not 
only as largely irrelevant, but by now as belonging to a bygone era. 
Contemporary political parties associated with social democratic and liberal 
cosmopolitan thought have over the last decades also become associated with the 
implementation and furthering of the very same neoliberal policies that the different 
participants in the alternative globalization discourse ostensibly have united against. 
It might be a factor of some future significance that groupings negatively disposed 
towards neoliberalism continue to play a minority role within such party 
organizations – I am here thinking of social- or ‘left-liberals’ who are inspired by 
e.g. J. S. Mill and Keynes (Leopold 2012, and; Jackson 2012), and the kind of “old 
school” social democrats who strongly disliked the shift to Third Way politics in the 
1990s (e.g: Martell 2012).  
But it is immitigably of greater consequence for the present ideological landscape 
informing world politics that the parties that once represented these viewpoints now 
for a long time have accepted41 the market logic of neoliberal doctrine. For instance 
was ‘Labour’s [ ] acceptance of the neo-liberal status quo’ (Bastow and Martin 
2003: 71) emblematic of the series of such party conversions that started happening 
‘around 1980’ and which ‘led to social democratic parties contributing to the 
deregulation, privatization and attacks on public welfare services which we have 
experienced the last couple of decades – no matter if it has been under the name tag 
“the third way”, as in the United Kingdom, or “Die neue Mitte”, as it was called in 
Germany’ (Wahl 2011: 196). Wahl also points out that ‘this tendency’ eventually 
went so far ‘that when social democratic governments were in a large majority in the 
                                                 
41 At the time of writing there is a slight resurgence for anti-neoliberal ideas on the parliamentarian 
left exemplified by Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, Bernie Sanders’ bid for presidential 
nomination by the Democratic Party in the US, and Jeremy Corbyn becoming the leader of the 
Labour Party in the UK. A host of Latin American parties have led the way for this 
reappearance of socialist party politics (see: Burbach, Fox & Fuentes 2013). 
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European Union for the first and only time at the end of the 1990s, this did not lead 
to any change in its neoliberal policy’ (Wahl 2011: 196).  
This move to the right by the established parties of the center-left (see also: Porta 
2007: 243) have led to the rise of an antagonistic climate also within the left broadly 
construed where ‘protests against neoliberal globalization have been met with 
various levels of distrust by center-left parties that had undergone [ ] changes in their 
ideological standing’ and those supportive of the alternative globalization discourse 
have ‘expressed a strong criticism of the perceived neoliberal turn of the main 
parties of the Left’ even in instances where the main focus of their protests have 
been ‘right-wing governments’ (Porta 2007: 242 and 244). This loss of faith in ‘the 
moderate-left parties’ – the traditional supporters of the mass of the electorate with 
primarily social concerns – have created something of a vacuum on the left side of 
the representative political spectrum which have led to an upsurge in votes for 
certain marginal parties around Europe which have stayed firm in their leftist, or 
even social liberal convictions, such as for the ‘the Communists’ and ‘the Greens’, 
with  related incidents such as when ‘the Trotskyite candidate’ in France ‘achieved 
10 percent of votes in the 2003 presidential election’ (Porta 2007: 244). We can 
therefore conclude that neoliberalism has made considerable encroachments into 
what traditionally has been thought of as “the left” while in response, for a portion 
of the electorate that has noticed this and reacted negatively, there has been a 
tendency to shift their allegiance leftwards along the party-political spectrum that is 
available to them in order to make up for the political imbalance resulting from the 
established left’s perceived turn to the right. 
If we accept Reitan’s broad conception of the “left” as actually delimiting the 
bounds for which ideological positions we should think of as making up the 
alternative globalization discourse, but at the same time accept that the discourse 
cannot possibly maintain its integrity while incorporating its neoliberal “other”, then 
this means that there is an anti-neoliberal/pro-neoliberal cleavage going through 
parliamentary politics (through social democratic, and possibly, liberal parties in e.g. 
Europe, as well as through the Democratic Party in the United States) that in all 
likelihood separates the ideological inclination of the leadership of e.g. social-
democratic parties from that of an unspecified portion of their membership and voter 
base. In short, we have to imagine that there is a jagged fault-line across the middle 
of the political spectrum which crisscrosses through the midst of centrist parties, 
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creating a chasm with (what over the last decades have been) their overwhelmingly 
pro-neoliberal elite and e.g. those who aspire to be part of it, on its right side, and 
the part of their members and supporters who have maintained, or more recently 
acquired, an anti-neoliberal disposition, on its left. This operation does more work 
than one immediately realizes, for as we have seen the defenders of neoliberalism 
have a tendency to portray the opposition to their agenda as coming primarily from a 
reactionary standpoint somewhere to its right. 
The selection criteria employed for investigating the positions on world order found 
within the alter-globalist discourse are based on a modification of the ideological 
range Reitan argues for. First, as I have now argued, Reitan goes a bit too far 
towards the right side of the classic left-right spectrum when she claims that liberal 
cosmopolitans and contemporary social democrats should be viewed as taking part 
in the discourse without further reservation. The cut-off point for inclusion has to be 
articulated a bit more precisely than that so that we do not end up mixing alter-
globalists and neoliberals into the same, and therefore evidently too wide, category. 
In addition, as I have tried to show with the help of David Held’s self-proclaimed  
position as being both social-democratic and cosmopolitan, there should be room for 
a middle category here as well, where someone that is center-left, but neither pro-
neoliberal or leaning towards the radical left, can be positioned. The full extent of 
this middle category and the argument that it fills the political space between the 
neoliberal right and the alter-globalist left was further elaborated in the previous 
chapter on cosmopolitanism. The fact that there is a perceived overlap between left-
cosmopolitan and alter-globalist positions and right-cosmopolitan and neoliberal 
positions also indicate that cosmopolitanism belongs in the center between the two. 
What this means for the alter-globalist discourse is that socialists of the Old Left 
persuasion might be included into its ranks, but not the nominal social democratic 
parties that have changed their ideological core from socialist to neoliberal and 
moved decisively to the right in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s disbandment.  
Influences    
The (Really) Old Left  
  The alternative globalization discourse follows in the political tradition with its 
wellspring in the Enlightenment which focuses on ‘political liberty, social justice, 
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and cosmopolitanism’ as Stephen Eric Bronner described it (Bronner 2004: 1). In a 
sense this is the ideological underpinnings of the discourse, but of these three 
concepts the emphasis is firmly on social justice for the alter-globalist discourse. But 
it would be wrong to think that the goal of social justice figures so prominently that 
political liberty is forgotten. We are dealing with a different phenomenon here than 
the twentieth century left which to various degrees in its social democratic and 
Marxist-Leninist incarnations tended to ignore individual freedoms in favor of the 
collective good – and today often is associated with national ownership of the means 
of production or a statist obsession with centralized bureaucratic control, which both 
were features shared by the Western (social democratic) and Eastern (communist) 
forms of socialism. But what makes the alternative globalization discourse 
fundamentally stand out from the left parties that were in power during the twentieth 
century is that it is the direct descendant of the social and cultural rebellion against 
both the Eastern communist and Western social democratic/social liberal left as it 
existed then. This rebellion occurred in the late 1960s when a qualitatively different 
‘New Left’ took on the shape of a ‘world historical movement’ (Katsiaficas 1987: 3-
28).  
The New Left Roots of the Alter-Globalist Discourse 
  By the late 1960s there was ‘a sense in the air, especially among the young, that 
Marxism and liberalism have in good measure ceased to provide explanations of the 
world’ (Barrington Moore, Jr. as cited in; Roszak [1969] 1995: 103). Herbert 
Marcuse was one of the chief theorists that criticized both the Marxist-Leninism 
dominant in the communist world and the liberalism dominant in the West at this 
time (for a discussion of Marcuse’s views and the impact these had on the counter-
culture see: Roszak [1969] 1995: 84-123). Marcuse’s criticism was founded on the 
assumption that neither ideological system could be said to be conducive to freedom 
in the sense that liberation from domination had yet to occur on either side (Marcuse 
[1964] 2002: 16-17). Marcuse identified both the Soviet and the American societies 
as part of a larger ‘advanced industrial society’ that was closed to new impulses and 
suggestions for improvement and ruled by ‘technocrats’ with little or no concern for 
the psychological welfare of those underneath them in the societal hierarchy 
(Marcuse [1964] 2002). There was no room in this enclosed conception of the 
modern world for either liberated individuals or a sensible relationship to nature 
since both co-existing systems are enthralled by the same ‘technological rationality 
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and the logic of domination’ which results in an unceasing effort to dominate both 
‘man’ and ‘nature’ (Marcuse [1964] 2002: 147 and 162). ‘We know that destruction 
is the price of progress [ ], that renunciation and toil are the prerequisites for 
gratification and joy, that business must go on, and that the alternatives are Utopian’ 
as Marcuse sums up the ‘ideology’ of ‘the established societal apparatus’ which ‘is a 
requisite for its continuous functioning and part of its rationality’ (Marcuse [1964] 
2002: 149). The similarities between Marcuse’s ‘ideology of advanced industrial 
society’ (Marcuse [1964] 2002: iii) and what many today think of when they refer to 
“neoliberalism” are here manifold (see: Bauman 1999, and; Boltanski 2011).  
The status quo as Marcuse described it has in certain fundamental respects not 
changed since then, as we can infer from the contemporary British ‘Greens’ point of 
view’ which is that ‘Labour and the Conservatives share a “super-ideology” of 
industrialism which holds that people are best served by economic growth’ (Jackson 
2015: 27). Already in 1964 Marcuse writes about ‘the overdeveloped countries’ 
where a change for the better or a ‘qualitative change seems to presuppose a 
quantitative change in the advanced standard of living, namely, reduction of 
overdevelopment’ which is yet another statement that fits with the program of (at 
least several of) today’s Green parties (Marcuse [1964] 2002: 246, emphasis in 
original).  
But the aspect of Marcuse’s theory which is most important for the subsequent 
development of; first the New Left and the related Counter Culture in the late 1960s, 
and then a generation later; for the alternative globalization discourse, is not that 
Marcuse thought about the environment. The crucial thing is that Marcuse did so in 
combination with other weighty concerns which together makes him one of the first 
theorists to articulate three commanding features of all subsequent progressive 
opposition to what he identified as the technocratic/industrialist status quo: i) 
Disillusionment with the Old Left (both in its communist and social 
democratic/liberal varieties), ii) a concern with nature previously relegated much 
further back if pronounced at all (but present in earlier anarchist thought,42 see: 
Bookchin 1999: 58, and; Graham 2013: 563), and, iii) a desire for liberation from 
domination by societal structures that was mainly a concern for a marginalized 
                                                 
42 ‘I regard Kropotkin as the real pioneer in the eco-anarchist tradition’ (Bookchin 1999: 58). 
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anarchist ideological current earlier (but which were revived from 1968 on, see; 
Graham 2013: 563).  
Marcuse did not see man’s use of nature as inherently evil; ‘there are two kinds of 
mastery, a repressive and a liberating one. The latter involves the reduction of 
misery, cruelty and violence’ (Marcuse [1964] 2002: 240), and by extension – also 
taking into account that Marcuse is considered a ‘Western Marxist’ (Keucheyan 
2013: 11) – one can draw the conclusion that Marcuse could have imagined a 
liberating form of mastery to take over if the current repressive one was overcome in 
the political sphere. This brings the thought of Marcuse a bit closer to the classical 
Marxism that inspired Lenin than to anarchism, even if Marcuse forcefully rejected 
the authoritarian Marxist-Leninism that was practiced in the communist countries. 
Nonetheless, in his turn away from the state centrism of both the two major Marxist 
ideological currents of the day (social democratic and communist) and towards left-
libertarian (anarchist) concerns about the need to achieve liberation from domination 
– not just its political and economic forms but also socially and culturally – Marcuse 
joins the ranks of the extra parliamentarian radical left.  
There ‘left-wing Marxism’ meets ‘anarchism’ which by contemporaries of Marcuse 
such as Noam Chomsky were considered ‘libertarian socialist’ modes of thought 
that ‘are the natural extension of classical liberalism into the current era of advanced 
industrial society’ (Chomsky [1970] 2005: 8). The melding of these ideological 
viewpoints had been foreshadowed by such innovative theorists as ‘Anton 
Pannekoek’ whose ‘radical Marxism merges with anarchist currents’ and who early 
on after the Bolshevik revolution criticized state socialism for merely substituting 
one ruling class for another (Chomsky [1970] 2003: 379). Chomsky’s understanding 
of the ideological climate this radical left strain confronted in the 1960s echoes that 
of Marcuse: ‘In contrast [to the libertarian socialist modes of thought], it seems to 
me that the ideology of state socialism, that is what has become of Bolshevism and 
state capitalism – the modern welfare state – are regressive and highly inadequate 
social theories’ (Chomsky [1970] 2005: 8). 
In the Western Marxist Marcuse and the libertarian socialist Chomsky we can see 
“left-Marxist” and anarchist ideas being accommodated from different sides and 
added together with attempts to show that this would further the ‘classical liberal 
ideals’ first set out in the Enlightenment era (Chomsky [1970] 2005: 67, se also; 22-
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23). Though these two theorists are coming at the problem from what originally 
were starkly differentiated ideological positions43 they both suggest that genuine 
liberty and solidarity could be something completely different to that on offer from 
either of advanced industrial society’s superpowers, and that this in all likelihood 
would involve some kind of hybridization of the radical left ideologies (including 
the furthering of elements of the once radical classical liberalism). In the process 
they and the rest of the New Left (which both Marcuse and Chomsky can be 
considered part of) that emerged in the 1960s completely abandoned any notions of 
emulating the Old Left which they saw themselves as representing a break from 
(Katsiaficas 1987: 19). The novel ideational stream that the New Left signified 
therefore almost exclusively seemed ‘to develop out of two of the major streams of 
radicalism – Marxian socialism and anarchism’ (Sargent 1972: 154).  
This had serious consequences for the development of a coherent political 
alternative politics at the time, as the anarchist theorist and activist veteran Murray 
Bookchin described it: ‘A movement was needed that was seriously concerned with 
changing society’ one with ‘stamina and staying power – very important traits of the 
much-despised Old Left’ but these traits ‘were clearly lacking in the New Left and 
was nonexistent in the counterculture’ (Bookchin 1999: 98). Bookchin’s might have 
been a perspective mostly influenced by what was going on in the United States at 
the time, and the assessment appears to be less valid in the Western European 
context where a lot of the energy from ‘the revolutionary left’ went into support for 
more typical Old Left parties such as François Mitterrand’s Socialist Party in France 
– who presided over a left turn for the party after it received a disastrous ‘6 percent 
of the vote in the 1969 presidential election’ (Harman 1998: 334). A certain amount 
of all this leftist agitation was also channeled into support for the Western 
communists in countries such as Italy, where the ‘second biggest vote winner, the 
Communist Party, was allowed a say in government policies for the first time in 
nearly 30 years’ (Harman 1998: 331). While perhaps the most unique development 
along Old Left lines, in terms of its reformist intent, was the creation of Green 
parties, most prominently the German Greens, a party which ‘grew out of’ the 
                                                 
43 There was a struggle in the First International with ‘Bakunin and his anarchists’ on one side and 
‘the General Council, which was under the leadership of Marx’ on the other with the result that 
‘Bakunin was expelled from the International’ (Engels and “Ed.” in; Marx [1891] 2008: 10-11, 
see also; Bakunin [1873] 1990: 181-189). 
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‘German New Left and new social movements such as feminism’, and first started 
gaining seats in the Bundestag in 1983 (Katsiaficas 2006: 196-199).  
However, there were considerable organizational resources that one can say, in 
hindsight at least, were misdirected by those involved in the first wave of the 
political refusal of liberal/social democratic centrism in the West. The support for 
left-Marxism and/or libertarian socialism was far from the only features of the New 
Left – though they might have been the more significant parts for its later evolution 
– because some of the people involved preferred to back the currently existing 
Eastern version of the Old Left instead. This embrace of authoritarianism by factions 
of the New Left was one its greatest internal contradictions. In one sense it was 
perhaps inevitable as the movement both the New Left and the counter-culture were 
parts of converged on opposition to the war the United States was waging in 
Vietnam during this time (Roszak [1969] 1995: xxvii). In response to what many 
perceived as a war of aggression needlessly perpetrated by the United States a not 
insignificant number of young Westerners reacted by becoming ‘Maoists’ – and to a 
degree also ‘Trotskyists’ – that ‘identified Third World guerilla struggle, especially 
in China, Vietnam, and Kampuchea, with socialism’ (Harman 1998: 339).  
As Bookchin put it: ‘White radicals, in effect, began to think in neo-Stalinist terms’ 
resulting in that ‘many SDS44 “Marxists” didn’t give a damn about freedom; they 
simply supported enemies of the United States’ such as ‘the Communist regime in 
North Vietnam, not to speak of their enthusiasm for Castro in Cuba and Mao in 
China’ not caring that for example ‘North Vietnam was a totalitarian state’ 
(Bookchin 1999: 78, 80-81). This tendency more or less died out when it became 
clear that ‘the Chinese backed the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea as it established a 
Stalinism even more horrific than the Russian original’ and ‘the final blow to any 
residual illusions came in 1978 when Vietnam invaded Kampuchea to overthrow Pol 
Pot by force and China went to war with Vietnam’ (Harman 1998: 339). But this 
was too late to have any bearing on the ideological configuration of the New Left in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. The final factor that obscured the core ideational 
aspects of the New Left as these were articulated by e.g. Marcuse and Chomsky – 
possibly not only for those experiencing its peak back then, but perhaps also for 
                                                 
44 Students for a Democratic Society, the main New Left organization in the United States in the late 
1960s. 
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those wanting to follow its lead in the present – was the tendency amongst the 
attendant ‘hippie’ counter-culture to circle in on ‘mysticism and withdrawal’ 
(Sargent 1972: 119-120).  
Observed from a distance then, the New Left of the late 1960s (especially when 
more mixed up with the counter-culture than what might be warranted) is likely to 
appear as a muddle of ideas, a lot of them of little contemporary relevance (Maoism, 
Stalinism, mysticism, etc.) but when more sharply focused in on some of the 
exemplary radical theoretical literature of the era we can see the beginnings of a 
discourse grappling with how to achieve human liberation and a society at peace 
with nature, all the while seeing not just capitalism, but as a whole the hierarchies of 
advanced industrial society, as the main obstacle for our future advancement as a 
species. In the process progress was redefined, so that it no longer would denote a 
process towards a more advanced stage of material accumulation but indicate the 
advancement towards ever greater forms of individual fulfillment and communal 
well-being instead. In a sense the alternative globalization discourse is simply a 
continuation of this earlier New Left discourse.45 Though the tendency to idealize 
the Old Left’s Eastern variations is now longer a significant part of its composition, 
this only accentuates the continued influence of the Western Marxist and libertarian-
socialist ideas that Marcuse and Chomsky were exemplary promoters of within the 
New Left discourse in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The Theories Constituting the Contemporary Discourse 
  To make sense of the contemporary alter-globalist discourse it is important to note 
that it follows from the earlier New Left discourse. But it in no way follows from the 
whole of it, since the alter-globalist discourse comes on the coattails of the Old 
Left’s collective demise on both sides of the former Iron Curtain in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. This context means that the old Stalinist or Maoist tendencies that 
there was some room for in the New Left in the early 1970s are more or less 
                                                 
45 In certain respects it is quite obvious that the alternative globalization discourse of today is an 
extension of the New Left one from the late 1960s. Some of its most profiled intellectual voices are 
the same ones as took part in the first discourse; Noam Chomsky, Antonio Negri, Susan George, and 
Tariq Ali, for example were all active either in the late 1960s (Ali and Chomsky), or started to 
participate in its still ongoing discourse in the 1970s (Negri and George).  
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completely absent from the alter-globalist discourse. This does not mean that 
Marxism in total is abandoned because ‘Western Marxism’ continues being one of 
the main wellsprings of inspiration for ‘the new critical theories’ that makes a 
considerable contribution to the alter-globalist discourse (Keucheyan 2013: 12). Not 
all of those identified as ‘contemporary critical theorists’ are necessarily profiled 
contributors to the alter-globalist discourse, but some of them wield considerable 
influence within it, such as; ‘David Harvey’, ‘Slavoj Žižek’, ‘Michael Hardt’ and 
‘Antonio Negri’ (Keucheyan 2013: 13, 20-21, 24, and; 28). The kind of Marxist-
Leninism which was used to justify the dictatorship of the proletariat, or in reality 
the rule of communist apparatchiks, no longer plays a role other than as a prime 
example of what – at almost any cost – is to be avoided. The Marxism that continues 
to be part of the alter-globalist discourse is the kind of Western Marxism that for 
instance Marcuse and other members of the Frankfurt School were representative of, 
whose goal was the liberation of individuals from structures of domination, not their 
subsumption to these as Marxist-Leninism had led to. 
What Are the Alter-Globalists Aspirations? 
We agree wholeheartedly, of course, that governments have to 
stop the destruction of the planet and that it would be just and 
beneficial to redistribute wealth equitably across the globe 
(Hardt & Negri 2009: 273). 
  There is a broad consensus within the alter-globalist discourse as regards the main 
challenges that has to be countered if the present condition of humanity taken as a 
whole and the planet that sustains its existence is to improve. The general perception 
is that capitalism in its latest neoliberal garb threatens to destroy nature beyond 
repair all the while ruining the livelihoods and dignity of vast numbers of people. 
And that the system it has produced operates for the short term economic benefit of 
a comparatively tiny elite. The anarchists, Marxists, and socialists participating in 
the alter-globalist debate all agree on this point, and it has infused the whole 
discourse with an ecological frame (see for instance: Kelly & Malone 2006, 
Davidson 2009, Foster, Clark, & York 2010, George 2010, and Klein 2014).  
The problem is that the general recognition of this malaise only defines the tendency 
that has to be countered and not how this is to be done. There is at least a shared 
semi-global mindset at work in this discourse, since it focuses on the ideology of 
neoliberalism as a global phenomenon and sees it as for instance the key current 
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driver of global environmental degradation. But it has by no means led to the 
wholesale adaptation of a fully global or planetary ideology meant to replace 
neoliberalism globally. There is only a handful of theorists operating within the 
discourse that has really seen the need for such a paramount development thus far, 
and they do not appear to be winning the internal argument. Up until now the 
general perception is that alter-globalist discourse is ideologically incoherent: 
…for decades the opponents of capitalism have revelled in their 
own incoherence. From the anti-globalization movement of the 
1990s through to Occupy and beyond, the movement for social 
justice has rejected the idea of a coherent programme in favour 
of ‘One No, Many Yes-es’. The incoherence is logical, if you 
think the only alternative is what the twentieth century left called 
‘socialism’. Why fight for a big change if it’s only a regression – 
towards state control and economic nationalism, to economies 
that work only if everyone behaves the same way or submits to a 
brutal hierarchy? In turn, the absence of any clear alternative 
explains why most protest movements never win: in their hearts 
they don’t want to. There’s even a term for it in the protest 
movement: ‘refusal to win’46 (Mason 2015: xii).  
Journalist and theorist Paul Mason’s allegations are based on years of observing the 
alter-globalist movement in the field, also in its more recent instantiations in the 
protests against austerity in Greece and in the worldwide Occupy movement (see: 
Mason 2012, and; 2013). Like most well informed commentators Mason clearly sees 
the alter-globalists as a movement of the left. But it is a left in complete disarray: 
‘What is striking about the revolutions of 2009-11 [e.g. Greece, the Arab Spring, 
and Occupy] is the absence of a coherent left’ (Mason 2011: 187). The whole left 
side of the political spectrum is by Mason perceived to be ideologically adrift: 
‘Leninism is looking shrunken and disoriented; horizontalism [i.e. 
anarchism/participatory democracy] can stage a great demo, but does not know what 
it wants’ (Mason 2011: 187). The lack of coherence stretches all the way to the 
political center; ‘the mainstream left –Labourism, social democracy, the US 
democrats and left-liberalism generally – appears politically confused’ (Mason 
2011: 187). When it comes to the latter it is unclear whether more than a tiny 
                                                 
46 Here Paul Mason cites Laurence Cox and Alf Gunvald Nilsen’s work We Make Our Own History: 
Marxism and Social Movements in the Twilight of Neoliberalism which was published by the 
London based Pluto Press in 2014. 
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minority of the politicians active in today’s center-left even perceives neoliberalism 
as a rightwing phenomenon that they should seek to counter.  
Boaventura de Sousa Santos made the same general observation as Mason almost a 
decade earlier, only in regards to the World Social Forum, when he claimed ‘[the 
WSF] holds no clearly defined ideology, in defining either what it rejects or what it 
asserts’ (Santos 2006: 7). The exception being that ‘the WSF conceives of itself as a 
struggle against neo-liberal globalization’ but it has notably not taken a stand on 
whether that struggle is ‘against a form of capitalism or against capitalism in 
general’ (Santos 2006: 7). This latter (lack of a) stance was of course necessary to 
create as broad a coalition as possible in the anti-neoliberal struggle, but it has not 
been conducive to the creation of an ideological platform that could stand as an 
alternative to neoliberalism in the global political arena. In short the concern is that 
even though the alter-globalists have clearly identified the enemy in 
“neoliberalism”, they have yet to work out a strategy for confronting it on its own 
institutional turf. And there is even less of a vision for a post-neoliberal society that 
would be anything but a return to a social democratic internationalism signified by 
‘state control and economic nationalism’ as Paul Mason puts it in the passage quoted 
above (Mason 2015: xii).  
Even though alter-globalism is a discourse of considerable breadth it was in a recent 
study claimed that ‘the fundamental utopia’ this ‘global-radical discourse’ promotes 
‘is a localized world where production and consumption are democratized (in 
participatory terms) and the principle of subsidiarity determines that power is always 
located at the lowest relevant level’ (Corry 2013: 111 and 121). But is there any 
contributors to the alter-globalist discourse that go beyond ‘critiquing global 
governance’ of the neoliberal variety ‘and promoting local governance’ (Corry 
2013: 134) and instead advocates a more globally integrated perspective? Or is it 
true as Olaf Corry claims that ‘This discourse in effect propagates a global govern-
mentality of the local more than a fully pastoral worldwide governmentality’ (Corry 
2013: 134)? To answer these questions I now turn to a representative selection of the 
whole alter-globalist discourse, from the most moderate, via the more reformist, to 
the steadily more radical.  
The theorists I have chosen for this task are the following; first, Susan George, as an 
exemplary figure from the least radical part of the alter-globalist discourse. Second, 
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the Western Marxists who are in favor of the creation of a counter-hegemonic party, 
such as for instance David Harvey. Third, Michael Albert and associated theorists, 
as representative of the anarchist faction who sees the implementation of 
participatory democracy as imperative to the creation of a just world. And fourth and 
finally, the most consistently radical faction, mainly represented by Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri, who together have articulated one of the most influential and 
comprehensive theories found within the alter-globalist discourse. These theorists 
have all been selected because they have presented theories which broadly fill out 
the entire part of the ideological continuum the alter-globalist discourse occupies. 
Seeing as we are here dealing with a global left discourse which in theory stretches 
from left-liberalism to anarchism of the socialist (as opposed to capitalist) variety 
there is no shortage of exemplary theorists along this axis. But I have aimed to 
employ the most useful and representative sample by carefully selecting both 
relevant and diverse texts written by relatively profiled participants in the alter-
globalist discourse (see: Fisher & Ponniah 2003, Sen & Waterman 2009, and; Lilley 
2011a). 
Neither Mason nor Santos is entirely correct in claiming that the alter globalist 
discourse is ideologically incoherent, there is some coherence as I aim to show in 
this section. Mason and Santos are right that the strategy and vision of the alter-
globalists are not very clearly articulated at this point. But in the end the inference I 
draw from this is that both the beginnings of an alter-globalist strategy and a vision 
can be discerned from the present discourse. We begin by looking into the 
theoretical contribution of Susan George who essentially argues that the alter-
globalists should be content with being a strong pressure group aiming to pull the 
political center leftwards.  
A Pressure Group in Support of Social-Democratic Internationalism 
  Susan George has been the Vice President of ATTAC France and is an active and 
profiled participant in the alter-globalist discourse (see: George 2004, and; 2010). 
George has what appears to be a democratic socialist/social democratic political 
orientation. Explicitly remarking hers goes against the anarchist position as she 
understands it George admits that ‘we need the state (although a far more 
democratic one) in order to attain many of our goals’ (George 2004: 102). Not 
because George sees the state as inherently good; ‘I am well aware that states 
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represent and defend class interests [ ] but I am also making a plea for using 
whatever tools we may have at our disposal’ (George 2004: 103). George continues: 
Democratic freedoms are such tools, not to be neglected and 
despised but cherished and kept in good working order. Let’s not 
forget that people gave their lives to establish these freedoms. 
The least we can do is respect their struggles and their memory 
by using all the rights so painfully acquired. Someone once said, 
“democracy is not something we have but something we do.” 
People who, for example, refuse to vote on the grounds that 
“they’re all the same” seem to me God’s gift to the neo-liberals 
(George 2004: 103). 
In a realist manner George thinks the only way to effectuate progressive change 
would be through convincing states that this is needed: ‘If you want to change the 
mandate of the EU Trade Commissioner, or any other Commissioner, you have to 
make the member states insist on it. There simply is no other agency’ (George 2004: 
103). This is according to George the same for intergovernmental institutions of 
global scope ‘To affect durably the WTO or other international institutions, you 
must also reach the member governments’ (George 2004: 103). This awareness of 
the political limitations and possibilities inherent in the current international system 
could possibly have aligned George with those in the alter-globalist discourse that 
thinks creating a party would be a good idea, but George stops clear of endorsing 
this obvious vehicle for getting governments to change their policies. When George 
is asked ‘if we [the alter-globalists] shouldn’t become a political party’ her answer is 
‘emphatically “No!”’ (George 2004: 257, se also: 178-185).  
George explains her reason for this negative stance towards parties in the following 
terms: ‘We are deeply political and we must therefore work partly through 
politicians and parties but do our politics differently from them. I don’t mean this as 
an insult, but traditional politics is the place of compromise’ (George 2004: 257). In 
this George’s strategy is not too different from that of the neoliberal theorists, who 
also sought to influence members of existing political parties to take up their cause, 
not to create a genuine political party from scratch. George relatively early realized 
that the neoliberal strategy might be worth emulating (see: George 1997). It 
becomes evident that George sees the role of the alter-globalists to back the already 
existing left parties when we see how she practically endorses the (now former) 
president of Brazil for the Workers Party, Lula da Silva, with the following 
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sentence; ‘when one of our own, like Lula, takes power, he still needs an 
independent movement to push his government’ (George 2004: 257). She also 
argues that: ‘Forging alliances and dealing with political parties doesn’t mean 
trampling on your principles or losing your credibility, it means you’re serious’ 
(George 2004: 178). George can also imagine collaborating with for example ‘the 
French Socialist Party’ but she admits to still being ‘furious with some French 
Socialists because they tried to block our [ATTAC’s] campaign on GATS in the 
European and national parliaments saying “we have to support our Commissioner, 
Pascal Lamy,” whom I consider a card-carrying neo-liberal’ (George 2004: 182). 
This illustrates how the right-most part of the alter-globalist discourse stops just 
short of the neoliberal wing of the social democratic parties. This is a fine line 
indeed where Lula da Silva is considered an ally, but Pascal Lamy is considered an 
adversary, as they are both members of center-left parties participating in the same 
international alliance (Progressive Alliance 2015). 
Lula and his heir, current Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, have admittedly had 
‘Internationalism’ high up on their foreign policy agendas (Burbach, Fox & Fuentes 
2013: 122). But as with George’s own ideas as expressed in the title of one of her 
most recent books We the Peoples of Europe (George 2008), where we should take 
notice of “the peoples” in the plural, this is not much of an advance from the 
previously unquestioned national-international mindset which stays closer to the 
national than the global imaginary. George represents the least ambitious ideological 
strain in the alter-globalist discourse, the reformist social democrats. It supports the 
democratic Old Left parties already in existence and hopes that these can make the 
existing institutional landscape more benevolent. The strain George represents has 
no aspirations about creating a Fifth International that could be an instrument for 
radically altering the world polity, but it is progressive in its views on the 
environment, gender, and many of the other general issues that animate the alter-
globalist discourse as a whole. George certainly has no qualms going after the 
people benefitting most from the present neoliberal arrangement: 
For perhaps the first time in history, the world really could afford 
to provide access to a decent life for every person on the earth – 
enough food, clean water, adequate housing, basic education, 
health care and public services, as set out in the Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948. Where would the money be found? 
Where most of it already is – in the international sphere, in the 
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profits of mega-corporations and on financial markets; in the 
cancellation of poor countries’ debts; in closing down tax havens 
and making corporate taxes mandatory; in making so-called 
“free trade” fair trade. Another world has to begin with a new, 
worldwide Keynesian type programme of taxation and 
redistribution (George 2004: 137). 
We can see from her insistence on a ‘worldwide Marshall Plan’ as laid out above 
that George has impeccable progressive credentials (George 2004: 138, see also; 
George 2010), but just like many other participants in the alter-globalist discourse 
she takes the national level of politics for granted and in no way perceives of this as 
an impediment to realizing her global vision: ‘Going green requires more equality 
and more trust, as well as institutions that contribute to both [ ] For me, hope lies in 
identifying all the ways we can find to scale up the local so that it becomes regional, 
national and global’ (George 2010: 267). We can take George’s notion of the local, 
the regional, the national, and then the global, as expressed here as an indication that 
she would have no trouble agreeing to Nussbaum’s concentric circles approach to 
seeing the world politically (as discussed in the previous chapter on 
cosmopolitanism). It is for George (as for Nussbaum) a neutral scale, not a political 
construct that weighs heavily on the options available for how effectively a world 
polity could possibly function.  
There is a mismatch between George’s seeming acceptance of the national 
imaginary and the goals she puts forth; a worldwide Keynesian program would 
require a globally sovereign entity capable of for instance closing down tax-havens, 
overruling the protestations of mega-corporations, and forcing financial markets to 
lower their profit margins. George claims that her worldwide Keynesian program 
‘would need to be administered democratically so that citizens would share the 
responsibility for choosing priorities and overseeing programmes for each country’ 
(George 2004: 138). George’s idea to get money through abolishing tax-havens is 
not a bad one, especially when one takes into account that: ‘The loss of taxation 
from this offshoring world of finance is minimally calculated as hundreds of billions 
of dollars per annum’ (Orry 2014: 71). This lower estimate is, for the sake of 
comparison, a description that could also be used for the annual defense budget of 
the United States. But George ignores the fact that the majority of tax havens also 
happen to be countries, and not just a few of them, since about ‘a quarter of 
contemporary states’ can be defined as tax havens ‘in one way or another’ (Orry 
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2014: 46). In short, yielding to the principle of national sovereignty is not going to 
set a stop to tax haven practice any time soon, unless the populations of for example 
Switzerland or Singapore saw it as a good thing that “their” banks were partially 
stripped of their assets of course. George’s plans is therefore a good example of 
what happens when one starts wanting to act globally, but is not willing to 
contemplate getting rid of the principle of national sovereignty – the danger here is 
that one can end up with a strong moral posture that is nonetheless devoid of any 
real political substance.  
Party Organization 
…the idea that somehow you can actually change the world 
without dealing with state power right now, and occupying 
certain key aspects of it, seems to me to be a bit la-la (David 
Harvey, interviewed in; Lilley 2011b: 77) 
  David Harvey is one of the theorists who have realized that the present incoherence 
is an obstacle hindering the advance of the alter-globalist discourse’s goals. Harvey 
states in an interview that ‘you don’t build a movement based on the divisions, you 
try to build a movement which incorporates difference, at the same time that it tries 
to recognize that in order to get something to happen, we have to transcend those 
divisions’ (Lilley 2011: 60). To get something done and institute change Harvey 
contends ‘you would need a [ ] political party that is going to advocate it in some 
way’ (Lilley 2011: 60). Harvey says this is ‘that kind of transcendence of the 
particularities and the willingness to move to the universal level which seems to me 
to be absolutely crucial in politics right now, which a lot of the left is reluctant to do’ 
(Lilley 2011: 60-61). That Harvey includes the whole alter-globalist discourse in his 
conception of “the left” is obvious here since the parliamentary remnants of the Old 
Left cannot be said to have a problem with this type of instrumental party politics. 
Samir Amin, another important contributor to the alter-globalist discourse – who 
shares what one can call a Western Marxist outlook with Harvey – has in a similar 
vein also endorsed the creation of a party to further the interests articulated in the 
alter-globalist discourse: ‘I would like to see [ ] a party that could respond to the 
challenge of our era’ (Amin 2008: 40).  
Movements, including progressive ones, want to maintain their 
independence. This is obviously not only their right, but it is 
desirable because independence is precisely the origin of the 
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effectiveness of their actions. Such independence in no way 
excludes the crystallization of new left parties that propose to 
integrate the different dimensions of responses to the challenge 
in a strategy of building a coherent alternative. Although there is 
no contradiction between these two propositions, the prospect of 
a revival of partisan organizations frightens some actors in the 
World Social Forums (Amin 2008: 40).      
Others on the Marxist side of the discourse, such as Michael Löwy, wondered if the 
time had come to launch ‘a new international’, but Amin more explicitly advocates 
the founding of a ‘Fifth International’ (Löwy 2009, and; Amin 2007, and; 2008). 
This is not just the employment of “international” as a synonymous term for truly 
global or planetary, but is meant in its classical interpretation as a way of 
representing diverse culturally homogenous groups; because Amin is clearly looking 
for ‘a new internationalism of the peoples’ which is as true to the national-
international imaginary as one gets (Amin 2006: 163).  
We can say that this is the faction within the alter-globalist discourse that comes 
closest to advocating the seizure of power by means of the centralized party. The 
creation of a party is potentially a risky proposition, because if it is done in the 
wrong manner it could represent a setback of unknown proportions for the alter-
globalist discourse as a whole. If on the other hand the transition to becoming a 
coherent ideology fit for party-political employment was skillfully done it could take 
the alter-globalist discourse to the level of real political influence. This means that if 
such a party started gaining a substantial following, it could in turn lead to victory in 
national elections in different countries. This is the view argued for by Leo Panitch47 
and Sam Gindin, whose theory is yet another example from this Western Marxist 
tendency within the alter-globalist discourse (see: Keucheyan 2013: 96-99).  
Referring to ‘Occupy Wall Street in October 2011’, or the latest major instantiation 
of the alter-globalist movement as a global protest movement at the time of writing, 
Panitch and Gindin observes there is a ‘gap that exists between the stubborn realities 
of capitalism and the revolutionary spirit so manifest in public squares around the 
world’ (Panitch & Gindin 2012: 340). This leads them to assert that: 
                                                 
47 ‘Panitch edits an important publication in the contemporary Marxist constellation, Socialist 
Register, founded in the 1960s by Ralph Miliband [ ] and the labour historian John Saville’ 
(Keucheyan 2013: 96). 
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It is not in fact possible to change the world without taking 
power. It is precisely because the aspiration for a world beyond 
capitalism is once again so broadly extant today that it is 
especially useful to recall [ ] that secular struggle between 
classes is ultimately resolved at the political–not at the economic 
or cultural–level [ ] Whether called socialism or not, today’s 
revived demands for social justice and genuine democracy could 
only be realized through such a fundamental shift of political 
power, entailing fundamental changes in state as well as class 
structures (Panitch & Gindin 2012: 340, emphasis in original). 
Achieving this fundamental political shift would according to Panitch and Gindin 
require another approach than that pioneered by the Old Left; ‘very different 
movements and parties from those that carried the socialist impulse in the previous 
century would be necessary to see this through’ as they put it (Panitch & Gindin 
2012: 340). If this plan succeeds an alter-globalist ideology could eventually 
confront neoliberalism head on from the inside of the institutions the neoliberals 
currently more or less monopolizes to their own advantage. This means that turning 
into a novel type of party, but a party at least in the sense that it competes with 
neoliberals for power institutionally, could in time lead to alter-globalism becoming 
the next hegemonic ideology at the global level. But this is, as we will see further 
on, without a doubt a problematic step to contemplate for many of the participants in 
the discourse.  
The worry is that achieving the ideological coherence it would take to become a 
party would mean that the discourse will have to purge itself of some contradictory 
standpoints and with this lose some of the diversity that seemingly is cherished 
above all else by a substantial part of its participants. Winning at the expense of 
losing a core value might not be an appealing option for this strong anti-party faction 
within the alter-globalist discourse. There is simply a rather pronounced cleavage in 
the alter-globalist discourse between those who would like to work for ‘the seizure 
of power’ and those who stand for ‘the total rejection of the concept of power’ 
(Santos 2006: 164). This cleavage is paralleled in the internal debate about the 
preferred mode of organization ‘between the centralized organization in the party, 
and the total absence of centralism and even organization, beyond what emerges 
spontaneously in the course of the collective action, by the initiative of the actors 
themselves as a whole’ (Santos 2006: 164). We have seen here that (Western) 
Marxists such as David Harvey, Samir Amin, Leo Panitch, and Sam Gindin favors 
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some kind of party creation (that ideally goes beyond the Old Left’s mode of 
organization, and not just repeats it) so neoliberalism can be confronted in political 
institutions. 
The First Attempt at World Order Decontestation  
  If we do consider the contemporary ‘global-radical discourse’ (Corry 2013: 111) to 
be a budding ideology of alter-globalism, it is still an ideology at an early stage of 
development when it comes to the decontestation of many things – as Paul Mason’s 
passage cited above reveals – including its position on world order.  
If we compare the alter-globalist discourse to the first phase of neoliberalism’s 
development discussed earlier then we can perhaps agree that the alter-global 
discourse already has gone through its equivalent to the neoliberals’ Colloque 
Walter Lippmann – where all the main contributors during the ideology’s formative 
phase meet each other and start exchanging ideas – with the analogous development 
for alter-globalism being the institution of the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, 
Brazil, in 2001 (see: Fisher & Ponniah 2003, Mertes 2004, and; Waterman 2009).  
But as we will see in the following section it seems evident that the alter-globalist 
discourse still has not yet experienced the corresponding “Mont Pèlerin Society 
moment” which neoliberalism went through in 1947. We can recall from the earlier 
chapter on neoliberalism that this represents a decisive event in the development of 
neoliberalism where crucial parts of the discourse were crystallized or decontested, 
and the discourse properly started taking on the shape of a fully articulated political 
program which aimed to replace the reigning dominant ideology (which at the time 
was an amalgam of social liberal/social democratic thought) and become the next 
dominant ideological force itself.  
Walden Bello has been an active participant in the alter-globalist discourse since its 
inception in the 1990s (see: Bello 2003, and; 2004). He has argued that the World 
Social Forum (WSF) should move from being ‘a site and space for the [alter-
globalist] movement to elaborate, discuss, and debate the vision, values, and 
institutions of an alternative world order built on a real community of interest’ and 
move towards developing ‘a strategy of counter-power or counter-hegemony’ (Bello 
2013: 244 and 247). What Bello argues for here is, in a similar manner to Harvey 
and Amin, to advance from an incipient ideological stage (such as the one 
neoliberalism experienced in the years between the Colloque Walter Lippmann and 
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the founding of the Mont Pelerin Society) and the start of a more politically active 
stage.  
In ideological terms this would for the alter-globalist discourse mean a commitment 
to the decontestation of core aspects of its ideational structure. Alter-globalist 
discourse is currently so loose that it can accommodate a very diverse range of 
positions, and this has been seen as one of its core strengths. But some positions 
within such a loose discourse are bound to be contradictory. Coherence is after all 
steadily more pronounced within a discourse the closer you get to the absence of 
contradictory tendencies. Too much incoherence within the discourse is a state of 
affairs that is untenable if the alter-globalists want ‘to move into spaces of power at 
the local, national, and regional levels’ as the Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez 
advised World Social Forum delegates in 2006 to do (as cited in Bello 2013: 247). 
We can note here that for the alter-globalists to start following advice from someone 
like Chávez would be tantamount to the acceptance of certain Old Left principles 
when it comes to political organization. But for Bello the question Chávez’ 
suggestion gives rise to is nonetheless whether or not:  
…the WSF still [is] the most appropriate vehicle for the new 
stage in the struggle of the global justice and peace movement? 
Or having fulfilled its historic function of aggregating and 
linking the diverse counter-movements spawned by global 
capitalism, is it time for the WSF to fold up its tent and give way 
to new modes of global organization of resistance and 
transformation (Bello 2013: 248)?  
Bello, as we have seen is not alone in wondering if the step towards a more cohesive 
organization should be taken. Bello comes close to the Western Marxists here, but 
this is not the only faction within the alter-globalist discourse which has started 
thinking about how to achieve a more coherent organization.  
Participatory Democracy (Local) 
  On the anarchist side of the alter-globalist discourse Michael Albert has argued that 
the World Social Forum, to fulfill its main function as being exactly a forum, should 
strive ‘to be as broad and diverse as possible’ (Albert 2009: 369). But this did not 
for Albert preclude the creation of other ‘networks or movements of movements’ 
that ‘share sufficiently their political aspirations to work closely together’ provided 
that they ‘exist alongside rather than instead of the Forum phenomenon’ (Albert 
- 224 - 
2009: 369, emphasis in original). Clearly the forum approach initiated with the 
creation of the World Social Forum had both its uses and limitations. Aware of both, 
Albert on Valentine’s Day 2012 launched the International Organization for a 
Participatory Society, or IOPS for short (IOPS 2015a). Albert apparently did not do 
this in an effort to replace the WSF, but to harness some of the energies within it and 
direct them towards a common goal or “political aspiration” as he put it. 
Albert has been one of the more inventive theoretical contributors to the alter-
globalism discourse over the years (see: Albert 2003, and; 2014), but his attempt at 
creating a “Mont Pèlerin Society moment” for the alter-globalist discourse appears 
at the time of writing to have failed. The effort is nonetheless noteworthy because it 
indicates that the alter-globalist discourse is influenced by the same ideological 
dynamics as have been described above. That it failed also tells us something about 
the theoretical shortcomings alter-globalist discourse perhaps has to own up to 
before it possibly might form a sound basis for creating a global ideology with mass 
appeal. 
Anyone on the planet with access to the internet could become a member of the 
IOPS as long as they were willing to create a profile on the organization’s website, 
and presently the still operative IOPS has 3,684 members from all over the world 
(its easily navigable membership list is also open to everyone, see: IOPS 2015b). 
Within two months of the launch of the IOPS in 2012 it had attracted the support – 
and membership – of the following influential alter-globalist thinkers and activists; 
Noam Chomsky, David Harvey, Vijay Prashad, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Chris 
Spannos, John Pilger, David Graeber, and Saul Landau (see: IOPS 2015b). In 
September the same year Vandana Shiva, another notable alter-globalist theorist, 
also joined the organization (IOPS 2015c).  
IOPS was styled as ‘interim’ and was supposed to exist until ‘a founding convention 
when the membership will determine the organization's definition in more detail’ 
(IOPS 2015a). The 14
th
 of September 2014 Albert disappointedly conceded that the 
IOPS did not ‘grow sufficiently to achieve enough weight, or even to achieve 
enough diversity or resources to have a founding convention’ (IOPS 2015d). The 
organization was not disbanded, but the by then ‘3,500 tangentially involved 
members’ were not considered enough of a basis for ‘having a convention in a 
participatory or effective manner’ (IOPS 2015d). The organization still to this day 
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has a trickle of new members added to it every month, but it has obviously failed to 
take off and it did not turn into the collaborative, worldwide, mass-movement Albert 
probably had hoped to initiate (see: IOPS 2015b). Since the IOPS website is still up 
and running this might change at some future point, but here I assume that the 
reason it failed was because of some inherent inadequacies to the way the 
organization was presented. 
The reasons why Albert’s IOPS initiative did not turn into an ideological world 
party or force and failed to emulate a similar organizational trajectory to that of the 
neoliberals’ Mont Pelerin Society are likely numerous. IOPS had initially been 
supported by quite a few theorists central to the alter-globalist discourse who had 
agreed to be on the organization’s ‘Interim Consultative Committee’, abbreviated 
ICC (see: IOPS 2015e). One thing is that it takes a certain kind of individual to 
openly enlist as a member of a radical party on the internet. But mainly I suspect 
that this lack of general enthusiasm derives from several other sources. First hardly 
anyone except a core of very engaged activists had gotten word about the existence 
of the IOPS.  
One illustrative suggestion made by a commenter calling himself “Max H” – in 
regards to Albert’s announcement that there would be no founding convention 
anytime soon – was that the several profiled ICC members, such as ‘Chomsky, 
Shiva, Graeber, Pilger’, could try to ‘plug [i.e. promote] IOPS here and there as an 
example of a positive movement’ (IOPS 2015d). To this suggestion Albert 
responded: ‘I don’t think being on the [ICC] is actually all that relevant. I guess 
anybody that has any connection to them could ask about it. I haven’t succeeded. 
Noam [Chomsky] and Pilger related to queries for preferences [presumably 
regarding the founding convention], but not [G]raeber or [S]hiva’ (IOPS 2015d). 
Albert also admits that several theorists or persons central to the alter-globalist 
discourse, such as ‘Arundhati Roy’ and ‘Naomi Klein’, ‘were asked to be on the 
[ICC] but didn’t want to’48 (IOPS 2015d).  
                                                 
48 Other theorists that have been central to alter-globalist discourse besides Arundhati Roy and 
Naomi Klein who are not listed as members of the IOPS are for instance; Susan George, Alex 
Callinicos, Immanuel Wallerstein, Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri (see: IOPS 2015b, and; 
2015e). 
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Clearly Albert’s efforts to get the IOPS on a sound footing was both a more divisive 
and less successful undertaking than Hayek’s instigation of the Mont Pèlerin Society 
was for the neoliberals. The second and more important reason the IOPS did not 
work out very well is probably that Albert – apparently almost singlehandedly – had 
articulated a political program that in certain respects was very specific in its 
ideological orientation, and this one would need to sign up to if one would like to 
become a member (see: IOPS 2015f, 2015g, 2015h and 2015i). 
Albert’s big idea – and by extension that of the IOPS – is to replace capitalism with 
something he calls “participatory economics” or “parecon” for short (see: Albert & 
Hahnel 1991a, Albert & Hahnel 1991b, and; Albert 2003). Albert informs in an 
interview with Chris Spannos that the idea of parecon is built on ‘the anarchist and 
libertarian socialist heritage’ and ‘the most recent experiences of the New Left of the 
Sixties’ (Spannos 2008: 14). ‘Parecon’ means ‘most broadly classlessness’ but more 
specifically the term is meant to signify ‘a classless economy’ (Spannos 2008: 14). 
Parecon ‘is not capitalism, but it is also not an economy ruled by roughly a fifth of 
the population that monopolizes empowering conditions’ as Albert puts it with an 
obvious hint to the real existing communism of the 20
th
 century (Spannos 2008: 14). 
Albert goes on to explain that: 
The central features of the model called parecon are workers’ 
and consumers’ self-managed councils, balanced job complexes, 
remuneration for duration, intensity, and onerousness of socially 
valued labor, and participatory planning. I think these 
institutional features are to the parecon model what private 
ownership, corporate divisions of labor, remuneration for 
property, power, and output, and market allocation are to 
capitalism. You can’t have a classless economy without these 
features (Spannos 2008: 15).  
This typically anarchist idea of self-management was as Albert acknowledges first 
articulated by well known theorists of the libertarian socialist canon such as ‘[Peter] 
Kropotkin and [Rudolf] Rocker’ whose ideas of ‘mutual aid’ and ‘anarcho-
syndicalism’ prefigures those of parecon (Spannos 2008: 14 and 16, see also; 
Kropotkin [1902] 2006, and; Rocker [1938] 2004). Chomsky has been an advocate 
of a kind of anarchism which follows closely in the footsteps of both Kropotkin and 
Rocker more or less his entire life (e.g. Lilley 2011c: 237). So in an extreme 
simplification of the anarchist canon we could say that there is a line that goes from 
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Kropotkin to Rocker, via Chomsky, and to Albert. Albert’s theory should also be 
seen in connection with Carole Pateman’s classic study Participation and 
Democratic Theory where she not only notes the difference between ‘contemporary 
and participatory theories of democracy’ but also at length discusses G. D. H. Cole’s 
‘theory of Guild Socialism’ which shares similarities with e.g. Rocker’s and Albert’s 
theories (Pateman 1970: 43 and 35). What all these theoretical precedents to parecon 
have in common is that they idealize the smaller scale of the pre-modern era. 
Kropotkin saw the self-government of the village community, the medieval guilds, 
and federated cities, as the kind of close-knit organization we should try to emulate 
in the modern world (Kropotkin [1902] 2006: 204-205). This was because these 
forms of political organization were much more inclined to come to the aid of its 
members than ‘the centralized State’ was considered to be by Kropotkin (Kropotkin 
[1902] 2006: 206). Kropotkin argued that when the modern state first started to 
develop it saw guilds and similar forms of organization as competing forms of 
political organization and because of this the state sought to sever the strong, pre-
existing, bonds that kept these together, which in the end meant that the state 
successfully replaced such organizations based on ‘mutual aid’ with ‘loose 
aggregations of individuals’ that could be more easily controlled (Kropotkin [1902] 
2006: 204-206). This Kropotkin and those that followed in his footsteps has wanted 
to reverse.       
What distinguishes these participatory theories of democracy from contemporary 
state centric theories of democracy is according to Pateman that for participatory 
theory the ‘existence of representative institutions at national level is not sufficient 
for democracy’ because this does not come close enough to self-governance to 
properly emancipate the individual (Pateman 1970: 42). The requirement for 
emancipation to happen is that ‘democracy must take place in other spheres’ so ‘that 
the necessary individual attitudes and psychological qualities can be developed’ 
(Pateman 1970: 42). The most important “other sphere” than the national one 
extolled by contemporary democratic theory is according to participatory theory at 
one’s place of work; ‘most individuals spend a great deal of their lifetime at work 
and the business of the workplace provides an education in the management of 
collective affairs that is difficult to parallel elsewhere’ (Pateman 1970: 43). In this 
way ‘spheres such as industry [i.e. the site of work] should be seen as political 
systems in their own right, offering areas of participation additional to the national 
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level’ (Pateman 1970: 43). And it is only if a polity is democratic from bottom to top 
that it should be considered properly democratic for participatory theory; ‘for a 
democratic polity to exist it is necessary for a participatory society to exist, i.e. a 
society where all political systems have been democratized and socialisation through 
participation can take place in all areas’ (Pateman 1970: 43).  
This bottom-up democracy seeks a reorientation away from the national to the local 
level, but unlike Kropotkin and some of his closer followers contemporary 
advocates such as Albert does not appear to have fully the same animosity towards 
the state or the national level (see: Albert 2014: 60). Contrary to the earlier 
anarchists Albert takes much of his inspiration from, he apparently thinks this form 
of democratic devolution to the local level easily can coexist with the national, or 
nation-state, level. The state or the state-system does not figure high on Albert’s list 
of obstacles to introducing ‘global justice instead of capitalist globalization’ since 
‘the problem isn’t international relations per se’ it is rather ‘that capitalist 
globalization alters international relations to further benefit the rich and powerful’ 
(Albert 2014: 60). 
The problem as Albert sees it is that ‘capitalist globalizers try to disempower the 
poor and already weak and to further empower the rich and already strong’ (Albert 
2014: 55). They have succeeded in ‘reduc[ing] the influence of whole populations, 
and even of state leaderships, save for the most powerful elements of Western 
corporate and political rule’ (Albert 2014: 56). Albert proposes that the currently 
troublesome international organizations that impose capitalist globalization on the 
world – i.e. the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade 
Organization so often singled out in alter-globalist discourse – should be replaced by 
a range of similar organizations which Albert calls ‘an International Asset Agency, a 
Global Investment Assistance Agency, and a World Trade Agency’ (Albert [2006] 
2014: 58). The main difference being that their mandate would not be to promote 
capitalist globalization, but instead to promote something along the lines of ‘the 
equity, diversity, solidarity, self-management, and ecological balance that activists 
favor’ (Albert 2014: 56).  
Albert’s suggestion resembles Nussbaum’s concentric circles idea of a world polity 
because these organizations would all ‘gain their credibility and power from an array 
of arrangements, structures, and ties enacted at the level of citizens, neighborhoods, 
- 229 - 
states, nations and groups of nations on which they rest’ (Albert 2014: 60). We can 
see that the national-international imaginary weighs heavily on Albert’s thinking 
here with his mention of “nations and groups of nations” as central constitutive units 
of his ideologically different (anti-capitalist and participatory democratic) but 
imaginary close to identical vision (the focus on the lower levels differ, but in the 
global sphere Albert still expounds a national-international worldview) of what a 
world ruled according to the tenets of alter-globalism should look like. Nations and 
international organizations prefigure in Albert’s ideal world order, but they would be 
ideologically anti-capitalist and cease to be the handmaidens of capital which they 
are presently recognized as being in the discourse. Economically Albert’s suggestion 
is a (very) radical one, but world politically speaking it is important to note that it is 
a reformist international rather than a planetarist radical vision he offers. Albert and 
the IOPS’s continued reliance on the national imaginary is further evident by the 
part of the IOPS’s organizational vision entitled “International” reproduced here:      
The organization seeks new international relations such that:  
 international institutions put an end to imperialism in all 
its forms including colonialism, neo colonialism, neo 
liberalism, etc.  
 international institutions are internationalist in that they 
diminish economic disparities in countries’ relative 
wealth. 
 international institutions protect cultural and social 
patterns interior to each country from external violation. 
 international relations facilitate international 
entwinement and ties as people desire, and thus 
internationalist globalization in place of corporate 
globalization (IOPS 2015g). 
It is clear that Albert (and the IOPS) does not see internationalism as a problem that 
in any substantial way explains neoliberal domination, to the contrary the idea is that 
the international state-system is an ideologically neutral background that on its own 
is unproblematic, but which has been momentarily hijacked by the neoliberals. 
Albert does not entertain the thought that neoliberalism has been allowed to become 
dominant thanks to the democratic deficiency that is a core characteristic of the 
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nation-state system at the international level. With this uncritical view of the 
national imaginary as a natural and perhaps unavoidable concentric circle it is not 
surprising that Albert apparently had no qualms with calling his organization the 
International Organization for a Participatory Society. Strangely for someone this 
preoccupied with democracy at the lowest levels there is no mention of global 
democracy replacing international relations in Albert’s vision. The closest you get is 
this: ‘If the whole world has participatory economics, then nothing structural 
prevents treating countries like one might treat locales – neighborhoods, counties, 
[US] states – within countries’ and from this it follows that ‘there is no structural 
obstacle to approaching the production side similarly, seeing the world as one 
entwined international system’ (Albert 2014: 64, added emphasis). Vandana Shiva, 
who as mentioned above became a member of the IOPS in September 2012, has a 
similar notion of the ideal political arrangement to Albert’s even though she calls it 
‘Earth Democracy’ (Shiva 2005). Characteristically for this strain of the alter-
globalist discourse Shiva’s envisioned Earth Democracy is also economically 
radical, but at best world politically reformist. Earth Democracy is an idea that by 
the name of it appears to be a planetarist notion, so it is worth looking into if this 
differs in any substantial way from Albert’s on the issue of world order.  
Shiva’s Earth Democracy is founded on a localized economy paired with an equally 
local democratic political setting: ‘Earth Democracy is based on vibrant local 
economies, which support national and global economies’ and ‘Earth Democracy is 
based on local democracy, with local communities – organized on principles of 
inclusion, diversity, and ecological and social responsibility – having the highest 
authority on decisions related to the environment and natural resources and to the 
sustenance and livelihoods of people’ (Shiva 2005: 10). The mention of “national 
and global economies” is an indication that Shiva does not really think in terms of a 
planetary democratic polity when she employs her concept of “Earth Democracy”. It 
is closer aligned to Albert’s notion of a localized democracy that is freed from 
centralized control in many respects, but which does not entirely dismiss the need 
for maintaining the national and international level for addressing certain issues. 
Shiva writes that: ‘Authority is delegated to more distant levels of governments on 
the principle of subsidiarity’ (Shiva 2005: 10-11). This Shiva asserts simultaneously 
as she claims to be in support of a: ‘Living democracy that grows like a tree, from 
the bottom up’ that is typical of the participatory position and this stance she 
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apparently cements with claiming that ‘the foundation of Earth Democracy’ is ‘self-
rule and self-governance’ presumably on the  community level (Shiva 2005: 11).  
The problem is that once Shiva introduces the idea of subsidiarity the whole Earth 
Democracy program she elucidates is in danger of being turned upside down. 
Following the principle of subsidiarity means that a political issue ought to be 
addressed at the lowest level where it can be solved and no higher than that (see: 
Føllesdal 1998). As Shiva puts it; ‘things are most effectively done at the level 
closest to where the impact is felt’ (Shiva 2005: 64). But Shiva does not point out 
that following the principle of subsidiarity for the solution of problems might only 
lead to local empowerment ‘unless allocating them to a higher-level central unit 
would ensure higher comparative efficiency or effectiveness in [solving] them’ 
(Føllesdal 1998: 190). With this in mind one could imagine how quickly such things 
as economic and environmental decisions – whose repercussions easily can be 
portrayed as being ultimately and in aggregate global in scope – could fall out of 
local hands, and that the locals would in the end be left with much more mundane 
matters to decide on. Subsidiarity in this sense can fast become a two-way street. 
But for Shiva ‘the principle of subsidiarity’ is seen as ‘an ecological imperative’ that 
when employed to empower the local level would lead to a better world: 
Devaluing the role of natural resources – in ecological processes 
and in people’s sustenance economy – and the diverting and 
destroying of these resources for commodity production and 
capital accumulation are the main reasons for the ecological 
crisis and the crisis of survival of the Third World. The solution 
lies in giving local communities control over local resources so 
that they have the right, responsibility, and ability to rebuild 
nature’s economy, and through it their own sustainability (Shiva 
2005: 164). 
How this process is supposed to work is worth discussing. Shiva presupposes a 
whole range of occurrences here, with probably the chief one being that some larger 
political entity such as the state must first relent on its claim to rule in many matters 
that affect the local level so that these local communities can gain the level of 
control that will allow them to become the kind of effective units needed to solve the 
whole ecological conundrum. It is also implicit in Shiva’s argument that there will 
be no transnational corporations operating in this environment with promises of vast 
earthly riches in exchange for industrially extracting the resources the local 
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community happen to be in control of. It would certainly empower local 
communities to have the sort of private funds allocated to them that now are mostly 
reserved for larger political units, but it would do very little to the overall 
environmental impact those very same company operations has if these are allowed 
to continue under the auspices of a local rather than a national level of government. 
Shiva does also not assume that the empowered local communities can be allowed 
complete autonomy in economic matters even though she envisions ‘living 
economies’ that ‘are primarily local and decentralized, in contrast to the dominant 
model, which is global and centralized’ (Shiva 2005: 64). The local and 
decentralized political units Shiva argues for are in fact only semi-autonomous. This 
we can see because Shiva’s living economies are supposed to be ‘grounded by two 
ecological principles necessary to protect and restore nature and society that free 
market economists have resisted implementing’ (Shiva 2005: 65).  
The two ecological principles are the ‘precautionary principle’ and the ‘polluter pays 
principle’ and according to Shiva the first ‘calls for not undertaking activities that 
could cause ecological harm’ while the second ‘requires that the polluter must pay 
for any harm done to nature and society and for the costs of cleanup’ (Shiva 2005: 
65). If these principles were enshrined in law and diligently enforced globally it 
would probably mean the end for the vast majority of the world’s industrial 
conglomerates, for not many modern products can be produced without for instance 
using raw materials whose sourcing caused some level of ecological harm. This 
however is not the main issue with Shiva’s Earth Democracy which is not exactly 
focused on saving capitalism, the main issue is that the local democracy she puts in 
prime position would clearly not be the autonomous participatory democratic units 
Shiva argues for in any proper sense, but would likely have to stringently follow 
what amounts to global constitutional principles.  
Global constitutional principles are not by themselves necessarily a Bad Thing, quite 
to the contrary they might be essential devices if one wants to pursue the creation of 
a functioning global polity, but there is something a bit disingenuous about 
emphasizing localized democracy to the degree Shiva does when she in the same 
text in practice ends up allocating the core responsibilities to the global plane after 
all. Earth Democracy for Shiva does not even mean that the present roles of 
corporations and intergovernmental institutions would be replaced by a global 
democratic structure, it just means that they would have to take environmental 
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concerns fully into account: ‘In Earth Democracy the responsibility of resolving the 
climate change problems would be on the companies – and their CEOs’ and; ‘The 
responsibility of governments and intergovernmental agreements would be to ensure 
that production and consumption patterns operate within sustainable cycles’ (Shiva 
2005: 65-66). Why there still would be companies with CEOs in a world of 
localized economies Shiva does not get into, and why the central control by 
governments and intergovernmental institutions is necessary when you have 
responsible local units is not something she properly explains either. Shiva is clearly 
aware that she elevates the role of the local community over that of the state and the 
corporations with her theory. But even if Shiva would like to see local communities 
take over the role of the state in an effort to regain some of the power people lost to 
corporations when these started dictating policy instead, she has not followed 
through fully on the consequences this might have for the constitution of a world 
order aligned with her new political base units (see Shiva 2005: 85-87). For one 
thing, in a hypothetical scenario where every human community on the planet 
becomes a local participatory democracy following the tenets of Earth Democracy, 
both states and corporations would have become redundant and any higher 
centralized political or economic control would be unnecessary. This utopian end-
point is at present absolutely rather than relatively utopian, at least as presented by 
Shiva since she does not explain how you get from the present to the desired goal. 
Why for instance would the state(s) and the corporations accept this new 
arrangement, which obviously would weaken these organizations’ status 
dramatically? How is the relatively tiny base units Shiva along with Albert promotes 
supposed to keep the state and the corporations from doing what the people in 
charge of these comparatively much more resourceful organizations desire? I think it 
is safe to say that the world political dimension has not been given nearly as much 
thought here as the local dimension.  
In conclusion; Albert, Shiva, and other associates on this side of the alter-globalist 
discourse, such as notably Noam Chomsky, have expressed a desire for participatory 
democracy and participatory economics that follows the ethos of liberation from 
domineering structures; especially as a means of countering the undesirable 
structural imperatives that arise from close cooperation between the state and 
capitalist enterprise. This comes straight from the New Left of the late 1960s that 
made “participatory democracy” one of its core tenets when it rearticulated what 
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was primarily earlier anarchist or libertarian socialist thought (see: Sargent 1972: 
97-114). Michael Albert tried to build something close to an alter-globalist party on 
this participatory basis. But it seems like Albert’s attempt at creating a participatory 
version of the neoliberals’ Mont Pelerin Society for the internet age with IOPS 
failed to accomplish the decontestation of alter-globalism’s view on world order. If 
that task on the other hand had been solved successfully it appears like that 
decontestation would have gone in favor of a kind of internationalism that is in line 
with the national imaginary and not a planetarism which is in line with the global 
imaginary.  
Albert’s parecon is a radical suggestion aimed at changing capitalism from the 
bottom up and Shiva presents a similar idea with her Earth Democracy, but in both 
instances as the theory is sought applied further up in the system it becomes 
exceedingly less radical until it ends up almost completely mirroring the present 
structural arrangement at the international level, just that the ideological content 
differs. This is probably not the best ideational foundation to base a counter-
hegemonic ideology on, since as we saw in the chapter on neoliberalism the 
corporate core supporters of that ideology thrive economically on the maintenance 
of the present international framework with its multiple jurisdictions. If the alter-
globalists in time were to end up gathering for the founding convention proposed by 
Albert, it might be preferable to do so with a less specific ideological take as its 
basis for discussions. The economic radicalism of Albert and Shiva’s proposals 
might be overcomplicating things by presuming that one should start with changing 
the economy from the bottom up, and then expecting the political apparatus to 
somehow adjust to this. This follows Marx’ idea that political ideologies are a direct 
results of a society’s at any time prevalent economic arrangements, but the lesson of 
both the neoliberals’ success and the Soviet Union’s demise have been that if you 
change the political parameters then the economy will adjust to the overarching 
ideological direction by either expanding or contracting. But it is arguably an irony 
of ironies that in a movement with such pronounced ideological diversity it has 
come to the anarchist wing – who in principle abhor hierarchical organization – to 
try to arrange a worldwide party. Let us now see what alternative ideological bases 
other than participatory democracy/economics there is to be found within the alter-
globalist discourse, if any. In theory just about any other political tendency than the 
anarchist one should come with an improved ideological basis for the creation of a 
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political organization capable of working within the legal framework of the present 
political system.  
Participatory Democracy (Federal) 
  The last of the ideological sub-strains making up the alter-globalist discourse is a 
rearticulated version of communism that has been most fully developed in Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri’s trilogy Empire (2000), Multitude (2004), and 
Commonwealth (2009).49 What they themselves have chosen to call their ideological 
strain is not that important here, but let it suffice to say that Hardt & Negri’s version 
of communism does not have much in common with the real existing socialism that 
was practiced in the twentieth century. It follows more closely in the New Left 
tradition where both Leninism and Old Left tendencies towards centralization were 
perceived as anathema to its way of rearticulating left politics. The argument as set 
out in the theoretical behemoth their trilogy is when taken in combination, which 
then totals out at nearly 1,500 pages, cannot be done justice to here – although I try 
to briefly summarize some central elements below. Instead I will focus on Hardt and 
Negri’s suggestions for how to advance the alter-globalist cause at the global level 
and what exactly they see this as being. Marxists with ideas more inspired by the 
ways of the Old Left, such as the aforementioned Samir Amin and Michael Löwy, 
have suggested that the time might be ripe for the creation of a Fifth International. 
Hardt and Negri in contrast want the alter-globalists to start thinking beyond the 
confines of twentieth century left politics. But before we can address Hardt and 
Negri’s proposal, we have to get a grip on how these two theorists conceive of the 
present global political terrain. 
Throughout their theoretical trilogy Hardt and Negri argue that we can make sense 
of current world politics in the following manner; the global realm is ruled by a 
‘network power’ they term ‘Empire’ which is composed of ‘an oligarchy of diverse 
political and economic bodies, including international institutions, the dominant 
nation-states, multinational corporations, continental and regional alliances, and so 
forth, which collaborate to create an open, constituent process’ (Hardt & Negri 
2000, 2004: xii, and; 2009: 226). “Constituent process” here means that these 
diverse forces together create an ad hoc world constitution (see: Hardt & Negri 
                                                 
49 In addition there is the almost pamphlet sized book Declaration (Hardt & Negri 2012) that 
functions as an addendum to this trilogy.  
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2003: 118). There is a minimum of democratic input to this process since ‘Empire is 
also democratic in the sense that it claims to represent the global people, although [ ] 
this claim is largely illusory’ (Hardt & Negri 2003: 110). This Empire is not in any 
conspiratorial manner in complete control of the world polity: ‘Capitalist 
globalization – the world market, the distribution networks, the linked productive 
structures, and so forth – has advanced far ahead of the structures of capitalist 
power’ so we can infer that Empire rather is symptomatic of the fact ‘that there is no 
global state to regulate global capital the way the nation-states regulated national 
capital’ (Hardt & Negri 2009: 274-275). There is instead a broad assemblage of 
forces that participate in regulating the terms of exchange and so on in the global 
realm, where everyone with something substantial to offer can take part. If you are 
not part of the regulatory process, you are not in a position to allocate any 
preferential treatment that follows from it your way either, so this relatively open 
process attracts all and sundry of the world’s global players who wants “a piece of 
the action”. There is no pretense to equality in this ad hoc constellation, Hardt and 
Negri’s conception of Empire is power politics pure and simple – provided that we 
recognize “power” as something that can come in a wide variety of shapes and sizes 
(e.g. Mann 2013). Together these groups form a hierarchy where the most powerful 
naturally occupy the upper echelons. 
The hierarchy goes as follows; first there is the level of ‘monarchical control’ where 
the United States as the world’s most formidable power overall holds prime 
position, but where crucially ‘Washington cannot exert monarchical control over the 
global order, without the collaboration of other dominant powers’ (Hardt & Negri 
2004: 61). So the “monarch” or executive part of the arrangement Hardt and Negri 
call Empire is largely the United States, but it is not strong enough to act with 
impunity, or without for instance some level of support from NATO or other 
regional allies: ‘If the United States is conceived as the monarchical power on the 
world scene, then [ ] the monarch must constantly negotiate and work with the 
various global aristocracies (such as political, economic and financial forces)’ 
(Hardt & Negri 2004: 61).  
The aristocratic level is then the second tier in this hierarchy, and it includes 
basically every powerful faction on the planet from the ‘transnational or global 
capitalist class’ to the ruling classes of e.g. Russia and China that also includes those 
with ‘bureaucratic and party privilege’ (Hardt & Negri 2009: 276-277). Underneath 
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them all is a nether class without much formal power: ‘ultimately this entire power 
structure most confront the productive global multitude, which is the real basis of 
the network’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 61). This aspect of Hardt and Negri’s model 
developed from the second to the third installment of their theory centering on the 
Empire, as they had realized that the Empire does not actually confront the multitude 
itself as we will see below. 
Just as the ‘aristocracy’ continuously tries to ‘negotiate a more advantageous 
relationship’ with ‘the monarch’ in an effort aimed at ‘ensuring for itself a large 
share of the profits’ (Hardt & Negri 2009: 278) it also has to address the level 
beneath or the third tier, but that is not where the actual multitude resides, since “the 
aristocracy” deals with: 
…those organisms and institutions that claim to represent “the 
people” on the third, lowest level of the imperial pyramid. In 
some instances the political elites of subordinated nation-states 
masquerade as representatives of the global people, as do the 
various popes and imams of the major religions, but most often 
they are poor cousins of the aristocracy trying to get their share 
of the loot; in others the various NGOs and aid organizations are 
cast as representing the people (or at least their interests); and the 
dominant media, of course, are always happy to don the cloak of 
the voice of the people. This level of the imperial system is all 
smoke and mirrors, because in the end there is no adequate 
means of representation and no global people to represent. But 
the claims of representation nonetheless play an essential role. 
Specifically, with respect to the aristocracy, this third level 
affords mechanisms of mediation to contain the seething 
multitude (Hardt & Negri 2009: 278). 
We can read into this description that the multitude is not, in fact, part of the 
hierarchy of the Empire at all. It is merely falsely represented by the kind of 
organization that profits from occupying the role of the global people vis-à-vis the 
aristocracy, and beyond that also to the monarchical level, with it all being described 
as a shadow play to keep the multitude in check. ‘The three levels of the imperial 
constitution need one another and cannot function on their own’ as Hardt and Negri 
asserts, but this opens up the question of whether the multitude, or the fourth tier, is 
recognized by the Empire at all. This Hardt and Negri answers with a quotation from 
Spinoza: ‘So the reason why in practice [aristocratic] government is not absolute [ ] 
can only be this, that the multitude is an object of fear to the rulers, thereby 
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maintaining some degree of freedom for itself, which it asserts and preserves, if not 
by express law, by tacit understanding’ (as cited in Hardt & Negri 2009: 279, first 
set of brackets in original). This age old understanding between ruler and ruled, or 
the ruling class and its subjects, predates democracy but is nonetheless based upon 
an implicit minimal consent of the governed. Here Hardt and Negri might be 
accused of understating the multitude’s capacity for agency, since at least in the 
democratic countries whose elites take part in forming Empire there is a distinct 
possibility that someone outside of the aristocratic circle could get elected into 
power by the multitude itself. Power in numbers is after all formalized in today’s 
democracies in a way it was not during the reign of the ancien regime. But for Hardt 
and Negri we are currently witnessing ‘the collapse of the structures of 
representation’ due to ‘lobbies’, ‘the deafening imbecility of the media circus’, 
‘capitalist financing campaigns’, ‘the extinction of civil society’ and so forth (Hardt 
& Negri 2012: 25-27). All these are valid points, but the case might be a bit 
overstated nonetheless.   
Hardt and Negri registers that there is now an ‘enormous desire for global 
democracy’, and argues that the ‘global scale seems increasingly like the only 
imaginable horizon for change’ and ‘real democracy [seems] the only feasible 
solution’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 289 and 312). But at the same time they also point 
out that it is ‘illusory to repropose national models of democracy and representative 
institutions on a global scale’ which they claim that most contemporary proposals do 
(Hardt & Negri 2004: 307). The main problem with such proposals for a global 
representative body is for Hardt and Negri ‘the concept of representation itself’ 
where in one example they claim that ‘the representative function is clearly reduced 
to a miniscule level when one delegate represents 10 million voters’ (Hardt & Negri 
2004: 294-295). This would have been a sensible argument if the representative was 
given the task of representing 10 million people on a personal rather than on an 
ideological level, since an arbitrarily selected 10 million people would of course 
altogether represent the widest possible spectrum of diverse ideologies. But Hardt 
and Negri’s objection does not make as much sense if they all share the same 
ideology and voted for their representative on the basis that she or he shared theirs – 
since their political intentions are then collectively a close approximation to that of 
the representative (provided that the representative was being honest when standing 
for election). But Hardt and Negri’s main point is nonetheless that ‘the modern 
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concept of representation’ can be seen as outdated and that present conditions 
‘makes new forms’ of democracy ‘possible’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 295). On a 
skeptical note they also point out ‘the gigantism of such proposals. Global 
commissions, global institutions, and global agencies are not necessarily adequate 
solutions to global problems’ with the implication that these could perhaps be better 
tackled at lower levels in a similar vein to Shiva’s conception of subsidiarity noted 
above (Hardt & Negri 2004: 298, emphasis in original).      
When ‘traditional political thinkers and organizers on the left’ point out that ‘there is 
little ideology or centralized political leadership’ in the alter-globalist movement and 
that ‘until there is a party and an ideology to direct [it] there will be no revolution’ 
Hardt and Negri answers that ‘it’s exactly the opposite!’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 107). 
Their point is that: ‘These movements are powerful not despite their lack of leaders 
but because of it. They are organized horizontally as multitudes, and their insistence 
on democracy at all levels is more than a virtue but a key to their power’ (Hardt & 
Negri 2012: 107). Again we see the argument that there is strength in diversity: 
Furthermore, their slogans and arguments have spread so widely 
not despite but because the positions they express cannot be 
summarized or disciplined in a fixed ideological line. There are 
no party cadres telling people what to think, but instead there 
exist discussions that are open to a wide variety of views that 
sometimes may even contradict each other but nonetheless, often 
slowly, develop a coherent perspective (Hardt & Negri 2012: 
107). 
There might in other words be a consensus developing within the alter-globalist 
discourse, and according to Hardt and Negri it is not congregating on a coherent 
ideological alternative to neoliberalism. What they argue for is instead a 
convergence on notions ‘of a participatory democracy of the common’ (Hardt & 
Negri 2012: 84). “The common” is for Hardt and Negri a key concept that has at 
least certain global connotations; ‘we recognize the centrality of the common, that 
is, the earth and its ecosystem – the forest, the seas, soil, air, water, and so forth – as 
well as the products of social labor, including ideas, images codes, information, 
affects, and much more’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 95). What Hardt and Negri then 
mean when they call themselves “communists” is that they support a project of 
‘reappropriating the common’ for the multitude’s responsible use in common (Hardt 
& Negri 2009: 164).  
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Hardt and Negri point to the tendency amongst participants in the alter-globalist 
movement to organize into ‘assemblies’ where the ‘assembly form [ ] serves as a 
tool for creating a democratic legislative power in these movements among 
hundreds and sometimes thousands of participants’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 90). They 
also point to a similar historical precedent to that mentioned by Albert: ‘Workers’ 
councils constituted the central proposition of all streams of socialism that, contrary 
to the authoritarian currents, consider the primary objective of revolution to be 
democracy, that is the rule of all by all’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 90-91). And on a note 
very similar to Pateman’s description of participatory democracy Hardt and Negri 
assume that the ‘surest and most powerful way to generate democratic political 
affects is by practicing democracy’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 93). They are not entirely 
sure however, how these localized assemblies are going to cooperate at higher 
levels, and therefore argue that: ‘The key task of generating a new legislative power 
remains that of inventing a federalist form to extend political participation in 
decision making across the entire social terrain’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 92). Hardt 
and Negri’s concept of “federalism” is quite different from the usual one: 
By federal here we do not mean a central authority ruling over 
smaller political units such as states or provinces. Instead we 
understand federal in a more basic sense as an open, extensive 
relation among diverse political forces spread across the social 
terrain and not subsumed under an abstract, centralized unity. 
The shape of federalist organization as we intend it, in other 
words, is not pyramidal but horizontal and extensive. Such a 
federalism fosters the plural and process-oriented dimensions of 
politics (Hardt & Negri 2012: 89). 
Hardt and Negri claims that the ‘assemblies established in the encampments and 
occupied squares of 2011 spread power in such a federalist fashion’ (Hardt & Negri 
2012: 89). Hardt and Negri have been heavily influenced by the work of Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari (see: Hardt & Negri 2000: 415). Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of rhizomatic structure is relevant here, i.e. a biological term which 
originally describes an extensive root structure covering a large area connecting 
many individual plants or fungi who are nonetheless parts of that larger specimen. 
Hardt and Negri, using the internet with its ‘interconnected nodes’ and ‘no central 
point of control’ as an example of a rhizome, sees this as a ‘democratic model’ 
resembling ‘what Deleuze and Guattari call a rhizome, a nonhierarchical and 
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noncentered network structure’ (Hardt & Negri 2000: 299). If we imagine that the 
Occupy congregations that blossomed up in hundreds of cities all over the world, 
instead of occupying squares, had managed to take over the city halls of all the 
world’s metropolitan centers and started to run the cities as if they were part of a 
larger chain. Then we could in theory have had a horizontal global system of 
networked cities practicing participatory democracy up and running pretty quickly, 
assuming that each of the cities themselves were composed of a network of 
assemblies so that everyone could participate. But of course, Hardt and Negri means 
to say that the Occupy participants “spread [decision-making] power” amongst 
themselves, not that they had appropriated power over society and then started 
sharing it out evenly to everyone. Pacifist protests in the squares of the West might 
be a nuisance to Empire or whatever one calls the powers that be, but it is not a like 
for like challenge for political power that conceivably could end with the existing 
hierarchy being overturned. The problem with relying solely on a bottom up 
strategy, as we will now see, is acknowledged by Hardt and Negri in an almost 
underhanded fashion. 
First of all Hardt and Negri realize that if assemblies of the manageable size 
idealized by participatory theory are going to be in charge of important decisions 
this ‘raises immediately an objection regarding expertise’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 96). 
There is no doubt that ‘the common’ has to ‘be managed in order to be sustained for 
the future’ and that this ‘requires planning’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 95). The solution 
seems obvious: ‘knowledge and expertise of our social world have to be cultivated 
on the broadest scale’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 96). Hardt and Negri point out that: 
‘The politicians and financial moguls who today make decisions are not geniuses 
delivered to us from heaven’ and that therefore there should be ‘no reason to think 
that through education we cannot all become at least as expert as they are regarding 
our natural, social, and economic worlds in order to make informed, intelligent 
decisions’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 96). This might be true, at least to a certain extent, 
but in any case this makes the grassroots project of responsible bottom-up 
participatory democracy a long-term project. Perhaps long enough in duration for 
the neoliberal Empire to consolidate its position in yet unimaginable ways and finish 
off the last bits of pristine nature left on the planet.  
This concern with expediency brings us to the crux of the matter; because these 
‘patient constituent processes’ that gradually can become participatory democratic 
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assemblies capable of autonomous informed decision making in all matters they 
have to or ‘must be complemented by immediately acting counterpowers’ (Hardt & 
Negri 2012: 59). Hardt and Negri here almost completely changes tack from their 
more sustained argument and state that ‘what is clear are the urgent needs of 
humanity and the earth, and the incapacity of all existing powers to fulfill those 
needs’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 59). Someone have to step in and reverse the process 
before it is too late, but Hardt and Negri have absolutely no trust in the traditional 
parties of the left that more moderate alter-globalists such as George thinks it might 
be helpful to engage with and argue for a more radical change than parties following 
the Old Left tradition could conceivably lend themselves to (see: Hardt & Negri 
2012: 86-88). But this insistence on the need for a more immediate and active 
construction of a “counterpower” nonetheless opens the theoretical possibility for a 
strategic coalition of Marxists looking to institute a Fifth International or a similar 
party organization that could deal with party politics and the anarchists in the 
movement more concerned with achieving durable emancipation from the bottom 
up.  
Conclusion: Towards Alter-Globalist Ideological Coherence? 
  The anarchist David Graeber has suggested that one of the main differences 
between the Marxist and the anarchist approach to thinking about politics is that 
‘Marxism has tended to be a theoretical or analytical discourse about revolutionary 
strategy’ while ‘Anarchism has tended to be an ethical discourse about revolutionary 
practice’ (Graeber 2009: 373, added emphasis). Here anarchism, which ‘is primarily 
an ethics of practice’, insists that ‘one must embody the society one wishes to 
create’ while among the Marxists there seems to be a tendency to think that one can 
‘create freedom through authoritarian means’ (Graeber 2009: 373). Importantly, as 
Graeber mentions elsewhere, the anarchists insist on building ‘networks based on 
principles of decentralized, nonhierarchical consensus democracy’ and as Graeber 
explains these ‘new forms of organization are its ideology’ (Graeber 2003: 332). 
This means that the anarchists’ ‘ideology, then, is immanent in the antiauthoritarian 
principles that underlie their practice’ (Graeber 2003: 333).  
The caricature of the contemporary Marxists as being all insistent on the creation of 
a Leninist ‘vanguard party’ is getting tiresome for that faction of the alter-globalist 
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discourse; for instance Samir Amin thinks this ‘a destructive description’ (Amin 
2008: 40). The novelty of the present day radical left discourse, as compared to the 
Really Old Left (i.e. the 1
st
 International composition of anarchists, communists, and 
socialists) it harkens from, is that it no longer sees itself as existing solely for the 
promotion of the interest of the working class: ‘Capitalism has reached a stage in its 
development where its victim (its opponent) is no longer formed exclusively by the 
proletariat, whose labor it exploits, but by humanity as a whole, whose survival it 
threatens’ (Amin 2008: 33). This comingling of promoting; liberation from 
hierarchy, decentralization, and bottom-up democracy (primarily by the anarchists), 
and the notion that one of the worst aspects of contemporary capitalism, which is 
now going through its neoliberal phase, is that it is destroying the Earth (a notion 
shared by all participants in the discourse), makes a prospective return to Old Left 
politics in support of political centralization and industrialism seem very unlikely. 
This development was foreshadowed by the rise of the New Left in the 1960s, who 
pioneered so much of the political thinking we now find in the alter-globalist 
discourse that it is no wonder that the alter-globalists have been called ‘the “new 
new left” ’(Graeber 2003: 334).  
One of the biggest differences between the New Left and the alter-globalist 
discourse is that the latter is truly global in a sense that was not accomplished by the 
New Left, which despite being a worldwide movement had much less direct input 
from the Third World or what is now similarly construed as the global South (see: 
Graber 2003: 328-329). The focus on the need for sound ecological living within the 
boundaries of the planet’s capacities for natural regeneration has also intensified 
from the New Left to the alter-globalist discourse. This is if anything the most 
promising indication that the alter-globalist discourse represents a budding 
planetarist ideology – the global imaginary has here completely set aside the Old 
Left’s glorification of industrialism – but this planetary ecological awareness is 
hardly mirrored by any plans for global political structures.  
What we get instead is a series of vague and underdeveloped ideas about what could 
follow in the international sphere if for instance participatory democracy or a 
sustainable community based economy were to be implemented at the local level. 
Albert’s theory of “parecon” and Shiva’s theory of “Earth Democracy” are both not 
really able to bridge the aspirations for the local or community level with a 
convincing attendant projection of what consequences these plans would have for 
- 244 - 
the global level of politics. This they strangely assume would structurally remain 
more or less the same as it is today even if the scaffolding that currently supports it 
is removed, which is essentially what they suggest should happen at the local level.  
In a similar manner, albeit a bit more attuned to how international politics works in 
the present, Susan George also assumes that one could implement a Keynesian 
program of taxation and redistribution at the global level while simultaneously 
respecting the democratic autonomy of the nations it would affect, without taking 
into account that this compartmentalization of the world polity would make it likely 
that negatively affected affluent places would reject her proposed plan 
democratically. George’s plan probably requires a world state like entity for its 
implementation, but this she does not acknowledge, and instead she continues to 
support the concept of national sovereignty as exemplified in the title of her book 
We the Peoples of Europe (George 2008). Again we see a mixture of having an 
ethos aligned with the global imaginary being combined with the intellectual refusal 
to think politically beyond the confines of the national imaginary. This is very much 
a repetition of the cosmopolitan discourse where Kant and those inclined to follow 
in his footsteps had a tendency to display a universalistic morality combined with a 
defense of communitarian politics without seeing how this made their ostensibly 
universalistic ethos a form of posturing devoid of real political substance. It is a 
pretense to universalism that turns out to be specious. Their ethos is not 
universalistic, but in fact remains at the level of political loyalty nationalistic. This is 
not to say the democratic socialist/social democratic internationalist grouping Susan 
George’s theory is representative of is in the same political camp as the Chauvinistic 
nationalists one could find in for example the French party Front National. But this 
section presumably has yet to grasp what it would mean politically to follow through 
politically on moral universalistic aspirations. The alter-globalists in this position are 
therefore not as diametrically opposed to the nationalistic right as they might prefer 
to think they are. I am here taking into account that the alter-globalists are still 
positioned much further from the anti-liberal right than what the neoliberals assume. 
The Marxists are here both prescient and backwards at the same time. They at least 
have the political wherewithal to assume that mounting a counter-hegemonic 
political challenge might be a necessary step in the direction of achieving the goal of 
a world no longer ruled by  neoliberal tenets. However, the suggested method for 
this, the instituting of a new or fifth International shows that they have not taken to 
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heart all the lessons provided by the fall of the Old Left and the rise of the New Left. 
The advocacy for the institution of a Fifth International among some of them show 
that they are completely beholden to the national-international imaginary, as for 
instance when Samir Amin suggests ‘a new internationalism of the peoples’ (Amin 
2006: 163). Other participants in this side of the debate such as Leo Panitch and Sam 
Gindin seem to have realized that one has to move beyond this tired old formula, but 
they are not sure exactly what that means except a break with the Old Left mode of 
doing things that in various ways is supported by other Marxists such as Löwy and 
Amin. 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri reluctantly argues for what amounts to a synthesis 
between the Marxist and the anarchist (or participatory democratic) positions. 
Clearly they see the participatory democratic part of the alter-globalist discourse as 
the ethically superior one. But perhaps in tacit acknowledgment of their own 
position as the movement’s arguably foremost theorists, they see no other option 
than making it clear that creating a functioning participatory society is bound to be a 
time-consuming exercise. As a consequence of this the alter-globalists should also 
entertain the prospect of launching a more traditionally organized challenge to 
neoliberalism, because if time is of the essence then it will take too long to unseat 
the neoliberals purely by a long-term bottom-up challenge. They seem torn between 
the ethos of democratic participation, which animates the anarchistic side of the 
discourse, and the perception of impending social and ecological doom if the 
neoliberals are left in power, the latter a notion which overshadows much of, if not 
all of, the alter-globalist debate.  
The likelihood that we might be living the doomsday scenario already – since it is 
common knowledge within the discourse that the temperature of the planet is on the 
rise and that inequality between the richest and the poorest in society is widening – 
necessitates a course of action with a shorter time horizon: ‘You can’t create a 
democratic society in a world where the few hold all the wealth and the weapons. 
You can’t repair the health of the planet when those who continue to destroy it still 
make the decisions’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 101). But Hardt and Negri are very 
careful to advice caution, because one has to ‘recogniz[e] the brutality of state 
socialist planning’ in the past as well as that the ‘traditional left’ which remain today 
has little to offer (Hardt & Negri 2012: 86-88, and; 93). Another piece of advice, 
which it would seem Albert had taken to heart when he put plans for turning the 
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IOPS into a more solid organization on hold, was that: ‘The subject who prepares’ 
or tries to shape the discourse towards coherence ‘cannot be a vanguard or a cabal 
like the Chicago boys [i.e. the neoliberals] but must instead be a multitude’ (Hardt & 
Negri 2012: 103). The major problem is the following: ‘The rich won’t just give 
away their money and property, and tyrants won’t just lay down their arms and let 
fall the reins of power. Eventually we will have to take them – but let’s go slowly. 
It’s not so simple’ (Hardt & Negri 2012: 101).  
This ambivalence is typical of the alter-globalist discourse. John Holloway has 
famously stated that the alter-globalist movement should seek to ‘change the world 
without taking power’ (Holloway 2002). This succinctly sums up the position of the 
participatory democrats of an anarchist persuasion. The Marxist faction is 
understandably skeptical whether that slogan makes any sense at all, but it is 
nonetheless a truism in the wider alter-globalist discourse that the Old Left methods 
some of them still subscribe to must be abandoned once and for all.  
Hardt and Negri, who are some of the most reflective thinkers in the discourse dealt 
with here agonizes about whether to stay ideologically true to their conviction 
(which is participatory democratic more than anything else) or to support some of 
the Marxist initiatives that would require some kind of ideological consolidation just 
so that possibly the advance of neoliberal thinking could be halted and a more 
conducive climate for democratic experimentation could be created. In the end they 
do not want to either stop it or endorse it fully, but this might be the beginnings of a 
dual-track understanding between the anarchists and the Marxist/socialists in the 
discourse, where the former lay the cultural groundwork for the long-term and the 
latter starts the political fight in the institutional arena. Their utopian end-points do 
not differ significantly after all, but reaching them only requires that the Marxists 
yields to the anarchists at some future point when the maintenance of a state-like 
structure is no longer seen as a necessity. In the meantime the Marxist, or perhaps 
more properly, the political faction could create conditions more suitable for 
anarchist experimentation in exchange for support against right wing parties and 
tendencies. This is of course a projection of current tendencies, and the only thing 
that is safe to say regarding the alter-globalist discourse when it comes to its 
planetarist credentials is that it at the moment clearly is not planetarist in the way I 
have portrayed that ideal earlier.  
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Many of the Marxists and the socialists (such as e.g. Susan George) are outspoken 
internationalists and still think in terms of “peoples” like Kant once did. The 
participatory democrats or (eco) anarchists clearly have trouble thinking beyond 
internationalism in the global sphere as well. But even though the analysis of the 
discourse here undertaken confirms the thesis that the national-international 
imaginary still holds sway over most of the participants also here, there are clear 
indications that the global imaginary is on the rise – which again furthers the notion 
that we are in the midst of a turn from a national conception of our core community 
to a global one. More precisely this should be thought of as an awkward half-way 
point between the two where the general tendency is to think in global terms, but at 
the same time another general tendency is to see no other potential political 
solutions available than those that were prescribed by the national-international 
mindset much earlier.  
A democracy modeled on the rhizomatic structure earlier theorized by Deleuze and 
Guattari might be the desired end point, but it is unclear to say the least if this 
structure lends itself to unseating the powerful and then keeping them away from 
power until the world has been educated sufficiently to accept participatory 
democracy in full. It seems like there is one internal contradiction within the 
discourse that has to be resolved before it can decide in which direction to develop, 
and that is to decide what is most important; is it to effectively oppose neoliberalism 
or is it to try out new modes of organization?  
If it is to effectively oppose neoliberalism the creation of a party centered around an 
ideology could be the most efficient strategy. But yet suggesting that an ideology 
might be a necessary tool for realizing the alter-globalist project (presumably a 
rhizomatic democratic world society) is dismissed by Hardt and Negri as an 
undesirable centralizing tendency. Centralized authoritarian structures, especially 
with a Hitler or Stalin in charge of them, obviously have their pitfalls. But who says 
that the alter-globalists would need an extremely rigid hierarchical structure along 
the lines of for instance the former communist parties to function effectively as a 
political collective? Albert’s IOPS, despite its obvious faults, indicates that the 
internet might facilitate the creation of a global party, and perhaps also intra-party 
deliberation and consensus making, without the need for strict leadership. This is not 
the place to go into detail about how the IOPS idea could be improved; but clearly in 
this day and age most of the functions of a party headquarters could be moved 
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online. Not to say that the experimental, more genuinely anarchist part of the alter-
globalist discourse, would need to suffer as a consequence. This is where a dual 
track approach where experimentation is encouraged locally comes in, but alongside 
a somewhat more traditional approach at for instance the global level. Ultimately 
this approach is halfheartedly endorsed by Hardt and Negri. Such a synthesis of the 
alter-globalist discourse could potentially result in a planetarist ideology. But 
presently we are witnessing a wider discourse which has yet to crystallize around a 
common world order project. It perhaps never will, due to the widespread aversion 
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Conclusion: What the Planetarist Distinction Reveals 
About Contemporary Globalization Ideologies 
The globalizing trends are moving so rapidly in integrative 
directions, especially with respect to economic, environmental, 
and cognitive dimensions of reality, that it seems almost 
inevitable that some form of geogovernance will take shape 
(Falk 1995: 13). 
What is generated concretely will depend on the outcome of the 
three-cornered complex and interactive struggle to control the 
transition to geogovernance being waged by statist, global 
market, and transnational democratic forces (Falk 1995: 36). 
   Is there a planetarist ideology among the contemporary globalization ideologies? 
The conclusion has to be no, because at present none of the contemporary 
globalization ideologies are sufficiently developed to deserve to be designated a 
fully developed planetarist ideology. Within the different discourses there is 
insufficient awareness of or attention paid to which ideological aspects would fit a 
global polity and which ones would not. The current crop of “global” ideologies 
analysed here, namely; neoliberalism (also called globalism), cosmopolitanism, and 
alter-globalism, have not reached the development necessary – as identified in the 
theoretical discourses that constitute the backbone of these ideologies – for any of 
them to pose a serious challenge to the principle of national sovereignty that 
underlies the international (and by no means fully global) constitution of the present 
world order. These are in other words not consistently global ideologies in their 
current form. This is the study’s major finding.  
Taken together they do however have the resemblance of an emergent and coherent 
left-right continuum operating on the global plane. The coherence stops when it 
comes to world order perspectives however, unless one counts a commitment to 
current international institutions by the neoliberals, the liberal cosmopolitans, and 
the rightmost parts of the alter-globalist discourse. The neoliberals seems to support 
internationalism because they want weak organizations at the global level, while the 
cosmopolitans appear to have unrealistically high hopes about what such institutions 
can achieve given the history of such institutions. Here the alter-globalists that think 
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in terms of internationalism are pretty much in the same camp as the cosmopolitans. 
The different theoretical discourses that shape all of these ideologies have not 
properly figured out if they should promote a planetary polity, internationalism, or 
even a localism that in time could render global political rule superfluous. If 
anything it is only neoliberalism that has solved this ideological tension by seeking 
to avoid political globalization due to the regulatory potential inherent in a sovereign 
global polity.  
Of all the theories taken into account in this study as potentially planetarist only four 
seemed to fit the universalist criteria fully; Mises’ global universalism, Wells’ 
cosmopolitan utopia, Wagar’s elaboration of Wells’ designs, and Hardt and Negri’s 
rhizomatic network of participatory democratic “nodes”, and the latter is only 
universalist if we assume Hardt and Negri imagine that this structure would work on 
a global scale. In addition there were other approximations towards a universalist 
planetarist position in the cosmopolitan camp. This was most pronounced in the 
works of Marchetti and Cabrera.  
Mises global universalism only fits at the level of structure, since he advocates a 
global polity. It is debatable how emancipatory and enlightening his scheme could 
possibly be since Mises does not seem to want neither taxation nor any 
redistribution of wealth or anything else that could be perceived as socialist. 
Nonetheless Mises’ articulates a position that could be held by an economically right 
wing libertarian-capitalist planetarist party, but it would most likely have to be a 
party in opposition if the world polity was to have enough funds to function properly 
as a global political organ. 
Wells’ cosmopolitan utopia comes close to being the gold standard in planetarist 
thought in the twentieth century. Wagar builds on this and it is probably that strain 
of Wellsian theory we will need to further elaborate if a planetary polity is to come 
to fruition within the parameters of a modern world state in this or a later century. 
Both Wells and Wagar have a tendency to downplay the democratic scope of their 
ideal polities, but all told Wells is far worse than Wagar in this respect. Because of 
this it is doubtful if we can tick the box fulfilling the emancipatory criteria when it 
comes to their vision. But they both show a commitment to science that comes very 
close to appearing enlightening.  
- 251 - 
Hardt and Negri’s rhizomatic network of participatory democratic “nodes” which 
builds on the work of Deleuze and Guattari is by far the most contemporary 
planetarist vision put forward in the discourses discussed here. It brings forward 
images of a planet of independent neighbourhoods assembled together in 
autonomous cities interlinked in a global network without a center. Hardt and Negri 
shares a predilection for participatory democracy harking back to for example “guild 
socialism” at an earlier time with the more explicitly anarchist faction of the alter-
globalist discourse, and they do not really emphasize the global dimension this could 
have very much. But Hardt and Negri do put some more thought into it than the 
anarchists who for their part ended up imagining an international structure on top of 
the local councils they had envisioned.  
It is obvious that for the side of the alter-globalist debate Hardt and Negri has 
aligned themselves with there is no particular concern with overcoming present 
obstacles to realizing their long-term plans. Great powers, multinational 
corporations, and armed criminal organizations do not figure prominently in their 
plans. But if we take these figurative alpha males in the human community into 
account it appears as if the rhizomatic network might be an absolutely utopian idea 
for the time being. Perhaps after a general period of world pacification under a more 
centralized cosmopolitan political apparatus could the conditions become ripe for 
attempting something more anarchic like this. If anything this world order project 
gets full score for its envisioned level of emancipation. But taking into account the 
refusal to acknowledge that presently very powerful countervailing organizations 
work heavily against the realization of their plans, there is a close to delusional 
aspect to this world order perspective that should make it fail the enlightening 
criteria. 
The fault-line, with internationalism (grounded in nationalism) on one side and a 
true global universalism I here call planetarism on the other, has been the principal 
concern in this study. The red thread throughout this work is that this dichotomy, 
which is seldom grasped, has nonetheless been dealt with by a select number of 
theorists in each camp. The cleavage exists, but it is hardly being constructively 
dealt with at the moment. This can be inferred from what is in this context a 
confusing mixture of the terms “global”, “international”, and “cosmopolitan” which 
are broadly taken to mean the same. That confounding is a signifying trait of our 
present age and it erases from our vocabulary terms that otherwise could have been 
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used for describing a very substantial ideological difference between visions of a 
world built on nation-states (i.e. the current international world) and visions of a 
world that would transcend the world of nation-states and take the political 
organization of humanity to the next level (i.e. a future global or unitary planetary 
level).  
The problem with these discourses (excepting cosmopolitanism) is that I have been 
searching for an answer to a question they hardly address in the literature they are 
composed of, namely what is neoliberalism or alter-globalism’s world order 
perspective? For the cosmopolitans this is a central or core part of what the ideology 
is about, so discussions of this topic can be located frequently enough. The 
neoliberal discourse really puts its focus on economics or it addresses “societal” 
issues in so vague terms that it could be conceived of as meant globally, though it 
probably is not. This was the chief reason that I ended up concentrating on a period 
in the development of neoliberal discourse when the participants in it actually 
addressed the issue. Alter-globalism is more a band of ideologies than an ideology, 
but it has temporarily at least worked as a discourse where the participants take each 
other’s views into account from time to time. Its focus has been on local 
emancipation, but the contours of a radical world order perspective can nonetheless 
be discerned in it. 
Summary of the Argument 
  I have argued that a planetarist conception of politics that in theory would point 
towards a future planetary polity should now be under development due to the 
heightened global awareness of the threat of climate change, ecological degradation, 
and the fact that we have most likely caused a new geological epoch recently 
christened the Anthropocene with our industrialism. Coupled with a rise in the 
human population these converging trends spell, if not disaster, then a real challenge 
that perhaps is best met with a novel form of species government authorized 
democratically by the human populace. I set out three criteria for an ideal planetarist 
ideology, which was that it would have to be; 1) universalist or globally inclusive, 
i.e. planetary, 2) emancipatory or democratic, and 3) enlightening rather than 
delusional or deceptive. It is conceivable that ideologies of both a capitalist, 
socialist, and ecologist nature could fit within this relatively broad framework, but it 
would not have much room for nationalist, authoritarian, or religiously 
fundamentalist varieties. In addition the first universalist criteria removes what 
earlier was perceived to be the most progressive ideologies, such as socialist 
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internationalism or liberal cosmopolitanism (in the internationalist variety) from the 
equation. This is a deliberate operation to find out how consistently global (in the 
planetarist sense) the contemporary globalization ideologies currently are.  
Using the work of Martin Shaw and Manfred B. Steger I aimed to show that Shaw’s 
national-internationalism and Steger’s global imaginary came too close to describing 
the same phenomena to make Steger’s conception of the global imaginary 
particularly useful for this task, since global for Steger still comes too close to 
meaning international – even though the global imaginary is a concept which with 
some modification can do the job. But after modification the global imaginary no 
longer applies to the ideologies Steger identified as belonging to this category, so to 
make up for this shortfall I suggested adding a category of “international 
imaginary”. The modified global imaginary could then be applied to explain where 
an ideal planetarist ideology ought to belong, but not, as I was to find out, any other 
articulated ideologies except for a few theoretical outliers in a sea of primarily 
internationalist ideological conceptions. This then pretty much proved that 
globalism, cosmopolitanism, and alter-globalism largely are “old internationalist 
wine poured into a new set of bottles with shiny new labels” to paraphrase the old 
chestnut.  
There is no substantial ideological change behind the application of terms that can 
be associated with a universalist or “planetarist” stance. There are a few exceptions, 
or anomalies, to use the Kuhnian expression, that were identified along the way. But 
there were not nearly enough of these to declare that a paradigm shift had taken 
place. The most promising versions were mostly quite old too, so that is a further 
indication that we are not about to witness a planetarist movement take control of 
the Earth.   
 
The Main Findings and Claims to Originality 
  The main finding is that at the present time there are no planetarist ideologies 
available for the part of the world populace that have started to see the world in 
global rather than national terms. The global imaginary theorized by Steger has yet 
to result in the formation of a truly global or planetarist ideology. I have here argued 
that neoliberalism, rather than being a planetarist ideology, actually appears to work 
against political globalization because its adherents fear economic regulation at the 
global level. Instead the neoliberals, who in the interwar years were in favour of 
world order perspectives ranging from global universalism to international 
federalism, early after the Second World War seems to have settled on a limited 
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internationalism. This privileged the elites in the United States and their Western 
European partners and can be properly described as Atlanticism. In time this elitist 
internationalism expanded to include elites from other parts of the world, from for 
example Japan and Latin America, and later with the fall of communism, also the 
rest of the world. But crucially, except for a drive to penetrate markets around the 
world with the help of the creation of a global legal framework that does not 
threaten capital in any way, there are few signs that the neoliberal ideology promotes 
anything else than a limited economic internationalism that benefits (modern 
capitalist) elites worldwide. 
A realist worldview which I have claimed was primarily brought into the neoliberal 
discourse by Walter Lippmann in the late 1930s and early 1940s appears to have 
influenced the decontestation of the neoliberal world order perspective that 
happened around this time. A closer reading of Lippmann’s oeuvre indicates that 
this was far from the only influence his thought had on the formation of 
neoliberalism. If Lippmann’s work heavily influenced Hayek and other neoliberals 
in the ideology’s formative phase, which there is some reason to believe, the lesson 
one can take from Lippmann’s work is positively Machiavellian (in the negative 
sense of that word). For Lippmann recommended a program of public deception, 
operational secrecy, and enthusiastic institutionalization to ensure rule by the elite he 
saw as best equipped to rule well. The neoliberals appear to have followed this 
advice, especially (as can be most easily proved) when it comes to enthusiastic 
institutionalization. Further research is needed to find out exactly what Lippmann’s 
level of influence was in the early formative period, but this contribution does 
indicate that Lippmann’s work well could be considered one means to lift the veil on 
the neoliberal enigma. If deception really is a core part of the neoliberal ideology as 
my reading of Lippmann seems to make possible, then the ideology is most clearly 
not enlightening, but it is certainly substantial reason to claim that it is neither 
emancipatory nor truly global, or planetarist, in the form it took after its world order 
perspective was decontested in the latter half of the 1940s. The coupling of 
Lippmann to the (theorized) decontestation of neoliberalism’s world order 
perspective in the late 1940s is an original contribution (to my knowledge). 
The cosmopolitan discourse appears to be almost overwhelmingly a discourse 
centered on a specious coupling of moral universalism and political national-
internationalism grounded in the national imaginary rather than the global. This is a 
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strong claim, but one I have done my utmost to substantiate in the chapter. This 
critique of cosmopolitanism, in the manner it is done, could be an original 
contribution to both ideology studies and the cosmopolitan debate. 
A critique of the alter-globalist discourse’s world order perspective that includes this 
breadth has never been done before, and the findings concerning Albert’s IOPS have 
perhaps never been reported before, so this might be an original research 
contribution. 
Moreover, the three discourses of neoliberalism, cosmopolitanism, and alter-
globalism appears to overlap considerably when it comes to the issue of world order. 
Cosmopolitans arguing for a multilayered governance structure instead of world 
government are doing the neoliberals’ bidding when it comes to undermining 
attempts to create world law or sovereignty at the global level. Cosmopolitans that 
do favor an internationalism that amounts to the institution of world government by 
stealth come closer to sharing the same goals as the social democratic and Western 
Marxist factions of the alter-globalist discourse that would like to see global 
institutions capable of regulation of capitalism or even facilitating a transition away 
from capitalism. These groups together represent the most pressing challenge to the 
neoliberal ideological architecture today, but they have yet to realize this to any 
extent and unite in a left, but not radical, party. The radicals that form the third 
fragment of the world order perspective debate one can find in the most radical half 
of the alter-globalist discourse. Their project of participatory democracy and bottom 
up change is so long term that it does not really represent a political challenge as 
much as a cultural change that might grow in importance in the long run. On the 
basis of this I would predict that a fusion of right-cosmopolitan and neoliberal 
perspectives on the one side and left-cosmopolitan and socialist/Marxist 
perspectives of the other is the more likely outcome of a maturing of the ideological 
debate on world order perspectives. The long term goals of the radical alter-
globalists would most likely be best served by a tacit support of the latter grouping, 
so here we have a potential united left-liberal, social democratic/democratic 
socialist, ecologist, and libertarian anarchist alliance in global politics. But that 
requires that the anarchist faction and the socialistic one realize that they have 
different objectives that do not necessarily compete in the present global sphere of 
politics. It also means that the left-liberal cosmopolitans have to distance themselves 
from the neoliberal project which appears to be more elitist and authoritarian and 
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less globalist and democratic than the terms “neoliberalism” and “globalism” 
implies. This all means that the “planetarist” concept can be used to show fault-lines 
within all three ideological discourses, but in the case of neoliberalism the tension 
appears to have been resolved in the past. In the case of cosmopolitanism and alter-
globalism this “planetarist” and “nationalist/localist” cleavage indicates a future 
ideological split, and interestingly a fusion of the left cosmopolitan and socialistic 
sides of the two different discourses. To develop in this direction cosmopolitans 
must unload their neoliberal leanings and alter-globalists should stop thinking that 
participatory democracy is an idea that can compete in the global political sphere as 
it is presently constituted where corporations and nation-states currently operate 
with impunity and would have to be confronted by coherent alternative projects for a 
better kind of democratic world integration, that ideally is emancipatory and 
enlightening. 
Lastly, the whole idea of using a nationalist-via internationalist- to planetarist scale 
to measure the relative ideological positions on world order in the neoliberal, the 
cosmopolitan, and the alter-globalist discourse has not been attempted before. 
Vaguely similar attempts have been made to discuss these ideologies or theorists in 
the sense that they are part of global discourses by; Gary Browning (2011), Olaf 
Corry (2013), and Rafal Soborski (2013). But they do not employ the same 
theoretical framework I have created here or go nearly as in depth into the full range 
of theorists as I have done here. Their work can be useful companions to this for 
anyone interested in seeing how the contemporary debate on the global ideological 
discourse is developing, and whether or not I have developed it further or in other 
directions than they have. 
In sum this thesis has both contributed with the creation of new knowledge and it 
demonstrates the application of existing knowledge in a novel way.  
 
Future Prospects 
  This work can be utilized as a foundation for further articulations of ideal global 
ideologies. It can also be seen as a preliminary theoretical investigation for a 
normative work on planetarism as the opposite imaginary background to 
nationalism, since this work only begins to develop the concept so it can be applied 
to measure existing globalization ideologies. 
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